Tdoc List
2022-10-21 15:46
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑222450 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑222451 | Process for SA3#108e-AdHoc | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222453 | Process and agenda planning for SA3#108e-AdHoc | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups (related to Rel-18 Studies) | S3‑222455 | LS on NCR Solutions | R3-225253 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑222519 | Reply LS on NCR Solutions | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223080 | |||
S3‑222627 | Draft Reply LS on NCR Solutions | ZTE Corporation,China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223080 | |||
S3‑222801 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on NCR solutions | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223080 | |||
S3‑222460 | LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN | S2-2207501 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑222753 | Reply to LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222902 | Protection of URSP rules from HPLMN | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222903 | Draft LS reply Protection of URSP rules from HPLMN | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222463 | Identifier availability for Lawful Interception during Inter-PLMN handover | s3i220485 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222466 | LS on Security Requirements for the MSGin5G Service | S6-222343 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑222525 | reply LS on Security Requirements for the MSGin5G Service | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222560 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | R3-225250 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑222654 | Reply LS on the User Consent for Trace Reportings | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑223080 | Draft Reply LS on NCR Solutions | ZTE Corporation,China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222627 | |||
4 | Work areas (Rel-18) |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for Management Function (MnF) |   | ||||||||||
4.2 | New WID on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products |   | ||||||||||
4.3 | New WID on Mission critical security enhancements phase 3 |   | ||||||||||
4.4 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 5G Rel-17 Features |   | ||||||||||
4.5 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function Function (AAnF) |   | ||||||||||
4.6 | New WID on SCAS for split-gNB product classes |   | ||||||||||
4.7 | Service Based Architecture (Rel-15/16/17) |   | ||||||||||
4.8 | Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe (Rel-17) |   | ||||||||||
4.9 | All topics (Rel-15/16/17/18 ) |   | ||||||||||
5 | Rel-18 Studies |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations | S3‑222851 | Updates to Solution#7 SI verification using Digital Signatures | Samsung, Apple, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222852 | Resolving EN of solution#7 (TR 33.809) | Samsung, Apple, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222853 | Conclusion for key issue#2 | Samsung, Intel, Apple, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222687 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222688 | Addressing EN on NR Repeater in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222689 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222541 | Evaluation of solution #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Apple, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222542 | Evaluation of solution #25 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222543 | Conclusion for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Apple, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222544 | Update to solution #25 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222762 | An update on the evaluation of solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223010 | |||
S3‑222454 | Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information | R2-2208985 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑222475 | Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222850 | Reply LS on authenticity and replay protection of system information | Samsung, Deutsche Telekom | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222655 | 5GFBS - Mapping of solutions and key issues | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223125 | |||
S3‑222988 | draft TR33.809 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223010 | An update on the evaluation of solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222762 | |||
S3‑223125 | 5GFBS - Mapping of solutions and key issues | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222655 | |||
5.2 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation | S3‑222537 | New solution on boot time attestation at 3GPP function level | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222600 | Solution #4 – Evaluation and addressing EN | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222995 | |||
S3‑222601 | Solution #7 – Evaluation and addressing EN | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222997 | |||
S3‑222683 | Address EN on PACF and MANO Communication | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222684 | Address EN on verifying attestation results for NRF and PACF | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CISA ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222995 | Solution #4 – Evaluation and addressing EN | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222600 | |||
S3‑222997 | Solution #7 – Evaluation and addressing EN | MITRE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222601 | |||
S3‑223072 | TR33848 v0140 | BT plc | draft TR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.3 | Study on Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 2 | S3‑222462 | Reply LS on 5G ProSe security open items | S2-2207838 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑222480 | New Key Issue on Security and privacy of switching between two indirect UE-to-Network Relay paths | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222481 | New Key Issue on privacy of switching between direct Uu and indirect Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay paths | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222482 | New KI on security of U2NW multi-path connection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222520 | New Key Issue on Security and privacy of path switching between PC5 and Uu | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222582 | KI for multi path relaying security | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222609 | New KI on U2U relay protection of remote UE traffic | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222993 | |||
S3‑222629 | Key issue on Subscription synchronization between PAnF and UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222630 | Key issue on Support direct communication path switching between PC5 and Uu | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222792 | New KI: Support for Emergency service over UE-to-Network Relaying | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222833 | add new key issue for path switching | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222844 | Key Issue for secure ProSe multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network relay | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222877 | Key Issue on security of multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network Relay | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222486 | E2E solution in L3 Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222487 | E2E solution in L2 Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222576 | Solution for U2U relay (model A) discovery security | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222969 | |||
S3‑222579 | Solution for U2U Relay (model B) discovery security | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222585 | Address the ENs in Sol #6 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223116 | |||
S3‑222592 | Update TR 33.740 solution#1 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222593 | Update TR 33.740 solution#2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222943 | |||
S3‑222594 | New Solution for Security of Layer-2 based UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222944 | |||
S3‑222595 | New Solution for E2E Authentication with Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222945 | |||
S3‑222596 | New Solution for Path Switching with Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222946 | |||
S3‑222610 | Solution for secure communication between source and target UEs via U2U relay | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222631 | Solution on Subscription synchronization between PAnF and UDM | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222665 | ProSe - Update solution #10 (EN1) | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222666 | ProSe - Update solution #10 (EN2) | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222667 | ProSe - Update solution #10 (EN3) | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222947 | |||
S3‑222668 | ProSe - New solution KI#2 and #3 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222948 | |||
S3‑222723 | pCR to TR33.740 Centralized discovery key management and U2U relay authorization | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223051 | |||
S3‑222726 | pCR to TR33.740 Distributed discovery key management and U2U relay authorization | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223052 | |||
S3‑222729 | pCR to TR33.740 Solution for U2U Relay discovery message security | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222731 | pCR to TR33.740 Solution for UE-to-UE relay security | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223053 | |||
S3‑222763 | A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model A discovery | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222764 | A new solution for UE-to-UE Relay discovery message protection for Model B discovery | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222765 | A new solution for secure PC5 link establishment for UE-to-UE Relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222791 | Deleting step 8 and EN about End-to-end IP security in solution #3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222793 | Support Emergency Service over UE-to-Network Relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222794 | Resolve some ENs for Solution3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222795 | Resolve EN for PC5 link setup between U2U and Target UE in Solution3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222986 | |||
S3‑222796 | Resolve some ENs for Solution4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222797 | Resolve EN for protection of DCR in Solution4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222987 | |||
S3‑222798 | Deleting step 10 and EN about End-to-end IP security in solution #4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222799 | Resolve EN for Token Provision in Solution4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222800 | Resolve EN for same credentials used for both in-coverage and out-of-coverage mode in Solution 3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222989 | |||
S3‑222845 | Solution for ProSe multipath transmission for redundant PDUs | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222846 | New Solution for end-to-end security establishment over the UE-to-UE Relay | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223060 | |||
S3‑222872 | Update to solution #7 and remove the Editor’s Note | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223109 | |||
S3‑222873 | Update to solution #8 in TR 33.740 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222874 | Update to solution #9 in TR 33.740 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222875 | New solution on Network-assisted Security Establishment Procedure for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223110 | |||
S3‑222876 | New solution on Security Establishment Procedure for 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223111 | |||
S3‑222628 | Add terms and abbreviations to TR 33.740 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222943 | Update TR 33.740 solution#2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222593 | |||
S3‑222944 | New Solution for Security of Layer-2 based UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222594 | |||
S3‑222945 | New Solution for E2E Authentication with Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222595 | |||
S3‑222946 | New Solution for Path Switching with Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222596 | |||
S3‑222947 | ProSe - Update solution #10 (EN3) | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222667 | |||
S3‑222948 | ProSe - New solution KI#2 and #3 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222668 | |||
S3‑222969 | Solution for U2U relay (model A) discovery security | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222576 | |||
S3‑222983 | Address the ENs in Sol #6 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222986 | Resolve EN for PC5 link setup between U2U and Target UE in Solution3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222795 | |||
S3‑222987 | Resolve EN for protection of DCR in Solution4 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222797 | |||
S3‑222989 | Resolve EN for same credentials used for both in-coverage and out-of-coverage mode in Solution 3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222800 | |||
S3‑222993 | New KI on U2U relay protection of remote UE traffic | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222609 | |||
S3‑223051 | pCR to TR33.740 Centralized discovery key management and U2U relay authorization | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222723 | |||
S3‑223052 | pCR to TR33.740 Distributed discovery key management and U2U relay authorization | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222726 | |||
S3‑223053 | pCR to TR33.740 Solution for UE-to-UE relay security | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222731 | |||
S3‑223054 | TR 33.740 v0.3.0 Study on security aspects of Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 2 | CATT | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223060 | New Solution for end-to-end security establishment over the Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222846 | |||
S3‑223109 | Update to solution #7 and remove the Editor’s Note | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222872 | |||
S3‑223110 | New solution on Network-assisted Security Establishment Procedure for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-UE Relay | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222875 | |||
S3‑223111 | New solution on Security Establishment Procedure for 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-UE Relay | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222876 | |||
S3‑223116 | Address the ENs in Sol #6 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222585 | |||
5.4 | Study on privacy of identifiers over radio access | S3‑222928 | Discussion paper for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | InterDigital, Inc., AT&T, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, JHU, Intel, Google, Lenovo, Nokia, NCSC, Oppo, Philips International B.V., US NSA, Verizon, Xiaomi, ZTE | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑222580 | |
S3‑222927 | PCR for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | InterDigital, Inc., Apple, AT&T, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Intel, JHU, Google, Lenovo, Nokia, NCSC, Oppo, Philips International B.V., US NIST, US NSA, Verizon, Xiaomi, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223044 | S3‑222570 | ||
S3‑222767 | Applicability of SUPI Type IMSI in KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223044 | |||
S3‑222768 | Addition of threats due to EAP in KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223044 | |||
S3‑222664 | Updates to Key Issue #2 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222991 | |||
S3‑222822 | Modification to KI details of the KI #2 | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222991 | |||
S3‑222673 | PrivID - New Key Issue | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222506 | New solution to key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223103 | |||
S3‑222528 | solution_for_privacy_KI#1 | China mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223017 | |||
S3‑222559 | New solution for privacy prevention of SUPI in NAI format | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223124 | |||
S3‑222586 | New solution for Key issue #1 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223045 | |||
S3‑222632 | SUPI padding solution on Key issue #1 | China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd, ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223085 | |||
S3‑222696 | New solution on Key issue #1 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223014 | |||
S3‑222769 | Solution for KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223011 | |||
S3‑222790 | Solution to address KI#1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223005 | |||
S3‑222820 | Padding-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223065 | |||
S3‑222821 | Hash-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223066 | |||
S3‑222570 | PCR for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | InterDigital, Inc., Apple, AT&T, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Intel, JHU, Google, Lenovo, Nokia, Oppo, Philips International B.V., US NIST, US NSA, Verizon, Xiaomi, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222927 | |||
S3‑222580 | Discussion paper for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | InterDigital, Inc., AT&T, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, JHU, Intel, Google, Lenovo, Nokia, Oppo, Philips International B.V., US NSA, Verizon, Xiaomi, ZTE | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222928 | |||
S3‑222663 | Updates to Key Issue #2 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222770 | Padding-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑222771 | Hash-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑222786 | Modification to KI details of the KI #2 | Ericsson LM | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑222991 | Updates to Key Issue #2 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, InterDigital, Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222664 | |||
S3‑223005 | Solution to address KI#1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222790 | |||
S3‑223011 | Solution for KI#1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222769 | |||
S3‑223014 | New solution on Key issue #1 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222696 | |||
S3‑223017 | solution_for_privacy_KI#1 | China mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222528 | |||
S3‑223044 | PCR for KI #1: Privacy aspects of variable length user identifiers | InterDigital, Inc., Apple, AT&T, CableLabs, Convida Wireless, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Intel, JHU, Google, Lenovo, Nokia, NCSC, NTT DOCOMO, Oppo, Philips International B.V., Qualcomm Incorporated, US NIST, US NSA, Verizon, Xiaomi, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222927 | |||
S3‑223045 | New solution for Key issue #1 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222586 | |||
S3‑223065 | Padding-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222820 | |||
S3‑223066 | Hash-based solution to the leakage of the length of SUPI through SUCI | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222821 | |||
S3‑223085 | SUPI padding solution on Key issue #1 | China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd, ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222632 | |||
S3‑223103 | New solution to key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222506 | |||
S3‑223124 | New solution for privacy prevention of SUPI in NAI format | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222559 | |||
S3‑223133 | TR 33.870 v040 | InterDigital, Inc. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.5 | Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | S3‑222617 | Mapping of solutions to key issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222615 | Resolving EN in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222740 | Updates to OCSP revocation Procedure | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223048 | ||||
S3‑222827 | Clarification for unknown revocation status | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223048 | |||
S3‑222616 | Proposal to complement KI#3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223028 | |||
S3‑222498 | New solution for KI #2 and #8 in NF certificate enrolment procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223099 | |||
S3‑222499 | New solution for KI #6 Relation between certificate management lifecycle and NF management lifecycle | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223100 | |||
S3‑222613 | Solution to indicate and validate the purpose of the certificate | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223029 | |||
S3‑222614 | Solution based on OCSP Stapling addressing KI #5 & #6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223030 | |||
S3‑222620 | Solution for ACM for network slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223031 | |||
S3‑222829 | A new solution of building initial trust for NF certificate enrolment | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223049 | |||
S3‑222619 | CMPv2 profile for SBA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223032 | |||
S3‑222828 | Proposal of CMP profiling for SBA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223032 | |||
S3‑222826 | [DRAFT] LS on automated certificate management | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222618 | Discussion paper on Network Function identifiers | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑223026 | Mapping of solutions to key issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223027 | Resolving EN in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223028 | Proposal to complement KI#3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222616 | |||
S3‑223029 | Solution to indicate and validate the purpose of the certificate | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222613 | |||
S3‑223030 | Solution based on OCSP Stapling addressing KI #5 & #6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222614 | |||
S3‑223031 | Solution for ACM for network slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222620 | |||
S3‑223032 | CMPv2 profile for SBA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222619 | |||
S3‑223033 | Draft TR 33.876 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | Nokia Germany | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑223048 | Clarification for unknown revocation status | Ericsson, Intel | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222827 | |||
S3‑223049 | A new solution of building initial trust for NF certificate enrolment | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222829 | |||
S3‑223099 | New solution for KI #2 and #8 in NF certificate enrolment procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222498 | |||
S3‑223100 | New solution for KI #6 Relation between certificate management lifecycle and NF management lifecycle | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222499 | |||
5.6 | New SID on AKMA phase 2 | S3‑222521 | Addressing the EN of KI#1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222608 | Update KI#1 in AKMA roaming | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222640 | update the Key issue of AKMA roaming | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222583 | New KI on AKMA Kaf refresh | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222635 | New KI on the Kaf refresh | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222698 | Key issue on KAF refresh without primary reauthentication and its feasibility | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222837 | Key Issue on KAF refresh | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222488 | Add evaluation to solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222489 | address Editor's Note in solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223096 | |||
S3‑222490 | add evaluation to solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223097 | |||
S3‑222568 | Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #6 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222960 | |||
S3‑222569 | Evaluation of solution #6 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222612 | New solution on AAnF discovery and selection for internal AF and NEF in AKMA roaming | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223126 | |||
S3‑222636 | Address EN and add evaluation for solution 3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223082 | |||
S3‑222637 | Address EN and add evaluation for solution 4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223083 | |||
S3‑222638 | Conclusion for KI#1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222639 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF in Data Network | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223084 | |||
S3‑222641 | update to solution #1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222642 | update to solution #2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222643 | update to solution #5 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222644 | update to solution #6 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222662 | AKMA roaming architecture | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222985 | |||
S3‑222674 | AKMA - New solution for AKMA roaming | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222950 | |||
S3‑222839 | New solution on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223057 | |||
S3‑222926 | AKMA roaming with AF outside VPLMN | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222933 | |||
S3‑222471 | Editorial change and addressing the editor's note in solution 7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223087 | |||
S3‑222472 | Add evaluation to solution 7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222522 | Addressing the EN in Solution#7 | China Mobile, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223087 | |||
S3‑222523 | Evaluation of Solution#7 | China Mobile, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222524 | Conclusion of key issue#2 | China Mobile, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222701 | solution 1 updates for internal AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222702 | solution 1 updates for external AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222938 | |||
S3‑222718 | Update on the solution #5 | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222719 | New solution for AKMA roaming scenario | LG Electronics France | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222633 | Discussion on the need and usecases for Kaf update | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222697 | Discussion paper of KAF refresh without primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222699 | Solution on Kaf refresh without primary authentication UA* | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222700 | Solution on Kaf refresh without primary authentication AAnF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222838 | New solution on AKMA KAF refresh | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222916 | Discussion about KAF refresh | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||||
S3‑222917 | New solution for KAF lifetime | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222634 | Modify the scope of TR 33.737 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222918 | Updates to the architectural assumptions clause | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223069 | |||
S3‑222933 | AKMA roaming with AF outside VPLMN | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222926 | |||
S3‑222938 | solution 1 updates for external AF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222702 | |||
S3‑222950 | AKMA - New solution for AKMA roaming | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222674 | |||
S3‑222960 | Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #6 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222568 | |||
S3‑222982 | New solution: AAnF discovery and selection for internal AF in AKMA roaming | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222985 | AKMA roaming architecture | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222662 | |||
S3‑223057 | New solution on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222839 | |||
S3‑223069 | Updates to the architectural assumptions clause | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222918 | |||
S3‑223082 | Address EN and add evaluation for solution 3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222636 | |||
S3‑223083 | Address EN and add evaluation for solution 4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222637 | |||
S3‑223084 | New solution about the roaming AKMA architecture of the AF in Data Network | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222639 | |||
S3‑223086 | Modify the scope of TR 33.737 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223087 | Addressing the EN in Solution#7 | China Mobile, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222522 | |||
S3‑223088 | draft TR 33.737 | China Mobile | draft TR | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑223089 | draft TR 33.737 | China Mobile | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223096 | address Editor's Note in solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222489 | |||
S3‑223097 | add evaluation to solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222490 | |||
S3‑223126 | New solution on AAnF discovery and selection for internal AF in AKMA roaming | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222612 | |||
5.7 | Study of Security aspect of home network triggered primary authentication | S3‑222510 | Update KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222513 | new solution on less impact on current using key | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222694 | Solution on UDM initiated primary authentication based on AAnF request for Kaf refresh scenario | BUPT, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223019 | |||
S3‑222695 | Solution on AUSF initiated primary authentication based on AAnF request for Kaf refresh scenario | BUPT, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222739 | Solution to enable HN triggered Primary Authentication with AUSF | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222920 | New solution for Home Network triggered primary authentication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223070 | |||
S3‑222922 | New solution for delegated Home Network controlled primary authentication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223071 | |||
S3‑222921 | New solution for KI#2: max lifetime for KAF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222511 | Update solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223106 | |||
S3‑222704 | solution 1 updates | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222934 | |||
S3‑222717 | Updates to solution 9 | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223006 | ||||
S3‑222737 | Resolving Editors Notes in Solution 8 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223002 | |||
S3‑222738 | Evaluation for Solution #8 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223003 | |||
S3‑222760 | Proposed resolution of the ENs in solution #5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222841 | Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223058 | |||
S3‑222842 | Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223059 | |||
S3‑222880 | Update to solution #7 and resolve the ENs on use case and counter wrap around reason | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222881 | Evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.741 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223114 | |||
S3‑222512 | Conclusion proposal for the study | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223107 | |||
S3‑222703 | conclusion for KI2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222843 | Conclusion on KI#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222919 | Discussion about the way forward for the Home Network triggered authentication | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222923 | Evaluation of the need to address the HONTRA use cases | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222934 | solution 1 updates | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222704 | |||
S3‑223002 | Resolving Editors Notes in Solution 8 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222737 | |||
S3‑223003 | Evaluation for Solution #8 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222738 | |||
S3‑223006 | Updates to solution 9 | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222717 | ||||
S3‑223019 | Solution on UDM initiated primary authentication based on AAnF request for Kaf refresh scenario | BUPT, China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222694 | |||
S3‑223058 | Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#9 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222841 | |||
S3‑223059 | Resolving EN and adding evaluation for solution#6 | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222842 | |||
S3‑223070 | New solution for Home Network triggered primary authentication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222920 | |||
S3‑223071 | New solution for delegated Home Network controlled primary authentication | Ericsson, Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222922 | |||
S3‑223106 | Update solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222511 | |||
S3‑223107 | Conclusion proposal for the study | Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi, SAMSUNG, Qualcomm, Deutsche Telekom, Intel | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑222512 | |||
S3‑223114 | Evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.741 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222881 | |||
S3‑223131 | TR 33.741v030 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.8 | Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation for 5G – phase 3 | S3‑222457 | LS OUT to GSMA on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | S2-2207142 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | S3‑223020 | ||
S3‑222458 | LS on how ML model integrity, confidentiality and availability is supported between NWDAFs from different vendors | S2-2207156 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑222787 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223020 | |||
S3‑222788 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on how ML model integrity, confidentiality and availability is supported between NWDAFs from different vendors | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223117 | |||
S3‑222518 | Reply LS on Data and Analytics Exchange between Two NWDAFs in Different PLMNs | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223020 | |||
S3‑222626 | LS on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223020 | |||
S3‑222735 | Reply LS on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | CATT | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223020 | |||
S3‑222882 | Reply LS on User consent for roaming case in eNA | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223020 | |||
S3‑222526 | Revision on key issue #1 | China moblie | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223090 | |||
S3‑222789 | Update KI#2: Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222500 | Solution on Reusing SBA for AI/ML model storage and sharing | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222621 | Solution on secured and authorized AI/ML Model transfer and retrieval | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223021 | |||
S3‑222623 | Resolving ENs (step 9) in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222625 | Resolving EN (step 1) in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223023 | |||
S3‑222747 | Updates to solution 2: remove EN E2E protection | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222748 | Updates to solution 2: remove EN Authorization | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223015 | ||||
S3‑222749 | Updates to solution 2: remove EN key management | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223016 | ||||
S3‑222527 | New solution on protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223091 | |||
S3‑222622 | Resolving ENs in Solution #5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223024 | |||
S3‑222551 | Adding parameters to solution#6 | China Telecommunications | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑222624 | Resolving EN in Solution #6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222733 | Anomalous NF behaviour event related data collection and anomalous NF | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223001 | |||
S3‑222567 | New solution addressing KI#6 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222734 | Cyber attack detection using NWDAF | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222744 | Solution to Cyber Attack Detection | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222840 | Solution on analytics for DoS attack detection | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑223001 | Anomalous NF behaviour event related data collection and anomalous NF | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222733 | |||
S3‑223015 | Updates to solution 2: remove EN Authorization | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222748 | ||||
S3‑223016 | Updates to solution 2: remove EN key management | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222749 | ||||
S3‑223020 | LS on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222626 | |||
S3‑223021 | Solution on secured and authorized AI/ML Model transfer and retrieval | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222621 | |||
S3‑223022 | Resolving ENs (step 9) in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223023 | Resolving EN (step 1) in Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222625 | |||
S3‑223024 | Resolving ENs in Solution #5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222622 | |||
S3‑223025 | Resolving EN in Solution #6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223090 | Revision on key issue #1 | China moblie | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222526 | |||
S3‑223091 | New solution on protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222527 | |||
S3‑223115 | draft TR 33.738 0.3.0 | China Mobile Group Device Co. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223117 | Reply LS on how ML model integrity, confidentiality and availability is supported between NWDAFs from different vendors | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222788 | |||
5.9 | Study on Security Enhancement of support for Edge Computing — phase 2 | S3‑222530 | New sol on Key issue #1.1: How to authorize PDU session to support local traffic routing to access an EHE in the VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222825 | A solution for authentication of EEC/UE and GPSI verification by EES/ECS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223047 | |||
S3‑222834 | A solution for authentication of UE and GPSI verification by EES/ECS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223050 | S3‑222824 | ||
S3‑222661 | MEC- New solution on Authentication in roaming architecture | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222888 | Resolve ENs in Sol #1 and Sol #2 | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222501 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223101 | |||
S3‑222508 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and EES | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223105 | |||
S3‑222656 | MEC- update to key issue#2 on adding security protection on negotiation messages | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222658 | MEC- Editorial updating on solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222659 | MEC- Addressing the EN#1 in solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222660 | MEC- Addressing the EN#2 in solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222984 | |||
S3‑222823 | A solution for UE authentication method negotiation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223046 | |||
S3‑222847 | Resolving EN and evaluation of solution#3 (TR 33.739) | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223061 | |||
S3‑222848 | Resolving EN and evaluation of solution#4 (TR 33.739) | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223062 | |||
S3‑222889 | Resolve EN in Sol #5 | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222502 | Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223102 | |||
S3‑222849 | Authorization of V-ECS in roaming scenario | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223063 | |||
S3‑222887 | KI 2.3 2.4, New Sol on authentication and authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223102 | |||
S3‑222503 | Transport security for the EDGE 10 interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222531 | Conclusion on Key issue #2.4: Transport security for the EDGE10 interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222507 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223104 | |||
S3‑222529 | New KI, solution and conclusion on Authorization between EESes | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222951 | |||
S3‑222572 | New key issue on authentication and authorization for EDGE-9 reference point | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222951 | |||
S3‑222657 | MEC - New key issue on AF specific identifier | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222514 | Solution on Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222459 | Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge | S2-2207394 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222464 | LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network | S6-221953 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑222465 | Reply LS to OPAG_34_Doc_07_OPAG_LS ETSI-3GPP-Network integration | S6-222337 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222467 | Forward on S6-222332, LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration | S6-222543 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑222468 | Reply LS to Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration | S6-222557 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222746 | draft-Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network | Intel | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223018 | ||||
S3‑222824 | A solution for authentication of UE and GPSI verification by EES/ECS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222834 | |||
S3‑222930 | Reply to: LS on Network federation interface for Telco edge consideration | Huawei Technologies Japan K.K. | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222951 | New KI, solution and conclusion on Authorization between EESes | Huawei, HiSilicon, , InterDigital, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222529 | |||
S3‑222952 | Draft TR 33.739 v0.3.0 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222959 | Resolve ENs in Sol #1 and Sol #2 | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222984 | MEC- Addressing the EN#2 in solution#7 | Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222660 | |||
S3‑223018 | Reply LS on FS_eEDGEAPP Solution for Support of NAT deployed within the edge data network | Intel | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222746 | ||||
S3‑223046 | A solution for UE authentication method negotiation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222823 | |||
S3‑223047 | A solution for authentication of EEC/UE and GPSI verification by EES/ECS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222825 | |||
S3‑223050 | A solution for authentication of UE and GPSI verification by EES/ECS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222834 | |||
S3‑223061 | Resolving EN and evaluation of solution#3 (TR 33.739) | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222847 | |||
S3‑223062 | Resolving EN and evaluation of solution#4 (TR 33.739) | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222848 | |||
S3‑223063 | Authorization of V-ECS in roaming scenario | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222849 | |||
S3‑223101 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222501 | |||
S3‑223102 | Authentication and Authorization between V-ECS and H-ECS | Huawei, HiSilicon,Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222502 | |||
S3‑223104 | New KI on Authentication and Authorization between AC and EEC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222507 | |||
S3‑223105 | Authentication mechanism selection between EEC and EES | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222508 | |||
5.10 | Study on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | S3‑222562 | Discussion paper – Need for LS to SA2 on PINE Identification | InterDigital, Inc. | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222589 | Discussion paper on new EAP based solution variants for KI#1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222563 | LS on PINE identification | InterDigital, Inc. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222573 | New KI on provisioning information to PINE for authenticating and authorizing PINE connects to PEGC | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222574 | New KI on verification of PIN communication configuration sent from PEGC to 5GC | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222646 | Key issue on secure data transfer between PEGC PEMC and PIN NF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222894 | Update KI #2 Secure provisioning of PIN policies | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222895 | Update KI #1 Secure PINE authorization | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222516 | Solution on PINE authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223108 | |||
S3‑222571 | New solution to KI#1 : EAP based PIN device authentication using AKMA | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222577 | New solution for authentication and authorization of PINE | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223012 | |||
S3‑222584 | New solution to KI#1: Using secondary authentication for PIN elements | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223056 | |||
S3‑222647 | Soultion for secure data transfer between PEGC PEMC and PIN NF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222672 | PIN - New solution KI#1 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222949 | |||
S3‑222896 | KI 2, New Sol on CAPIF based PIN AF authorization | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222897 | KI 1, New Sol on EAP-based PINE authentication | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222974 | |||
S3‑222645 | Add some context to assumptions to TR 33.882 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222648 | Clean up to TR 33.882 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222949 | PIN - New solution KI#1 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222672 | |||
S3‑222974 | KI 1, New Sol on EAP-based PINE authentication | Xiaomi Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222897 | |||
S3‑223012 | New solution for authentication and authorization of PINE | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222577 | |||
S3‑223013 | TR 33.882 v0.3.0 Study on personal IoT networks security aspects | vivo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223056 | New solution to KI#1: Using secondary authentication for PIN elements | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222584 | |||
S3‑223108 | Solution on PINE authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222516 | |||
5.11 | Study on SNAAPP security | S3‑222905 | New structure for requirements | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222963 | |
S3‑222496 | New Solution on Obtain Resource Owner Authorization in API Invocation using OAuth Token | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223098 | |||
S3‑222561 | New solution to KI#1 using OAuth client credential grant | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223055 | |||
S3‑222743 | Authenticate and authorize UE in UE originated API invocation | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223004 | |||
S3‑222854 | New Solution on User Authorization in API Invocation | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222906 | pCR to TR 33.884 new solution on UE authentication | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222966 | |||
S3‑222907 | pCR to TR 33.884 new solution on non resourceowner UE authorization | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222908 | draft LS on SNAAPP requirements clarifications | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222970 | |||
S3‑222909 | draft LS reply on CAPIF authorization roles related to FS_SNAAPP | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222972 | |||
S3‑222963 | New structure for requirements | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222905 | |||
S3‑222966 | pCR to TR 33.884 new solution on UE authentication | NTT DOCOMO | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑222906 | |||
S3‑222970 | draft LS on SNAAPP requirements clarifications | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222908 | |||
S3‑222972 | draft LS reply on CAPIF authorization roles related to FS_SNAAPP | NTT DOCOMO | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222909 | |||
S3‑222980 | draft TR 33.884 0.2.0 | NTT DOCOMO INC. | draft TR | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | |||||
S3‑223004 | Authenticate and authorize UE in UE originated API invocation | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222743 | |||
S3‑223055 | New solution to KI#1 using OAuth client credential grant | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222561 | |||
S3‑223098 | New Solution on Resource Owner Authorization in API Invocation using OAuth Token | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222496 | |||
5.12 | Study on enhanced security for network slicing Phase 3 | S3‑222545 | Update to KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222546 | New KI to protect slice related information sent to Home by roaming UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222650 | Update KI#1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222745 | Update to KI#1 Providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222830 | update to KI#1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222899 | Update KI1 providing VPLMN slice information to roaming UE | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222550 | Update to KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222832 | update to KI#3 network slice admission control | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222978 | |||
S3‑222549 | New key issue with multiple NSACFs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222978 | |||
S3‑222649 | New KI on the Security of Network Slice Service continuity | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222675 | Self-Secure Network Slice | US National Security Agency, MITRE, Cable Labs, InterDigital, Charter Communications, AT&T, Apple, CISA/ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222547 | New solution to KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222831 | add solution for KI#1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222900 | KI1, New Sol Confidentiality and integrity protection for UE initiated capability indication procedure | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222901 | KI1, New Sol Secure mechanism for network triggered UE capability indication procedure | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222548 | New solution to KI#2 suporting temporary slice | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222978 | New key issue with multiple NSACFs | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222549 | |||
S3‑222979 | Draft TR 33.886 for eNS3 | Huawei Technologies (Korea) | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
5.13 | Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | S3‑222714 | KI1 update | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Cablelabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222937 | |
S3‑222715 | Solution 1 enhancement for EN removal on key derivation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222939 | |||
S3‑222716 | Solution 1 enhancement for EN removal on privacy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222940 | |||
S3‑222485 | New solution to address KI#1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222690 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in PLMN | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223007 | |||
S3‑222691 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in SNPN | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223008 | |||
S3‑222692 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in SNPN by AAA | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223009 | |||
S3‑222712 | Conclusion for KI2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222936 | |||
S3‑222483 | Update Key Issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222484 | New solution to KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222713 | Conclusion for KI3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222693 | Key issue on authentication of AUN3 device not supporting EAP | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222709 | Discussion paper of WWC SID update for TNAP mobility | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Apple | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222710 | New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo,Cablelabs, Charter Communications, Apple | SID revised | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222711 | New KI on TNAP mobility | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Apple | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222935 | |||
S3‑222456 | Reply LS on TNAP mobility security aspect | S2-2206999 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222935 | New KI on TNAP mobility | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Apple, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222711 | |||
S3‑222936 | Conclusion for KI2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222712 | |||
S3‑222937 | KI1 update | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222714 | |||
S3‑222939 | Solution 1 enhancement for EN removal on key derivation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222715 | |||
S3‑222940 | Solution 1 enhancement for EN removal on privacy | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222716 | |||
S3‑223007 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in PLMN | CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222690 | |||
S3‑223008 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in SNPN | CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222691 | |||
S3‑223009 | EAP base authentication for AUN3 devices behind RG in SNPN by AAA | CableLabs,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222692 | |||
S3‑223127 | Draft TR 33.887 v0.3.0 Study on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.14 | Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN | S3‑222552 | Security Event Logging for RAN AI/ML framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222553 | Solution for User Privacy of the RAN AI/ML framework | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222554 | Detecting sources of potential data poisoning attacks towards RAN AI-ML based network optimizations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222597 | Privacy Requirements for user privacy in RAN AI/ML framework | Qualcomm Finland RFFE Oy | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223067 | |||
S3‑222741 | Update Security Requirements to Key issue 1 | Intel | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222886 | Update to KI#1 in TR 33.877 | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223067 | |||
S3‑222912 | Content for the scope clause of the technical report | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222913 | New Key issue on the security of the information transfer of the RAN AI/ML framework | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222914 | Updates to KI#1 User Privacy of the RAN AI/ML framework | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223067 | |||
S3‑222915 | New Key issue on the robustness of the RAN AI/ML framework against data poisoning attacks | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223068 | |||
S3‑223067 | Updates to KI#1 User Privacy of the RAN AI/ML framework | Ericsson, Qualcomm Inc, Xiaomi, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222914 | |||
S3‑223068 | New Key issue on the robustness of the RAN AI/ML framework against data poisoning attacks | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222915 | |||
S3‑223074 | Draft TR 33.877 v0.3.0 Study on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NG-RAN | Ericsson España S.A. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.15 | Study on security support for Next Generation Real Time Communication services | S3‑222538 | Add security requirement to KI on data channel | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222955 | |
S3‑222539 | EN removal of solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222956 | |||
S3‑222540 | New solution on SBA in IMS control plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222957 | |||
S3‑222761 | Proposed resolution of some ENs in solution #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222957 | |||
S3‑222835 | Update Key issue #2: Security aspects of Data Channel usage in IMS network | Ericsson | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222955 | ||||
S3‑222836 | Update solution#1 | Ericsson | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222932 | ||||
S3‑222932 | Update solution#1 | Ericsson | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222836 | ||||
S3‑222955 | Add security requirement to KI on data channel | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222538 | |||
S3‑222956 | EN removal of solution#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222539 | |||
S3‑222957 | New solution on SBA in IMS control plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222540 | |||
S3‑222958 | Draft TR 33.890 v0.3.0 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.16 | Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 | S3‑222497 | New Solution based on Reusing Existing N3GPP Security for SNPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222891 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication mechanism for trusted non-3GPP Access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222961 | |||
S3‑222892 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication mechanism for untrusted non-3GPP Access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222965 | |||
S3‑222893 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication for devices not supporting 5GC NAS over WLAN access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222990 | |||
S3‑222904 | New solution for KI#1: Use of anonymous SUCI in trusted non-3GPP access | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222931 | |||
S3‑222766 | SUCI protection for non-3GPP (WLAN) access to SNPN | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222461 | Questions for SUCI protection requirements for non-3GPP (WLAN) access to SNPN | S2-2207700 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑222515 | Reply LS on Questions for SUCI Protection Requirements for Non-3GPP (WLAN) Access to SNPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222651 | New KI on the UE authentication for access to hosting network | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223118 | |||
S3‑222652 | New KI on the user authentication for access to hosting network | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222742 | Key Issue on Authentication for access to localized services | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223118 | |||
S3‑222772 | Service requirements related to the security for providing localized services | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222773 | New Key Issue "Authentication for UE access to hosting network" | Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223118 | |||
S3‑222774 | Addressing Note in TR 23.700-08 on credentials provisioning | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222775 | Communication security and subscriber privacy for access to localized services, alternative 1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222776 | Communication security and subscriber privacy for access to localized services, alternative 2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222777 | New Key Issue on authorization of UE access to the hosting network for providing localized services | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222890 | New KI on UE authentication and authorization in hosting network scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223118 | |||
S3‑222587 | Key issue on security of SNPN using AAA server for primary authentication | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222931 | New solution for KI#1: Use of anonymous SUCI in trusted non-3GPP access | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222904 | |||
S3‑222961 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication mechanism for trusted non-3GPP Access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222891 | |||
S3‑222965 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication mechanism for untrusted non-3GPP Access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222892 | |||
S3‑222971 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication for devices not supporting 5GC NAS over WLAN access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222990 | KI1, New Sol on Authentication for devices not supporting 5GC NAS over WLAN access in NPN scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222893 | |||
S3‑223118 | New Key Issue "Authentication for UE access to hosting network" | Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, Xiaomi, Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222773 | |||
S3‑223120 | draft TR 33.858 v0.2.0 (Study on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2) | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.17 | Study on Security of Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM | S3‑222754 | Proposed key issue on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport Broadcast Remote ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222755 | Proposed key issue on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport broadcasted DAA traffic | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222756 | Proposed solution on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport broadcast remote ID | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222757 | Proposed solution on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport DAA traffic | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223128 | |||
S3‑222479 | Update to Sol#1 in 33.891 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223095 | |||
S3‑222509 | Evaluate the Sol#1 in 33.891 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222590 | Update Solution#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222941 | |||
S3‑222591 | New solution: Restricted Discovery for Direct C2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222942 | |||
S3‑222736 | Evaluation for Solution #2 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222758 | Proposed resolution of EN on mixing traffic in solution #3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222759 | Making solution #3 resolve key issues #4 and #5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222941 | Update Solution#4 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222590 | |||
S3‑222942 | New solution: Restricted Discovery for Direct C2 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222591 | |||
S3‑223095 | Update to Sol#1 in 33.891 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222479 | |||
S3‑223128 | Proposed solution on the privacy of 3GPP identifiers used to transport DAA traffic | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222757 | |||
S3‑223129 | Draft TR 33.891 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.18 | Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications | S3‑222564 | Assumption on actors and attacker model | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222565 | Update of KI#1 | Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222964 | |||
S3‑222566 | Evaluation of solution #2 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222968 | |||
S3‑222750 | Proposal for an evaluation to solution #2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223073 | |||
S3‑222751 | Proposal for a KI on injection of authentication data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222752 | Discussion paper on a way forward for LS on protection of the URSP rules from HPLM | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222964 | Update of KI#1 | Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222565 | |||
S3‑222968 | Evaluation of solution #2 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222566 | |||
S3‑223073 | Proposal for an evaluation to solution #1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222750 | |||
S3‑223122 | Draft TR 33.892 V0.3.0 | Lenovo | draft TR | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | |||||
5.19 | Study on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | S3‑222473 | address the editor's note in key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222671 | Ranging - Update Key Issue #1- privacy risks of exposing positioning reference signals | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222858 | 33.893: Additional Roles for Authorization in KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222557 | New Key issue for Detecting ranging triggered DoS attacks | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222558 | New Key issue for Updating security policy parameters on ranging device when it is out of 5G coverage | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222677 | Protection of Sidelink IDs | US National Security Agency, MITRE, Cable Labs, Charter Communications, AT&T, Apple, CISA/ECD | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222474 | solutions on privacy protection for UEs in ranging | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223094 | |||
S3‑222670 | Ranging - New solution KI#1, #2, #3 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222859 | 33.893: Solution on Application Server Authorization for KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223112 | |||
S3‑222860 | 33.893: Solution on 5GC NF Authorization for KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223034 | |||
S3‑222861 | 33.893: Solution on Subscription-based Authorization of the Role of the UE during Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223035 | |||
S3‑222862 | 33.893: Solution on Token-based Authorization of the Role of the UE during Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222878 | New solution on GMLC based authorization for Ranging/SL Positioning services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223112 | |||
S3‑222879 | New solution on Token based Authorization for Network assisted sidelink positioning services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223113 | |||
S3‑222929 | Use of authorization tokens at PC5 security establishment | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223113 | |||
S3‑222478 | New solution of security for the Ranging SL positioning device discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222477 | New solution for protecting direct communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222863 | 33.893: Solution on Direct Communication Security for SL Positioning Service | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223036 | |||
S3‑222857 | 33.893: Terminology Alignment | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223037 | |||
S3‑223034 | 33.893: Solution on 5GC NF Authorization for KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222860 | |||
S3‑223035 | 33.893: Solution on Subscription-based Authorization of the Role of the UE during Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222861 | |||
S3‑223036 | 33.893: Solution on Direct Communication Security for SL Positioning Service | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222863 | |||
S3‑223037 | 33.893: Terminology Alignment | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222857 | |||
S3‑223038 | Draft TR 33.893 v0.3.0 | Xiaomi Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑223094 | solutions on privacy protection for UEs in ranging | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222474 | |||
S3‑223112 | New solution on GMLC based authorization for Ranging/SL Positioning services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222878 | |||
S3‑223113 | New solution on Token based Authorization for Network assisted sidelink positioning services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222879 | |||
5.20 | Study on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based Services and Applications in 5G | S3‑222602 | KI on authorization of AF accessing th 5GC assistance information | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222996 | |
S3‑222603 | KI on authorization of UE accessing the 5GC analytic information | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222708 | Key issue on authorization of UE accessing the 5G analytics | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IDCC, OPPO, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222611 | New KI:the Authorization of Federated Learning Model Sharing | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222707 | Key issue on AF authorization for AIML operations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222604 | KI on securing application AIML data exchange between UE and AF | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222706 | Key issue on securing AIML operation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IDCC, OPPO, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222605 | KI on securing provisioning of external parameters | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222575 | New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model protection | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222705 | Key issue on Security criteria of UE selection for AIML | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IDCC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222606 | KI on classification and protection of AIML data among 5GC AF and UE | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222998 | ||||
S3‑222578 | New key issue on Federated Learning AIML model privacy protection | InterDigital Communications | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222607 | KI on user consent for 5GC provided assistance information | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222996 | KI on authorization of AF accessing th 5GC assistance information | OPPO, Xidian, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222602 | |||
S3‑222998 | KI on classification and protection of AIML data among 5GC AF and UE | OPPO, Xidian | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222606 | ||||
S3‑223000 | draft TR 33.898 | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.21 | Study on applicability of the Zero Trust Security principles in mobile networks | S3‑222504 | Evaluation of tenet 1 on resources | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223075 | |
S3‑222910 | Alignment of 3GPP’s 5G Security to the first NIST Tenet of ZTA | Ericsson | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223075 | ||||
S3‑222679 | ZT Tenet 1 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223075 | |||
S3‑222720 | Evaluation of Tenet #1 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223075 | |||
S3‑222505 | Evaluation of tenet 2 on secure communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222992 | |||
S3‑222911 | Alignment of 3GPP’s 5G Security to the second NIST Tenet of ZTA | Ericsson LM | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222992 | ||||
S3‑222721 | Evaluation of Tenet #2 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222992 | |||
S3‑222924 | Alignment of 3GPP’s 5G Security to the third NIST Tenet of ZTA | Ericsson LM | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223076 | |||
S3‑222681 | ZT Tenet 3 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223076 | |||
S3‑222722 | Evaluation of Tenet #3 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223076 | |||
S3‑222682 | ZT Tenet 4 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222724 | Evaluation of Tenet #4 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222517 | Evaluation of tenet 5 on security posture | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223077 | |||
S3‑222680 | ZT Tenet 5 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223077 | |||
S3‑222725 | Evaluation of Tenet #5 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223077 | |||
S3‑222678 | ZT Tenet 6 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223078 | |||
S3‑222727 | Evaluation of Tenet #6 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223078 | |||
S3‑222676 | ZT Tenet 7 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223079 | |||
S3‑222728 | Evaluation of Tenets #7 | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223079 | |||
S3‑222730 | Evaluation of Tenets and current security mechanisms | Lenovo, US NSA | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222994 | |||
S3‑222588 | New Key Issue on Potential Excessive Trust of NFs | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222732 | Key Issue on Need for continuous security monitoring and Trust evaluation | Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US NSA, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security, China Mobile, ZTE, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222999 | |||
S3‑222992 | Evaluation of Tenet #2 | Lenovo, US National Security Agency, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222721 | |||
S3‑222994 | Evaluation of Tenets and current security mechanisms | Lenovo, US National Security Agency | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222730 | |||
S3‑222999 | Key Issue on Need for continuous security monitoring and Trust evaluation | Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Rakuten Mobile Inc., Interdigital, US National Security Agency, Motorola Solutions, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, Center for Internet Security, China Mobile, ZTE, CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222732 | |||
S3‑223075 | ZT Tenet 1 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223134 | S3‑222679 | ||
S3‑223134 | ZT Tenet 1 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS,Ericsson, Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑223075 | |||
S3‑223076 | ZT Tenet 3 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223135 | S3‑222681 | ||
S3‑223135 | ZT Tenet 3 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS, Nokia, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑223076 | |||
S3‑223077 | ZT Tenet 5 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222680 | |||
S3‑223078 | ZT Tenet 6 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222678 | |||
S3‑223079 | ZT Tenet 7 | US National Security Agency, NIST, CISA ECD, Lenovo, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, Johns Hopkins University APL, CIS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222676 | |||
S3‑223121 | draft TR 33.894 v0.3.0 | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.22 | Study of Security aspects on User Consent for 3GPP Services Phase 2 | S3‑222491 | New key issue on User Consent for AI/ML for Network Optimization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑222653 | New KI on User consent for application layer AIML operation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222598 | New Key Issue on user consent for Personally Identifiable Information used for Network Optimization | Qualcomm Finland RFFE Oy | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222492 | Key Issue Update on User Consent for NTN | Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V., Xiaomi, Qualcomm | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222818 | UC3S User consent checking by roaming partner NF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222819 | UC3S Central authorization function for user consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223132 | |||
S3‑222493 | New Solution on User Consent for Analytics Request from vPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222883 | New solution on User Consent for UE Data Exposure to HPLMN in the Roaming case | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222884 | New solution on User Consent for UE Data Exposure to VPLMN in the Roaming case | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222885 | New solution on Modification or Revocation of User Consent for eNA in the Roaming case | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222494 | New Solution on unified User Consent Architecture for RAN features | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222669 | UC - New solution NTN | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222870 | 33.896: Solution on Obtaining User Consent with Mobility in RAN for KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222871 | 33.896: Solution on Obtaining User Consent with Mobility in SN for KI#2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222869 | 33.896: Resolve the ENs in Solutions #1 and #2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223039 | |||
S3‑222495 | Overview of UC3S_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222925 | Guiding principles for determining the applicability for user consent | Ericsson | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222599 | Discussions on User Consent for Analytics Request in roaming scenarios | Qualcomm Finland RFFE Oy | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222783 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on the data and analytics exchange between two NWDAFs in different PLMNs | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222784 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on how ML model integrity, confidentiality and availability is supported between NWDAFs from different vendors | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222785 | Update KI#2: Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑223039 | 33.896: Resolve the ENs in Solutions #1 and #2 | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222869 | |||
S3‑223130 | TR 33.896v030 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑223132 | UC3S Central authorization function for user consent | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222819 | |||
5.23 | Study on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | S3‑222469 | Requirement on TMGI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223092 | |
S3‑222470 | Security threat and requirement in MOCN network sharing scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223093 | |||
S3‑222555 | MOCN security handling for MBS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223123 | |||
S3‑222556 | TMGI protection during group Paging | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222855 | Updates to KI on MOCN scenario | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑223093 | |||
S3‑222856 | Solution on MBS protection for MOCN deployments | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223064 | |||
S3‑223064 | Solution on MBS protection for MOCN deployments | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222856 | |||
S3‑223081 | TR 33.883 for 5MBS security | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑223092 | Requirement on TMGI protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222469 | |||
S3‑223093 | Security threat and requirement in MOCN network sharing scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222470 | |||
S3‑223123 | MOCN security handling for MBS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222555 | |||
5.24 | Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture | S3‑222802 | Editiorial updates to 33875-130 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222803 | Abbreviations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222804 | Trust in standalone SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222805 | Extend trust in inter-PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222962 | |||
S3‑222686 | Resolving ENs in solution 6.13 | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222806 | KI1 analysis on NFp authentication in indirect comm | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222967 | |||
S3‑222532 | Conclusion on KI#1 authentication of NRF/NFp in the indirect communication mode | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222536 | Resolving EN in Key issue #3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222778 | KI#3 (Subscribe-Notify): Clarification of Editor's Note | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222807 | KI3 EN resolution on requirements for subscribe notify | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222534 | Resolving ENs in Sol#12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222954 | |||
S3‑222808 | KI3 EN resolution in sol12 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222954 | |||
S3‑222779 | KI#3 (Subscribe-Notify): Removing EN and providing evaluation for Solution #12 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222954 | |||
S3‑222533 | Resolving ENs in Sol#15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222953 | |||
S3‑222780 | KI#3 (Subscribe-Notify): Removing EN and providing evaluation for Solution #15 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑222953 | |||
S3‑222781 | KI#3 (Subscribe-Notify): Analysis and conclusion | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222809 | KI4 Sol SCP authorization check by NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222685 | Resolving ENs in solution 6.16 | CableLabs | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑222810 | KI6 EN resolution Sol7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222975 | |||
S3‑222811 | KI7 Sol17 EN resolution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222976 | |||
S3‑222535 | Conclusion on KI#7 authorization mechanism determination | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222812 | KI7 conclusion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑222977 | |||
S3‑222813 | KI9 solution 18 update | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222814 | KI9 Sol11 EN resolution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222817 | KI10 Update of Sol20 RHUB PRINS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑222815 | KI10 Clarification on securing remote RHUB and SEPP discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222816 | KI10 Solution for securing remote RHUB and SEPP discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222782 | Solution for KI#12 Different SEPP Type requirements | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222953 | Resolving ENs in Sol#15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222533 | |||
S3‑222954 | Resolving ENs in Sol#12 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222534 | |||
S3‑222962 | Extend trust in inter-PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222805 | |||
S3‑222967 | KI1 analysis on NFp authentication in indirect comm | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222806 | |||
S3‑222973 | Resolving ENs in Sol#12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑222975 | KI6 EN resolution Sol7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222810 | |||
S3‑222976 | KI7 Sol17 EN resolution | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222811 | |||
S3‑222977 | KI7 conclusion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222812 | |||
S3‑222981 | TR 33.875-140 eSBA Security | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||||
S3‑223119 | KI#3 (Subscribe-Notify): Clarification of Editor's Note | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
5.25 | Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access | S3‑222864 | 33.700-28: Draft Skeleton | Xiaomi Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑222865 | 33.700-28: Scope | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223040 | |||
S3‑222866 | 33.700-28: Assumptions | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223041 | |||
S3‑222476 | Key issue on security enhancement with discontinuous satellite coverage | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222581 | Key issue on Security for Satellite Coverage Information provisioning | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222867 | 33.700-28: New Key Issue on Protection of Satellite Coverage Information used by the UE | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑222868 | 33.700-28: New Key Issue on Protection of Satellite Coverage Information used by 5GC/EPC | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑223042 | |||
S3‑222898 | New KI on AF authorization in Satellite access scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑223040 | 33.700-28: Scope | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222865 | |||
S3‑223041 | 33.700-28: Assumptions | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222866 | |||
S3‑223042 | 33.700-28: New Key Issue on Protection of Satellite Coverage Information used by 5GC/EPC | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑222868 | |||
S3‑223043 | Draft TR 33.700-28 v0.1.0 | Xiaomi Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
6 | New Study/Work item proposals |   | ||||||||||
7 | CVD and research |   | ||||||||||
8 | Any Other Business | S3‑222452 | Meeting notes from SA3 leadership | MCC | report | No |
No
| reserved | No |