3GPP/SMG Meeting #14 Oslo, Norway, 01-04 August 2000

Document \$3-000430

e.g. for 3GPP use the format TP-99xxx or for SMG, use the format P-99-xxx

	(CHANGE	REQU	JEST			le at the bottom of the to fill in this form corr	
		33.102	CR		(Current Version	on: 3.5.0	
GSM (AA.BB) or 3G	G (AA.BBB) specificat	on number↑		↑ CR r	number as	allocated by MCC s	upport team	
For submission	neeting # here↑	For info		X	in and the latest	strate non-strate	gic use or	nly)
Form: CR cover sheet, version 2 for 3GPP and SMG The latest version of this form is available from: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Information/CR-Form-v2.doc Proposed change affects: (at least one should be marked with an X) The latest version of this form is available from: ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Information/CR-Form-v2.doc UNSIM X ME UTRAN / Radio Core Network X								
Source:	Ericsson					Date:	2000-07-25	
Subject:	Replace IMU	I and TMUI with	IMSI and	ISMT b				
Work item:	Security							
Category: (only one category shall be marked with an X) Reason for	Corresponds Addition of for Functional moderates	odification of fe	ature		e X	Release:	Phase 2 Release 96 Release 97 Release 98 Release 99 Release 00	X
<u>change:</u>	Onango iiwo	i to iivioi ana iiv	10110111					
Clauses affected: Contents, 5.1.1, 6.1, 6.3.6								
Other specs Affected:	Other 3G core Other GSM co MS test specif BSS test spec O&M specifica	re specifications cations fications	- - -	List of C	Rs: Rs: Rs:			
Other comments:								
help.doc								

<----- double-click here for help and instructions on how to create a CR.

Contents

Foreword		Error! Bookmark not defined.		
1	Scope	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
2	References	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
2.1	Normative references	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
2.2	Informative references			
3	Definitions, symbols and abbreviations	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
3.1	Definitions	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
3.2	Symbols	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
3.3	Abbreviations	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
4	Overview of the security architecture	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5	Security features	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1	Network access security	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1.1	User identity confidentiality	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1.2	Entity authentication	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1.3	Confidentiality	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1.4	Data integrity	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.1.5	Mobile equipment identification	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.2	Network domain security	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.2.1	Void	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.2.2	Void			
5.2.3	Void	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.2.4	Fraud information gathering system	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.3	User domain security			
5.3.1	User-to-USIM authentication			
5.3.2	USIM-Terminal Link	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
5.4	Application security			
5.4.1	Secure messaging between the USIM and the network			
5.4.2	Void			
5.4.3	Access to user profile data			
5.4.4	IP security			
5.5	Security visibility and configurability			
5.5.1	Visibility			
5.5.2	Configurability			
6	Network access security mechanisms	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.1	Identification by temporary identities	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.1.1	General	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.1.2	TMUI TMSI reallocation procedure	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.1.3	Unacknowledged allocation of a temporary identity	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.1.4	Location update	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.2	Identification by a permanent identity	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.3	Authentication and key agreement			
6.3.1	General	Error! Bookmark not defined.		
6.3.2	Distribution of authentication data from HE to SN			
6.3.3	Authentication and key agreement			
6.3.4	Distribution of IMSI and temporary authentication data within			
	domain			

6.3.5	Re-synchronisation procedure	
6.3.6	Reporting authentication failures from the SGSN/VLR to the HLR	
6.3.7	Length of sequence numbers	
6.4	Local authentication and connection establishment	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.1	Cipher key and integrity key setting	
6.4.2	Ciphering and integrity mode negotiation	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.3	Cipher key and integrity key lifetime	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.4	Cipher key and integrity key identification	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.5	Security mode set-up procedure	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.6	Signalling procedures in the case of an unsuccessful integrity check	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.4.7	Signalling procedure for periodic local authentication	
6.4.8	Initialisation of synchronisation for ciphering and integrity protection	
6.5	Access link data integrity	
6.5.1	General	
6.5.2	Layer of integrity protection	
6.5.3	Data integrity protection method.	
6.5.4	Input parameters to the integrity algorithm	
6.5.4.1	COUNT-I	
6.5.4.2	IK	
6.5.4.3	FRESH	
	DIRECTION	
6.5.4.4		
6.5.4.5	MESSAGE	
6.5.5	Integrity key selection	
6.5.6	UIA identification	
6.6	Access link data confidentiality	
6.6.1	General	
6.6.2	Layer of ciphering	
6.6.3	Ciphering method	
6.6.4	Input parameters to the cipher algorithm	
6.6.4.1	COUNT-C	
6.6.4.2	CK	
6.6.4.3	BEARER	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.6.4.4	DIRECTION	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.6.4.5	LENGTH	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.6.5	Cipher key selection	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.6.6	UEA identification	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.7	Void	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.8	Interoperation and handover between UMTS and GSM	
6.8.1	Authentication and key agreement of UMTS subscribers	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6.8.1.1	General	
6.8.1.2	R99+ HLR/AuC	
6.8.1.3	R99+ VLR/SGSN	
6.8.1.4	R99+ ME	
6.8.1.5	USIM	
6.8.2	Authentication and key agreement for GSM subscribers	
6.8.2.1	General	
6.8.2.2	R99+ HLR/AuC	
6.8.2.3	VLR/SGSN	
6.8.2.4	R99+ ME	
	Distribution and use of authentication data between VLRs/SGSNs	
6.8.3		
6.8.4	Intersystem handover for CS Services – from UTRAN to GSM BSS	
6.8.4.1	UMTS security context	
6.8.4.2	GSM security context	
6.8.5	Intersystem handover for CS Services – from GSM BSS to UTRAN	Error: Bookmark not defined.

6.8.5.1 6.8.5.2		ty context	
	2	contextge for PS Services – from UTRAN to GSM BSS	
6.8.6			
6.8.6.1		ty context	
6.8.6.2 6.8.7		contextge for PS services – from GSM BSS to UTRAN	
6.8.7.1		ty context	
6.8.7.2		context	
7	•	context	
		nechanisms	
8.1		tween the USIM and the network	
8.2			
8.3	Mobile IP security		Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x A (informative):	Requirements analysis	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x B:	Void	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x C (informative):	Management of sequence numbers	Error! Bookmark not defined.
C.1	Generation of sequence	ce numbers in the Authentication Centre	Error! Bookmark not defined.
C.2 C.2.1 C.2.2 C.2.3 C.2.4	Protection against was Acceptance ruleList update	numbers in the USIMrap around of counter in the USIM	Error! Bookmark not defined Error! Bookmark not defined Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x D: Void		Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x E: Void		Error! Bookmark not defined.
Anne	x F (informative):	Example uses of AMF	Error! Bookmark not defined.
F.1	Support multiple auth	entication algorithms and keys	Error! Bookmark not defined.
F.2	Changing list paramet	ers	Error! Bookmark not defined.
F.3	Setting threshold valu	es to restrict the lifetime of cipher and integri	ty keysError! Bookmark not defined
	_	1	

5.1.1 User identity confidentiality

The following security features related to user identity confidentiality are provided:

- **user identity confidentiality:** the property that the permanent user identity (<u>IMUIIMSI</u>) of a user to whom a services is delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link;
- **user location confidentiality:** the property that the presence or the arrival of a user in a certain area cannot be determined by eavesdropping on the radio access link;
- **user untraceability:** the property that an intruder cannot deduce whether different services are delivered to the same user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.

To achieve these objectives, the user is normally identified by a temporary identity by which he is known by the visited serving network, or by an encrypted permanent identity. To avoid user traceability, which may lead to the compromise of user identity confidentiality, the user should not be identified for a long period by means of the same temporary or encrypted identity. To achieve these security features, in addition it is required that any signalling or user data that might reveal the user's identity is ciphered on the radio access link.

Clause 6.1 describes a mechanism that allows a user to be identified on the radio path by means of a temporary identity by which he is known in the visited serving network. This mechanism should normally be used to identify a user on the radio path in location update requests, service requests, detach requests, connection re-establishment requests, etc..

6.1 Identification by temporary identities

6.1.1 General

This mechanism allows the identification of a user on the radio access link by means of a temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI/P-TMSI). A TMSI /P-TMSI has local significance only in the location area or routing area in which the user is registered. Outside that area it should be a accompanied by an appropriate Location Area Identification (LAI) or Routing Area Identification (RAI) in order to avoid ambiguities. The association between the permanent and temporary user identities is kept by the Visited Location Register (VLR/SGSN) in which the user is registered.

The TMSI/P-TMSI, when available, is normally used to identify the user on the radio access path, for instance in paging requests, location update requests, attach requests, service requests, connection reestablishment requests and detach requests.

The procedures and mechanisms are described in GSM 03.20 and TS 23.060. The following subclauses contain a summary of this feature.

6.1.2 TMUITMSI reallocation procedure

The purpose of the mechanism described in this subsection is to allocate a new <u>TMUITMSI/LAI</u> pair to a user by which he may subsequently be identified on the radio access link.

The procedure should be performed after the initiation of ciphering. The ciphering of communication over the radio path is specified in clause 6.6. The allocation of a temporary identity is illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3: TMSI allocation

The allocation of a temporary identity is initiated by the VLR.

The VLR generates a new temporary identity (TMUInTMSIn) and stores the association of TMUInTMSIn and the permanent identity IMUIIMSI in its database. The TMUITMSI should be unpredictable. The VLR then sends the TMUInTMSIn and (if necessary) the new location area identity LAIn to the user.

Upon receipt the user stores <u>TMUInTMSIn</u> and automatically removes the association with any previously allocated <u>TMUI</u>TMSI. The user sends an acknowledgement back to the VLR.

Upon receipt of the acknowledgement the VLR removes the association with the old temporary identity <u>TMUIoTMSIo</u> and the <u>IMUIIMSI</u> (if there was any) from its database.

6.1.3 Unacknowledged allocation of a temporary identity

If the serving network does not receive an acknowledgement of the successful allocation of a temporary identity from the user, the network shall maintain the association between the new temporary identity TMUInTMSIn and the tMUIIMSI and between the old temporary identity TMUIOTMSIo (if there is any) and the tMUIIMSI.

For a user-originated transaction, the network shall allow the user to identify itself by either the old temporary identity <u>TMUIoTMSIo</u> or the new temporary identity <u>TMUInTMSIn</u>. This allows the network to determine the temporary identity stored in the mobile station. The network shall subsequently delete the association between the other temporary identity and the <u>IMUIIMSI</u>, to allow the temporary identity to be allocated to another user.

For a network-originated transaction, the network shall identify the user by its permanent identity (<u>IMUIIMSI</u>). When radio contact has been established, the network shall instruct the user to delete any stored <u>TMUITMSI</u>. When the network receives an acknowledgement from the user, the network shall delete the association between the <u>IMUIIMSI</u> and any <u>TMUITMSI</u> to allow the released temporary identities to be allocated to other users.

Subsequently, in either of the cases above, the network may initiate the normal <u>TMUITMSI</u> reallocation procedure.

Repeated failure of <u>TMUITMSI</u> reallocation (passing a limit set by the operator) may be reported for O&M action.

6.1.4 Location update

In case a user identifies itself using a <u>TMUIoTMSIo/LAIo</u> pair that was assigned by the visited VLRn the <u>IMUIMSI</u> can normally be retrieved from the database. If this is not the case, the visited VLRn should request the user to identify itself by means of its permanent user identity. This mechanism is described in 6.2.

In case a user identifies itself using a <u>TMUIoTMSIo</u>/LAIo pair that was not assigned by the visited VLRn and the visited VLRn and the previously visited VLRo exchange authentication data, the visited VLRn should request the previously visited VLRo to send the permanent user identity. This mechanism is described in 6.3.4, it is integrated in the mechanism for distribution of authentication data between VLRs. If the previously visited VLRo cannot be contacted or cannot retrieve the user identity, the visited VLRn should request the user to identify itself by means of its permanent user identity. This mechanism is described in 6.2.

6.3.6 Reporting authentication failures from the SGSN/VLR to the HLR

The purpose of this procedure is to provide a mechanism for reporting authentication failures from the serving environment back to the home environment.

The procedure is shown in Figure 13.



Figure 13: Reporting authentication failure from VLR/SGSN to HLR

The procedure is invoked by the serving network VLR/SGSN when the authentication procedure fails. The *authentication failure report* shall contain the subscriber identity and a failure cause code. The possible failure causes are either that the network signature was wrong or that the user response was wrong.

The HE may decide to cancel the location of the user after receiving an authentication failure report.