CR-Form-v7

CHANGE REQUEST

| ⌘ | **33.234** CR **037** | ⌘rev | **1** | ⌘ | Current version: | **6.2.1** | ⌘ |

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

Proposed change affects: | UICC apps⌘ | | ME **X** | Radio Access Network | | Core Network **X** |

Title: ⌘	Alignment of IPsec profile with RFC2406	
Source: ⌘	Siemens	
Work item code:⌘	WLAN	***Date:*** ⌘ 28/09/2004
Category: ⌘ **F**		***Release:*** ⌘ Rel-6

Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:	Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:
F *(correction)*	*2 (GSM Phase 2)*
A *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*	*R96 (Release 1996)*
B *(addition of feature),*	*R97 (Release 1997)*
C *(functional modification of feature)*	*R98 (Release 1998)*
D *(editorial modification)*	*R99 (Release 1999)*
Detailed explanations of the above categories can	*Rel-4 (Release 4)*
be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.	*Rel-5 (Release 5)*
	Rel-6 (Release 6)

Reason for change: ⌘	The current profile of IPSec ESP in section 6.6 of TS 33.234 contradicts the specification of IPSec ESP in RFC2406. RC2406 states in section 3.2: ìNote that although both confidentiality and authentication are optional, at least one of these services MUST be selected hence both algorithms MUST NOT be simultaneously NULL.î. An editors' note is removed.
Summary of change:⌘	(Message) authentication must not be switched off. Update of reference to IKEv2. Removal of editors' note.
Consequences if not approved: ⌘	Non-conformance with RFC2406.

Clauses affected: ⌘	2.2, 6.6

	Y	N		
Other specs affected: ⌘		X	Other core specifications	⌘
		X	Test specifications	
		X	O&M Specifications	

Other comments: ⌘	-

2 References

The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1]   3GPP TR 22.934: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Feasibility study on 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking".

[2]   3GPP TR 23.934: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; Functional and architectural definition".

[3]   IETF RTC 3748: "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)".

[4]   draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-12, April 2004: "Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)". IETF Work in progress

[5]   draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13, April 2004: "Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)". IETF Work in progress

[6]   IEEE Std 802.11i/D7.0, October 2003: "Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security".

[7]   RFC 2716, October 1999: "PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol".

[8]   SHAMAN/SHA/DOC/TNO/WP1/D02/v050, 22-June-01: "Intermediate Report: Results of Review, Requirements and Reference Architecture".

[9]   ETSI TS 101 761-1 v1.3.1B: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; Data Link Control (DLC) layer; Part 1: Basic Data Transport".

[10]   ETSI TS 101 761-2 v1.2.1C: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; Data Link Control (DLC) layer; Part 2: Radio Link Control (RLC) sublayer".

[11]   ETSI TS 101 761-4 v1.3.1B: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; Data Link Control (DLC) layer; Part 4 Extension for Home Environment".

[12]   ETSI TR 101 683 v1.1.1: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; System Overview".

[13]   3GPP TS 23.234: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System Description".

[14]   RFC 2486, January 1999: "The Network Access Identifier".

[15]   RFC 2865, June 2000: "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)".

[16]   RFC 1421, February 1993: "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures".

[17]   Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) draft standard: "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", November 2001.

[18]   3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing and identification".

[19]   IEEE P802.1X/D11 June 2001: "Standards for Local Area and Metropolitan Area Networks: Standard for Port Based Network Access Control".

[20]   3GPP TR 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[21]   3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".

[22]   CAR 020 SPEC/0.95cB: "SIM Access Profile, Interoperability Specification", version 0.95VD.

[23]   draft-ietf-aaa-eap-08.txt, June 2004: "Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application". IETF Work in progress

[24]   RFC 3588, September 2003: "Diameter base protocol".

[25]   RFC 3576, July 2003: "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)".

[26]   RFC 3579, September 2003: "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)".

[27]   draft-ietf-eap-keying-02.txt, June 2004: "EAP Key Management Framework". IETF Work in progress

[28]   E. Barkan, E. Biham, N. Keller: "Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptoanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication", Crypto 2003, August 2003.

[29]   draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-1~~4~~6.txt, ~~May~~ September 2004: "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol".

[30]   RFC 2406, November 1998: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".

[31]   draft-ietf-ipsec-ui-suites-06.txt, April 2004: "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec". IETF Work in progress

[32]   draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-09.txt, May 2004: "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets". IETF Work in progress

[33]   draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-algorithms-05.txt, April 2004: "Cryptographic Algorithms for use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2". IETF Work in progress

[34]   RFC 2104, February 1997: "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication".

[35]   RFC 2404, November 1998: "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH".

[36]   RFC 2548, March 1999: " Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes".

[37]   draft-mariblanca-aaa-eap-lla-01.txt, June 2004: "EAP lower layer attributes for AAA protocols".

6.6   Profile of IPSec ESP

IPSec ESP, as specified in RFC 2406 [30], contains a number of options and extensions, where some are not needed for the purposes of this specification and others are required. IPSec ESP is therefore profiled in this section. When IPSec ESP is used in the context of this specification the profile specified in this section shall be supported. Rules and recommendations in ref. [31] and [33] have been followed, as in case of IKEv2.

First cryptographic suite:

- Confidentiality: 3DES in CBC mode;

- Integrity: HMAC-SHA1-96. The key length is 160 bits, according to RFC 2104 [34] and RFC 2404 [35];

- Tunnel mode must be used.

Second cryptographic suite:

- Confidentiality: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode. The key length is set to 128 bits;

- Integrity: AES-XCBC-MAC-96;

- Tunnel mode must be used.

It shall be possible to turn off ~~security~~ confidentiality protection ~~(confidentiality and/or integrity)~~ in the tunnel ~~(for example high trust between the 3GPP network operator and the WLAN access provider)~~. This means that the transform IDs for encryption ENCR_NULL ~~and NONE for integrity~~ shall be allowed to negotiate, as specified in ref. [29]. Integrity protection shall always be used, i.e. the authentication algorithm [30] shall not be NULL.

For NAT traversal, the UDP encapsulation for ESP tunnel mode specified in [32] shall be supported.

~~Editor's note: An example of a profile of IPSec ESP, which may be useful to study when writing this section, can be found in TS 33.210, section 5.3. Future editions of this specification will define additional profiles.~~