**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #104-e *S3-212667-r1***

**e-meeting, 16 - 27 August 2021**

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.926** | **CR** | Draft CR | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **17.1.0**  |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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| ***Title:***  | Adding a new threat for NSSAAF |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei, HiSilicon |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | SCAS\_5G\_NSSAAF |  | ***Date:*** | 2021-07-09 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **B** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | TS 33.501 clause 16.4 and 16.5, i.e. AAA Server triggered Network Slice-Specific Re-authentication and Re-authorization procedure and AAA Server triggered Slice-Specific Authorization Revocation, have identified the security requirement to defend against the AAA-S impersonating attack, and have accordingly defined countermeasures. The test case in S3-21xxxx is proposed for the above security requirement. This contribution propoes the accompanying threat. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Adding a new threat to NSSAAF |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Incomplete spec |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | Annex X.2 (new) |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **X** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **X** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **X** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Start of Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

## X.2.2 Threats related to NSSAAF

### X.2.2.Y Threats related to impersonating attack by AAA-S

* *Threat name:* Threats related to impersonating attack by AAA-S
* *Threat Category*: Denial of service, spoofing identity
* *Threat Description*: Network slice specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) is performed between UE and AAA server (AAA-S). AAA-S may also trigger network slice-specific authorization revocation by sending a request to NSSAAF. After receiving the request to revoke the slice-specific authorization for a slice for a UE from an AAA-S, if NSSAAF does not check whether the AAA-S is legitimate in the sense that it had performed the NSSAA for the slice for the UE, a malicious AAA-S may masquerade as the legitimate AAA-S to invoke the slice-specific authorization for the slice for the UE. Then UE is denied access to the slice. Similarly a malicious AAA-S may also trick NSSAAF to perform slice specific re-authentication and re-authorization just to incur extra signalling load.
* *Threatened Asset*: user data related to NSSAA, processing capacity

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End of Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*