3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#19

S3-010325

## 4 - 6 July, 2001, Newbury, UK

	CR-Form-v4
CHANGE REQUEST	
¥	<b>33.200</b> CR 002 <b># ev _ # Current version: 4.0.0 #</b>
For <b>HELP</b> on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the <b>X</b> symbols.	
Proposed change affects: # (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network Core Network X	
Title: ¥	Clarification of scope
Source: #	Vodafone
Work item code: अ	MAPsec Date: # 29-06-2001
Category: ₩	FRelease: %Rel-4Use one of the following categories: F (correction)Use one of the following releases: 2(GSM Phase 2)A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)R96(Release 1996)B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature)R97(Release 1997)C (functional modification)R98(Release 1998)D (editorial modification)R99(Release 1999)Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.REL-5(Release 5)
Reason for change	<b>2: ¥</b> The scope states that the specification applies to "MAP version 3". This is misleading because "MAP version 3" could refer to v3.x.y of 29.002 which does not support MAP security. "MAP version 3" could also refer to the version of the protocol as transmitted between entities in the application context information, but this is also misleading because MAP uses a large number of application contexts, whose versions can evolve at different rates. In addition, the scope states that the specification applies to "29.002 Rel-4 and higher". This will lead to ambiguity if 33.200 is changed in future releases since it will become unclear which version should be applied to future releases of 29.002.
Summary of chang	<b>The sentence that refers to "MAP version 3" and that states that the specification refers to "Rel-4 and higher" is deleted. The existing text in the preceding paragraph is deemed adequate.</b>
Consequences if not approved:	* The specification will be open to misinterpretation and it may lead to ambiguity in future releases.
Clauses affected:	¥
Other specs affected:	% Other core specifications %   Test specifications    O&M Specifications

## How to create CRs using this form:

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Other comments:

Comprehensive information and tips about how to create CRs can be found at: <u>http://www.3gpp.org/3G\_Specs/CRs.htm</u>. Below is a brief summary:

- 1) Fill out the above form. The symbols above marked **#** contain pop-up help information about the field that they are closest to.
- 2) Obtain the latest version for the release of the specification to which the change is proposed. Use the MS Word "revision marks" feature (also known as "track changes") when making the changes. All 3GPP specifications can be downloaded from the 3GPP server under <u>ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/specs/</u> For the latest version, look for the directory name with the latest date e.g. 2001-03 contains the specifications resulting from the March 2001 TSG meetings.
- 3) With "track changes" disabled, paste the entire CR form (use CTRL-A to select it) into the specification just in front of the clause containing the first piece of changed text. Delete those parts of the specification which are not relevant to the change request.

## 1 Scope

This technical specification covers the security mechanisms and procedures necessary to protect the MAP protocol. The complete set of enhancements and extensions to facilitate security protection for the MAP protocol is termed MAPsec and it covers transport security in the MAP protocol itself and the security management procedures.

The security mechanisms specified for MAP are on the application layer. This means that MAPsec is independent of the network and transport protocols to be used.

This technical specification contains the stage-2 specification for security protection of the MAP protocol. The actual implementation (stage-3) specification can be found in the MAP stage-3 specification, TS 29.002 [4].

This specification applies to MAP version 3, TS 29.002 [4] Rel-4 and higher.

NOTE: It is explicitly noted that automated key management and key distribution is not part of Rel-4. All key management and key distribution in Rel-4 must therefore be carried out by other means. (See Annex A)