**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #104e ad-hoc *S3-213371r3***

**e-meeting, 27 - 30 September 2021** Revision of S3-20xxxx

**Source: Huawei, HiSilicon**

**Title: Revocation of UUAA in 5GS**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 4.7 ID\_UAS**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Approve the proposed pCR as normative text***

# 2 References

[1] TR 33.854

# 3 Rationale

This contribution proposes the UUAA revocation procedure based on the agreed principle in the study (i.e. TR 33.854 [1]). It is in-line with the SA2’s procedure as well.

# 4 Detailed proposal

pCR

\*\*\* BEGINNING OF CHANGES (all text new) \*\*\*

### 5.2.1.5 UUAA Revocation

USS may trigger revocation of UUAA at any time. The below description considers only the security related parameters (for full details of the flows see TS 23.256 [3]).



Figure 5.2.1.5-1: UUAA revocation in 5GS

Editor's Note: The figure are to be aligned with the following steps

1. The USS sends an UUAA revocation request to UAS-NF. The request includes GPSI and CAA-Level UAV ID.

Editor's Note: Sending the re-authentication request also allows UAS-NF to identify the USS, e.g. through sending the USS identifier in the request or based on other identification information exchanged through the interface between UAS NF and USS. Whether the identifier of the USS is sent will depend on the security solution chosen for the UAS NF to USS interface which is FFS.

2. The UAS NF retrieves the UAV UE's context. The UE’s context contains identity mapping between the GPSI and the USS identifier that performed UUAA. The UAS-NF verifies the USS revocation request by checking whether the GPSI and the USS identifier match the stored mapping of GPSI and USS identifier. The UAS-NF shall only continue the revocation procedures if they match.

The UAS NF determines whether the target NF is an AMF or an SMF.

* If the target NF is an AMF, the UAS NF further determines the target AMF for revocation and continues step 3a.
* If the target NF is an SMF, the UAS NF further determines the target SMF for revocation and continues step 3b.

3a or 3b. The UAS NF sends to either the target AMF or the target SMF the UUAA revocation message for the UE identified by the GPSI and the PDU session identified by the GPSI and the IP address.

4. The UAS NF responses the USS that the UUAA revocation has been initiated.

Editor's Note: Further UUAA revocation steps are FFS.

~~5. If the target NF is an AMF, the AMF takes the actions described in TS 23.256 [3].~~

~~6. If the target NF is an SMF, the SMF takes the actions described in TS 23.256 [3].~~

~~Editor's Note: It is FFS, if the UUAA revocation fails at the UE (i.e., step 5/6) due to any network issues, then the early information to USS in step 4 may not be sufficient.~~

\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*