3GPP TSG-RAN WG2 #111-e Draft R2-2008262

Electronic Meeting, August 17 - 28, 2020

Agenda Item: 8.11.3.1

Source: Swift Navigation

Title: [AT111-e][607][POS] Summary of email discussion on Integrity definitions, KPIs, and use cases (Swift)

Document for: Discussion, Decision

# 1 Introduction

This document extends the initial email discussion from R[2-2008256](file:///E:\WORK\1%203GPP\Meeting\RAN2%20111-e\2%20During\Docs\R2-2008256.zip) [1] as follows:

* [AT111-e][607][POS] Integrity definitions, KPIs, and use cases (Swift)

Scope: Discuss proposals and attempt to reach consensus on definitions, KPIs, and use cases for positioning integrity.

Intended outcome: Summary with potential agreeable TP, in R[2-2008256](file:///E:\WORK\1%203GPP\Meeting\RAN2%20111-e\2%20During\Docs\R2-2008256.zip). Extension to further converge and produce a text proposal in R2-2008262, with attention to anticipated specification impact.

Deadline: Thursday 2020-08-20 1100 UTC – extended to Thursday 2020-08-27 1200 UTC

The following topics are proposed for agreement.

# 2 Integrity KPIs Definitions

The following agreement was made online for [1]:

Agreements:

* Start from the definitions of the four candidate KPIs. Additional definitions can be added when needed.

It was proposed to adopt the Target Integrity Risk (TIR), Alert Limit (AL), Protection Level (PL) and Time-to-Alert (TTA) as KPIs. However, the final definitions and the decision on whether these terms constitute KPIs within the context of 3GPP were both FFS.

The following definitions are therefore proposed. Please comment if you agree with the integrity definitions and whether to include the definitions as KPIs within the specification.

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**Target Integrity Risk (TIR)**

The probability that the positioning error exceeds the Alert Limit (AL) without warning the user within the Time-to-Alert (TTA).

**Alert Limit (AL)**

The maximum allowable positioning error such that the positioning system is available for the intended application. If the positioning error in any dimension or combination of dimensions (e.g. horizontal or vertical) is beyond the AL, operations are hazardous and the positioning system should be declared unavailable for the intended application to prevent loss of integrity.

**Protection level (PL)**

The PL is a bound on the positioning error that ensures that, the probability per unit of time of the true error being greater than the AL and the PL being less than or equal to the AL, for longer than the TTA, is less than the required TIR.

**Time-to-Alert (TTA)**

The maximum allowable elapsed time from when the positioning error exceeds the Alert Limit (AL) until the equipment annunciates a corresponding alert.

NOTE: The TIR, AL and TTA are design parameters that are fixed and defined for a particular implementation, whereas the PL is a real time output of the positioning system.

<------------------------------------------End of text proposal------------------------------------------->

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| **Company** | **Do you agree with the Integrity Definitions? Please propose alternatives if not.** | **Do you agree that the Integrity Definitions are KPIs?** |
| CATT | **Target Integrity Risk (TIR)**  The probability that the positioning error exceeds the Alert Limit (AL) without warning the user within the Time-to-Alert (TTA), required according to the location service.  **Alert Limit (AL)**  The maximum allowable positioning error such that the positioning system is available for the location service. If the positioning error in any dimension or combination of dimensions (e.g. horizontal or vertical) is beyond the AL, operations are hazardous and the positioning system should be declared unavailable for the intended application to prevent loss of integrity.  NOTE: The TIR, AL and TTA are design parameters that are fixed and defined for service level, whereas the PL is a real time output of the positioning system. | Agree |
| Swift Navigation | Yes, we agree with the text proposal definitions. | There has been discussion of what constitutes a KPI. To resolve this, we need a working definition of what is a KPI. Our view is that a KPI is a measurable and quantifiable property of a system that indicates its level of performance.  In the field of integrity, as we are dealing with very rare events, we are rarely able to directly measure the integrity performance experimentally (e.g. TIR of 10^-7/hr would require >1142 years of experimental data). Therefore, we propose to extend the idea of a KPI to performance indicators of a system that can be verified through direct measurement OR analysis.  Given this definition it is clear that the performance of an integrity system is indicated by what TIR, AL and TTA it can achieve.  In contrast the PL is a real-time output of the system that is related to and necessary to quantify the KPIs but in itself is not strictly a KPI under this definition.  Therefore, we propose **TIR, AL** and **TTA** as the KPIs. PL however is an important definition that should nonetheless be included in the SI. |
| InterDigital | Our proposals and comments in this document come from our contribution R2-2007588.  For PL, “per unit of time” is not clear. What are typical units assumed for “unit of time”?  In the Note, “PL is a real time output”, but it is not clear how and which component in the network updates the PL. It is also not clear whether the update will be done by UE or the network. | A proposal for the definition of TTA: Recovery time, where this is the time given by application/location service to the network to recover from a positioning failure. The network can configure in the UE a time duration, which is related to the recovery time, to recover from a positioning failure. If the network/UE cannot recover within the recovery time, an alert is raised. |
| vivo | We also think the definition of Protection Level is confusion and it is not aligned with the definition of TTA. The definition of PL use” for longer than the TTA”, TTA is not related to annunciate the alert, but indicates how long the position error exists before recovery. We may decouple the PL with TTA. | We propose **TIR, AL** and **TTA** as the KPIs as we discussed in the online meeting PL is a real time output, so PL isn’t a KPI. |
| Nokia | Agree with the definitions of TIR, AL and TTA  For PL, we propose the following definition:  “**Protection Level:** Statistical error bound computed so as to guarantee that the probability of the absolute position error exceeding said number is smaller than or equal to the target integrity risk”.  A definition of PL explained in terms of PL is not good. | We fully support the comment from Swift.  It is important to distinguish KPIs from requirements and agree on the definition and usage of KPIs. A KPI is a measurable quantity for which a target value has been defined. PL, being calculated by the positioning system, cannot be considered as a KPI according to this definition. Requirements express the positioning based application expectations with respect to the integrity system. |

Further, it was agreed that additional definitions can be added based on contribution-led priorities. Please identify additional definitions to be considered, and why.

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| **Company** | **Definitions** | **Why is the definition(s) relevant to the integrity study and protocol/specifications?** |
| Swift Navigation | Adapted from [4]:  **Integrity:** The Integrity of a positioning system is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the positioning error supplied by the positioning system, including the ability to provide timely and valid alerts to the UE and/or the user when the positioning error does not fulfil the condition for intended operation.  **Hazard:** Apotential source of harm caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the positioning system.  **Feared Event:** Feared Events are considered to be all possible events (i.e. of natural, systemic or operational nature) that can cause the computed positioning error to deviate from the true position, regardless of whether a specific Fault can be identified in one of the positioning systems or not.  **Fault:** A Feared Event that occurs intrinsic to the positioning system, i.e. caused by the malfunction of one of the elements of the positioning system.  **Fault-free:** A Feared Event is considered Fault-free when it is not caused by a malfunction of the positioning system. Typically, Fault-free Feared events are conditions when the positioning system inputs are erroneous e.g. a GNSS satellite failure  or abnormal atmospheric condition.  **Misleading Information (MI):** A MI event occurs when, the positioning system being declared available, the positioning error exceeds the PL but not the alert AL.  **Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI):** A HMI event occurs when, the positioning system being declared available, the positioning error exceeds the AL without annunciating an alert within the TTA.  **Integrity Event:** An Integrity Event occurs when the positioning system outputs Misleading Information (MI) or Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI).  **Protection level (PL)**  The PL is a bound on the positioning error that ensures that, the probability per unit of time of the true error being greater than the AL and the PL being less than or equal to the AL, for longer than the TTA, is less than the required TIR. | These definitions establish core integrity principles which can be commonly applied to the three study objectives, regardless of the positioning technology or methods. It is necessary to have these definitions to fully contextualize the definitions of the KPIs. |
| InterDigital | Positioning failure | It is not a part of KPI, but it should be explained in the note, to demonstrate how the KPIs can be tied to a failure event |
| Nokia | The list of definition should be limited to those needed to characterize events or define the requirements. the final list can only be drawn up when we have better defined the use cases and their specific potential requirements. We can just decide on the TIR, AL, PL and TTA for now but focus on the high level solution and impacts to positioning architecture, protocol, interfaces and RAN2 specifications first. |  |

# 3 Integrity Use Cases

It was proposed in [1] to illustrate the application of integrity to the safety-critical, liability-critical and commercial applications [e.g. TR 22.872], including Automotive, Industrial IOT and Rail, with additional use cases to be considered case-by-case.

Please indicate (e.g. (a) (c) etc) which of the following use cases should be prioritized for inclusion in the baseline TR:

1. **Automotive/Road**
2. **Industrial IoT**
3. **Rail**
4. **Aerial**
5. **Emergency and Mission Critical**
6. **Location Based Services**
7. **eHealth**
8. **Maritime**

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| **Company** | **Which use cases do you propose should be prioritized?** e.g. (a) (c) etc | **Additional use case suggestions?** |
| CATT | a, b, c, g, e, f |  |
| Swift Navigation | (a) (c)  There is broad industry consensus on the framework for TIR, TTA, AL, PL which is a use case agnostic framework. The use cases are important to illustrate these concepts in practice as well as to understand the threshold values for the KPIs. However, we strongly believe that setting threshold values or services levels for integrity should be out of scope for this study as ultimately it does not impact the specification and can be implementation-defined. Therefore, we propose to include the use cases in the SI purely for illustrative rather than normative purposes.  We think the most important illustrative use cases are (a) and (c), as these are the most well understood and stringent use cases currently under consideration. |  |
| InterDigital | (a),(b),(c)  Regarding (b), integrity will be needed for positioning targeting moving robots in a factory, i.e., AGV, for prevention of accidents. |  |
| vivo | (a),(b),(c)  Route area use cases should be studied in priority. And IIoT is an important work item in 3GPP and reliability is commecial requirement for IIoT. |  |
| Nokia | (a), (b), (e), (f) |  |

# 4 Protocol Impact

What are the protocol/specification implications that need to be addressed in the Study for the proposed Integrity Definitions and Use Cases?

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| **Company** | **Protocol/specification impacts to be addressed in the Study?** |
| CATT | 1. TS 22.261 section 7.3.2 should be updated to introduce the integrity requirement of service level. 2. Which positioning methods are supposed to support integrity (e. g The Table 4.3.1-1: Supported versions of UE positioning methods in TS38.305). |
| Swift Navigation | * As our strong view is that service levels and threshold values are out of scope for this SI, we do not recommend to amend TS 22.261. * This current SI should inform the direction of the future WI which will recommend changes to TS 37.355 to include the necessary IEs to support integrity. Specific impacts should be addressed as part of the WI, not this SI. * We agree with CATT that the positioning methods supporting integrity should be enumerated in TS 38.305 as part of this SI. |
| InterDigital | The protocols that may be impacted as a result of supporting integrity are LPP, NRPPa and RRC. This study should address the impacts on these protocols when supporting integrity for different positioning methods.  We also agree with CATT and Swift that TS 38.305 should list the positioning methods supporting integrity. |
| vivo | TS22.872 defination of integrity and use cases of positioning need update with integrity KPIs. |
| Nokia | * The potential impacts on LPP should be analyzed in the SI, and introduced in TS 37.355 during the WI phase. In particular, we think the signaling aspects should be examined:   + Signaling of parameters relating to integrity (e.g. KPIs) from LMF to UE, or vice versa.   Since integrity benefits from being calculated from the combination of several positioning methods, we do not recommend defining which of them support integrity or not (in TS38.305). this should be left to implementation. |

# 4 Skeleton TR

The Skeleton TR was discussed in Agenda Item 8.11.1 with the following outcome:

* Skeleton to be addressed in the continuation of email discussion [607] (to be discussed later).

Taking into consideration the skeleton proposals in [2], [3, 4] and the email/online discussions from [1], an updated skeleton is proposed for consideration:

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9 Positioning integrity and reliability

*From objective 2: Includes solutions necessary to support integrity and reliability of assistance data and position information:*

9.1 Integrity Overview – Background Information

9.1.1 Integrity Definitions

9.1.2 Integrity Concepts

9.2 Use Cases

9.3 Positioning Integrity Error Categories

9.3.1 RAT-Independent

9.3.1 RAT-Dependent

9.4 Positioning Integrity Methods

9.4.1 RAT-Independent

9.4.1 RAT-Dependent

9.5 Procedure and protocol impact analysis

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| **Company** | **Do you agree with the proposed Skeleton?** |
| Swift Navigation | Yes. |
| Vivo | Yes |
| Nokia | Yes |

# 5 Conclusion

# 6 References

1. R2-2008256 [AT111-e][607][POS] Summary of email discussion on Integrity definitions, KPIs,

and use cases, Swift Navigation.

1. R[2-2006671](file:///E:\WORK\1%203GPP\Meeting\RAN2%20111-e\2%20During\Docs\R2-2006671.zip) Skeleton proposals for TR38.857, CATT.
2. R[2-2006542](file:///E:\WORK\1%203GPP\Meeting\RAN2%20111-e\2%20During\Docs\R2-2006542.zip) Proposed table of contents - Section 9 (positioning integrity) - TR 38.857, Swift

Navigation, Ericsson, Intel Corporation.

1. R[2-2006541](file:///E:\WORK\1%203GPP\Meeting\RAN2%20111-e\2%20During\Docs\R2-2006541.zip) TP for Study on Positioning Integrity and Reliability, Swift Navigation, Deutsche

Telekom, u-blox, Ericsson, Mitsubishi Electric, Intel Corporation, CATT, UIC.