**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #104-e *S3-212466-r1***

**meeting, 16 – 27 Aug 2021**

**Source: MITRE**

**Title: New solution: Hardware Mediated Execution Enclave (HMEE)**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.4**

1 Decision/action requested

***This pCR proposes to solve Key Issue #6, 7, 15, and 25***

2 References

[3] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 009: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Report on use cases and technical approaches for multi-layer host administration".

3 Rationale

This solution aims to address KI 6, 7, 15, and 25 by proposing to standardize the use of Hardware Mediated Execution Enclave (HMEE) when deploying a Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure (NFVI). From ETSI GS NFV-SEC 009 [3] *A hardware-mediated execution enclave is defined as an area of process space and memory within a system environment within a computer host which delivers confidentiality and integrity of instructions and data associated with that enclave. This enclave is protected from eavesdropping, replay and alteration attacks as the programs within the enclave are executed.* Utilizing an HMEE within the NFVI may solve the issue of Virtual Network Function (VNF) isolation, memory introspection, and confidentiality of data-in-use in both virtualized and containerized environments.

Use of an HMEE in the NFVI provides means to support at least the following security controls:

* Security of data-in-use. When code is executed on a shared physical host it is at risk of being modified or inspected by co-located VNFs or the host itself. With HMEE, code is executed in a secure environment, protecting the code and data from co-located VNFs and the host.
* Data integrity. The operator can attest that data within the HMEE has not been altered by unauthorized users.

To scale across 5G NFV this solution proposes to utilize the trust domains from solutions to key issue #1. For example, trust domains that have security critical functions shall only be deployed on hosts that have HMEEs enabled. Meanwhile, less sensitive functions belong to a lower trust domain and do not need to be deployed on HMEE enabled hosts.

4 Detailed proposal

SA3 is kindly requested to agree to the below pCR to TR 33.848.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* First Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

## 6.XX Solution #XX: Hardware Mediated Execution Enclave (HMEE)

### 6.XX.1 Introduction

This solution aims to address KI 6, 7, 15, and 25 by proposing to standardize the use of Hardware Mediated Execution Enclave (HMEE) when deploying a Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure (NFVI). From ETSI GS NFV-SEC 009 [3] *A hardware-mediated execution enclave is defined as an area of process space and memory within a system environment within a computer host which delivers confidentiality and integrity of instructions and data associated with that enclave. This enclave is protected from eavesdropping, replay and alteration attacks as the programs within the enclave are executed.*

Utilizing an HMEE within the NFVI may solve the issue of Virtual Network Function (VNF) isolation, memory introspection, and confidentiality of data-in-use in both virtualized and containerized environments. HMEE solutions offer protection from co-located VNFs running on the same physical host as well as protection from the host itself. General purpose HMEE can be equipped on Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) hardware that may be used to host the NFVI.

 Use of an HMEE in the NFVI provides the means to support at least the following security controls:

* Security of data-in-use. When code is executed on a shared physical host it is at risk of being modified or inspected by co-located VNFs or the host itself. With HMEE, code is executed in a secure environment, protecting the code and data from co-located VNFs and the host.
* Data integrity. The operator can attest that data within the HMEE has not been altered by unauthorized users.

To scale across 5G NFV this solution proposes to utilize the trust domains from solutions to key issue #1. For example, trust domains that have security critical functions shall only be deployed on hosts that have HMEEs enabled. Meanwhile, less sensitive functions belong to a lower trust domain and do not need to be deployed on HMEE enabled hosts.

Editor’s Note: Availability risk needs FFS.

### 6.XX.1 Solution details

When deploying an NFV environment the following should be considered:

* The NFVI shall be deployed using hardware resources that have an HMEE enabled. NFVI hosts should be able to attest trusted execution of VNFs. If the NFVI is deployed on the cloud in an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model, then the operator shall be able to attest the root of trust on demand. How the attestation can occur is up to key issue #13.
* The NFVI shall be assessed to determine risk and based on this, it shall be designated an appropriate trust domain for VNF deployment. HMEE enabled hosts provide security guarantees that reduce security risks and therefore shall belong to higher trust domains.
* Operators shall be able to attest that VNFs sensitive data and functions are executed using the HMEE.
* Data-in-use shall be tagged for use by a specific VNF and be inaccessible by either other VNFs or the virtualisation layer (container engine or hypervisor). VNF sensitive data and functions shall be handled in the HMEE.

### 6.XX.1 Evaluation

This solution addresses Key Issues 6, 7, 15, and 25.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End of Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*