
Title: Reply LS on privacy and security requirements in GSM/UMTS devices.
Response to: LS (S3-031312 = S3-030680) on Privacy and Security Requirements within GSM/UMTS Devices
Release: -
Source: SA3
To: SA1
CC: GSMA SeRG

Contact Person:

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Attachments: none

Overall Description:

SA3 would like to thank SA1 for providing further information on the issues relating to security and privacy on GSM/UMTS devices. SA3 would like to respond to the actions listed in the LS from SA1:

- *SA3 is kindly asked to investigate how unauthorised access shall be prevented to user and network operator confidential information in GSM and UMTS devices.*

SA3 believe that mechanisms to prevent unauthorised access to confidential information and sensitive functions on a device by malicious applications are best specified by the groups that are responsibility for defining application execution environments on devices. SA3 would like to highlight, for example, the Security Recommended Practice for MIDP in the Java Community Process as an example of how code signing can help address these security and privacy issues. In addition, work on hardware-based solutions such as the work in the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is also relevant. SA3 does not currently believe that 3GPP has a role in specifying solutions in this area. In particular, we do not believe that it would be beneficial to restart the 3GPP work on MexE Security.

- *SA1 would also welcome SA3's recommendations for any new Stage 1 requirements that are identified during their investigation.*

SA3 believe that it may be useful to capture requirements which may help in the design and implementation of solutions to prevent unauthorised access to confidential information and sensitive functions on a device by malicious applications. For instance, it would be useful to categorise information elements on GSM/UMTS devices to determine which elements are the most important ones to protect against unauthorised access. These requirements could be defined independently of the terminal platform, operating system and execution environment. The requirements work done in 3GPP MexE Security might be a useful input to this work. With regard to where this work should be done, SA3 is not convinced that 3GPP is the right place.

Action on SA1:

None.

Dates of next SA3 meetings:

SA3#32	9-13 February 2004	Europe
SA3#33	11-14 May 2004	Beijing, China
SA3#34	6- 9 July 2004	North America