

3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#32
09 - 13 February 2004
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK

S3-040063

Title **Psecudo-CR to TS 33.220**
Source: **Nokia**
Document for: **Approval**

This short contribution proposes how to generate a Transaction identifier in a generic format, as well as unpre-dictable.

***** End of Change *****

4.3.2 Bootstrapping procedures

When a UE wants to interact with an NAF, and it knows that bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a bootstrapping authentication (see figure 4)

Editor's note: Zh interface related procedure will be added here in future development. It may re-use Cx interface that is specified in TS 29.228.

Otherwise, the UE shall perform a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation required message or a key update indication from the NAF (cf. subclause 4.3.3).




Figure 4: The bootstrapping procedure

1. The UE sends an HTTP request towards the BSF.
2. BSF retrieves the user profile and a challenge, i.e. the Authentication Vector (AV, AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK) over Zh interface from the HSS.
3. Then BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message (without the CK, IK and XRES). This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself.
4. The UE calculates the message authentication code (MAC) so as to verify the challenge from authenticated network; the UE also calculates CK, IK and RES. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both BSF and UE.
5. The UE sends request again, with the Digest AKA RES as the response to the BSF.
6. If the RES equals to the XRES that is in the AV, the UE is authenticated.
7. BSF generates key material Ks by concatenating CK and IK. Ks is used to derive the key material Ks_NAF. Ks_NAF is used for securing the Ua interface. [The Transaction identifier \(Tid\) value shall be generated in format of NAI with a hash value from User identity, the RAND value from step 3, and the BSF server name, i.e. Tid = f \(user_identity, RAND, BSF server name\)@BSF_server's_domain_name.](#)
8. The BSF shall send 200 OK message and shall supply ~~a transaction identifier~~ [the Tid](#) to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication. The BSF may also supply the parameter n used to determine the NAF_Id_n (cf.

previous bullet) to the UE over the Ub interface. If the parameter n is not supplied then no key derivation is performed, i.e. $K_s = K_{s_NAF}$.

9. The key material K_s is generated in UE by concatenating CK and IK. The K_s is used to derive the key material K_{s_NAF} . K_{s_NAF} is used for securing the Ua interface.

K_{s_NAF} is computed as $K_{s_NAF} = \text{KDF}(K_s, \text{key derivation parameters})$, where KDF is a suitable key derivation function, and the key derivation parameters include the user's IMSI, the NAF_Id_n and RAND. The NAF_Id_n consists of the n rightmost domain labels in the DNS name of the NAF, separated by dots ($n= 1, \dots, 7$). For $n = 0$, NAF_Id_n equals the full DNS name of the NAF. The next bullet specifies how the UE obtains n .

NOTE: This note gives an example how to obtain the NAF_Id_n : if the DNS name of the NAF is "server1.presence.bootstrap.operator.com", and $n = 3$, then $\text{NAF_Id_n} = \text{"bootstrap.operator.com"}$.

Editor's note: The definition of the KDF and the possible inclusion of further key derivation parameters is left to ETSI SAGE.

***** End of Change *****