Tdoc List

2024-08-23 14:03

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑242700 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242702 Process for SA3#117 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242703 Detail agenda planning for SA3#117 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243406  
    S3‑243406 Detail agenda planning for SA3#117 SA WG3 Chair other - No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242703
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑242701 Report from SA3#116 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242705 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242839 SWG Discussion SA3 Chair discussion Endorsement Yes
YesOption 4 was the preferred option among the companies. Cablelabs: when do we start with the LI report? The SA3 Chair commented that LI would provide a report for the current meeting, but the form of the report (tdoc or oral) was to be discussed. Vodafone: there are meeting reports in SA3-LI, we could incorporate them in the SA3 reports. Puneet (SA Chair) asked how many present companies were attending the present meeting. A few hands were raised. The SA chair commented that their ToR may have to be reviewed. The IPR reminders should be read at the start of every meeting (the SA3-LI chair confirmed that this was being done). A report of the SWG meeting needed to be provided and presented at TSG level (showing contributions, number of attendees, and so on). Alex (SA3-LI Chair) commented that the MCC report could be provided easily.They added that LI was given to SA3 as a decision of PCG. The SA Chair commented that treated contributions needed to be public information, more transparency was needed. The SA3-Li Chair replied that the Portal provided all the necessary information on contributions and attendance. The SA Chair commented that the SA3 Chair should have a full view on SA3-Li activities in case the SA3-LI was not available in the TSG meeting, in order to answer any questions. The SA3 Chair commented that he didn’t attend the meetings and couldn’t have this full view. The SA3-Li Chair commented that he was the only LI representative in Plenaries but he couldn’t attend all meetings. Any questions directed to SA3-LI could be answered offline if the SA3 Chair needed help. It was endorsed to maintain the current structure between SA3 and SA3-LI adding the necessary report on SA3-LI activities on a particular agenda item in the SA3 agenda. It was commented that the SA3-LI CRs could also be agreed during the SA3 meeting as it was done in the past.
 		noted No    
2.2 SA3-LI report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑242710 LS on Resource content filters C4-241339 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243040 Reply LS to CT4 on Resource content filters Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243217 Reply LS on Resource content filter Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243678  
    S3‑243678 Reply LS on Resource content filter Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243217
    S3‑243279 Reply-LS on LS on Resource content filters Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243678  
    S3‑242719 LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context S2-2405459 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243042 Discussion about Rel-18 ATSSS Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei: enough to say that TLS is supported after removing the editor's note.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242959 Reply LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242733 Recent attack on polynomial based MACs with short tag ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242767 Discussion on polynomial based MACs with short Tag Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Approval Yes
YesKDDI had issues with observation 1 and they needed clarification with observation 5.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242768 Reply LS on Polynomial based MACs with short Tag Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242706 Response to S3-240886 LS on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" GSMA 5GMRR LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242780 LS on aggregation and other N32 topics in the context of mediated roaming BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243676  
    S3‑243676 LS on aggregation and other N32 topics in the context of mediated roaming BSI (DE) LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242780
    S3‑242931 LS on Discrepancy between GSMA and 3GPP specifications on 5G Roaming over Roaming Intermediaries CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
YesThe Chair queried if there was anything expected from SA to do here. Nokia replied that SA should be aware of the statement given to GSMA that new solutions are not allowed in this situation from 3GPP perspective. Huawei: it's not clear what SA has to say to GSMA. SA already told GSMA that they needed to come to 3GPP to provide input contributions as LS exchanges were not the best way to work. NTT-Docomo commented that GSMA had been invited to come to 3GPP twice already without any response. Huawei: no harm in asking SA for guidance.
 		revised No S3‑243677  
    S3‑243677 LS on GSMA non compliance with 3GPP specifications on 5G Roaming over Roaming Intermediaries CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242931
    S3‑242716 Reply LS on security of IP transport over satellite transport links R3-243955 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242725 LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions S2-2407350 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242721 LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays S2-2407207 LS in   Yes
YesInterdigital: we prefer Ericsson or Huawei's baseline for the response.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242732 Reply LS on request clarification on mobile metaverse services S6-242734 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243000 Draft LS to SA6 on obtaining user consent for the exposure of User Sensitive Information Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242824 SA3 input to Reply LS on clarifications on consent management Nokia LS out   Yes
YesHuawei, Ericsson: this may cause additional discussions and create confusion. Apple was fine with the agreed version from Jeju meeting, not this version.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243366 LS on obtaining user consent for the exposure of User Sensitive Information S6a240323 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242727 LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel S4-241373 LS in   Yes
YesNokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm had some issues with the LS replies.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑243407 Reply to: LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel China Mobile LS out approval No
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243027 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243407  
    S3‑243232 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243407  
    S3‑242730 LS on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF S6-242714 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242898 Reply LS to SA6 on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: the term trusted AF is not clear.
 		revised No S3‑243408  
    S3‑243408 Reply LS to SA6 on Clarification related to Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242898
    S3‑242723 LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT S2-2407231 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243239 Reply LS on Clarification of requirements for Ambient IoT China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242737 LS on Support for Ambient IoT Security SP-241016 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242753 LS on RAN2 agreements and assumptions for Ambient IoT R2-2406150 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242724 LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture S2-2407236 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243144 Observations on and issues with NAS based solutions to Key Issue #1 of TR 33.700-32 "Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID" Ericsson, CableLabs, NTT DOCOMO discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242852 LS Replay on User Identities and Authentication Architecture InterDigital Canada LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243558 LS Replay on User Identities and Authentication Architecture InterDigital Canada LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242852
    S3‑242891 Reply LS to SA2 on User Identities and Authentication Architecture Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑242903 draft - Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243145 Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture Ericsson LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243157 Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture LG Electronics LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243251 Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243264 [Draft] Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑242939 Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑243321 Discussion on the User Identities LS from SA2 Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243322 Reply LS on User Identities and Authentication Architecture Qualcomm Incorporated LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243558  
    S3‑242718 Reply LS on clarification on mobile metaverse services S1-241351 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242713 LS on RFC 9374, "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)" IETF Drone Remote ID Protocol (DRIP) LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242714 LS on RFC 9543, "A Framework for Network Slices in Networks Built from IETF Technologies" IETF Traffic Engineering Architecture and Signaling Working Group (teas) LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242715 LS on a Realization of Network Slices for 5G Networks Using Current IP/MPLS Technologies IETF Traffic Engineering Architecture and Signaling Working Group (teas) LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242712 LS on Registering JWT claims at IANA CP-241308 LS in   Yes
YesThere were discussions whether this impacted SA3 specifications. Cablelabs asked whether it was up to SA3 to register in IANA but the Chair replied that CT had the lead on this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242717 LS on Avoiding Cross-TSG TEI RP-241686 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242741 Reply LS to SA3 on LI considerations for TR 33.757 s3i240502 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242900 [Draft] Reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243410  
    S3‑243240 Draft reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243410  
    S3‑243410 Draft reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243240
    S3‑242758 Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑243299 Reply LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243411  
    S3‑243411 Reply LS on Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243299
    S3‑243391 LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication C4-235577 LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242901 draft - Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243412  
    S3‑242902 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243679  
    S3‑243293 Discussion about the HONTRA related responses from the AMF Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243294 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243412  
    S3‑243412 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243294
    S3‑243295 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243679 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242820 Discussion on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
YesHuawei commented that the inventory may not complete. They added that SA3 wasn’t ready to start the study yet. Nokia wanted to bring a SID for the next meeting. The Chair proposed to have some offline calls and have an agreement. A more thorough document needed to be produced. Cablelabs: it is controversial whether symmetric encryption is impacted by PQC. Qualcomm wasn’t sure that a SID would do something significant. The Chair proposed to have a conference call before next meeting about this ropic.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243153 LS on Masking of cryptographic keys in UE trace file from 3GPP core network entities Ericsson LS out   Yes
YesNokia: comment with SA5 during this meeting, this has an impact on existing products. Ericsson warned that keys would be exposed in the clear.
 		revised No S3‑243696  
    S3‑243696 LS on Masking of cryptographic keys in UE trace file from 3GPP core network entities Ericsson LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243153
    S3‑242762 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Communications other Information Yes
YesPublication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#116) • Published: • TCG PC Client Reference Integrity Manifest Specification https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-PC-Client-Reference-Integrity-Manifest-Specification-Version-1.1-Revision-11_pub.pdf • TCG Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) Information Model https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-Reference-Integrity-Manifest-RIM-Information-Model-Version-1.1-Revision-1.0_pub.pdf • Overview of TCG Technologies for Device Identification and Attestation https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Overview-of-TCG-Technologies-for-Device-Identification-and-Attestation-Version-1.0-Revision-1.39.pdf • In public review: • TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class (SSC): https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-Storage-Security-Subsystem-Class-SSC-Opal-Version-2.30-Revision-0.21_30July24.pdf • TCG TPM Vendor ID Registry https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-TPM-Vendor-ID-Registry-Family-1.2-and-2.0-Version-1.07-Revision-0.02_16July24.pdf • TCG EK Credential Profile for TPM Family 2.0; Level 0 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-EK-Credential-Profile-for-TPM-Family-2.0-Level-0-Version-2.6-Revision-23_16July24.pdf • TCG OID Registry https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-OID-Registry-Version-1.00-Revision-0.74_10July24.pdf • TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-PC-Client-Platform-TPM-Profile-for-TPM-2.0-Version-1.06-Revision-32_5April24.pdf 2. Meetings: • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Boston, MA, USA) – 28 – 31 October • MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET • TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET • CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET
 		noted No    
    S3‑242728 Reply LS on GSMA OPG PRDs publication S5-243436 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242729 Reply LS on clarifications on consent management S6-242504 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242731 Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information S6-242733 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242720 Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information S2-2406888 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242711 Reply LS on N32-f N32-c correlation C4-242393 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242707 Reply LS on LS reply on LCS user plane connection binding to the UE C1-243934 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242708 Reply to LS on differentiating security materials used for PC5 direct discovery for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay C1-243949 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242709 Reply LS on CAPIF extensibility C3-243204 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242722 LS on Clarifications related to User Identities S2-2407219 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242726 LS Reply on Internal 5G Core information expose to trusted AF S2-2407354 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242734 Reply LS on GSMA OPG PRDs publication SP-240946 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242735 Reply LS on data plane control by roaming hubs SP-241014 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242736 LS on Security considerations for MPQUIC SP-241015 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242738 Reply LS on enhancement to the protocol stack of IMS Data Channel s3i240475 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242739 Reply LS to SA2 on User Identities and Authentication Architecture s3i240476 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242740 Reply LS to SA2 on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions s3i240477 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242756 LS reply on LS on support of SSIM on eUICC C6-240261 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242757 Reply LS on Security Considerations for MPQUIC IETF QUIC Working Group (QUIC) LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243096 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243559 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243256 Reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243559  
    S3‑243307 LS Reply to LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243559  
    S3‑243331 reply LS on security considerations for 5G ProSe multi-hop relays Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243559  
    S3‑243390 LS reply to 3GPP Reply-LS on PQC Migration GSMA LS in discussion Yes
YesIt was commented that SAGE should do the analysis for SA3. The Chair proposed an Lsout to SAGE since there was no agreement on whether the algorithms were really quantum safe. Ericsson commented that SA3 had already provided a response and there was no need to reopen the discussions just because there were doubts outside 3GPP. NIST commented that they had published on their website that the algorithms were quantum safe.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑243393 Newly published data channel GSMA PRD TS.66 GSMA LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243394 Version 2.0 of 256-bit AICI. ETSI SAGE LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑243402 LS on security visibility for user or application Google LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with sending this LS. Ericsson didn’t agree with sending this LS either. Operator policies or regulation may be behind Nokia didn’t support this LS either. NTT-Docomo: only the first topic in the actions should be addressed to GSMA, but not formulated as a question. Google: we have something described very clearly in the spec but that is not implemented correctly. GSMA could at least give some awareness. GSMA DG is also concerned about this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243409 Discussion for LS S2-2407236 on User Identities Interdigital discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑242760 UE Security Testing BSI (DE) discussion Discussion Yes
YesBSI commented that this would not overlap with RAN5 conformance testing, this was related to security testing in the UE. Nokia preferred to have a separate SCAS document, not to do it in RAN5. Ericsson preferred to treat this offline. It wasn’t clear how the testing would differ from what was being done in RAN5. Qualcomm preferred to have this in RAN5. NTT-Docomo: RAN5 testing has a well established process, maybe they can have a security specific annex. Samsung didn’t agree with having this in a new specification in SA3. The Chair commented that it was not up to SA3 to make a decision on the testing in the UE since it was in the domain of RAN5, but this could be discussed further.
 		noted No    
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑243160 Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei and Nokia wanted some rewording. Nokia: when NF not registered into the NRF, how is it dealt with?
 		revised No S3‑243682  
    S3‑243682 Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243160
    S3‑243161 Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243683  
    S3‑243683 Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243161
    S3‑243162 Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia needed more time to analise this.
 		noted No    
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑242876 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242877 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243350 Emergency Service over UE-to-Network relay - PEI status check Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243383 Emergency Service over UE-to-Network relay - PEI status check Philips International B.V CR Approval Yes
YesNokia: we don’t check the PEI in emergency calls. Qualcomm: no need to check the PEI.
 		not pursued No    
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑242904 CR to update AKMA service disable procedure ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243413  
    S3‑242952 AKMA API Name correction along with other editorial corrections Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242953 AAnF Providing VPLMN Id to AF Nokia, CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. China Mobile needed some clarifications.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243053 update to AKMA service disabling Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesOverlapping with S3-242904. Ericsson: can this be solved in CT groups? Nokia: CT is not addressing this in their specs.
 		revised No S3‑243413  
    S3‑243413 update to AKMA service disabling Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243053
    S3‑243159 Editorial correction for AKMA procedures LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN S3‑243097 Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243405  
    S3‑243405 CR resubmission - the content of AN-parameters Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243097
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC                      
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑243265 Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE Xiaomi, OPPO, Phillips CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243684  
    S3‑243684 Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE Xiaomi, OPPO, Phillips CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243265
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA. S3‑243064 Correct the Federal Learning procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson only agreed with one change.
 		revised No S3‑243414  
    S3‑243414 Correct the Federal Learning procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesLeaving only the agreed change with Ericsson.
 		agreed No   S3‑243064
    S3‑243067 Update procedure Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing in TS 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia disagreed. CT4 solved this already.
 		not pursued No    
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑242778 Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS BSI (DE) CR Decision No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242822  
    S3‑242822 Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Nokia CR Decision Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242823 S3‑242778
    S3‑242823 Trust anchoring for N32-f/PRINS Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Nokia CR Decision Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. They also added that as a new feature it should be addressed in Rel-19.
 		not pursued No   S3‑242822
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑242742 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242743 Discussion paper on UPU Security and related header protection Lenovo discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243316 Discussion on protecting header information in UPU Qualcomm Incorporated, Vivo, Oppo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242950 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243317 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated, Vivo, Oppo draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242951 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242761 MPQUIC TLS Annex Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242964 MPQUIC TLS Annex Intel, Nokia, Charter Communications, CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243415  
    S3‑243415 MPQUIC TLS Annex Intel, Nokia, Charter Communications, CR - Yes
YesMCC: this should be cat-B for Rel-19, no new features are allowed in Rel-18. IT was commented that this was aligning with SA2. MCC added that this should be cat-B and it may be discussed in Plenary. It was commented that SA2 had made this change recently.
 		agreed No   S3‑242964
    S3‑242831 Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco, Huawei CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242832 Updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco, Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243416  
    S3‑243181 Editorials on updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243416 Editorials on updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Ericsson CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242843 Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF China Mobile Com. Corporation CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: not in scope of eNA. It's also an additional feature for Rel-18, it's frozen.Nokia supported this. MCC: cover page issues.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242905 Message name correction to TS 33.501 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242949 Discussion paper reauthentication via untrusted non 3GPP access Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243047 Adding the requirement of media confidentiality protection for IMS data channel Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesApple didn’t agree with this CR. Nokia didn’t agree with the first change and the second change was not needed. China Mobile: the reply LS depends on this CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243048 Replacing DCMF with MF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243417  
    S3‑243417 Replacing DCMF with MF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243048
    S3‑243177 Incorrect statements about 33.310 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243178 Incorrect statements about 33.310 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243179 Incorrect statements about 33.310 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243180 Incorrect statements about 33.310 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑243185 SCPAC: Secondary Node key update for SCPAC Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesApple: better add a note instead of this new text. MCC clarified that legacy CPAC already referred to pre-Rel-18 and mentioning Rel-17 was not needed.
 		revised No S3‑243418  
    S3‑243418 SCPAC: Secondary Node key update for SCPAC Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑243185
    S3‑242785 Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242842 Supplementary on Solution #6: Collection of security related log data of NFs via DCCF BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.2 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). S3‑242759 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243419  
    S3‑243419 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242759
    S3‑242769 Refinement of UDR security requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
YesBSI: unnecessary. Ericsson also found this CR unnecessary. This was taken offline.
 		noted No    
4.3 WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF). S3‑243285 Discussion on SS7/MAP interface at SMSF to define MAP filtering and protection requirements for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay discussion Discussion Yes
YesEricsson wondered whether this was introducing new requirements. IIT Bombay: no new requirements are introduced, as stated in section 5.2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243289 Protection requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243420  
    S3‑243420 Protection requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243289
    S3‑243292 Filtering requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243685  
    S3‑243685 Filtering requirements on Map interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243292
    S3‑243312 New clause on protection of Map interface in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF IIT Bombay draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243314 New clause on Map-based SS7 interface filtering in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF IIT Bombay draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243315 Minor additions/modifications for draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243363 Security for Map-based SS7 interface IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is captured already in the non-SBA interfaces clause. MCC: is this CR under the scope of the WID?
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243421 Draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243686 Cover page TS 33.529 IIT Bombay TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243701 Living document for SMSF SCAS IIT Bombay draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243702 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.5 WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑242763 [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction Airbus CR Agreement Yes
YesAirbus commented that SA6 was still discussing the topic so this has to be postponed depending on their progress.
 		revised No S3‑243717  
    S3‑243717 [MCXSec4] 33180 R19 MC Recording Server Introduction Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242763
4.7 WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm S3‑242975 Revised WID on Milenage-256 algorithm THALES, IDEMIA WID revised Agreement Yes
YesTS 35.237 would need to be withdrawn after the next TSG.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242977 Selection of the option THALES discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑242979 Content of TR 35.234 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243422  
    S3‑243422 Content of TS 35.234 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242979
    S3‑242980 Content of TS 35.235 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243423  
    S3‑243423 Content of TS 35.235 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242980
    S3‑242982 Content of TS 35.236 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243424  
    S3‑243424 Content of TS 35.236 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242982
    S3‑243425 Draft TS 35.234 Thales draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243426 Draft TS 35.235 Thales draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243427 Draft TS 35.236 Thales draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.8 WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols S3‑243176 Forbid insecure usage of aes-gcm and aes-gmac Ericsson other Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. No hurry to do this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243056 update to the support of ESP encryption transforms in TS 33.210 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesNokia: RFC says should, why are we saying may here? Huawei: there are other mechanisms. Cisco: a Should in IETF is like a must under certain conditions.
 		revised No S3‑243719  
    S3‑243719 update to the support of ESP encryption transforms in TS 33.210 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243056
    S3‑243173 Updating baseline of living document to 33.203 with content of the latest version of TS 33.203 Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243174 Updating baseline of living document to 33.310 with content of the latest version of TS 33.310 Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243175 Updating baseline of living document to 33.501 with content of the latest version of TS 33.501 Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242781 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243428  
    S3‑243428 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
 		email approval No   S3‑242781
    S3‑242782 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243429  
    S3‑243429 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
 		email approval No   S3‑242782
    S3‑242783 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243430  
    S3‑243430 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
YesThe content of these draftCRs (S3-243428, S3-243429, S3-243430, and S3-243430) is considered frozen and hence not subject to any further changes except the new statements deprecating cryptographic primitives. The intention is to give companies enough time and stable versions of the changes to check such statements internally. In case of no challenge in this (SA3#118, SA3#119) meeting cycle, the draftCRs are to be converted to CRs and agreed in SA3#119
 		email approval No   S3‑242783
    S3‑242784 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243431  
    S3‑243431 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
YesContent is declared stable.
 		email approval No   S3‑242784
4.9 WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 S3‑243235 Adding description of non-MSGin5G UE scenarios China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243236 Living document of security aspects of MSGin5G service Ph3 China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243432  
    S3‑243432 Living document of security aspects of MSGin5G service Ph3 China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243236
    S3‑243433 CR for living document TITLE TO BE PROVIDED BY CMCC China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑242770 Test Case on No Default Content Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243435  
    S3‑243435 Test Case on No Default Content Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242770
    S3‑242771 Test Case on No Directory Listings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
YesEricsson: this looks like some kind of black box testing.
 		revised No S3‑243436  
    S3‑243436 Test Case on No Directory Listings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
YesIncorporating changes from BSI CR in S3-242973
 		approved No   S3‑242771
    S3‑242772 Test Case on No Web Server Header Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243687  
    S3‑243687 Test Case on No Web Server Header Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242772
    S3‑242773 Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243437  
    S3‑243437 Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
YesIncorporates the content of the CR S3-242974 from BSI.
 		approved No   S3‑242773
    S3‑242774 Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243688  
    S3‑243688 Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242774
    S3‑242968 Editorial Correction of TC_NO_SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_WEB_SERVER BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242970 Clarification on TC_NO_CGI_OR_SCRIPTING_FOR_UPLOADS BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242972 Clarification on TC_ACCESS_RIGHTS_WEB_SERVER_FILES BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242973 Clarification on TC_NO_DIRECTORY_LISTINGS BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242974 Clarification on TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_ERROR_PAGES_INFORMATION BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesThe content will go to the living document in 3434.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242976 Clarification on TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING BSI (DE) CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242978 Removal of boiler plate texts in format of evidence BSI (DE) CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243661  
    S3‑243661 Removal of boiler plate texts in format of evidence BSI (DE) CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242978
    S3‑242981 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243029  
    S3‑243029 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR   Yes
YesHuawei asked to discuss it in the next meeting.
 		not pursued No   S3‑242981
    S3‑243112 Expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon,CAICT,CTCC, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243113 Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon,CAICT,CTCC, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243114 Add threat to expired certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243115 Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243281 Test Case for Intra-VNF Communication Interface Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia: no requirement for this
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243403 Remove unnecessary complexity from UDM test case BSI draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243404 Add an OAuth2.0 test case to check for the absence of an access token BSI draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243434 Living document for Rel-19 SCAS TS 33.117 Huawei draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243438 Draft CR TR 33.926 SCAS_5G_Maint Huawei draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243439 Draft CR TS 33.511 Huawei draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑243163 Support iat claim in the access token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑243164 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.12 WID on Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 S3‑242816 Discussion on Impact Analysis for Inter-CU LTM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242906 Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242954 Discussion Paper on Security Key Handling for Inter-CU LTM Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242995 LTM - Discussion paper on LTM security Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243061 discussion paper on LTM solutions Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243194 Discussion on LTM from security perspective Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243249 Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243195 Key issue for security aspects of inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243522  
    S3‑243522 Key issue for security aspects of inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243195
    S3‑243196 Key issue for authenticity verification of Cell Switch Command Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243523  
    S3‑243523 Key issue for authenticity verification of Cell Switch Command Samsung other Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243196
    S3‑242798 1-Hop Forward Security Solution for LTM vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243524  
    S3‑243524 1-Hop Forward Security Solution for LTM vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242798
    S3‑242817 Discussion on Potential Solution for Inter-CU LTM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242818 Solution for Inter-CU LTM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243525  
    S3‑243525 Solution for Inter-CU LTM Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242818
    S3‑242908 NCC synchronization solution for LTM ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243526  
    S3‑243526 NCC synchronization solution for LTM ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242908
    S3‑242997 LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#1 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243527  
    S3‑243527 LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#1 Apple other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242997
    S3‑242998 LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#2 Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243528  
    S3‑243528 LTM - content on living CR - Candidate solution#2 Apple other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242998
    S3‑243158 New solution for LTM security handling LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243529  
    S3‑243529 New solution for LTM security handling LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243158
    S3‑243197 Solution for security aspects of inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243530  
    S3‑243530 Solution for security aspects of inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243197
    S3‑243268 LTM: Solution on Rekeying Sychronization at Handover Completion Xiaomi Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243531  
    S3‑243531 LTM: Solution on Rekeying Sychronization at Handover Completion Xiaomi Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243268
    S3‑243330 Fixing the RRC/PDCP anchor for inter-gNB LTM cell switches Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243532  
    S3‑243532 Fixing the RRC/PDCP anchor for inter-gNB LTM cell switches Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243330
    S3‑242907 MAC CE integrity protection solution for LTM ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243198 Solution for verifying authenticity of cell switch command Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243266 LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using AS Security Context Xiaomi Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243267 LTM: New Solution for Protecting NCC in MAC CE using C-RNTI Xiaomi Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243199 Conclusion for inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242819 LS on Security Handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243666  
    S3‑243666 LS on Security Handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242819
    S3‑242996 LTM - Reply LS to RAN2 on LTM progress Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243666  
    S3‑243193 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243689  
    S3‑243689 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Information No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑243193
4.13 WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑243326 Discussion on normative solutions for KI#1 and KI#3 Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242744 Security re-establishment for Trusted non-3GPP access Lenovo draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243641  
    S3‑242821 Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243642  
    S3‑243642 Living document of the Non3GPPMobEnh study Nokia draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑242821
    S3‑243098 DraftCR for TNAP and TWIF case Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243641  
    S3‑243327 Mobility under a TNGF Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243641  
    S3‑243641 Mobility under a TNGF Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243327
    S3‑243328 Mobility under a TWIF Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243329 Informative text of using FT for NSWO Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243643  
    S3‑243643 Informative text of using FT for NSWO Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243329
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑242815 New Use case proposal for data exposure related to attacks on network slices IRT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243493  
    S3‑243493 New Use case proposal for data exposure related to attacks on network slices IRT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242815
    S3‑243087 Evaluation to Use case 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243494  
    S3‑243494 Evaluation to Use case 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243087
    S3‑242899 Addressing EN in Use Case 5 U.S. National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243495  
    S3‑243495 Addressing EN in Use Case 5 U.S. National Security Agency, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242899
    S3‑243088 Evaluation to Use case 5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243495  
    S3‑242748 Updates to Solution #2 Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243496  
    S3‑243496 Updates to Solution #2 Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242748
    S3‑242749 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243497  
    S3‑243497 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242749
    S3‑242838 KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection OTD_US, MITRE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243365  
    S3‑243365 KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection OTD_US, MITRE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243498 S3‑242838
    S3‑243498 KI#1, Solution #3 Updates: Data Collection OTD_US, MITRE pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243365
    S3‑243084 Evaluation for solution 3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243498  
    S3‑243007 EN removal for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243499  
    S3‑243499 EN removal for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243007
    S3‑243008 Evaluation for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243500  
    S3‑243500 Evaluation for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243008
    S3‑243311 Security Log Management specifications in O-RAN Alliance Ericsson discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243308 Update and evaluation for Solution #5 "Security log events collection for evaluation and monitoring" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243501  
    S3‑243501 Update and evaluation for Solution #5 "Security log events collection for evaluation and monitoring" Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243308
    S3‑243085 Evaluation for solution 5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243501  
    S3‑242869 New solution for KI #1 Data Collection using DCCF MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243502  
    S3‑243502 New solution for KI #1 Data Collection using DCCF MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242869
    S3‑243001 New solution for data collection related to API security risks Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243503  
    S3‑243503 New solution for data collection related to API security risks Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243001
    S3‑243309 New Solution to Key Issue #1: Using security log events, counters and protocol signaling monitoring Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243504  
    S3‑243504 New Solution to Key Issue #1: Using security log events, counters and protocol signaling monitoring Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243309
    S3‑242746 Initial Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243505  
    S3‑243505 Initial Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, US National Security Agency, MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this contribution.There was some big impact associated with the word "requirement". ZTE, CATT and China Mobile objected to this contribution. ORANGE didn’t object but it wasn’t clear for them what the following tasks would be. The Chair declared the contents of this document as a working agreement.
 		approved No   S3‑242746
    S3‑242868 Conclusions for Data Collection MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242747 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243611  
    S3‑243611 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242747
    S3‑242833 Solution for enhancement of SBA access control decision mechanisms Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243613  
    S3‑243613 Solution for enhancement of SBA access control decision mechanisms Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242833
    S3‑242867 New solution for KI#2: Dynamic Security Policy Enforcement Framework MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is like definiing an alternative authentication on top of what we have now. I suggest to remove the evaluaton.
 		revised No S3‑243614  
    S3‑243614 New solution for KI#2: Dynamic Security Policy Enforcement Framework MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242867
    S3‑243310 New Solution to Key Issue #2: Policy enforcement using NRF configuration and short access token lifetime Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243615  
    S3‑243615 New Solution to Key Issue #2: Policy enforcement using NRF configuration and short access token lifetime Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243310
    S3‑242745 Cleanup of TR Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243612 Draft TR 33.794 Motorola Mobility draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑243296 Remove Editor's Note from KI#1: Third party specific user identities Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242872 Update Sol3 on Support of Third Party specific User Identities in IMS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243616  
    S3‑243616 Update Sol3 on Support of Third Party specific User Identities in IMS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242872
    S3‑243022 Addressing the ENs on dynamic name card details and exposure mechanisms of solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243024 Addressing the EN on details of determining the received Avatar ID of solution 5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243617  
    S3‑243617 Addressing the EN on details of determining the received Avatar ID of solution 5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243024
    S3‑243023 Addressing the ENs on token related details and alignment of SA2 for solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243618  
    S3‑243618 Addressing the ENs on token related details and alignment of SA2 for solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243023
    S3‑243025 Evaluation on Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243619  
    S3‑243619 Evaluation on Solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243025
    S3‑243228 Resolving EN in sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243620  
    S3‑243620 Resolving EN in sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243228
    S3‑243229 Evaluation for sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243621  
    S3‑243621 Evaluation for sol#6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243229
    S3‑242873 Update Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243622  
    S3‑243622 Update Sol7 on Protect IMS DC based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242873
    S3‑242870 Update sol9 on Secure IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243623  
    S3‑243623 Update sol9 on Secure IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242870
    S3‑243230 New solution on avatar communication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243624  
    S3‑243624 New solution on avatar communication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243230
    S3‑243026 A new solution on the security of IMS DC capability exposure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243625  
    S3‑243625 A new solution on the security of IMS DC capability exposure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243026
    S3‑243298 New solution for KI#3: IMS DC capability exposure security based on existing specification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243626  
    S3‑243626 New solution for KI#3: IMS DC capability exposure security based on existing specification Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243298
    S3‑243297 Conclusion for KI#1: Third party specific user identities Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242871 Conclusion for KI#3 on IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243656 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑242910 Remove the EN in KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243241 Solve EN for Sol#1&5 of TR 33.757 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243467  
    S3‑243467 Solve EN for Sol#1&5 of TR 33.757 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243241
    S3‑243386 Solve EN for sol#1&12 of TR 33.757 regarding SA3-LI China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: LI impact to be solved in SA3-LI.
 		approved No   S3‑243242
    S3‑243082 Evaluation for KI#1 and KI#2 on N4/SBA Security for solution 3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243469  
    S3‑243469 Evaluation for KI#1 and KI#2 on N4/SBA Security for solution 3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243082
    S3‑243356 Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243470 Resolution of EN concerning message inspection, filtering and topology hiding – solution 13. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243358 Evaluation of solution 13 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243079 Evaluation on the solution 13 for KI1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this evaluation.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243018 Conclusion to KI#1 China Telecomunication Corp.,ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243471  
    S3‑243471 Conclusion to KI#1 China Telecomunication Corp.,ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243018
    S3‑243171 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 "Security for dedicated UPF interacting with PLMN through N4 interface" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243471  
    S3‑243205 Conclusion for KI#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243471  
    S3‑243360 Conclusion to KI#1 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243471  
    S3‑242779 Conclude LI impacts for PNI-NPN Solutions in TR 33.757 Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243471  
    S3‑243021 Addressing the EN and evaluation of Solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243472 Addressing the EN and evaluation of Solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243013 Evaluation to solution#6 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243473  
    S3‑243473 Evaluation to solution#6 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243013
    S3‑243017 Evaluation to solution#7 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243474  
    S3‑243474 Evaluation to solution#7 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243017
    S3‑243379 Update sol#8 for wrong NF type handling Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243475  
    S3‑243475 Update sol#8 for wrong NF type handling Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243379
    S3‑243201 Update to Solution#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243476  
    S3‑243476 Update to Solution#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243201
    S3‑243200 Evaluation for solution#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243380 Update sol#10 for message handling Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243477  
    S3‑243477 Update sol#10 for message handling Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243380
    S3‑242841 Revision of two errors in TR 33.757 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243357 Resolution of editors note concerning message inspection/filtering and topology hiding – solution 14. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243478  
    S3‑243478 Resolution of editors note concerning message inspection/filtering and topology hiding – solution 14. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243357
    S3‑243359 Evaluation of solution 14 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243080 Evaluation on the solution 14 for KI2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243020 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243479  
    S3‑243479 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp., ZTE, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243020
    S3‑243172 Conclusion for Key Issue #2 "Dedicated NFs interacting with PLMN through SBA interface" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243479  
    S3‑243206 Conclusion for KI#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243479  
    S3‑243361 Conclusion to KI#2 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243479  
    S3‑243378 Add conclusion to KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243479  
    S3‑242750 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243480  
    S3‑243480 Updates to Solution#11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242750
    S3‑242911 Update the Sol#15 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243481  
    S3‑243481 Update the Sol#15 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242911
    S3‑242912 Update the Sol#16 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243482  
    S3‑243482 Update the Sol#16 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242912
    S3‑243081 Evaluation on the solution 17 for KI3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243483  
    S3‑243202 Update to solution#17 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243483  
    S3‑243483 Update to solution#17 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243202
    S3‑242909 Conclusion to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243484  
    S3‑243484 Conclusion to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242909
    S3‑243086 Conclusion on KI3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussion whether normative work was needed.The support was 50% for both options.
 		merged No S3‑243484  
    S3‑243207 Conclusion for KI#3 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243484  
    S3‑242862 New solution for KI#1: Analytics for Secure N4 interface with Security Gateway MITRE-FFRDC, Defense Information Systems Agency EM pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243203 Solution to enforce additional policy checks for NF Consumer in PNI-NPN Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: too late for solutions, we are reaching conclusions now and we need to follow the work plan. The Chair commented that the Rapporteur shouldn’t deny the contribution as a rule. Nokia supported the solution. NSA supported the contribution as well.
 		revised No S3‑243485  
    S3‑243485 Solution to enforce additional policy checks for NF Consumer in PNI-NPN Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243203
    S3‑243204 Solution for SUPI privacy Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243690  
    S3‑243690 Solution for SUPI privacy Samsung pCR Approval No
YesHuawei objected because this was changing the network architecture.
 		noted No   S3‑243204
    S3‑242754 TR 33.757 correction of Term for PNI-NPN Operational domain Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242766 Revision of two errors in TR 33.757 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243242 Solve EN for sol#1&12 of TR 33.757 regarding SA3-LI China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243386  
    S3‑243468 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑243398 Proposed solution for Secure Transport of Messages Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243662  
    S3‑243662 Proposed solution for Secure Transport of Messages Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243398
    S3‑243397 Proposed solution for certificate enrolment Google, JHU APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243486  
    S3‑243486 Proposed solution for certificate enrolment Google, JHU APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243397
    S3‑242854 Solution on certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243487  
    S3‑243487 Solution on certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco Systems, MITRE-FFRDC, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242854
    S3‑242892 update to Sol#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243488  
    S3‑243488 update to Sol#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242892
    S3‑242893 update to Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243489  
    S3‑243489 update to Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242893
    S3‑242894 overall evaluation for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243490  
    S3‑243490 overall evaluation for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242894
    S3‑242895 overall evaluation for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Huawei: we need to have a picture to know the benefits of a second framework. NSA, NCSC questioned the vlaue of doing the comparison.
 		revised No S3‑243491  
    S3‑243491 overall evaluation for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242895
    S3‑243722 Draft TR 33.776 Cisco draft TR discussion No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits S3‑242777 Proposed changes to the Conclusions Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242786 Annexes on 256-bit security and backwards compatibility KDDI Corporation, Cablelabs, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243647  
    S3‑243647 Annexes on 256-bit security and backwards compatibility KDDI Corporation, Cablelabs, Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242786
    S3‑242776 Editorial Modifications Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243648  
    S3‑243648 Editorial Modifications Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242776
    S3‑242787 pCR on Editorial cleanup KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242788 Presentation of Specification to TSG: TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243649  
    S3‑243649 Presentation of Specification to TSG: TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242788
    S3‑242914 LS on assigning algorithm identifier values for 256-bit algorithms ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243655 Draft TR 33.700-41 KDDI draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks S3‑243342 Threat update for KI1 for MiBida NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243506 Threat update for KI1 for MiBida NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR - No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243385 33.701: Update to Solution 4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242994 MiBiDA - Update solution#10 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243507  
    S3‑243507 MiBiDA - Update solution#10 Apple pCR - No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242994
    S3‑242965 Solution #14 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243508  
    S3‑243508 Solution #14 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242965
    S3‑243362 Removal of ENs to solution 14 in MiBiDA NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243508  
    S3‑242801 New Solution Mitigation of Roaming Attack vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243509  
    S3‑243509 New Solution Mitigation of Roaming Attack vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242801
    S3‑243364 New UE configuration based solution for MibidA NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243510  
    S3‑243510 New UE configuration based solution for MibidA NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243364
    S3‑243215 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.701 Samsung, Ericsson, Nokia, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑242915 conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑243118 Way forward Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑243122 Conclusion proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243511  
    S3‑243511 Conclusion proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesShow of hands for the Conclusion: - Support: Vivo, Nokia, Google, Ericsson, Lenovo, Samsung, Huawei, Philips. - No support, NTT-Docomo, Xiaomi, Thales, Apple, ORANGE, CableLAbs, ZTE
 		revised No S3‑243691 S3‑243122
    S3‑243691 Conclusion proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243511
    S3‑242992 MiBiDA - Conclusions Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑242966 Conclusion for KI#1 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑242799 Discussion on Conclusion to Address Attack in MiBiDA vivo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242800 Conclusion for key issue #1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243511  
    S3‑243269 33.701: Addition to Overall Summary Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242916 Overall summary update ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242993 MiBiDA - Update overall summary Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243120 Updates to overall summary Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243659  
    S3‑243659 Updates to overall summary Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243120
    S3‑243119 Conference call minutes Huawei, HiSilicon report Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243395 Evaluation to Solution #1 Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243657  
    S3‑243657 Evaluation to Solution #1 Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243395
    S3‑243396 Evaluation to Solution #4 Google pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243557 Draft TR 33.701 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243692 Cover sheet TR 33.701 Huawei TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑242764 LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243533  
    S3‑243533 LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242764
    S3‑243250 Draft LS on reply to LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243319 Security of Satellite Store & Forward Solutions Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243320 Reply LS on FS_5GSAT_Ph3_ARCH conclusions Qualcomm Incorporated LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243533  
    S3‑242918 Update the Clause 4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242919 Update the KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243534  
    S3‑243534 Update the KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242919
    S3‑242846 An Update for Solution #21: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243535  
    S3‑243535 An Update for Solution #21: Remediation of unauthenticated (D)DOS in S&F InterDigital Communications pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242846
    S3‑242847 An Update for the Evaluation of Solution #21 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243536  
    S3‑243536 An Update for the Evaluation of Solution #21 InterDigital Communications pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242847
    S3‑242920 Evaluation for Solution #13 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243537  
    S3‑243537 Evaluation for Solution #13 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242920
    S3‑242971 Evaluation of solution #13 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243537  
    S3‑243348 Evaluation of Solution#13 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesS3-243537
 		merged No    
    S3‑242967 Evaluation of solution #1 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242969 Evaluation of solution #2 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242985 Remove ENs and update evaluation in Solution #12 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243539  
    S3‑243539 Remove ENs and update evaluation in Solution #12 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242985
    S3‑243002 Solution 6 update with evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243538  
    S3‑243538 Solution 6 update with evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243002
    S3‑243003 Solution 22 updates with EN removal Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243005 Solution 22 updates with evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243540  
    S3‑243540 Solution 22 updates with evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243005
    S3‑243073 Evaluates to solution#22 of TR 33.700-29 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243540  
    S3‑243349 Evaluation of Solution#22 Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243540  
    S3‑243035 Evaluation update on solution 9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243057 Resolution of EN on solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243693  
    S3‑243693 Resolution of EN on solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243057
    S3‑243058 Evaluation update on solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243541  
    S3‑243541 Evaluation update on solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243058
    S3‑243218 Evaluation of solution#7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243542  
    S3‑243542 Evaluation of solution#7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243218
    S3‑243219 Resolving EN of solution#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243543  
    S3‑243543 Resolving EN of solution#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243219
    S3‑243220 Evaluation of solution#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243544  
    S3‑243544 Evaluation of solution#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243220
    S3‑243234 Update solution 5 China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243545  
    S3‑243545 Update solution 5 China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243234
    S3‑243253 Update to solution #15 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243254 Update to solution #16 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243318 Addition to solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243694  
    S3‑243694 Addition to solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243318
    S3‑243072 Removing ENs and adding evaluation in Sol#19 of TR 33.700-29 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243695  
    S3‑243695 Removing ENs and adding evaluation in Sol#19 of TR 33.700-29 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243072
    S3‑243222 Resolving EN of solution#25 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243546  
    S3‑243546 Resolving EN of solution#25 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243222
    S3‑243223 Evaluation of solution#25 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243547  
    S3‑243547 Evaluation of solution#25 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243223
    S3‑243255 Update to solution #17 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243548  
    S3‑243548 Update to solution #17 in TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243255
    S3‑243221 Update to solution#24 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243549  
    S3‑243549 Update to solution#24 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243221
    S3‑243224 Update to solution#26 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243550  
    S3‑243550 Update to solution#26 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243224
    S3‑242865 pCR to TR33.700-29 New solution on anti DoS attacks and privacy protection for S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243551  
    S3‑243551 pCR to TR33.700-29 New solution on anti DoS attacks and privacy protection for S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242865
    S3‑243033 Security protection based on AKA procedure in S&F operation with a full CN onboard the satellite Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243552  
    S3‑243552 Security protection based on AKA procedure in S&F operation with a full CN onboard the satellite Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243033
    S3‑243233 New solution of Authentication and authorization in S&F based on onboard EPC China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243553  
    S3‑243553 New solution of Authentication and authorization in S&F based on onboard EPC China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243233
    S3‑243034 Interim GUTI privacy protection based on pseudonym UE IDs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243554  
    S3‑243554 Interim GUTI privacy protection based on pseudonym UE IDs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243034
    S3‑242988 New key issue for satellite switching with re-synchronization in regenerative architecture Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242956 Discussion Paper FSAT Solutions Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242917 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242955 Conclusion of Key Issue 1 Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243045 Conclusion of Key issue #1 in TR 33.700-29 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243152 Conclusion for KI#1 THALES pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243555 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑242932 Agreed pCR of the last meeting Mobike Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242935 Discussion paper for Fast BSS details from 802.11 specs Nokia discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243667  
    S3‑243667 Discussion paper for Fast BSS details from 802.11 specs Nokia discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242935
    S3‑242837 Further conclusion for Key issue #1 Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243697  
    S3‑243697 Further conclusion for Key issue #1 Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242837
    S3‑242934 LS on clarification on trusted non 3GPP access technologies Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242933 KI1 and KI3 conclusion update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243644  
    S3‑243644 KI1 and KI3 conclusion update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242933
    S3‑243101 Remove ENs to KI#1 and KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243644  
    S3‑243323 Updating the conclusion to KI#1 and KI#3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243644  
    S3‑242937 KI2 and KI4conclusion update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243645  
    S3‑243645 KI2 and KI4conclusion update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242937
    S3‑243100 new conclusion to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243645  
    S3‑242936 Discussion paper for Fast BSS based NSWO solution Nokia discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243099 new conclusion to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243646  
    S3‑243324 Proposed conclusion for KI#4 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243646  
    S3‑243646 Proposed conclusion for KI#4 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243324
    S3‑242938 TR editorial correction Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243102 Update evaluation to solution 9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243103 Update evaluation to solution 12 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243104 Update evaluation to solution 13 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243105 Update evaluation to solution 16 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243106 Update evaluation to solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243107 Update evaluation to solution 19 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243108 Update evaluation to solution 20 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243225 Resolving EN in sol#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243226 Resolving EN in sol#12 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243227 Resolving EN in sol#19 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243660 Draft TR 33.702 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243698 Cover sheet TR 33.702 Nokia TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑243121 Updates to the assumption clause Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243492  
    S3‑243492 Updates to the assumption clause Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243121
    S3‑242859 pCR to TR 33.713 Add new security assumptions for Clause 4 CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this is too premature, let's see every key issue and solutions. I need to see the authentication clarified first and come back to this later. Thales disagreed with the contribution and agreed with ORANGE.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243284 Assumption on AIoT Device OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this is premature. Sotring long term credentials means that we have them, we havent decided about this yet.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242963 New Key Issue THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243165 AIoT: Security assumptions in the 5G system Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE proposed to leave the first bullet. China Mobile: let's note it because there was no agreement about this in the last meeting. Qualcomm didn’t agree with the first bullet.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243238 Architecture and Security Assumptions  for AIoT services China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital, Qualcomm, Nokia and Ericsson disagreed. Interdigital: too early to make this assumption. What is meant with "access" here? Just remove the text after "normal UE". Nokia: what about the non UICC credentials? Apple: we don’t object to have the UICC in the AioT device. If the AioT is a new type of UE we should not have this statement here. ORANGE: this clause is useless. Let's do it through the usual key issue discussion. China Mobile supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243237 Discussion on security assumption China Mobile, CAICT discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242961 UICC support for Ambient IoT Service THALES, ORANGE discussion Endorsement Yes
YesInterdigital: asking RAN to ask CT6? Nokia supported sending the LS but to ETSI SET. NTT-Docomo agreed with Interdigital and they added that some devices may support non volatile storage. This meant no authentication. ORANGE: first decide if we need an authentication to the network, then how then we can send an LS when we understand where we are going.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242922 Update the KI#1 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242845 An update for Key Issue #2: Authorization for 5G Ambient IoT Services InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242860 pCR to TR33.713 Update key issue#4 for adding threats and requirements CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243278 Update KI#4 for Command OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243355 Update to KI#4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242983 Update KI on protection of information during AIoT service communication OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243059 update to the key issue on the protection of information during AIoT service Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243169 AIoT: Security threats for KI on protection of information during AIoT service communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242991 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on communication security Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242861 pCR to TR33.713 New key issue on authentication of AIoT Devices CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242990 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on Authentication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243060 New Key Issue for Authentication in Ambient IoT service Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple pCR Approval Yes
YesThere were 17 supporting companies. Thales,Nokia and Idemia opposed to the implication that the current requirements were not enough for AIoT devices. NTT-Docomo: what do we mean by the network? Is it everything? Application layer? It's unclear and this requirement will not help us in our discussions. Companies objecting to the contribution: Thales, NTT-Docomo, IDEMIA, Qualcomm.
 		revised No S3‑243680  
    S3‑243680 New Key Issue for Authentication in Ambient IoT service Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, Vivo, Apple pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo asked to be minuted the following: NTT DOCOMO objects to putting in the first line of the security requirement, as it is unclear what kind of solutions could fulfil this requirement and which kind of solutions don't fulfil this requirement. It is also unclear whether the requirement together with the leeway provided by the final editor's note can be fulfilled by solutions that would only perform authentication with a reader UE, or with an application server outside the 5G system. Supporters of the contribution on the header page. Thales, IDEMIA, Ericsson objected to this contribution. The Chair commented that similar discussions happened in SA1 and that they were preparing an LS. A joint conference call would be possible to try to make some progress. ORANGE commented that SA1 didn’t deal with architecture issues. The Chair declared the contents of this document as a working agreement. Phillips that approving this document meant a larger number of contributions for the next meeting addressing the solutions of this key issue. NTT-Docomo commented that the planned Time Units had been exceeded already and needed to be re-planned.
 		approved No   S3‑243060
    S3‑243286 KI on authentication related to inventory use case OPPO pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243280 New KI on AIoT Authentication of Command Use Case OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243166 New key issue for connectivity authentication in Ambient IoT Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243168 New key issue for Authenticated and authorized access to devices in Ambient IoT via 3GPP core Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243354 KI Authentication and identity of type 1 and 2 devices Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243167 New key issue for application layer authentication in Ambient IoT Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242802 New Key Issue on Exposure of Inventory Device Quantity vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242921 Clean up for TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242984 Solution on disabling operation procedure for AIoT services OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243054 solution on protection for disabling device operation Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: password sent in clear text?It needs to be clarified. Evaluation is FFS. ORANGE: step 8, no way to access the UDM without being authenticated. OPPO: this doesn’t address all of key issue 1.Permanent disable is part of the requirement.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243261 New solution on disabling operation procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243287 Solution on Disabling Enabling OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243681 Solution on Disabling Enabling OPPO pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243346 Solution#1 update - Addressing ENs Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242923 Update the Sol#2 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243170 Authorization of AIoT capable UE in topology 2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243263 New solution on authorization of intermediate node for Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243282 Solution for Intermediate UE Authorization OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243387 Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT AS Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243388 Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243389 Solution for Authentication, Authorization and ID privacy of AIoT devices without USIM Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242797 Solution on Privacy Protection for AIoT device Sony pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242844 Solution for Lightweight AIoT ID privacy InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242863 pCR to TR33.713 New solution for protecting Device IDs in inventory scenarios CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242924 New solution on KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242989 AIoT - Security solution on privacy Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243288 Solution on temporary ID based AIoT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243290 Solution on AIoT device ID privacy protection using anonymous key OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243340 A new solution for privacy protection of AIoT device identifier Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243345 New solution - Ambient IoT ID privacy Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243351 New solution for protecting AIoT ID Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242805 New solution on Communication Security of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242864 pCR to pCR to TR33.713 New solution for message protection in command scenarios CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243055 solution on protection for inventory and command procedure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243262 New solution on security protection method for Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243341 A new solution for end-to-end security protection of command Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242804 New solution on Authentication for AIoT Device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243283 Solution for AIoT Lightweight Authentication Based on 5G-AKA OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242803 New solution on Protection on Quantity of AIoT Devices during Inventory vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242866 Discussion on Ambient IoT Device Resource Limitation Xidian University discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑243699 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities S3‑242752 Updates to Solution #1 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: remove the reference to the LS. Interdigital:remove the term application level.
 		revised No S3‑243466  
    S3‑243466 Updates to Solution #1 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242752
    S3‑242850 TR 33.700-32 update solution #2 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243440  
    S3‑243440 TR 33.700-32 update solution #2 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242850
    S3‑242851 TR 33.700-32 update solution #3 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243441  
    S3‑243441 TR 33.700-32 update solution #3 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242851
    S3‑242884 Sol#5 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243442  
    S3‑243442 Sol#5 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242884
    S3‑242885 Sol#5 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243443  
    S3‑243443 Sol#5 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242885
    S3‑242925 address the ENs in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242926 address the EN in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.2 with user_ID activation ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242927 address the EN in Solution#4 clause 6.4.2.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242928 add evaluation to Solution#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243444  
    S3‑243444 add evaluation to Solution#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242928
    S3‑242940 Enhancing solution 15 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243446  
    S3‑243446 Enhancing solution 15 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242940
    S3‑243037 Addressing the EN on Human User authentication of through NAS procedure Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243038 Evaluation to solution 6 to address KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: not sure if it addresses all security requirements. Last paragraph may not be needed.
 		revised No S3‑243447  
    S3‑243447 Evaluation to solution 6 to address KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243038
    S3‑243142 Update of Solution #9: Clarification and removal of Editor's Notes Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243448  
    S3‑243448 Update of Solution #9: Clarification and removal of Editor's Notes Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243142
    S3‑243143 Update of Solution #9: Resolution of Editor's Note on protection of user ID Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243449  
    S3‑243449 Update of Solution #9: Resolution of Editor's Note on protection of user ID Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243143
    S3‑243208 Resolution of ENs on user initiated procedure in Solution#16 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243209 Resolution of ENs on Network triggered procedure in Solution#16 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243210 Evaluation for solution#16 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: impact on UE and network needs to be captured. Ericsson: capture interaction with the human user.
 		revised No S3‑243450  
    S3‑243450 Evaluation for solution#16 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243210
    S3‑243270 33.700-32: Update to Solution 8 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243451  
    S3‑243451 33.700-32: Update to Solution 8 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243270
    S3‑243271 33.700-32: Update to Solution 22 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243452  
    S3‑243452 33.700-32: Update to Solution 22 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: refer to SA2 TR in the note instead of naming a SA2 architecture or procedure.
 		approved No   S3‑243271
    S3‑243344 Solution#10 update - Addresing EN Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243453  
    S3‑243453 Solution#10 update - Addresing EN Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243344
    S3‑242886 Sol#19 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243454  
    S3‑243454 Sol#19 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242886
    S3‑242887 Sol#19 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242941 Enhancing solution 18 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242942 evaluation of solution 18 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242943 Enhancing solution 17 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243455  
    S3‑243455 Enhancing solution 17 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242943
    S3‑243116 Add evaluation to solution 20 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: there are two requirements in key issue 2, clarify that the first requirement is addressed. ORANGE: NAS confidentiality needs to be activated.
 		revised No S3‑243456  
    S3‑243456 Add evaluation to solution 20 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243116
    S3‑243146 Update of Solution #11: Resolving Editor's Notes on further clarification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243147 Update of Solution #11: Resolve Editor's Note on mobility Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242751 Updates to Solution #14 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243457  
    S3‑243457 Updates to Solution #14 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242751
    S3‑242888 Sol#21 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242889 Sol#21 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243458  
    S3‑243458 Sol#21 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242889
    S3‑243313 Addressing ENs in solution #12 in TR 33.700-32 CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243459  
    S3‑243459 Addressing ENs in solution #12 in TR 33.700-32 CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: add reference to SA2 TR in the evaluation.
 		approved No   S3‑243313
    S3‑243381 Update solution #13 in TR 33.700-32 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR   Yes
YesORANGE: it addresses a key issue that doesn’t exist.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243036 User ID privacy protection based on EAP-TLS protocol using pseudonym mechanism Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243460  
    S3‑243460 User ID privacy protection based on EAP-TLS protocol using pseudonym mechanism Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243036
    S3‑243128 New solution for user authentication with EAP-PSK Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243129 New Solution on user authentication with user certificate of KI1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: remove evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑243461  
    S3‑243461 New Solution on user authentication with user certificate of KI1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesIncorporating ORANGE comments on step 0 referring to UICC provisioning.
 		approved No   S3‑243129
    S3‑243272 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Credential Derived by UIMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesThales: Provision keys for non-3GPP devices is out of scope.
 		revised No S3‑243462  
    S3‑243462 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Credential Derived by UIMF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243272
    S3‑243273 33.700-32: New Solution on Privacy Protection for UIP Exposure Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: aliign with SA2 terminology, not SA6's. Remove the evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑243463  
    S3‑243463 33.700-32: New Solution on Privacy Protection for UIP Exposure Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243273
    S3‑243049 Discussion paper on privacy issue associated with user id Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243050 KI2 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yesinterdigital: threat is fine, but the third requirement is already covered. Huawei: Don’t mix provacy and user consent issues. ORANGE: requirements are solution specific.
 		revised No S3‑243464  
    S3‑243464 KI2 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243050
    S3‑243382 Update the Key issue #3 in TR 33.700-32 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR   Yes
YesInterdigital: too late for this key issue, SA2 has concluded on this particular issue of non 3GPP devices.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242856 Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.700-32 CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei disagreed, they had an alternate proposal in 890. They said that SA2 could not conclude on a security issue.
 		revised No S3‑243465  
    S3‑243465 Conclusion for KI#3 in TR 33.700-32 CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242856
    S3‑242890 Conclusions for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243465  
    S3‑242944 concluding KI3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243465  
    S3‑243148 Conclusion for Key Issue #3 (authentication and authorization of non-3GPP device behind UE/5G-RG) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243465  
    S3‑243291 Proposed conclusion for KI 1 for user authentication NTT DOCOMO INC., Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: Not complying with the service requirement. Apple,ORANGE, CableLabs and Qualcommsupported this conclusion. Huawei and Nokia disagreed with this conclusion.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243445 Draft TR 33.700-32 Interdigital draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement S3‑243150 Mapping of solutions to key issues Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242878 key issue for no transmit zones Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243151 Solution for multiple USS case Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243604  
    S3‑243604 Solution for multiple USS case Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243151
    S3‑243668 Solution for multiple USS case using token Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242848 TR 33.759 update solution #1 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243605  
    S3‑243605 TR 33.759 update solution #1 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242848
    S3‑242879 Sol#2 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243672  
    S3‑243672 Sol#2 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242879
    S3‑242881 Sol#3 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243673  
    S3‑243673 Sol#3 update to address ENs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242881
    S3‑242880 Sol#2 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243674  
    S3‑243674 Sol#2 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242880
    S3‑242882 Sol#3 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243675  
    S3‑243675 Sol#3 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242882
    S3‑242883 Sol#4 evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242849 TR 33.759 conclusion KI #1 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243603 Draft TR 33.759 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑243182 Resolve the EN in Key issue #1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: what's the meaning of end to end security here? Xiaomi: end to end security is not needed. Interdigital: this is contradicting the security threat assumptions. Huawei supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243306 Resolve EN in KI#1: Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: this proposal and China Telecom's are not aligned with regards to the end ot end security. Interdigital didn’t understand the threat.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243043 Conclusion of KI#2 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243573  
    S3‑243573 Conclusion of KI#2 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval No
YesQualcomm didn’t agree.
 		noted No   S3‑243043
    S3‑243184 Conclusion of KI#1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242853 TR 33.743 update solution #1 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243663  
    S3‑243663 TR 33.743 update solution #1 InterDigital Canada pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242853
    S3‑243091 Update solution#5 to add security establishment with more than one intermediate relays Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243090 Resolve ENs in solution#5 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243560  
    S3‑243560 Resolve ENs in solution#5 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243090
    S3‑243092 Evaluates to solution#5 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243561  
    S3‑243561 Evaluates to solution#5 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243092
    S3‑243183 update solution #6 in TR 33.743 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: intermediate relay is out of coverage the connection to the network may not be possible. Xiaomi: not aligned with SA2 assumption. Qualcomm: we don’t agree with the threat.
 		revised No S3‑243562  
    S3‑243562 update solution #6 in TR 33.743 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243183
    S3‑243258 Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243563  
    S3‑243563 Update to solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243258
    S3‑243260 Add the evaluation of solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243564  
    S3‑243564 Add the evaluation of solution #8 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243260
    S3‑243302 Resolve EN in Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: we don’t see the need for end to end security. We don’t agree with the reason. Xiaomi: don’t delete the first editor's note, no alignment with SA2.
 		revised No S3‑243565  
    S3‑243565 Resolve EN in Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243302
    S3‑243305 Evaluation of Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243566  
    S3‑243566 Evaluation of Solution#4: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243305
    S3‑243335 Updates to solution #10 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243336 Addressing ENs in solution #10 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243337 Adding an evaluation to solution #10 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243709  
    S3‑243709 Adding an evaluation to solution #10 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243337
    S3‑243093 Evaluates to solution#4 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243568  
    S3‑243568 Evaluates to solution#4 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243093
    S3‑243094 Evaluates to solution#6 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243670  
    S3‑243670 Evaluates to solution#6 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243094
    S3‑243095 Evaluates to solution#1 of TR 33.743 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243663  
    S3‑243257 Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the first editor's note removal.
 		revised No S3‑243569  
    S3‑243569 Update to solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243257
    S3‑243259 Add the evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243710  
    S3‑243710 Add the evaluation of solution #7 in TR 33.743 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243259
    S3‑243300 Resolve ENs in Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243706  
    S3‑243706 Resolve ENs in Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243300
    S3‑243303 Evaluation of Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243707  
    S3‑243707 Evaluation of Solution #2: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243303
    S3‑243332 Updates on solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243333 Addressing ENs in solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243570  
    S3‑243570 Addressing ENs in solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243333
    S3‑243334 Adding an evaluation to solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243571  
    S3‑243571 Adding an evaluation to solution #9 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243334
    S3‑243301 Resolve EN in Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243572  
    S3‑243572 Resolve EN in Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243301
    S3‑243304 Evaluation of Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243708  
    S3‑243708 Evaluation of Solution #3: Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243304
    S3‑243015 Update EN in solution#13 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243711  
    S3‑243711 Update EN in solution#13 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243015
    S3‑243019 Evaluation of solution#13 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243712  
    S3‑243712 Evaluation of solution#13 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243019
    S3‑243089 Resolve EN and evaluate to Sol#11 for multi-hop U2U security establishment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243669  
    S3‑243669 Resolve EN and evaluate to Sol#11 for multi-hop U2U security establishment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243089
    S3‑243338 Updates on solution #14 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243339 Add an evaluation to solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243231 pCR to TR33.743 Update clause 3.1 and clause 3.3 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243248 pCR to TR33.743 Update clause 4 to standardize the use of terminology CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243041 Conclusion of KI#1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243567 Draft TR 33.743 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements S3‑242807 Update on Key Issue#1 vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243574 Update on Key Issue#1 vivo, CAICT pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243051 Update the security threats of Key Issue #2: Authorization mechanism of selection of VFL participants in the VFL group Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243705  
    S3‑243705 Update the security threats of Key Issue #2: Authorization mechanism of selection of VFL participants in the VFL group Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243051
    S3‑242945 KI3 update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242806 Update on Key Issue#4 vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243575  
    S3‑243575 Update on Key Issue#4 vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242806
    S3‑243074 Update KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243575  
    S3‑243187 Update KI#4 of TR 33.784 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243575  
    S3‑242808 New solution on KI#1 Authorization for LCS Data Storage and Retrieval vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: No conclsuon of storage in ADRF in SA2. WE don’t agree.
 		revised No S3‑243576  
    S3‑243576 New solution on KI#1 Authorization for LCS Data Storage and Retrieval vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242808
    S3‑242929 update to Solution#2 LMF authorization ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243577  
    S3‑243065 Resolution of EN on solution 1 for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the contribution.
 		revised No S3‑243703  
    S3‑243703 Resolution of EN on solution 1 for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑243065
    S3‑242946 Enhancing solution 3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243578  
    S3‑243578 Enhancing solution 3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242946
    S3‑242809 EN Address for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243579  
    S3‑243579 EN Address for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242809
    S3‑243189 Resolve one EN for Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243580  
    S3‑243580 Resolve one EN for Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243189
    S3‑243191 Resolve other EN for Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243031 Addressing the EN on the authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Ericsson, Vivo: keep the editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑243581  
    S3‑243581 Addressing the EN on the authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243031
    S3‑243370 Resolve ENs for sol#7 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243582  
    S3‑242792 Add notes to section 6.7 in TR 33.784 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243713  
    S3‑243582 Resolve ENs for sol#7 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243370
    S3‑243713 Add notes to section 6.7 in TR 33.784 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242792
    S3‑243371 Resolve ENs for sol#8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243583  
    S3‑243583 Resolve ENs for sol#8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243371
    S3‑242826 A new solution for AIML Data Privacy Protection InterDigital New York pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson, Huawei disagreed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243063 Resolution of EN on solution 9 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: solution seems too complex, the management of these groups. China Mobile: not aligned with SA2.
 		revised No S3‑243584  
    S3‑243584 Resolution of EN on solution 9 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243063
    S3‑243244 Solve EN for solution#9 to align with SA2 China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243584  
    S3‑242811 Update for Solution#10 Privacy of Simple alignment vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243585  
    S3‑243585 Update for Solution#10 Privacy of Simple alignment vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242811
    S3‑243245 Solve EN for solution#10 to align with SA2 China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243052 Resolve the EN and update Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: keep the editor's note, still under discussion in SA2. Vivo wanted to remove it.
 		revised No S3‑243586  
    S3‑243586 Resolve the EN and update Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243052
    S3‑243077 Evaluation on the solution 11 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243587  
    S3‑243587 Adding Enn on the solution 11 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243077
    S3‑243186 Remove ENs and add evaluation in solution #12 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243588  
    S3‑243588 Remove ENs and add evaluation in solution #12 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243186
    S3‑243243 Solve EN for solution#12 to align with SA2 China Mobile, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242795 New Solution to KI#4: Privacy preserving scheme for exchanging training data when AF acting as VFL server China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242827 A new solution of security protection for VFL entity communication InterDigital New York pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242814 New solution on Reusing SBA to Protect Communication Data in Training Process vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243589  
    S3‑243075 Solution to KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243589  
    S3‑243589 Solution to KI#4 : Security of communication data used in VFL training process Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243075
    S3‑243188 Reusing the exsiting security mechanism for VFL communication data OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243589  
    S3‑243062 Evaluation on solution 1 for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243704  
    S3‑243704 Evaluation on solution 1 for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243062
    S3‑243367 Add evaluation for sol#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243577  
    S3‑243577 Add evaluation for sol#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243367
    S3‑242947 Solution 3 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243590  
    S3‑243590 Solution 3 evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242947
    S3‑242810 Evaluation for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243591  
    S3‑243591 Evaluation for Solution#4 Authorization of VLF member selection vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242810
    S3‑243190 Evaluation of Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: disagree with deleting the editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑243592  
    S3‑243592 Evaluation of Solution#5 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243190
    S3‑243032 Evaluation to the solution on an authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243593  
    S3‑243593 Evaluation to the solution on an authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243032
    S3‑243368 Add evaluation for sol#7 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243594  
    S3‑243594 Add evaluation for sol#7 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243368
    S3‑243369 Add evaluation for sol#8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243595  
    S3‑243595 Add evaluation for sol#8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243369
    S3‑243066 Evaluation on solution 9 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243596  
    S3‑243596 Evaluation on solution 9 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243066
    S3‑243076 Evaluation on the solution 10 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243597  
    S3‑243597 Evaluation on the solution 10 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243076
    S3‑243078 Evaluation on the solution 12 for KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242812 Conclusion Skeleton for AIML_SEC vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is not needed. China Mobile and Nokia agreed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242948 KI2 conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the conclusion.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242813 Conclusion for KI4 vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243192 Conclusion on KI#4 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242840 Editorial correction to section 6.4 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243246 Terms alignment with SA2 China Mobile, vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243247 Add abbreviations on TR 33.784 China Mobile, vivo, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242755 Editorial correction to section 6.4 CMDI pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242765 Editorial correction to section 6.4 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243392 Draft TR 33.784 China Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing S3‑242825 A solution for Key Issue #2.1: Secure retrieval of 5G system UE IDs InterDigital New York pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243627  
    S3‑242828 Solution for security retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243628  
    S3‑243628 Solution for security retrieval of 5G UE Id and privacy related information Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242828
    S3‑242829 Solution for secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243629  
    S3‑243629 Solution for secure retrieval of 5G UE privacy related information based on AKMA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242829
    S3‑242999 MEC - Soltuion on EEC provided Information authentication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243630  
    S3‑243630 MEC - Soltuion on EEC provided Information authentication Apple pCR - No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242999
    S3‑243028 A new solution on authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243627  
    S3‑243627 A new solution on authorizing AF to retrieve UE ID Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243028
    S3‑243123 Resolution of ENs on solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243631  
    S3‑243631 Resolution of ENs on solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243123
    S3‑243124 Evaluation on solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243632  
    S3‑243632 Evaluation on solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243124
    S3‑243149 New solution for EEC provided information verification: UE ID token Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243633  
    S3‑243633 New solution for EEC provided information verification: UE ID token Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243149
    S3‑243216 Solution for IP address verification Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243634  
    S3‑243634 Solution for IP address verification Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243216
    S3‑243343 Solution for IP address verification using access token Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243635  
    S3‑243635 Solution for IP address verification using access token Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243343
    S3‑242830 New KI on Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243665  
    S3‑243665 New KI on Security aspects related to enhancements of EAS and local UPF (re)selection Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242830
    S3‑243039 Conclusion on the security releted with 5G System Enhancements for Edge Computing Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243721 Draft TR 33.749 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access S3‑243044 Update of Solution #5: UE authentication and traffic protection in ATSSS-Lite Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243598  
    S3‑243598 Update of Solution #5: UE authentication and traffic protection in ATSSS-Lite Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243044
    S3‑243046 Update of Solution #5: Discussion on UPF exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: too late to bring this when we are going to close the TR.
 		approved No    
    S3‑243068 Address EN for solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243069 Add evaluation to solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243600  
    S3‑243600 Add evaluation to solution 1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243069
    S3‑243070 Address EN for solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243601  
    S3‑243601 Address EN for solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243070
    S3‑243071 Add evaluation to solution 6 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243347 Update to new SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesCableLabs didn’t want to add new issues. A new study can be brought later to address this. Huawei didn’t agree to update it either. They added that in SA2 was not clear the scenario of two USIMs in the UE.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242962 Discussion on Dual steer device and AKMA procedure NEC Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
YesCableLabs: this should be a new study. Ericsson: SA2 may reject this work, we don’t agree. Nokia didn’t support it either. SA2 hasn’t decided yet about DualSteer devices so we cannot approve it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242960 Update to New SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) NEC Corporation SID revised   Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241191
    S3‑242857 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.754 CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243602  
    S3‑242858 Conclusion for KI#2 in TR 33.754 CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243602  
    S3‑242957 Cleanup TR 33.754 Introduction Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242958 Cleanup TR 33.754: Key issues Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243602  
    S3‑243602 Cleanup TR 33.754: Key issues Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242958
    S3‑243372 Conclusions for KI#1 and KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243602  
    S3‑243599 Draft TR 33.754 Intel draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑243714 Cover sheet TR 33.754 Intel TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving S3‑243125 Update KI2 about privacy of exposure energy related information Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243607  
    S3‑243352 Resolution of EN concerning privacy. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243607  
    S3‑243607 Resolution of EN concerning privacy. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243352
    S3‑242986 Update of Solution #1: Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy related information collection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: SA2 hasn’t concluded yet. Further evaluation is needed.
 		revised No S3‑243608  
    S3‑243608 Update of Solution #1: Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy related information collection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242986
    S3‑243083 solution related to KI2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: lot of stuff in the scope of SA2 that needs to be removed. Nokia supported Ericsson. They asked to remove the evaluation. MCC: the note should be an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑243609  
    S3‑243609 solution related to KI2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243083
    S3‑243141 Solution mapping Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243610  
    S3‑243610 Solution mapping Ericsson,Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243141
    S3‑243353 Update of mapping table Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243610  
    S3‑243606 Drraft TR 33.766 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑242987 Evaluation to solution#2 in TR 33.745 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243512  
    S3‑243512 Evaluation to solution#2 in TR 33.745 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242987
    S3‑243004 update to Solution#1 ownership security ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243513  
    S3‑243513 update to Solution#1 ownership security ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243004
    S3‑243016 Updates for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243514  
    S3‑243514 Updates for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243016
    S3‑242794 New Solution to KI#7: Verify and authorise direct connections between 5G NR Femtos China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243515  
    S3‑243515 New Solution to KI#7: Verify and authorise direct connections between 5G NR Femtos China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242794
    S3‑243011 New Solution for Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243516  
    S3‑243516 New Solution for Security of 5G NR Femto Ownership Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243011
    S3‑243012 New Solution for Femto Owner one time registration with operator network Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243517  
    S3‑243517 New Solution for Femto Owner one time registration with operator network Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243012
    S3‑243014 New Solution for Support of 5G Femto location security Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243519  
    S3‑243519 New Solution for Support of 5G Femto location security Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243014
    S3‑243109 hosting party authentication using EAP-AKA’ Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243110 Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243520  
    S3‑243520 Security solution for backhaul link between 5G NR Femto and 5GC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243110
    S3‑243111 Security solution for link between 5G NR Femto and 5G NR Femto MS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242790 Add notes to KI#4 in TR 33.745 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242796 New KI on Requirements for traffic monitoring and anomaly behavior analysis of 5G Femto China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243521  
    S3‑243521 New KI on Requirements for traffic monitoring and anomaly behavior analysis of 5G Femto China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242796
    S3‑242835 pCR on KI for 5GS Core network topology hiding from 5G Femto deployments Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241110
    S3‑243009 New key issue for detection of malicious 5G NR Femto Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243010 New key issue for privacy aspects of MRL Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243006 add conclusions to KI#1 ownership security ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243518 Alignment of terminology of 5G femto NokiIa LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243556 Draft TR 33.745 ZTE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑243211 Discussion paper on metaverse Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243126 New key issue on security aspect of digital asset container in 5G Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243650  
    S3‑243650 New key issue on security aspect of digital asset container in 5G Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243126
    S3‑243212 Key issue on authentication and authorization of digital representation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243651  
    S3‑243276 33.721: Key Issue on Authentication and Authorization of Avatar Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243651  
    S3‑243651 33.721: Key Issue on Authentication and Authorization of Avatar Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243276
    S3‑243274 33.721: Resolve Editor’s Notes in Key Issue 2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243715  
    S3‑243715 33.721: Resolve Editor’s Notes in Key Issue 2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243274
    S3‑242930 Evaluation for Solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243652  
    S3‑243652 Evaluation for Solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242930
    S3‑242874 Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243653  
    S3‑243653 Solution for KI#1 on Authorization supporting spatial localization service Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242874
    S3‑242875 Solution for KI1 on Authorization of spatial anchor services with multiple VAL-S Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243654  
    S3‑243654 Solution for KI1 on Authorization of spatial anchor services with multiple VAL-S Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242875
    S3‑243127 New solution for KI#1 using Attribute-Based Authorization for the consumers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243664 New solution for KI#1 using Attribute-Based Authorization for the consumers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243213 Solution for digital asset request validation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243275 33.721: New Solution for Key Issue 2 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243720 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung other Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 S3‑243134 New key issue for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243638  
    S3‑243639 New key issue for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243154 New key issue about CAPIF interconnection in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243638  
    S3‑243638 New key issue about CAPIF interconnection in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243154
    S3‑243384 Additional requirements for Key issue on CAPIF interconnection security Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243638  
    S3‑242896 key issue on CAPIF-8 security procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243636  
    S3‑242897 key issue on authorization of fine granularity access control Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243636  
    S3‑243139 Key issue on security of resource owner permission management Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243636  
    S3‑243636 Key issue on security of resource owner authorization management Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243139
    S3‑243155 New key issue about CAPIF-8 security in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243636  
    S3‑243156 New key issue about Service API invocation authorization with resource owner consent in TR 33.700-22 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243636  
    S3‑243377 New KI_Key issue on security of resource owner consent management Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243636  
    S3‑243137 New key issue for accessing UE resources by an application on another UE Ericsson, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑243640  
    S3‑243376 New KI_Key issue on API invoker on one UE accessing resources owned by another UE Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243640  
    S3‑243640 New KI_Key issue on API invoker on one UE accessing resources owned by another UE Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243376
    S3‑243135 New solution for CAPIF interconnection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243136 New key issue for nested API invocation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑243138 Solution for accessing UE resources by an application on another UE Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243140 Solution for managing resource owner permission Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243214 Solution for security aspects of CAPIF interconnection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243252 Key Issue on Authenticating multiple API invokers of the same Resource Owner Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243700  
    S3‑243700 Key Issue on Authenticating multiple API invokers of the same Resource Owner Nokia pCR - No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243252
    S3‑243373 add high-level architectures for TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243716  
    S3‑243716 add high-level architectures for TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243373
    S3‑243374 add scope for TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243375 draft_TR 33.700-22 skeleton FS_CAPIF_Ph3-sec Xiaomi Communications draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑243637  
    S3‑243637 draft_TR 33.700-22 skeleton FS_CAPIF_Ph3-sec Xiaomi Communications draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑243375
    S3‑243658 Draft TR 33.700-22 Xiaomi draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑243718 Draft TR 33.700-22 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑242775 Adaptation of 256-bit algorithm for AS and NAS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242791 Algorithm identifier values for 256-bit algorithms KDDI Corporation draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242913 introduction of 256-bit encryption and integrity protection algorithms in TS 33.501 ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242789 New WID on supporting 256-bit ciphering and integrity protection algorithms KDDI Corporation WID new Approval Yes
YesThe Chair asked whether there was any work expected apart from the CRs. KDDI answered that was all. Qualcomm: too early, I would like to see more progress on the algorithm first. We are still waiting for the algorithms to be published. Nokia: we need this WID. We also need to figure out the labelling according to the version 2.0 of the algorithms that were just submitted by SAGE. OPPO: optional support but mandatory for Mes in Rel-19? The Chair commented that the decision to male it deployable would come later. Qualcomm: we need to see the specs to figure out how to introduce the changes coming from version 2.0. The Chair commented that there was no rush to agree on this WID now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242793 (Draft) LS on 256-bit algorithm identifiers KDDI Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242834 Discussion of enhancements for SNPN cellular hotspots Cisco Systems, Intel discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242066
    S3‑242836 Study on Security Aspects of Interconnect of SNPN Cisco Systems, Intel SID new Approval Yes
YesCableLabs supported this work.We have a SA1 requirement on this. Ericsson and Huawei had some issues. There would be no SA2 work following the requirement of SA1. Not up only for 3GPP but in the scope of other SDOs. ORANGE found misalignment with SA1 in the wording. The study was going beyond what SA1 was doing. MITRE supported the WID. Ericsson retired their objection. Cisco didn’t find any technical reasoning against the objections.
 		noted No   S3‑242061
    S3‑242855 New WID on Security for MonStra Vodafone, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson,CableLAbs supported this. Chinia Telecom: sending a copy of signalling traffic to an external system is not acceptable. Huawei: there was a similar function in LTE, There are other options with less network impact. Vodafone: how the copy is created is not to be standardised. The monitoring system is external to the 5G core. NSA supported this work as well. Verizon: interfaces will be standardised? Ericsson: this concerns SA5 as well. Operational troubleshooting, monitoring systems and so on have always been used, since long ago. The encryption has now complicated the process. Nokia agreed with this. KPN and ORANGE supported this WID. NTT-Docomo: who decides the granularity of the authorization for the external monitoring systems? This needs to be clear to avoid endless discussions.
 		revised No S3‑243671  
    S3‑243671 New WID on Security for MonStra Vodafone, Telefonica, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell WID new Approval Yes
YesNTT wondered how this WID would be contained. Ericsson suggested to work offline prior to the meeting to agree on a living document. Huawei wondered if TS 33.501 would be the right place for this.
 		agreed No   S3‑242855
    S3‑243030 New WID on Security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecomunication Corp., , ZTE WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243117 New WID Proposal on Mitigations on Bidding Down Attack Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243130 New WID on specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesNokia, Huawei: postpone to the next meeting. Huawei proposed to use an existing spec instead of creating a separate specification. Ericsson answered that Thales supported the WID and pointed out that this was the third time already that the WID was presented.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243131 Skeleton of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243132 pCR to f5** specification TS Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243133 Presentation of specification of alternative example f5* (f5**) function Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243277 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243325 Update of WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Qualcomm Incorporated WID revised Agreement Yes
YesIt was clarified that this would not bring any new work.
 		agreed No   SP‑240653
    S3‑243399 Rejecting security mode by the UE Google discussion discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑243400 New mini WID on rejecting insecure security algorithms in NAS SMC procedure Google WID new Agreement Yes
YesORANGE and Ericsson didn’t support the WID, China Mobile either. They didn’t agree with the action taken by the UE. NTT_Docomo didn’t support it either. Google: all we want is a mechanism for the UE to reject an insecure connection. Apple supported the WID. Ericsson, China Mobile, Vivo, ORANGE objected to the WID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑243401 Rejecting insecure security algorithms in NAS SMC procedure Google discussion Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑242704 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
YesORANGE: select locations where there are enoguh number of hotels available near the conference center. Thales: consider also sanitary conditions. October in Hyderabad is not the best time. ORANGE: meeting locations must be easy and secure.
 		noted No