**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #102Bis-e *S3-211039-r2***

**e-meeting, 1 – 5 March 2021** *Revision of S3-21XXXX*

**Source: Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell**

**Title: KI on Ensuring restrictive transfer of ML models between authorized NWDAF Instances**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.16**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***New KI to eNA study TR33.866 on ensuring*** ***restrictive transfer of ML models between authorized NWDAF Instances***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TR 23.700-91: “Study on enablers for network automation for the 5G System (5GS); Phase 2”

# 3 Rationale

SA2 agreed that NWDAF instances can discover other NWDAF instances providing ML models via NRF. In the current release sharing of ML models or model meta data is limited to a single vendor environment. Adequate security mechanisms are needed to ensure that the models are indeed only transferred between authorized NWDAF instances.

# 4 Detailed proposal

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGES

### 5.3.X Key Issue #3.X: Ensuring restrictive transfer of ML models between authorized NWDAF instances

#### 5.3.X.1 Key issue details

In 3GPP TR 23.700-91 [X], Key Issue 19 describes trained model sharing between multiple NWDAF Instances..

Since machine learning models are trained using proprietary algorithms, and sometimes are also trained using sensitive data, securing them and ensuring restricted usage and secure transfer is paramount. Therefore, this key issue will study how to ensure that trained model sharing is only allowed among authorized NWDAD instances.

#### 5.3.X.2 Security Threats

If ML models are shared with a NF, which is not authorized, proprietary and sensitive implementation specific information may be leaked.

#### 5.3.X.3 Potential security requirements

Only authorized NWDAF instances should be allowed to consume ML models from other NWDAF instances.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGES