**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #105-edraft\_S3-213825-r2**

**e-meeting, 08 – 19 November 2021**

**Title: [Draft]** LS Reply on security protection of RRCResumeRequest message

**Response to:** R2-2109121/S3-213825

**Work Item:** FS\_5GFBS

**Source:** SA3

**To:** RAN2, RAN3

**Cc:** -

**Contact person:** Alf Zugenmaier / NTT DOCOMO

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**Send any reply LS to:** 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator, <mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org>

**Attachments:** TR33.809

# 1 Overall description

SA3 would like to thank RAN2 for their kind LS Reply on security protection of RRCResumeRequest message (R2-2109121/S3-213825).

SA3 has agreed on the potential security requirement of protecting RRCResumeRequest message against tampering in 5.1.3 of the attached TR 33.809, and is considering to specify Solution 17 of TR 33.809 on protection of RRCResumeRequest as normative solution. However, there were different interpretations of the impact described in RAN2’s LS. Therefore, SA3 would like RAN2 and RAN3 to detail this solution to meet the above security requirement and inform SA3 of any deployment impact.

In particular, SA3 would also like to be informed of:

- error cases that can lead to deletion of context,

- behaviour of UE with suspended RRC connections in case this feature is activated or deactivated in gNBs, and

- cell selection procedures potentially prioritising availability of this feature,

as these details may be exploitable for further denial of service attacks.

# 2 Actions

**To RAN2, RAN3**

**ACTION:** SA3 would like to ask RAN2 and RAN3 to provide information about deployment impacts as well as details of the solution from RAN2/RAN3 perspective.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG3 meetings

SA3#106 07 – 11 February 2022 TBD, EU

SA3#106-bis 04 – 08 April 2022 TBD, US