Tdoc List

2024-11-15 14:52

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑244600 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
YesIt was pointed out that agenda 5.15 needed to be added.
 		revised No S3‑245134  
    S3‑245134 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244600
    S3‑244602 Process for SA3#119 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244603 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245135  
    S3‑245135 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244603
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑244601 Report from last SA3 meeting MCC report   Yes
YesEricsson commented that the January meeting was not confirmed and the number of agenda items either.
 		approved No    
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups                      
3.1 Reports and Liaisons S3‑244628 LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay C1-244647 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑244961 reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245136  
    S3‑245128 Reply LS on including HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245136  
    S3‑245136 Reply LS on including HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑245128
    S3‑245127 Support cleartext HPLMN ID in PC5 U2U relay discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: this CR is not needed. Ericsson supported having this CR after some work.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244629 LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure C1-245039 LS in   Yes
YesDT: if there is no LTE at all, the user should go to the customer service.This is a very rare case. Alf (NTT-Docomo): I don’t get this error case. The Chair asked: For 5G, UE using a NULL scheme to recover from the error at least once? Ericsson, Apple, Verizon, T-Mobile, AT&T, Google, ORANGE, ZTE, Thales, DT,MITRE, BSI, TNO.The Chair asked these companies whether this could be made optional. DT said that this was an UE implementation. GSMA agreed that this case was rather rare: Besides, if the operator view is better not to risk this, we should probably go that way. As for customer service, new UE will have eSIMs, so this would push the subscription down which is easy to do. Huawei: this is not error in USIM but a error when the SUCI is transferred. Vivo: the privacy issue should be a decision made by the user and not the operator. The user can know there is something wrong in the USIM and it’s up to them to decide whether to protect their privacy. China Mobile: keep the connection even if there are security issues. ORANGE: some USIM update services are out of scope of 3GPP. Huawei: dropping the connection is one option, we don’t understand why this should be an UE implementation solution. Samsung:exposed SUPI is gone if we reprogram it. BSI: there can be other errors when procisioning the USIM.If there is something wrong we just lose connectivity, that's it. Thales: this is very rare, no need to have a special handling of this. The Chair cprposed to respond that reducing the privacy was not agreeable in SA3. How the UE recovers, will not be specified but SA3 may be open for further discussions on that. Qualcomm: stop using 5G in this case.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244711 Discussion paper on SUCI calculation failure Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245045 Discussion paper on SUCI calculation failure Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244897 Discussion paper on SUCI error handling Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244949 Discussion on incoming SUCI LS Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244605 Discussion paper for CT1 LS on expected UE behavior on potential SUCI computation failure Deutsche Telekom AG discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244697 Discussion paper on SUCI calculation Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244712 Reply LS to CT1 on UE bahaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245137  
    S3‑244950 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245137  
    S3‑245137 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244950
    S3‑245046 [draft] Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245137  
    S3‑244729 Reply LS on UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No    
    S3‑244730 UE behaviour in case of SUCI calculation failure vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244708 New (mini) WID on SUCI calculation failure alignment Nokia WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244630 Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks C1-245048 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244631 Reply-LS on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 5G Core Network Attacks C4-243671 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244845 Reply LS to CT4 on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 5G Core Network Attacks Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia: no need to reply if we agree with CT4.
 		approved No    
    S3‑244632 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication C4-244496 LS in   Yes
YesHuawei: we don’t need a CR. The Chair commented: next meeting will have a reply where we will point out that there is no need for a new TS in SA3.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑244749 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244750 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244974 Clarification for re-authentication notification response in HONTRA procedure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244975 Clarification for re-authentication notification response in HONTRA procedure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245075 HONTRA Error Handling Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245076 HONTRA Error Handling Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244748 draft - Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244973 [Draft] Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245077 [Draft] Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244633 LS on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case C4-244497 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑244726 Discussion on PLMN ID setting in the 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header in the Indirect Network Sharing case during UE authentication China Unicom, ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244752 Security aspects for Indirect Network Sharing ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244727 Reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case China Unicom LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244707 Reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244751 reply LS to CT4 on use of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id for Indirect Network Sharing case ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244636 LS on AIML data collection RP-242389 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: we prefer Samsung and Qualcomm's proposals.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244654 Reply LS on AIML Data Collection S5-246299 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244642 Reply LS on AIML data collection S2-2411191 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244713 Reply LS on AIML data collection Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245138  
    S3‑244728 Reply LS on AIML data collection vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245138  
    S3‑244947 Discussion on RAN plenary LS on AIML Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244948 Reply LS on AIML data collection Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245138  
    S3‑245038 [draft] Reply LS on AIML data collection Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245138  
    S3‑245138 Reply LS on AIML data collection Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245038
    S3‑244638 LS Reply to Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) S2-2409441 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑245055 LS reply on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesCATT didn’t agree with this reply. Vivo preferred Huawei's answer for question 1.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244875 Reply LS on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244990 Reply LS on Issues related to Analytics context transfer between AnLF(s) CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244641 LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT S2-2411049 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑244800 Reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245139  
    S3‑245139 LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244800
    S3‑244805 [draft] Reply LS to SA2 on on security aspects of Ambient IoT Sony LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244803 KI#3 Discussion related to SA2 LS S2-2411049 Sony discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244861 Discission paper concerning RAN agreements Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
YesHuawei: the original LS was noted.There was no feedback required.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244864 LS reply to LS on RAN2 agreements and assumptions for Ambient IoT Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244863 LS reply to LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244925 reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244944 Reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244958 reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244967 [Draft] Reply LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑245012 Draft_LS reply to LS on security aspects of Ambient IoT Ericsson LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245139  
    S3‑244643 Reply LS on Clarification regarding definition of 5G NR femto ownership S2-2411241 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244646 LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel S4-241373 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244854 LS on request for IMS Data Channel related clarifications s3i240707 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244855 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245140  
    S3‑245140 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244855
    S3‑245073 IMS Data Channel and LI Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
YesChina Mobile: we need to coordinate with SA4, we cannot solve this alone. Nokia: SA3,SA4 and SA2 need to work together.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245074 [Draft] Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245140  
    S3‑244650 LS on SA5 MonStra work progress S5-246296 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244651 LS on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF S6-242714 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244844 draft reply LS to SA6 Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia: not fine with the second answer.
 		revised No S3‑245141  
    S3‑245141 Reply LS to SA6 Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244844
    S3‑244607 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Belgium. LLC report Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244634 LS on PWS support for NB-IoT NTN R2-2409243 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244635 Response LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 R5-245464 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244637 LS on Completion of 5WWC_Ph2 (R18) work S2-2409022 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244639 Reply LS on LCS user plane connection binding to the UE S2-2409544 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244640 Further LS Reply on Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF S2-2410813 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244644 Reply to Reply LS on CEN's requirements for eCall over IMS S2-2411246 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244647 LS Reply on Newly Published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 S4-241684 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244648 LS reply to IETF Traffic Engineering Architecture and Signaling Working Group on ""A Realization of Network Slices for 5G Networks Using Current IP/MPLS Technologies"" S5-244662 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244649 LS Reply on Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF S5-245162 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244652 LS on SA6 Answer to GSMA LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 S6-243763 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244653 Reply LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 SP-241404 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244627 LS to 3GPP CT4 on recursively defined JSON structures and reply to LS C4-241343 GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244850 RCS lawful intercept requirements s3i240708 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244851 Reply LS on UE-Satellite-UE Communication Architectures s3i240752 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245133 LS on draft-ietf-raw-technologies, "Reliable and Available Wireless Technologies IETF LS in discussion Yes
YesIt was commented that comments could be gathered in the IETF mail list.Huawei asked to keep it open to have more time to see it.
 		noted No    
3.2 Follow up topics from LSs S3‑244619 Coverpage for TR Skeleton for 3GPP Cryprographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244620 Scope of TR on 3GPP cryptographic inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244846 Inventory of protocols and algorithms for PQC migration Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244621 Technical Content for 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245362  
    S3‑245362 Technical Content for 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244621
    S3‑244847 Analysis of GSMA PQC guidelines related to SA3 specifications Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244927 Input to SA for Reply LS on clarifications on consent management Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245363  
    S3‑245363 Input to SA for Reply LS on clarifications on consent management Nokia LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244927
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑244623 Discussion on SCAS for Containerized applications Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
YesHuawei considered that ETSI NFV SEC was a more appropriate group for this. Ericsson supported this document. BSI also supported it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244660 Clarification on TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
YesThis was kept open to be discussed with Ericsson. Nokia didn’t agree with this as it seemed out of scope of the SCAS procedure.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244661 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) other   Yes
YesThis was kept open, Huawei, Ericsson and Nokia needed more time.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244662 Living Document to TS 33.518 NRF SCAS BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245364  
    S3‑245364 Living Document to TS 33.518 NRF SCAS BSI (DE) draftCR - No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑244662
    S3‑244663 Add threat description about the implications of the AUSF confirming an authentication with the SUPI while the authentication was started with the SUCI BSI (DE) other   Yes
YesKept open, concerns from Nokia,Ericsson and Huawei. No final agreement, it was noted.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244664 Add test case TC_AUSF_CONFIRMATION_WITH_SUPI that check whether the AUSF is vulnerable to a confirmation attack BSI (DE), Radix Security draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244665 Add threat description about the implications of the AUSF not validating RES* correctly BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244666 Add test case that verifies if the AUSF processes RES* failures correctly BSI (DE), Radix Security draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244667 Correction and clarification of TC_AMF_NAS_INTEGRITY_FAILURE BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
YesMCC: remove the use of "must".
 		revised No S3‑245328  
    S3‑245328 Correction and clarification of TC_AMF_NAS_INTEGRITY_FAILURE BSI (DE) draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244667
    S3‑244685 MnF User session timeout Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the change, maybe a note could be added instead. Nokia commented that this could be reworded to simplify it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245329 MnF User session timeout Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245062 Remove normative language from test cases Keysight Technologies UK Ltd draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑245006 Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check Ericsson discussion   Yes
YesBSI: is this the only option? Huawei didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245007 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245008 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245009 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245010 Draft_LS on Checking PLMNID of NFc in interconnect scenario Ericsson LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑244879 Update to TS 33.503 to fix the referred clause and table of services Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑244880 Update to TS 33.503 to fix the referred clause and table of services - Mirror Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑244904 Notification about AKMA service disabling via NEF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesKept open. Ericsson had issues.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245279 Notification about AKMA service disabling via NEF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244905 Correction to AAnF response without UE Identity Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN S3‑244867 Redundant text in Annex I. Nokia CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is clearly editorial, it should be D. MCC: cat-D not allowed in Rel-18 anymore. It was decided to do it only in Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244868 Redundant text in Annex I. Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245146  
    S3‑245146 Redundant text in Annex I. Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244868
    S3‑244915 Corrections to Nudm_UEAuthentication_ResultConfirmation Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑244917 Corrections to Nudm_UEAuthentication_ResultConfirmation Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑244979 Terminology Alignment and Consistency for Target UE Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA.                      
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑244668 Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245147  
    S3‑245147 Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS BSI (DE), Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244668
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑244692 Discussion paper reauthentication via untrusted non 3GPP access Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244693 Reauthentication aspect for IPSec in non 3GPP access Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: only Rel-19 is needed, otherwise we go back to Rel-15. Ericsson: no need to specify this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244694 Reauthentication aspect for IPSec in non 3GPP access Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245143  
    S3‑245143 Reauthentication aspect for IPSec in non 3GPP access Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244694
    S3‑244695 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244696 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesTo be discussed offline before next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244698 NSWO AN and SNN related update Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this starts in Rel-17, though, Huawei didn’t agree with this CR.This causes to have two IE, it is not a clarification but a new feature. Rel-17 is frozen.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244699 NSWO AN and SNN related update Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244700 Kamf definition alignment for NAS count Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: not needed. Huawei also thought this wasn't needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244701 Kamf definition alignment for NAS count Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244702 Kamf definition alignment for NAS count Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244703 Kamf definition alignment for NAS count Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244704 Home control for NSWO Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: note is not needed. Step 16 is saying exactly the same thing. Ericsson had the same comment.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244705 Home control for NSWO Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244706 AUSF requirement for the case of Indirect Network Sharing: Nokia CR Approval Yes
YesDiscussions were postponed for the next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244716 SERP - Discussion paper Apple discussion   Yes
YesNokia: not acceptable. Qualcomm: we didn’t support this when we planned Rel-19 back in Chicago, so we still don’t support this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244717 SERP - revised WID Apple WID new   Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t support this. Apple pointed out that there was only one company objecting this. Nokia didn’t support this contribution. Ericsson supported this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244718 SERP - CR on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message Ericsson, Apple draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244719 SERP - LS to RAN on SERP Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244804 Proposal for changing the description of SN counter in SCPAC Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd CR   Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree: this is changing the meaning of the requirement, it is not editorial.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244807 Removing MRF from IMS data channel architecture Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑244876 Discussion Paper for using MPQUIC in ATSSS scenario Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244877 Update to MPQUIC TLS Annex Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesIntel didn’t agree with this.Ericsson didn’t agree either. Nokia: this is a note, hence informative.We support the CR. CableLabs agreed with the CR. NTT-Docomo: too early to put this note, this needs to be studied with a SID. Huawei clarified that it's an option to improve the performance.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244989 Adding initial trust in CMPv2 initialization request Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245144  
    S3‑245144 Adding initial trust in CMPv2 initialization request Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244989
    S3‑244992 Adding initial trust in CMPv2 initialization request Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245145  
    S3‑245145 Adding initial trust in CMPv2 initialization request Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244992
4.2 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). S3‑244792 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree: how to test these requiirements? This was kept open.
 		revised No S3‑245275 S3‑244310
    S3‑245275 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244792
    S3‑244793 Cover Sheet for TS 33.530 SCAS_5G_UDR BSI (DE) TS or TR cover Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245330 Draft TS 33.530 BSI draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.3 WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF).                      
4.5 WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑244655 [33.180] Additions to access token for recording authorization Motorola Solutions, Airbus CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia was fine with this.
 		revised No S3‑245148  
    S3‑245148 [33.180] Additions to access token for recording authorization Motorola Solutions, Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244655
    S3‑244906 [33.180] MCRec ID Introduction Airbus CR Decision Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245149  
    S3‑245149 [33.180] MCRec ID Introduction Airbus CR Decision Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244906
4.7 WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm S3‑245101 TR 35.937 skeleton THALES draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245102 Changes to TS 35.234 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245103 Changes to TS 35.235 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245104 Content for TS 35.236 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245105 Content for TR 35.937 THALES pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: remove references to ETSI SAGE. Some style corrections and 3GPP drafting rules compliance was needed here. The changes will be incorporated into the draft specifications.
 		approved No    
    S3‑245154 Draft TS 35.234 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245155 Draft TS 35.235 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245156 Draft TS 35.236 Thales draft TS discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245157 Draft TR 35.937 Thales draft TR discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245293 Cover sheet draft TR 35.234 Thales TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245294 Cover sheet draft TR 35.235 Thales TS or TR cover discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245295 Cover sheet draft TR 35.236 Thales TS or TR cover discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245331 Cover sheet TR 35.937 Thales TS or TR cover discussion Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.8 WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols S3‑245019 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245150 Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
YesChanges on the cover sheet to remove reference to
 		agreed No    
    S3‑245020 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245151 Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
YesChanges on the coverpage only.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑245021 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245152 Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
YesCover sheet changes,
 		agreed No    
    S3‑245022 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245153 Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson CR - Yes
YesCover sheet changes.
 		agreed No    
4.9 WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3                      
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑244893 Draft CR TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244894 Draft CR TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245332  
    S3‑245332 Draft CR TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑244894
    S3‑244895 Draft CR TR33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245333  
    S3‑245333 Draft CR TR33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑244895
    S3‑244896 Draft CR TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244952 Certificate threats for split gNB Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245158  
    S3‑245158 Certificate threats for split gNB Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244952
    S3‑244953 Adding certificate handling tests to SCAS for split gNB Qualcomm Incorporated CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245093  
    S3‑245093 Adding certificate handling tests to SCAS for split gNB Qualcomm Incorporated CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245159 S3‑244953
    S3‑245159 Adding certificate handling tests to SCAS for split gNB Qualcomm Incorporated CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑245093
    S3‑245358 Adding certificate test cases to TS 33.511 Huawei; HiSilicon, CAICT, CTCC, Nokia CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245359 Adding threat about certificate verification to TR 33.916 Huawei; HiSilicon, CAICT, CTCC, Nokia CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245360 Corrections and test case updating to TS 33.117 Huawei; HiSilicon, CAICT, CTCC, Nokia CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245361 Updating test case about authentication status of UE by UDM Huawei; HiSilicon, CAICT, CTCC, Nokia CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑244817 Retrieval of public key used for token verification Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesContent will go to draft CR in S3-245334,
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244918 Authorization of a service request when the discovery is delegated to the target PLMN Nokia CR   Yes
YesHuawei: we need to check this in CT4 and SA2. More time is needed. Ericsson also wanted more time and proposed to start the draft CR in the next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑244919 DP SBA Rel-19 public key retrieval for access token verification Nokia discussion   Yes
YesConcerns from NCSC. Huawei proposed to send an LS to CT4.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244926 DRAFT CR SBA Rel-19 public key or cert retrieval for access token verification Nokia draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245334  
    S3‑245334 DRAFT CR SBA Rel-19 public key or cert retrieval for access token verification Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, Samsung, BT PLC, KDDI, Huawei, NCSC, Nokia draftCR - Yes
YesIncorporates cotnent of S3-245011.
 		approved No   S3‑244926
    S3‑245011 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, Samsung, BT PLC CR   Yes
YesContent will go to draft CR in S3-245334.
 		not pursued No    
4.12 WID on Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 S3‑244980 LTM: Requirement on AS Security Context Synchronization Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: some rewording is needed.
 		revised No S3‑245160  
    S3‑245160 LTM: Requirement on AS Security Context Synchronization Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244980
    S3‑244624 Analysis on Solution 2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244753 Resolve the EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
YesVivo: make the second editor's note a note saying that it is not addressed in the solution.
 		revised No S3‑245161  
    S3‑245161 Resolve the EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244753
    S3‑245099 Editorial updates for solution #6 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244983 LTM: Further Evaluation to Solution 7 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is not relevant for SA3. Samsung supported this comment, They didn’t agree either. It was clarified that this needed input from RAN3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244981 LTM: Further Update to Solution 8 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
YesVivo: issue with the solution part.
 		revised No S3‑245162  
    S3‑245162 LTM: Further Update to Solution 8 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244981
    S3‑244731 New solution on Mismatch of UE security context vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245163  
    S3‑245163 New solution on Mismatch of UE security context vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244731
    S3‑244732 Conclusion on mismatch of UE security context vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245335  
    S3‑244924 conclusion assuming the PDCP anchor changing Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245335  
    S3‑244982 LTM: Partial Conclusion on Key Issue 1 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245335  
    S3‑245335 LTM: Partial Conclusion on Key Issue 1 Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244982
    S3‑244714 LTM - way forward discussion - leave the final decision to RAN Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245106 Discussion on Impact Analysis for Inter-CU LTM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244914 Discussion on security of LTM cell switch command MAC CE OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
YesThe Chair commented that there weren't much time for this topic and the number of contributions needed to be limited. He asked the companies to try to restrict themselves.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244916 Security analysis of LTM cell switch command MAC CE OPPO other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245336  
    S3‑245336 Security analysis of LTM cell switch command MAC CE OPPO other Approval Yes
YesHuawei asked to be minuted: the MAC CE protection will not be addressed in Rel-19 in this topic. It was agreed to add a note on this.
 		approved No   S3‑244916
    S3‑244984 LTM: Update to Overall Summary Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
YesVivo didn’t agree with the document. Kept open: concerns from Samsung, Qualcomm.
 		revised No S3‑245337  
    S3‑245337 LTM: Update to Overall Summary Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244984
    S3‑244715 LTM - WID revision Apple WID new   Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: include the TUs that we have spent already. There was no agreement.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245025 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245164  
    S3‑245164 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑245025
4.13 WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑244686 Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245166  
    S3‑245166 Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244686
    S3‑245338 Non3GPPMobEnh enhancement Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑244687 TNGF solution alignment Nokia, CableLabs other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244688 TWIF solution Nokia, Lenovo, Charter Communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245165  
    S3‑245165 TWIF solution Nokia, Lenovo, Charter Communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244688
    S3‑244689 LS on Non3GPPMob_Sec update Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not needed. Huawei agreed, there was no need to report to SA2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244951 Adding TWIF related text to the non-3GPP living document Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245165  
4.14 WID on WID on Security for MonStra S3‑244675 Living document for MonStra: draftCR to TS 33.501, Signalling Monitoring Vodafone draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245168  
    S3‑245168 Living document for MonStra: draftCR to TS 33.501, Signalling Monitoring Vodafone draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244675
    S3‑245339 Security of Signalling Traffic monitoring Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yest was pointed out that Vodafone needed to revise this CR in Plenary since it was referring to a TS that didn’t have a number yet (TS 28.abc). MCC: is TS 28.abc sent for one shot approval in Plenary?
 		agreed No    
    S3‑244853 Updating living Draft CR for MonSTra Vodafone, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245129 MonSTra Security Solution Ericsson, Vodafone, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NSA, BT, Verizon other Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: some wording issues in X.2 as the note seems to contradict the text. Vodafone wanted to finalise this document during the current meeitng.
 		revised No S3‑245167  
    S3‑245167 MonSTra Security Solution Ericsson, Vodafone, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NSA, BT, Verizon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245129
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑245078 Resolution of EN in Solution #8 (Using security log events, counters and protocol signaling monitoring) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244678 KI 1 Conclusion Clarification on Replay Use Case MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: not clear what fraudulent means here. The rational has more text than what is actually addressed here. Huawei: this change makes it a sub case of bullet C. China Mobile: It reduces the scope of the replay attack.
 		revised No S3‑245180  
    S3‑245180 KI 1 Conclusion Clarification on Replay Use Case MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244678
    S3‑244722 Confidentiality and Integrity for KI 1 Conclusion U.S. National Security Agency, MITRE-FFRDC, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244721 Clarifications to Conclusion 1 U.S. National Security Agency, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC, Johns Hopkins University APL, Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245181  
    S3‑245181 Clarifications to Conclusion 1 U.S. National Security Agency, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC, Johns Hopkins University APL, Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244721
    S3‑245082 Editorial update of conclusions for KI#1 (Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245181  
    S3‑244609 Updates and Clean-up of KI#1 Conclusion Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245182  
    S3‑245182 Updates and Clean-up of KI#1 Conclusion Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244609
    S3‑245079 Resolution of EN in conclusions for KI#1 (Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245182  
    S3‑244626 New annex for security event data records Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: put this in a solution.Huawei supported this. John Hopkins: we got comments that this wasn’t appropriate for a conclusion so we put it in an annex. NSA: I prefer to have this in an Annex. It applies to different solutions. They withdrew their comment in order to male progress. MCC: there are a lot of references missing. Alex (GSMA): Cyber Resilience act is now in the works for TC CYBER. Network information systems and management systems are impacted by this. ETSI will start work on this and it will impact on the products making some of these capabilities mandatory. The preference for TC CYBER is to reference 3GPP material. If there is nothing normative to reference in 3GPP TC CYBER will have to write it themselves. Alex encouraged SA3 to produce normative work on this field as this kind of work is what the European Union expects in the next two years.
 		revised No S3‑245183  
    S3‑245183 New annex for security event data records Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesPutting it in solution format.
 		approved No   S3‑244626
    S3‑244610 Updates and Clean-up of KI#2 Conclusion Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: what is this policy we are trying to specify? Huawei didn’t agree with this document.
 		merged No S3‑245184  
    S3‑244723 General Recommendations for Conclusion 2 Policy Enforcement U.S. National Security Agency,OTD_US, Johns Hopkins University APL, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245184  
    S3‑245184 General Recommendations for Conclusion 2 Policy Enforcement U.S. National Security Agency,OTD_US, Johns Hopkins University APL, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244723
    S3‑245081 Resolution of EN in conclusions for KI#2 (Security mechanisms for policy enforcement at the 5G SBA) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia objected to this contribution.
 		merged No S3‑245184  
    S3‑244611 Cleanup of TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245185  
    S3‑245185 Cleanup of TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244611
    S3‑245080 Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson draftCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244858 Discussion about way forward for zero trust study and beyond China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244903 Way forward Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244993 Proposal way forward for eZTS CATT, China Unicom, China Telecom discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244612 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG for TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245365  
    S3‑245365 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG for TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244612
    S3‑245179 Draft TR 33.794 Lenovo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245280 Add standardized format for security event logs into conclusion of KI#1 Johnn Hopkina pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑245120 Remove ENs of solution#3 for KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245083 Conclusion for KI#1: Third party specific user identities Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245188  
    S3‑245122 Conclusion of KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we would like to use TS 33.203 but it's unfortunate that the spec title refers to 3G.
 		revised No S3‑245188  
    S3‑245188 Conclusion of KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245122
    S3‑244808 Addressing the ENs on Avatar ID determination and token details of Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245190  
    S3‑245190 Addressing the ENs on Avatar ID determination and token details of Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244808
    S3‑245042 Resolving EN in solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245191  
    S3‑245191 Resolving EN in solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245042
    S3‑244810 Conclusion to KI#2 of NG_RTC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: too early to finish this key issue, we have two contributions for this meeting related to this. SA2 is preparing CRs for their next meeting about this. We don’t think we can conclude in the current meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245084 Discussion about the KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245085 LS on IMS avatar communication Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: we are not comfortable sending this LS. Samsung supported this as well. Vodafone: add SA in copy. Nokia SA4 as well.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245121 Remove ENs of solution#9 for KI#3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: SA2 has not concluded, don’t remove the editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑245355  
    S3‑245355 Remove ENs of solution#9 for KI#3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245121
    S3‑244809 Addressing the ENs on user interaction of Solution#10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244811 Conclusion to KI#3 of NG_RTC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245196  
    S3‑245086 Conclusion for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245196  
    S3‑245196 Conclusion for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑245086
    S3‑245123 Conclusion of KI#3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245196  
    S3‑245087 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.790, Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2, Version 0.6.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245357  
    S3‑245357 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.790, Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2, Version 0.6.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245087
    S3‑245186 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑244625 Correction of terms in Overview of TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244797 Removing EN in Sol#2 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245200  
    S3‑245200 Removing EN in Sol#2 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244797
    S3‑244613 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245201  
    S3‑245201 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244613
    S3‑244884 Evaluation to solution 11 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245201  
    S3‑245029 [TR 33.757] Update to solution#20 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245202 [TR 33.757] Update to solution#20 Samsung pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244883 Evaluation to solution 20 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesJohn Hopkins: I can’t agree unless the terminology is corrected. Samsung objected to the SEAF co-located with the AMF.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244796 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, China Unicom, CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245206  
    S3‑245206 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, China Unicom, CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia and Ericsson asked if it was the understanding that the new proxy entity will not be standardised. China Mobile didn’t agree on this understanding because they wanted to standardise it. It was asked to be minuted in the meeting report: NOKIA TO PROVIDE MINUTES HERE Show of hands: Support: Samsung, Ericsson, China Mobile, Huawei,NSA, ZTE, China Telecom,John Hopkins,Nokia No support: Xiaomi. It was agreed finally to add an editor's note.
 		approved No   S3‑244796
    S3‑244865 Conclusion to KI#2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245206  
    S3‑245027 Conclusion update for KI#2 for DNS messages protection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245207  
    S3‑245207 Conclusion update for KI#2 for DNS messages protection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245027
    S3‑245028 Conclusion update for KI#2 in TR 33.757 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245206  
    S3‑245119 Update conclusion for KI#2 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245206  
    S3‑244754 Conclusion to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245208  
    S3‑244866 Conclusion to KI#3 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245208  
    S3‑244882 conclusion on key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245208  
    S3‑245208 conclusion on key issue#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244882
    S3‑245026 Conclusion for key issue#3 Samsung, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245208  
    S3‑245187 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑244673 Pre-authorization solution for ACME NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245366  
    S3‑245366 Pre-authorization solution for ACME NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244673
    S3‑244720 Using mTLS with ACME NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244679 Address ENs in Solution #8: Supporting all 5G SBA certificate types Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244656 Evaluation update for solution #9 (Using ACME protocol for certificate renewal) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree. The editor's note was not addressed yet.
 		revised No S3‑245367  
    S3‑245367 Evaluation update for solution #9 (Using ACME protocol for certificate renewal) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244656
    S3‑244680 Conclusion for KI#1: ACME initial trust framework Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245209  
    S3‑245209 Conclusion for KI#1: ACME initial trust framework Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244680
    S3‑244659 Conclusion for KI#2 (Secure Transport of Messages) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245210  
    S3‑245210 Conclusion for KI#2 (Secure Transport of Messages) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244659
    S3‑244657 Conclusion for KI#4 (Certificate enrolment) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
YesHuaweii: we already have a related solution, we don’t need another one. This is redundant. Cisco agreed that the other solutions addressed enrolment, but this one addressed the key issue more clearly.
 		revised No S3‑245211  
    S3‑245211 Conclusion for KI#4 (Certificate enrolment) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244657
    S3‑244658 Conclusion for KI#5 (Certificate Renewal) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245368  
    S3‑245368 Conclusion for KI#5 (Certificate Renewal) Google Ireland Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244658
    S3‑244681 Conclusion for KI#7: Supporting all 5G SBA certificate types Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245317  
    S3‑245317 Conclusion for KI#7: Supporting all 5G SBA certificate types Cisco Systems pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244681
    S3‑244682 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.776, Version 1.0.0 Cisco Systems TS or TR cover Approval Yes
YesHuawei and Ericsson had comments on the abstract.
 		revised No S3‑245318  
    S3‑245318 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.776, Version 1.0.0 Cisco Systems TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244682
    S3‑245189 Draft TR 33.776 Cisco draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits                      
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks                      
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑244998 Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245340  
    S3‑245340 Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244998
    S3‑244794 Reply LS to Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245340  
    S3‑244878 Discussion about mitigating the Security risk of Unprotected NAS Reject Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesSamsung didn’t agree with this paper. We cannot leave it to UE implementation as there is vulnerability to DoS attacks. Vivo: UE implementation is not clear. Nokia: it cannot be left for UE implementation. Phillips didn’t agree either that this could be left for UE implementation.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245039 Discussion on security procedure on S&F operation for a split MME architecture Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: what is meant by legacy here?
 		noted No    
    S3‑244608 Additional conclusions for KI#1 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245212  
    S3‑245212 Additional conclusions for KI#1 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244608
    S3‑244791 Updates to conclusions for split MME architecture Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244814 Update of conclusions KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245341  
    S3‑245341 Update of conclusions KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244814
    S3‑244955 Proposed addition to the split MME conclusion for key issue #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245213  
    S3‑245213 Proposed addition to the split MME conclusion for key issue #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244955
    S3‑244976 Update to the conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.700.29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245214  
    S3‑245214 Update to the conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.700.29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244976
    S3‑244996 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update conclusion#1 CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: we prefer not to endorse specific solutions. Qualcomm was against this.
 		merged No S3‑245213  
    S3‑244756 Conclusion on KI#2 for split MME architecture ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesPhillips supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244815 Update of Conclusions KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245215  
    S3‑244954 Proposed privacy conclusion for split MME case Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245215  
    S3‑245215 Proposed privacy conclusion for split MME case Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo supported this. Xiaomi supported this. CATT: this is inherited from 4G. Phillips, ZTE and Nokia didn’t support this. Phillips: there is a privacy issue in here.
 		noted No   S3‑244954
    S3‑244977 Update to the conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.700.29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245215  
    S3‑244997 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update conclusion#2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245215  
    S3‑245072 K#2 conclusion Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244733 Address EN in solution 31 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245216  
    S3‑245216 Address EN in solution 31 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244733
    S3‑244816 Update on solution 28 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244956 Further additions to the enhancement of IOPs in solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245343  
    S3‑245343 Further additions to the enhancement of IOPs in solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244956
    S3‑244755 Adding solution to KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245217  
    S3‑245217 Adding solution to KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244755
    S3‑245040 Update on KI#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesSupported by Phillips. Huawei: this kind of threat is not in the scope of 3GPP. It’s similar to false base stations. Nokia supported this comtribution.
 		revised No S3‑245218  
    S3‑245218 Update on KI#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245040
    S3‑244790 Updates to Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245219  
    S3‑245219 Updates to Overall Summary of solutions Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244790
    S3‑245041 Update on overall summary Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245219  
    S3‑244645 Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions S2-2411250 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑244852 Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions s3i240703 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245192 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑244789 General Principle for Conclusion OPPO discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: let's see the proposed solutions before going to this conclusion. CableLabs supported this. KPN: categorize the solutions could be a good way forward. Thales: exsiting many solutions without a technical evaluation. This makes it difficult. Huawei: we don’t need to solve every editor's note or evaluate every solution to agree on some principles. We did this in the past.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244902 General conclusion proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: not enough arguments here to support this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244911 Conclusion of Device Power Constrain Consideration OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this shouldn’t be in the conclusion but somewhere else.NTT-Docomo agreed with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244922 conclusion on key issue#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244972 Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital, Huawei supported this. Concerns from ORANGE and NTT-Docomo.
 		revised No S3‑245170  
    S3‑245170 Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244972
    S3‑244830 KI#3 Conclusion Sony pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this is not a conclusion, it looks like something belonging to a key issue section. Apple: conflicting text. Ericsson agreed with ORANGE and Apple. The editor's note mentions something that needs to be done in the Study, not belonging to a conclusion. There was no support for this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245004 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#3 CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: I don’t see the selected solution for the normative work here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245005 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#4 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244921 conclusion on key issue#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: too premature to have this conclusion now. Solutions need to be discussed first. Lenovo supported this contribution. Nokia had issues with the challenge-response solution. KPN and Ericsson had also concerns on this bullet point.. China Mobile supported the second bullet. Qualcomm: we need further discussions on the solutions.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245171 conclusion on key issue#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245049 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#5 CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: premature. Lenovo: premature and some parts are confusing.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245131 Conclusion for Key Issue #5 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244862 Solution to KI#3, KI#4 and KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this could work with the group paging solution. There may be a big impact on the UE as well. KPN: the feasibility of this solution should be part of the evaluation. ORANGE: evaluation should be FFS. Ericsson and Xiaomi: how to maintain the counter should be studied.
 		revised No S3‑245172  
    S3‑245172 Solution to KI#3, KI#4 and KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244862
    S3‑244669 New solution on combined authentication and data protection for Ambient IoT services KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245344  
    S3‑245344 New solution on combined authentication and data protection for Ambient IoT services KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244669
    S3‑244912 Authentication Using L1 Parameter OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: evaluation needs more justification on why this is used, otherwise remove it. China Mobile: not sure whether this will work, it doesn’t satisfy the requirement in the key issue. Nokia suggested to add an editor's note. Huawei: we have reservations about this approach and we doubt this is feasible. The Chair commented that if RAN was involved the work should be done in RAN instead of relying on LS exchanges.
 		revised No S3‑245173  
    S3‑245173 Authentication Using L1 Parameter OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244912
    S3‑244945 New solution for authentication in Ambient IoT service China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: Device and reader don’t need to be in the same security domain as the network function. Inerdigital: more a security architecture than a solution, I'd rather see a key issue about this. Qualcomm: not sure what security threats are being addressed here.
 		revised No S3‑245174  
    S3‑245174 New solution for authentication in Ambient IoT service China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244945
    S3‑245002 Mutual Authentication Using AEAD for Inventory and Command case Xidian, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesSony: iit looks like an nventoyr request that triggers authentication. Huawei: not clear that AKA is being used here. It should be clarified.
 		revised No S3‑245175  
    S3‑245175 Mutual Authentication Using AEAD for Inventory and Command case Xidian, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245002
    S3‑245016 New Solution to KI#5 Ericsson pCR   Yes
YesInterdigital: the figure needs better explanation. Huawei: how to avoid the hash collision needs to be clarified. Resource exhaustion attack is not prevent here either. Qualcomm: not sure what problem this solution addresses. China Mobile: I have a problem with involving 5GC here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245176 New Solution to KI#5 Ericsson pCR - No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245044 New solution on authentication and privacy of AIoT device Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: how do you protect from replay attacks here? Lenovo: add an editor's note on encrypted paging identities. Huawei: how does this work for group paging? Sony: I support Lenovo's comment and it should be added to the evaluation. Interdigital: identity spoofing possible in step 5. Add editor's note. ORANGE: remove evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑245177  
    S3‑245177 New solution on authentication and privacy of AIoT device Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245044
    S3‑245107 New solution THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245178  
    S3‑245178 New solution THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245107
    S3‑244736 KI#4, New Sol Communication Security of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: keep just one sentence in evaluation. Sony:clarify step 3.
 		revised No S3‑245296  
    S3‑245296 KI#4, New Sol Communication Security of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244736
    S3‑244909 Security Key Generation Using L1 Parameter OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245297  
    S3‑245297 Security Key Generation Using L1 Parameter OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244909
    S3‑245001 pCR to TR33.713 New solution general AIoT Device operation message protection procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: not clear how this works. Interdigital: exhaustion attack possible due to encryption/decryption in steps 2 and 4.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244738 KI#3, New Sol Privacy protection based on anonymous AIoT device ID vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo: broadast paging is a concern. I don’t think this is a good solution. Interdigital: anonymous ID use by TLS handshake, so it assumes that the device supports TLS handshake and this is a big assumption. NTT-Docomo wasn’t a fan of this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244908 Solution on PHY key based protecting AIoT device identifiers OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245298  
    S3‑245298 Solution on PHY key based protecting AIoT device identifiers OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244908
    S3‑244737 KI#1, New Sol Disable AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245299  
    S3‑245299 KI#1, New Sol Disable AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244737
    S3‑244788 Resolving EN from Sol#5 OPPO, Xidian pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: the picture needs fixing.
 		revised No S3‑245300  
    S3‑245300 Resolving EN from Sol#5 OPPO, Xidian pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244788
    S3‑244968 Update to solution #16 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245301  
    S3‑245301 Update to solution #16 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244968
    S3‑244969 Add evaluation for solution #16 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245302  
    S3‑245302 Add evaluation for solution #16 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244969
    S3‑245070 Solution#1 update - Addressing EN Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245071 Solution#1 evaluation update Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244757 Add the evaluation for the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244970 Update to solution #18 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244971 Add evaluation for solution #18 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245303  
    S3‑245303 Add evaluation for solution #18 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244971
    S3‑244671 Resolution of ENs in Solution #21 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245304  
    S3‑245304 Resolution of ENs in Solution #21 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244671
    S3‑244672 Resolution of ENs in Solution #20 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245305  
    S3‑245305 Resolution of ENs in Solution #20 InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244672
    S3‑244709 Ambient IoT solution on privacy revision Apple pCR   Yes
YesQualcomm: not sure that the document is addressing the editor's notes that were removed.
 		revised No S3‑245306  
    S3‑245306 Ambient IoT solution on privacy revision Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244709
    S3‑244761 Resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245307  
    S3‑245307 Resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244761
    S3‑244762 Adding evaluation to sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245308  
    S3‑245308 Adding evaluation to sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244762
    S3‑244795 Resolve ENs in sol#23 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244806 Solution 26 Update and Evaluation Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245309  
    S3‑245309 Solution 26 Update and Evaluation Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244806
    S3‑244960 Addressing the EN in solution #27 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245000 pCR to TR33.713 Update solution#30 to remove EN CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: keep the editor's note for the evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑245310  
    S3‑245310 pCR to TR33.713 Update solution#30 to remove EN CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245000
    S3‑245017 Addressing ENs in Solution#29 to KI#3 Ericsson pCR   Yes
YesKPN: reformulate note 2. MCC refer to SA2 specification, not the WG. Nokia didn’t agree with note 4. Sony: paging message is not specified in SA2, but in SA3.
 		revised No S3‑245311  
    S3‑245311 Addressing ENs in Solution#29 to KI#3 Ericsson pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245017
    S3‑245018 Evaluation of Solution#29 to KI#3 Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245043 Resolving EN in solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245063 Resolution of ENs on Authentication Result, Encryption and Command Protection Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245064 Resolution of EN on Temporary ID synchronization Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245065 Resolution of EN on group of devices Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245066 Update of solution#13 for key mismatch handling Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245067 Evaluation of Solution#13 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245068 Solution#31 update - Addressing EN Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245069 Solution#31 update Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244819 Solution 14 Update and Evaluation Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245312  
    S3‑245312 Solution 14 Update and Evaluation Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244819
    S3‑244913 Remove ENs and add evaluation in Solution #17 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245313  
    S3‑245313 Remove ENs and add evaluation in Solution #17 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244913
    S3‑244959 Addressing the EN in solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245314  
    S3‑245314 Addressing the EN in solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244959
    S3‑244710 Ambient IoT solution on mutual authentication revision Apple pCR   Yes
YesKPN: the new figure is not aliigned with RAN.
 		revised No S3‑245315  
    S3‑245315 Ambient IoT solution on mutual authentication revision Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244710
    S3‑244735 KI#5, Solution update on AIoT device authentication vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245316  
    S3‑245316 KI#5, Solution update on AIoT device authentication vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244735
    S3‑244759 Resolving ENs in sol#6 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244760 Evaluation for solution 6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244831 Updating Solution #7 OPPO, Xidian pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244920 addressing the editor's note in solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244999 pCR to TR33.713 Update solution#9 to remove EN CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244763 Update the KI#1 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244764 Update the KI#3 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244734 Update on Key Issue#6 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244670 New KI: Reader Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑244758 New key issue on secure data transfer between UE and AIOTF ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑245013 New key issue for secure storage in AIoT devices Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑245014 New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑245015 New key issue for Authenticated and authorized access to devices in Ambient IoT via 3GPP core Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑245132 Authorization of external AF for Inventory NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑245169 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities S3‑244676 Cover Sheet TR 33.700-32 InterDigital France R&D, SAS TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245369  
    S3‑245369 Cover Sheet TR 33.700-32 InterDigital France R&D, SAS TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244676
    S3‑244677 TR 33.700-32 Conclusion for Key Issue#3, Cablelabs, Lenovo InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245268  
    S3‑245268 TR 33.700-32 Conclusion for Key Issue#3, Cablelabs, Lenovo InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244677
    S3‑244690 concluding KI3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245268  
    S3‑244843 Additional conclusions for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245268  
    S3‑245056 Conclusion on authorization of non-3GPP devices behind gateway UE or 5G-RG (KI#3) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245268  
    S3‑245193 Draft TR 33.700-32 Interdigital draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement S3‑244840 New solution for UAV triggered UUAA Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245256  
    S3‑245256 New solution for UAV triggered UUAA Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244840
    S3‑244841 New solution for USS triggered UUAA Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245257  
    S3‑245257 New solution for USS triggered UUAA Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244841
    S3‑244842 Solution 7 updates to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244957 Enhancing the conclusion of KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245258  
    S3‑245258 Enhancing the conclusion of KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244957
    S3‑245048 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.759 'Study on security enhancements of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) Phase 3', Version 1.0.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245370  
    S3‑245370 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.759 'Study on security enhancements of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) Phase 3', Version 1.0.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245048
    S3‑244869 Updates to Terms, Abbreviations and Overview Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244966 UUAA in 5GS updates Ericsson draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245023 pCR to TR33.713 Conclusion#5 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245194 Draft TR 33.759 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑244674 LS on Multi-hop U2N Relay Architecture Aspects InterDigital France R&D, SAS LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245259  
    S3‑245259 LS on Multi-hop U2N Relay Architecture Aspects InterDigital France R&D, SAS LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244674
    S3‑245091 Update Solution #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245260  
    S3‑245260 Update Solution #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245091
    S3‑244962 Addressing Ens in solution #16 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245261  
    S3‑245261 Addressing Ens in solution #16 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244962
    S3‑245092 Update Solution#4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245262  
    S3‑245262 Update Solution#4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245092
    S3‑244963 Conclusion of multi-hop U2N relay discovery security in KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245263  
    S3‑245263 Conclusion of multi-hop U2N relay discovery security in KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244963
    S3‑244887 Conclude to KI#1 of TR 33.743 - U2NW discovery security Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245263  
    S3‑244978 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245263  
    S3‑245090 Conclusion to KI#1 – multi-hop U2NW discovery Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245263  
    S3‑245024 pCR to TR33.743 Conclusion#1 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245263  
    S3‑244888 Conclude to KI#1 of TR 33.743 - U2NW security setup Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, China Telecom, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245264  
    S3‑245264 Conclude to KI#1 of TR 33.743 - U2NW security setup Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, China Telecom, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244888
    S3‑244964 Conclusion of multi-hop U2N relay communication security in KI#1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245264  
    S3‑245089 Conclusion for Key Issue#1 - Communication setup Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245264  
    S3‑244886 Update to KI#2 conclusion of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245265  
    S3‑245265 Update to KI#2 conclusion of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244886
    S3‑244892 New solution about Multi-hop U2U Model A discovery in non-IP scenario Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245266  
    S3‑245266 New solution about Multi-hop U2U Model A discovery in non-IP scenario Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244892
    S3‑245195 Draft TR 33.743 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245267 Cover sheet Draft TR 33.743 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements S3‑244740 KI1 update vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree.Ericsson supported this. OPPO supported to update the key issue 1. It was mentioned that SA2 had left an editor's note for SA3 working on this new solution in 741.
 		merged No S3‑245271  
    S3‑244849 Update KI #1 of TR 33.784 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245271  
    S3‑245271 Update KI #1 of TR 33.784 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244849
    S3‑244741 New sol: User consent for LCS vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245108 A user consent mechanism for data collection related to AIML-based positioning Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244907 Authorization of direct AI/ML based Positioning UE data collection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: privacy profile is irrelevant in this use case. Ericsson supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244873 Solution 1 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244988 Resolution of ENs and updates in Solution#16 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244871 Update of Conclusion on Key issue #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this.
 		revised No S3‑245346  
    S3‑245346 Update of Conclusion on Key issue #1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244871
    S3‑244991 Conclusion update for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245345  
    S3‑245345 Conclusion update for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244991
    S3‑244742 Additional Conclusion for key issue#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244987 New conclusion for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244739 Address EN in solution 4 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244994 Resolution of Editor's Note in Solution#5 (Authorization of VFL participants involving NWDAF and AF) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244743 Additional Conclusion for key issue#2 vivo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245269  
    S3‑245269 Additional Conclusion for key issue#2 vivo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson asked to be minuted: Ericsson provided a compromise. Ericsson not satisfied with S3-245269 but for the sake of progression of the study and to focus on other more important questions, Ericsson accepts S3-245269.
 		approved No   S3‑244743
    S3‑244881 Update to Conclusion on Key issue #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245269  
    S3‑244995 Conclusion for KI#2 for the case that the NWDAF is the VFL Server Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245269  
    S3‑244874 Solution 9 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244691 KI3 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245270  
    S3‑244744 Additional Conclusion for key Issue#3 vivo, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: thiis is not supported by many companies in SA2 and it is still under discussion there. We shouldn’t influence SA2 discussions, this is within their scope. Huawei supported the contribution. China Mobile supported this as well. Vivo: no impact on SA2, this is high level. Ericsson: this would give guidance to SA2 and influence their work. The Chair commented that this wasn't in SA3's scope.
 		revised No S3‑245270  
    S3‑245270 Additional Conclusion for key Issue#3 vivo, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
YesSupport (on 270r1. IF ANOTHER REVISION IS UPLOADED THE SHOW OF HANDS BELOW IS TO BE DELETED). China Mobile, Vivo, China Telecom, Huawei, CATT, ZTE. No support: Ericsson, Interdigital, Nokia, Xiaomi, OPPO,KDDI.
 		approved No   S3‑244744
    S3‑244872 Update of Conclusion on Key issue #3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245270  
    S3‑244745 TR clean up vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245347  
    S3‑245347 TR clean up vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244745
    S3‑244857 Presentation of Report to TSG: China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245197 Draft TR 33.784 China Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing S3‑244813 Solving the problem of generating and forwarding the salt to the BSF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245348  
    S3‑245348 Solving the problem of generating and forwarding the salt to the BSF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244813
    S3‑245052 Resolving ENs in Solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245272  
    S3‑245272 Resolving ENs in Solution #6 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245052
    S3‑245053 Resolving ENs in Solution #9 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245273  
    S3‑245273 Resolving ENs in Solution #9 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245053
    S3‑244812 conclusion to KI#2.1 of eEDGE Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245274  
    S3‑244942 Conclusion for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245274  
    S3‑245274 Conclusion for KI#2.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244942
    S3‑245054 Conclusion for KI#2.1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245274  
    S3‑244943 Conclusion for KI#1.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
YesEricsson: not needed.
 		revised No S3‑245349  
    S3‑245349 Conclusion for KI#1.1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244943
    S3‑244936 Informative annex for N6 delay measurement protocols Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244965 LS on security aspects related to protocols used in N6 delay measurements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
YesApple: no need, it is implied that we recommend these kind of protocols. Nokia replied that SA2 should remove references to insecure protocols. Ericsson: not sure if this is needed, it can be done directly in SA2. Nokia: SA2 is meeting next week and finalising the normative work then.
 		revised No S3‑245276  
    S3‑245276 LS on security aspects related to protocols used in N6 delay measurements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244965
    S3‑245198 Draft TR 33.749 China Unicom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access S3‑244787 Cover Sheet for TR 33.754 Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd TS or TR cover   Yes
YesQualcomm: concluding that there is no normaitve work envisioned is a conclusion. Revised to change the outstanding issues.
 		revised No S3‑245277  
    S3‑245277 Cover Sheet for TR 33.754 Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd TS or TR cover - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244787
    S3‑245003 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.754 Study on security aspects for multi-access (DualSteer + Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting support in the 5G system architecture phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4), Version 1.1.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving S3‑244606 Discussion paper on user consent for energy information collection and energy information exposure Deutsche Telekom AG discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244859 Resolution of ENs concerning compliance to regional legislation when collecting and exposing user energy consumption information. Nokia, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: the way the requirements are written are very unusual. We don’t need these requirements. AT&T: reword requirements, something like "support compliance".
 		revised No S3‑245278  
    S3‑245278 Resolution of ENs concerning compliance to regional legislation when collecting and exposing user energy consumption information. Nokia, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244859
    S3‑244860 Regional legislation compliance in relation to collection of user information. Nokia, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245350  
    S3‑245350 Regional legislation compliance in relation to collection of user information. Nokia, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244860
    S3‑244885 resolve EN for K1 and KI2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245278  
    S3‑245050 New solution for security aspects on user consent for policy update based on energy information IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245051 New solution for security aspects on user consent for energy information exposure/retrieval IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245199 Draft TR 33.766 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑245100 Teminology updates regarding NR Femto Hosting Party LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245282  
    S3‑244765 Update to KI#9 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245281  
    S3‑244898 Addressing EN in KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245281  
    S3‑245281 Addressing EN in KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244898
    S3‑244766 Address the EN in Sol#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244725 Add evaluation to solution#3 Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244799 EN Removal for solution #5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: replace SA2 with a reference to the TR number. This will be fixed by the Rapporteur in the draft TR.
 		approved No    
    S3‑244801 EN Removal for solution #6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: reference to the SA2 spec is missing. Replace SA2 with reference to their TR. This will be fixed by the Rapporteur.
 		approved No    
    S3‑244802 Updates and EN Removal for solution #7 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244946 New solution for key issue 3 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: not OK with this solution.Impact on the security gateway. Charter: security gateway has no protocol awareness, we wouldn’t know how to implement this in there.
 		revised No S3‑245351  
    S3‑245351 New solution for key issue 3 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244946
    S3‑244768 Update conclusions to KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245282  
    S3‑244798 Updates to conclusions for Key Issue #1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: the last sentence of the note is new, never been discussed before. Remove this.
 		revised No S3‑245282  
    S3‑245282 Updates to conclusions for Key Issue #1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244798
    S3‑244818 Updates to conclusions for Key Issue #3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesChina Mobile didn’t agree with ths.
 		revised No S3‑245352  
    S3‑245352 Updates to conclusions for Key Issue #3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244818
    S3‑244900 Updating conclusion#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245283  
    S3‑245283 Updating conclusion#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244900
    S3‑244901 Updating conclusion#6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245284  
    S3‑245284 Updating conclusion#6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244901
    S3‑244767 Add conclusions to KI#9 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245285  
    S3‑244899 Adding conclusion to KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesCharter: security gateway doesn’t have awareness of protocols. Huawei: the SGW is ahead of the core network, so it doesn’t have a knowlledge of the topology.
 		revised No S3‑245285  
    S3‑245285 Adding conclusion to KI#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244899
    S3‑244769 Remove the EN in stable conclusions ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245353  
    S3‑245353 Remove the EN in stable conclusions ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244769
    S3‑244724 Update solution mapping to incorporate KI#9 Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑245203 Draft TR 33.745 ZTE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑245286 Cover sheet draft TR 33.745 for approval ZTE TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑244770 Conclusion on KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245287  
    S3‑244890 Conclude KI#1 in TR 33.721 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245287  
    S3‑245034 [TR 33.721] Conclusion for Key issue#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245287  
    S3‑245287 [TR 33.721] Conclusion for Key issue#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245034
    S3‑244771 Conclusion on KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245288  
    S3‑244891 Conclude KI#2 in TR 33.721 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245288  
    S3‑245288 Conclude KI#2 in TR 33.721 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244891
    S3‑244986 33.721: Conclusion for Key Issue 2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson argued against the use of Annex V of TS 33.501 in the conclusions. This was considered new information, not clear.
 		merged No S3‑245288  
    S3‑245035 [TR 33.721] Conclusion for Key issue#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245288  
    S3‑245033 [TR 33.721] Update to solution#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245289  
    S3‑245289 [TR 33.721] Update to solution#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245033
    S3‑245124 Solution for KI#3 to authorize DA client to create digital asset Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245290  
    S3‑245290 Solution for KI#3 to authorize DA client to create digital asset Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245124
    S3‑245125 olution for KI#3 to authorize VAL-S or VAL_C to access digital asset Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245291  
    S3‑245291 olution for KI#3 to authorize VAL-S or VAL_C to access digital asset Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245125
    S3‑245036 [TR 33.721] Conclusion for Key issue#3 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244985 33.721: New Solution for Key Issue 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245354  
    S3‑245354 33.721: New Solution for Key Issue 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244985
    S3‑245126 Solution for KI#4 to authorize avatar by metaverse service provider Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245292  
    S3‑245292 Solution for KI#4 to authorize avatar by metaverse service provider Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245126
    S3‑245204 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 S3‑244773 Add evaluation to Sol#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244832 Solution 2 updates to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245220  
    S3‑244833 Adding evaluation to Solution 2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245220  
    S3‑245220 Adding evaluation to Solution 2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244833
    S3‑244617 Updates to Solution #5 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245221  
    S3‑245221 Updates to Solution #5 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244617
    S3‑244747 Evaluation to solution #4 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244774 Conclusion on KI#1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245222  
    S3‑244837 Conclusion to KI#1.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245222  
    S3‑245222 Conclusion to KI#1.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244837
    S3‑244779 Update and evaluate solution #6 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245223  
    S3‑245223 Update and evaluate solution #6 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244779
    S3‑244784 Evaluation to solution #9 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245224  
    S3‑245110 Add evaluation for solution #9 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245224  
    S3‑245224 Add evaluation for solution #9 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245110
    S3‑245116 Resolve ENs for solution #9 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245225  
    S3‑245225 Resolve ENs for solution #9 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245116
    S3‑244928 Addressing ENs on KI1.2 RO permission management in solution 7 Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245226  
    S3‑245226 Addressing ENs on KI1.2 RO permission management in solution 7 Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244928
    S3‑245058 Resolving ENs and evaluation of Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245227  
    S3‑245227 Resolving ENs and evaluation of Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245058
    S3‑244781 Evaluation to solution #4 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244834 Solution 4 updates to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245228  
    S3‑244835 Adding evaluation to Solution 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245228  
    S3‑245228 Adding evaluation to Solution 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244835
    S3‑244783 Evaluation to solution #8 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245229  
    S3‑245109 Add evaluation for solution #8 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245229  
    S3‑245229 Add evaluation for solution #8 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245109
    S3‑245115 Resolve ENs for solution #8 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245230  
    S3‑245230 Resolve ENs for solution #8 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245115
    S3‑244775 Conclusion on KI#1.2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245231  
    S3‑244780 Conclusion on key issue #1.2 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245231  
    S3‑244838 Conclusion to KI#1.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245231  
    S3‑245231 Conclusion to KI#1.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244838
    S3‑245057 Update to KI#1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245232  
    S3‑245232 Update to KI#1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑245057
    S3‑244836 Adding evaluation to Solution 10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245233  
    S3‑245233 Adding evaluation to Solution 10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244836
    S3‑244929 Update to KI1.3 Solution 29 on scope enhancing Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245234  
    S3‑245234 Update to KI1.3 Solution 29 on scope enhancing Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244929
    S3‑244839 Conclusion to KI#1.3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245235  
    S3‑245235 Conclusion to KI#1.3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244839
    S3‑244616 Updates to Solution #21 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245236  
    S3‑245236 Updates to Solution #21 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244616
    S3‑244826 Evaluation for sol#21 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245236  
    S3‑244772 Evaluation for the Solution 23 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245237  
    S3‑245237 Evaluation for the Solution 23 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244772
    S3‑244821 Evaluation for sol#13 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245238  
    S3‑244931 Update to KI2 Solution 13 on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect requesting security information from another CCF Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245238  
    S3‑245238 Update to KI2 Solution 13 on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect requesting security information from another CCF Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244931
    S3‑244822 Evaluation for sol#14 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245239  
    S3‑244932 Update to KI2 Solution 14 on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect when API invoker has not included CCF information Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245239  
    S3‑245239 Update to KI2 Solution 14 on authentication aspect in CAPIF interconnect when API invoker has not included CCF information Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244932
    S3‑244823 Evaluation for sol#15 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245240  
    S3‑244933 Update to KI2 Solution 15 on authorization token request handling in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245240  
    S3‑245240 Update to KI2 Solution 15 on authorization token request handling in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244933
    S3‑244824 Evaluation for sol#18 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245241  
    S3‑245111 Add evaluation for solution #18 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245241  
    S3‑245241 Add evaluation for solution #18 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245111
    S3‑244825 Evaluation for sol#19 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245242  
    S3‑245112 Add evaluation for solution #19 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245242  
    S3‑245242 Add evaluation for solution #19 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245112
    S3‑244827 Evaluation for sol#22 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245243  
    S3‑245059 Resolving ENs and evaluation of Solution #22 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245243  
    S3‑245243 Resolving ENs and evaluation of Solution #22 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245059
    S3‑244828 Evaluation for sol#24 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245244  
    S3‑245030 [TR 33.700-22] Update to solution#24 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245244  
    S3‑245244 [TR 33.700-22] Update to solution#24 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245030
    S3‑244829 Update sol#17 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245245  
    S3‑245245 Update sol#17 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244829
    S3‑244930 Update to KI2 Solution 12 on security method retrieval in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245246  
    S3‑245246 Update to KI2 Solution 12 on security method retrieval in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244930
    S3‑244934 Update to KI2 Solution 16 on mapping an API invoker authorization request to the correct CCF in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245247  
    S3‑245247 Update to KI2 Solution 16 on mapping an API invoker authorization request to the correct CCF in CAPIF interconnect Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244934
    S3‑245113 Add evaluation for solution #20 of TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244776 Conclusion on KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245248  
    S3‑245248 Conclusion on KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244776
    S3‑244820 Conclusion for KI#2 China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245248  
    S3‑245117 Conclusion for CAPIF 6 and CAPIF 6e security Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245248  
    S3‑245060 Update to Solution #25 and evaluation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245249  
    S3‑245249 Update to Solution #25 and evaluation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245060
    S3‑244937 KI4 Sol on Authentication of the origin API invoker in nested API invocation Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245250  
    S3‑245250 KI4 Sol on Authentication of the origin API invoker in nested API invocation Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244937
    S3‑245031 [TR 33.700-22] Update to solution#27 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245251  
    S3‑245251 [TR 33.700-22] Update to solution#27 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245031
    S3‑245061 Resolving EN and evaluation of Solution #26 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245252  
    S3‑245252 Resolving EN and evaluation of Solution #26 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245061
    S3‑245114 Authorization mechanism for nested API invocation Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245253  
    S3‑245253 Authorization mechanism for nested API invocation Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑245114
    S3‑245032 [TR 33.700-22] Conclusion for Key issue#4 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244935 Update to KI5 Solution on authenticating multiple API invokers of the same RO Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245254  
    S3‑245254 Update to KI5 Solution on authenticating multiple API invokers of the same RO Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244935
    S3‑244938 New KI on Onboarding security issue Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245255  
    S3‑245255 New KI on Onboarding security issue Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244938
    S3‑244939 Solution on validation of correct GPSI in API invoker information Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245371  
    S3‑245371 Solution on validation of correct GPSI in API invoker information Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑244939
    S3‑244940 Correction of implementation mistake Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244941 Update of mapping table Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑244778 Evaluation to solution #5 in TR 33.700-22 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244870 Conclusion for KI#3 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245118 New WID on security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 Xiaomi communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑245205 Draft TR 33.700-22 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑244614 Discussion Paper on eZTS SBA WID Proposal Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑244615 New WID on enablers for Zero Trust Security in SBA Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245319  
    S3‑245319 New WID on enablers for Zero Trust Security in SBA Motorola Mobility [Rapporteur] WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑244615
    S3‑244618 New Study on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new   Yes
YesNokia cadded that there were comments for which Release this SID would go for. They proposed to start in Rel-19 and continue in Rel-20. The Chair added that this was being done in other SDOs already. DT supported this and preferred to have it in Rel-19. Apple supported this and agreed to start in Rel-19. LTE inventory could be done later on. CableLabs supported this as well. Alex (GSMA): good thing to do, but this is not a study, it’s a report (so change the title). NCSC: why going back to 4G? This is about migration. GSMA replied that all generations apply, to know what crypto is available and how strong it is. Surely it can be found that 2G and 3G may be found to be not possible to protect. Vivo supported this SID, no preference for Release. Huawei: concerned about Release 19, there is no time for this.Let's leave it for Rel-20. NIST supported this SID. The Chair clarified that there was no normative work expected from here. The understanding is that TUs would not be needed. Qualcomm: we disagree. These crypto algorithms may change every Release so we have to update the TR every time. PQC is not going to happen in one Release. Ericsson was fine with the study but wanted to rephrase the objectives. Huawei: questionable for Rel-19. No rush, let's discuss it in Rel-20. NIST: snapshot, not new features here. ORANGE: ndoing nothing is not giving a good image for 3GPP when other bodies have started sdoing the same. NTT-Docomo: scope can be 5G specs only, by using the flag that is in the Portal for these. The Chair clarified that this SID would not be approved if it appeared as Rel-20 in Plenary. Huawei answered that this would have no impact if it didn’t have any TUs. The Chair answered that this would keep it aside anyway. Verizon: other organizations have started, we need to be proactive. T-Mobile: let’s do it Rel-19. Motorola Solutions: Rel-19 and extend it, there is no normative impact.
 		revised No S3‑245142  
    S3‑245142 New Study on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244618
    S3‑244622 New SID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Agreement Yes
YesIt was clarified that there was only one meeting left for Rel-19. Huawei: 3GPP is not the right place to deal with containers. Alex (GSMA) commented that the Industry needs to do this somewhere. The implications on the security of products in the market should be at least studied, leading to something normative is a different question. Nokia: we have a gap about containers in our specifications. NTT-Docomo supported this work. Huawei:
 		noted No    
    S3‑244683 New WID on Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245372  
    S3‑245372 New WID on Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244683
    S3‑244684 Use of AEAD in Next-Generation 3GPP System KDDI Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
YesQualcomm: we will need RAN groups to get involved here. CableLabs: we support the study but we cannot endorse this. Better to discuss the SID. SA3 needs to iniitiate this. Nokia wanted to endorse the document.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244777 WID on security aspects of 5G NR Femto ZTE Corporation WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245325  
    S3‑245325 WID on security aspects of 5G NR Femto ZTE Corporation WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244777
    S3‑244782 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 3 China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245342  
    S3‑245342 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 3 China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244782
    S3‑244785 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑245320  
    S3‑244786 New WID on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. WID new Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑244848 New WID on UAS security enhancements Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245321  
    S3‑245321 New WID on UAS security enhancements Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244848
    S3‑244856 New WID on Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML China Mobile, vivo WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245322  
    S3‑245322 New WID on Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML China Mobile, vivo WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244856
    S3‑244889 New WID on ProSe Ph3 security Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245320  
    S3‑245320 New WID on ProSe Ph3 security Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244889
    S3‑244910 New WID on Security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245373  
    S3‑245373 New WID on Security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑244910
    S3‑244923 New WID on Ambient IoT security Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245037 New WID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245323  
    S3‑245323 New WID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑245037
    S3‑245047 New WID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 CATT WID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson clarified that the content had to go to 401 and 501 given the nature of the changes.
 		revised No S3‑245356  
    S3‑245356 New WID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 CATT WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑245047
    S3‑245088 New WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245326  
    S3‑245326 New WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson,China Mobile WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑245088
    S3‑245094 Protection of XRM metadata Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245095 New WID on MOBIKE for NTN 3GPP backhaul over the feeder link Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair recommended to take this WID directly to Plenary.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245096 New WID on Protection of XRM Metadata Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Agreement Yes
YesChina Mobile: premature to have this WID at this meeting. Lenovo: there are issues that we havent looked at before or studied properly. Nokia supported the WID. We will get into the situation that there will be mechanims defined in SA2 that have no security solution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑245097 MOBIKE for NTN 3GPP backhaul over feeder link Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑245098 Protecting XRM Metadata in QUIC aware forwarding Ericsson draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245130 New WID on security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 Xiaomi commnications WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑245324  
    S3‑245324 New WID on security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 Xiaomi communications WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑245130
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑244604 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
YesOnline meeting in January 2025. Reduced agenda and limited conference calls.The Chair will provided more information in time.
 		noted No    
    S3‑244746 R20 Security Planning - vivo's views vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑245327 Release 20 Planning WG Chair other Presentation Yes
YesIt was commented that coordination and cooperation with SA2 needed to be more efficient. - Joint conference calls or workshops for 6G architecture. ORANGE: prioritization of WIDs happen every Release in SA3 because we have less time than SA2. The prioritization should be done at SA2+SA3 level. Vodafone: we disagree with a 6G joint workshop SA2-SA3. Let's use that time to work. SA is doing its prioritization at SA level, not SA2 level. 5G Advance will have WIDs and 6G will have SIDs, let's focus on the normative work. NTT-Docomo: joint sessions with SA2 didn’t work.
 		noted No