**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #116 *S3-242520-r1***

Jeju, South Korea, 20th - 24th May 2024 (revision of S3-241957)

**Source: Huawei, HiSilicon**

**Title: Revocation supporting multiple USS**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.11**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Approve the pCR to TR 33.759***

# 2 References

None

# 3 Rationale

The current revocation procedures works only for single USS. This contribution proposes amendments to the procedure in order to support multiple USS. As a side note, the re-authentication procedure in 5.2.1.4 in TS 33.256 is not affected as long as UUAA is updated to support mulitple USS.

# 4 Detailed proposal

pCR

\*\*\* 1st CHANGE \*\*\*

## 6.Y Solution # Y: revocation supporting multiple USS

### 6.Y.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the key issue #1. The solution adapts the revocation procedure in TS 33.256 [4] to support multiple USS.

### 6.Y.2 Solution details

With reference to the clause 5.2.1.5 in TS 33.256 [4], the steps are amended as follows to support multiple USS:

1-2. no change to the corresponding steps in the clauses 5.2.1.4 in TS 33.256 [4].

3a or 3b. The UUAA revocation message that the UAS NF sent to the target AMF or SMF also includes the USS identifier.

NOTE 1: As stated in 5.2.1.6 in TS 33.256 [4], the USS identifier is based on the security link on the interface between UAS NF and USS (e.g., the identity mapped during link establishment or the identity in certificate).

3c-4. no change.

4a or 4b. The UUAA revocation indication message that the target AMF or the SMF sent to the UE contains also the USS identifier.

5. The UE on receiving the revocation indication only delete authorization data corresponding to the USS identifier.

### 6.Y.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Alignment with SA2 conclusions for the support of multiple USS is FFS.

\*\*\* END OF 1st CHANGE\*\*\*