**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #110Ad-Hoc-e *draft\_S3-231799-r3***

**Electronic meeting, Online, 17 - 21 April 2023** *merger of* *S3-232011, 231799*

**Source: Qualcomm Incorporated, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V., CATT**

**Title: Conclusion of KI#1**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.3**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***This contribution proposes a conclusion of KI #1.***

# 2 References

[1] TR 33.740

# 3 Rationale

This contribution proposes to add a conclusion of Key Issue #1.

Particularly, it is proposed to use a direct discovery set protection indication provisioned by the 5G PKMF to inform the UE of whether to enable or disable direct discovery set protection. By doing this, two type of security protections (i.e., message protection using two sets of security materials or a single sets of security materials) can be supported based on whether multiple direct discovery sets associated with different ProSe services can be carried over a single U2U relay service associated with an RSC.

# 4 Detailed proposal

It is proposed that SA3 approve the below pCR for inclusion in the TR [1].

**\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\***

## 7.1 Key Issue #1: Security for UE-to-UE Relay discovery

The following text is taken as a conclusion for the UE-to-UE Relay discovery:

The two sets of discovery security materials are used for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection. One is used for protecting direct discovery set. The other one is used for protecting the U2U relay discovery message.

Provisioning of discovery security materials for the direct discovery set reuses the security material provisioning mechanism for Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery as specified in TS 33.503[6].

Provisioning of discovery security materials for the U2U relay discovery message reuses the security material provisioning mechanism for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery as specified in TS 33.503 [6].

Editor’s Note: Further conclusion is FFS.

**\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\***