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*Technical Report*

**3rd Generation Partnership Project;  
Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;  
3G Security;  
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA);  
System Description  
(Release 6)**

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Keywords

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## Foreword

This Technical Report has been produced by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

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
where:

- x the first digit:
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## Introduction

This section provides an introduction on the context of GAA and some clarification of this TR was written (with some reference to 3 related Technical Specifications).



**Figure 1: Schematic illustration of GAA**

A number of applications share a need for mutual authentication between a client (human user and/or device) and an application server before further communication can take place. Examples include (but are not limited to) communication between a client and a presence server (possibly via an authentication proxy), communication with a PKI portal where a client requests a digital certificate, communication with a content server, a BM-SC, etc.

Since a lot of applications share this common need for a peer authentication mechanism, it has been considered useful to specify a Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). This GAA describes a generic architecture for peer authentication that can *a priori* serve for any (present and future) application.

This TR can be considered as a framework document for the generic authentication architecture as is illustrated in Figure 1. GBA, AP and Certificates are building blocks of the GAA and they are specified each in a separate TS. How they fit together in GAA is explained in this document.

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# 1 Scope

This 3GPP Technical Report aims to give an overview of the different mechanisms that mobile applications can rely upon for authentication between server and client (person and/or device). Additionally it provides guidelines related to the use of GAA and to the choice of authentication mechanism in a given situation and for a given application.

To this end the TR puts the different specifications under the work item Support for Subscriber Certificates which are related to peer authentication, into perspective. It clarifies the logic for having three technical specifications, sketches their content and explains the inter-relation among these three TSs and their relation with this TR.

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# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.220: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture".
- [3] 3GPP TS 33.221: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates".
- [4] 3GPP TS 33.222: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using secure hypertext transfer protocol (HTTPS)".
- [5] RFC 2818: "HTTP-over-TLS."

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# 3 Definitions and abbreviations

## 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply.

**Subscriber certificate:** a certificate issued by a mobile network operator to a subscriber based on his/her subscription. It contains subscriber's own public key and possibly other information such as subscriber's identity in some form.

## 3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AKA	Authentication and Key Agreement
AP	Authentication Proxy

<u>AS</u>	<u>Application Server</u>
BSF	Bootstrapping Server Function
GAA	Generic Authentication Architecture
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
HSS	Home Subscriber System
NE	Network Element
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
SSC	Support for Subscriber Certificates
UE	User Equipment

## 4 Generic Authentication Architecture

### 4.1 GAA overview

There are generally speaking two types of authentication mechanisms. One is based on a secret shared between the communicating entities, the other one is based on (public, private) key pairs and digital certificates. Also in GAA these are the two options that are a priori available for mobile applications as is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: GAA schematic overview

### 4.2 Authentication using shared secret

There are several authentication protocols that rely on a pre-shared secret between the two communicating entities. Popular examples include HTTP Digest, IKE with pre-shared secret and a priori any mechanism based on username and password.

The main problem with these mechanisms is how to agree on this pre-shared secret. Section 5.2 and GBA TS 33.220 [2] describe how in a mobile context an AKA based mechanism can be used to provide both communicating entities with a pre-shared secret.


### 4.3 Authentication based on (public, private) key pair and certificates

An alternative to using shared secrets for authentication is to rely on asymmetric cryptography. This assumes that the entity that needs to be authenticated (one or both partners in the communication) possess a (public, private) key pair and a corresponding digital certificate. The latter validates the key pair and binds the key pair to its legitimate owner. Well-known protocols whose authentication is based on (public, private) key pairs include PGP and HTTP over TLS[5] (the later is commonly called by its protocol identifier, "HTTPS").

The main disadvantage of this type of authentication is that a PKI is needed and that asymmetric key cryptographic operations often require substantially more computational effort than symmetric key operations. Section 5.3 and SSC TS 33.221 [3] describe how a mobile operator can issue digital certificates to its subscribers (hence providing a basic PKI).

## 5 Issuing authentication credentials

### 5.1 Schematic overview



Note: Other mechanisms for issuing authentication credentials may exist but are out of scope for this TR.

**Figure 3: Illustration of mechanisms to issue authentication credentials**

Figure 3 illustrates the relation between this TR and TS 33.220 [2] and TS 33.221 [3]. There are on the one hand authentication methods that are based on shared secrets and GBA, described in TS 33.220 [2], specifies a mechanism to provide communicating parties with such a shared secret. On the other hand there are authentication methods that rely on (public, private) key pairs and digital certificates and SSC, described in TS 33.221 [3], specifies how to issue certificates to mobile subscribers.

### 5.2 GBA: Mechanism to issue shared secret

TS 33.220 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) TS 33.220 [2] specifies an application independent mechanism based on AKA to provide a client and an application server with a common shared secret. This shared secret can subsequently be used to authenticate the communication between the client and an application server.

### 5.3 SSC: Mechanism to issue subscriber certificates

TS 33.221 [3], Support for Subscriber Certificates, specifies a mechanism to issue a digital certificate to a mobile subscriber.

Once a mobile subscriber has a (public, private) key pair and has obtained a certificate for it, he can use the certificate together with the corresponding key pair to produce digital signatures in e.g. m-commerce applications but also to authenticate to a server (e.g. as in TLS).



## 6 GAA building blocks

### 6.1 GAA structural overview




Figure 4: Detailed overview of inter-relation of GAA building blocks

This section gives a high level overview of the content of the different documents under the WI Support for Subscriber Certificates and describes how these documents fit together in the Generic Authentication Architecture framework.

### 6.2 GAA

GAA refers to this TR which describes the general framework of the Generic Authentication Architecture.

### 6.3 GBA

As briefly indicated in section 5.2, GBA provides a general mechanism based on AKA to install a shared secret between a UE and a server.

AKA is a very powerful mechanism that mobile networks make use of. GBA takes benefit of this mechanism and re-uses AKA to bootstrap application security. GBA introduces a new network element (NE) called the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF). This BSF has an interface with the HSS. The UE runs AKA with the HSS via the BSF. From the resulting (CK, IK), a session key is derived in BSF and UE. An application server (called Network Application Function (NAF) in TS 33.220 [2]) can fetch this session key from the BSF together with subscriber profile information. In this way the application server (NAF) and the UE share a secret key that can subsequently be used for application security ([certainly for authentication but possibly also for integrity/confidentiality protection - although the latter two might not be strictly in the scope of GAA](#)). The communication between the UE and the BSF as well as that between NAF and BSF and between BSF and HSS are application independent and are specified in TS 33.220 [2].

The following argument lead to the introduction of this new NE (BSF):

- keep the number of different types of NEs as well as the total number of NEs that retrieve AVs from the HSS to a minimum.

One generic mechanism for different applications avoids a large diversity of mechanisms and allows to address security issues once and in a consistent way.

## 6.4 SSC

If a client wants to make use of asymmetric encryption technology, he needs a digital certificate that is created by a certification authority (CA). Such a certificate binds a public key to the identity of its legitimate owner and certifies the validity of the public key. If a mobile subscriber wants to have and make use of a (public, private) key pair, the key pair and a certificate should either be preloaded or the subscriber must have the means to either generate or obtain a key pair and dynamically obtain a corresponding digital certificate. As briefly indicated in section 5.3, SSC specifies a mechanism to dynamically issue a digital certificate to a mobile subscriber.

To dynamically obtain a digital certificate a UE must send an appropriate certificate request to a PKI portal of his home operator, and the PKI portal must authenticate the certificate request. The certificate enrolment process i. e. the issuing of a subscriber certificate and the corresponding communication session between a UE and a PKI portal is in fact an example of a mobile application. As many mobile applications it requires authentication of the communicating entities, in this case the UE and the PKI portal (the latter plays the role of the application server). As for any other application there are 2 options for this authentication: pre-shared secret based or based on asymmetric cryptography and certificates. The latter is only an option when a new certificate is requested from the PKI portal while another still valid certificate is already loaded in the UE. The former method requires a shared secret between the PKI portal and the UE. If the shared secret is not pre-configured, GBA can be used to obtain such a shared secret.

As indicated in Figure 4, the result of the process of issuing a certificate to a mobile subscriber which is described in the SSC TS 33.221 [3] is that the UE is loaded with a certificate corresponding to its (public, private) key pair. This is indicated by the green upward arrow.

Once the certificate is in place it can be used (together with the corresponding (public, private) key pair) to authenticate the UE. This is indicated by the black dotted lines that connect “certificates” to the underlying applications (HTTPS and SSC in Figure 4). The (public, private) key pair and the corresponding digital certificate can also be used for integrity protection (or less likely confidentiality) but these are not part of the scope of GAA.

## 6.5 Access to Network Application Functions using HTTPS

**Editor’s note:** An AS or an AP may force the UE to run GBA as specified in TS 33.220 or an AS may understand that the client request is already authenticated by an Authentication Proxy. Depending on the policy of the operator, an AS or an AP may also use alternative authentication mechanisms e.g. mechanisms based on subscriber certificates or authentication mechanisms specified outside of 3GPP if such mechanisms are at their disposal. It is therefore assumed that an AS and an AP should be able to take the decision what parts of GAA shall be used if any.

It is envisaged that HTTPS (or HTTP/TLS) may be used in a number of services to secure the application session between the UE and the application server (Ua interface in TS 33.220, see [4]). TS 33.222 describes the details of the possible authentication options when HTTPS is used between a UE and an application server. Any existing or future application based on HTTPS can refer to TS 33.222 for details on authentication and the set up of a secure HTTPS session.

### 6.5.1 HTTPS with Authentication Proxy

TS 33.222 (see [4]) describes a mechanism where a reverse proxy (called authentication proxy (AP)) is used between the UE and the AS.

The AP is the TLS end point and the UE shall be able to simultaneously connect to different ASs behind one AP. The AP shall be able to authenticate the UE using the means of GAA, and shall send the authenticated UE identity to the AS. If UE authentication is based on a shared secret then the AP acts as the NAF in the GAA architecture and terminology.

Possible advantages of the use of such an AP may include reduced consumption of authentication vectors, minimization of SQN synchronization failures and reduction of number of TLS sessions that a UE needs to set up and maintain.

### 6.5.2 HTTPS without Authentication Proxy

HTTP based application servers can also be deployed without the use of an authentication proxy. In this case the HTTPS (or TLS) session is between the UE and the AS. In this case the AS shall be able to authenticate the UE using

[the means of GAA. If UE authentication is based on a shared secret then the AS acts as the NAF in the GAA architecture and terminology.](#)

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## 7 Application guidelines to use GAA

### 7.1 Use of shared secrets and GBA

### 7.2 Use of certificates

## Annex A: Change history

Change history							
Date	TSG #	TSG Doc.	CR	Rev	Subject/Comment	Old	New
2003-10	SA3#30				New Draft TR: Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA)		0.1.0
2003-11	SA3#31				Text has been added to the introduction and to sections 1 to 6	0.1.0	0.2.0
2003-12	SP-22	SP-030582	-	-	Presentation to TSG SA#22 for Information	0.2.0	1.0.0
<a href="#">2004-01</a>	<a href="#">SA3#32</a>				<a href="#">Editorial changes plus additional reference</a>	<a href="#">1.0.0</a>	<a href="#">1.0.1</a>
<a href="#">2004-01</a>	<a href="#">SA3#32</a>				<a href="#">Text has been added to section 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5</a>	<a href="#">1.0.1</a>	<a href="#">1.2.0</a>