**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #108e  *S3-22xxxx***

**e-meeting, 22 – 26 August 2022**

**Title: LS on Source user info in Direct Communication Request in UE-to-Network Relay**

**Response to:**

**Release: Release 17**

**Work Item: 5G\_ProSe\_Sec**

**Source: SA3**

**To: SA2, CT1**

**Cc:**

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# 1 Overall description

In 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay, the Relay Service Code (RSC) and PRUK (ProSe Relay User Key) ID in the Direct Communication Request (DCR) message are security protected based on the provisioned security materials. This is intended to protect the user privacy as well as the integrity of the DCR message.

According to the TS 24.554, the source user info in the DCR message is a mandatory IE. TS 23.304 also specifies the same. It is SA3’s understanding that the source user info is not used for the PC5 security setup while it would reveal the remote UE’s privacy sensitive information if transmitted without protection. Therefore, SA3 requests CT1 and SA2 to not include the source user info in the DCR message for UE-to-Network relay in the respective specifications.

If the source user info is necessary for UE-to-Network relay operations, SA3 suggests exchanging it using a secure signalling after PC5 security is established.

# 2 Actions

**To SA2, CT1**

**ACTION:** SA3 kindly requests SA2 and CT1 to update their specifications as suggested above.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings

SA3#108e-Bis 10-14 October 2022 Online

SA3#109e 14 - 18 November 2022 TBD