**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #102-e *S3-210222***

**e-meeting, 18 - 29 January 2021**

**Source: China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon**

**Title: Check whether the N3IWF sends the EAP-Identity Request message**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 4.16**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Approve this contribution to add a solution in TR33.520***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TS 33.501, Security architecture and procedures for 5G System

# 3 Rationale

This contribution propose to add a new requirement for N3IWF.

# 4 Detailed proposal

pCR

\*\*\* BEGINNING OF CHANGES \*\*\*

##### 4.2.2.1.X Handling of EAP-Identity Request message

*Requirement Name*: The capability to Create Child SAs

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.501 [1], clause 7.2.1

*Requirement Description*: "The N3IWF shall refrain from sending an EAP-Identity request. The UE may ignore an EAP Identity request or respond with the SUCI it sent in the Registration Request." as specified in TS 33.501 [1], clause 7.2.1.

*Threat Reference*: TBD

**Test Name:** TC\_N3IWF\_REFRAIN\_SEND\_IDENTITY\_REQUEST

**Purpose:**

Verify that the N3IWF will not send an EAP-Identity request message, and if the N3IWF sends EAP-Identity Request message, whether the N3IWF will conintue to proceed the EAP-5G procedure.

**Pre-Conditions:**

- The AMF network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE may be simulated.

- A document describes whether the N3IWF will send an EAP-Identity Request message.

**Execution Steps**

1. The UE initiates IKE\_SA\_INIT procedure without UE identity.

2. The N3IWF responses an EAP message

**Expected Results:**

If the EAP message is EAP-5G start, then it is ok.

If the EAP message is EAP-Identity Request meesage, then check whether the N3IWF sends a N2 msg to the AMF, and whether the procedure in 7.2 of TS 33.501[1] runs successfully.

**Expected format of evidence:**

Save the logs and the communication flow in a .pcap file.

\*\*\*END OF CHANGES\*\*\*