**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #119 S3-245141-r1**

Orlando, US, 11 -15 November 2024

**Title: Reply-LS on Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF**

**Response to: LS S3-243832 on clarification related to internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF from SA6**

**Release: Rel-18**

**Work Item: NSCALE**

**Source: SA WG3**

**To: SA6**

**Cc: SA2, CT3, SA5**

**Contact person: Zander Lei**

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**Send any reply LS to: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator,** **mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org**

**Attachments:**

# 1 Overall description

SA3 would like to thank SA6 for the LS on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF. SA3 has discussed the questions raised by SA6 and the answers are provided as follows:

* **Q1: Whether a trusted AF of an 3GPP operator is considered within the operator’s domain; If yes, whether it is possible to expose** **Internal 5G Core information such as DNN, S-NSSAI, etc. to a trusted AF (e.g., a NSCE server).**

**[SA3**]: No, a “trusted AF” is not equivalent to an “AF within the operator’s domain”. The term "trusted AF" is neither defined nor used in SA3 specifications. From the security/SA3 perspective, it is not well-defined and not recommended to be used in 3GPP specifications without a proper definition.

As far as information exposure to an AF is of concerns, it is allowed to expose “Internal 5G Core information” to an AF *within the operator’s domain*. Besides, it is also possible to expose internal 5G Core information to an AF outside the operator’s domain after proper security protection or privacy protection. For example, an “S-NSSAI” can be mapped to an AF-Service-Identifier before exposing to an AF outside the 3GPP operator domain (i.e., the “S-NSSAI” shall not be exposed directly in this case to be in line with the security requirements specified in the TS 33.501).

* **Q2: Whether the NSI (i.e., Network Slice Instance) and/or NSI ID can be exposed to the trusted AF.**

**[SA3]:** An NSI or an NSI ID is an internal instance/ID used in 5G Core and it has not been used for exposure to an AF in SA3 specifications. From the security perspective, it needs to be protected before exposing to an AF outside the 3GPP operator domain in case it has to be exposed (and can be exposed directly if the AF is within the 3GPP operator domain).

# 2 Actions

**To SA6**

**ACTION:** SA3 kindly asks SA6 to take above information into account.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings

SA3#120 17 – 21 February 2025 Athens (Greece)

SA3#121 7 – 11 April 2025 Goteborg, Sweden