3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-91 - 2018-04-16 to 2018-04-20, Belgrade
meeting id: S3-91 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑181100 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181101 | Report from last SA3 meeting | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181102 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181103 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181104 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181105 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181106 | Reply LS on the status of work on interfaces | S5-181455 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181107 | Statement on urgency of alignment of ETSI SSP with 3GPP release 15 | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181108 | Reply LS on Statement on urgency of alignment of ETSI SSP with 3GPP release 15 | SP-180240 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181109 | LS on encrypting broadcasted positioning data and LS on provisioning of positioning assistance data via LPPa for broadcast | C1-180643 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181110 | LS on encrypting broadcasted positioning data and on provisioning of positioning assistance data via LPPa for broadcast | C4-182150 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181111 | LS on encrypting broadcasted positioning data and LS on provisioning of positioning assistance data via LPPa for broadcast | S2-182415 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181112 | LS on one step MO SMS procedure | C1-181759 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181113 | LS on a potential USIM solution for PLMN and RAT selection policies for roaming | C6-170696 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181114 | Reply LS on PLMN and RAT selection policies for roaming | S2-182723 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181115 | NGMN Paper on 5G End-to-End Architecture Framework | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181116 | 5G Security – Package 3:^^Mobile Edge Computing / Low Latency / Consistent User Experience^^Updated version | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181117 | UE capability related to integrity protection of DRBs | R2-1804056 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181118 | LS on Security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | R2-1804108 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181119 | LS on security for inactive state | R2-1804136 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181120 | Reply LS on EDT procedures and AS NAS interaction | R3-181573 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181121 | LS on secured Signalling-only connection | RP-180590 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181122 | Reply LS on clarification on Restricted Operator Services | S2-181407 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181123 | LS response on User Plane Security Policy | S2-182787 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181124 | LS to BBF on general status of work | S2-183036 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181125 | LS on Guidance on UE WiFi MAC Address inclusion in LTE Positioning Protocol | SP-180234 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181126 | Section 8, Size of the integrity protection tag MAC-I | Vodafone, AT&T, MITRE, NIST, InterDigital, TCG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181127 | Co-existence of different size keys and MAC-I tags | AT&T, Vodafone, NIST, MITRE, InterDigital, TCG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181128 | TCG progress report | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181129 | Use of PKI to Mitigate Vulnerabilities in 3GPP Networks | AT&T, MITRE, Interdigital, TCG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181130 | 33.834 - References | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181131 | Solution #6 Editor’s Note resolution | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181132 | USIM 5G security parameters storage trigger | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181133 | Update clause reference for key identification | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181134 | Second RR protection for multiple registration in same PLMN | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181135 | Discussion on authentication and NAS SMC handling with race condition | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181136 | Rules on concurrent running of authentication and NAS SMC procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181137 | Remove redundant description on SN name construction | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181138 | Remove of K_AMF_CI | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181139 | Remove EN for initial NAS message protection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181140 | Reconstruct for security handlings | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181141 | Add description for key handing during multiple registration in same PLMN | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181142 | Add description for NAS and AS algorithm selection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181143 | Modification on UE’s subscribe privacy requirement | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181144 | Modification on SMS over NAS | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181145 | Modification on NEF requirement | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181146 | Modification on NAS SMC procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181147 | Modification on key hierarchy | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181148 | Editorial modification on initial NAS message protection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181149 | Modification on gNB’s requirement | ZTE Corporation, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181150 | Editorial modification on reference | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181151 | Editorial modification on key setting and key lifetimes | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181152 | Editorial modification on key handling in mobility registration update | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181153 | Editorial modification on EAP-AKA' | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181154 | Editorial modification on authentication method selection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181155 | Editorial modification on authentication and authorization requirement | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181156 | Editorial modification on 5G AKA | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181157 | Discussion on using a key left at the AUSF for fast re-authentication | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181158 | Add description for authentication using a key left at the AUSF - general | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181159 | Add description for authentication using a key left at the AUSF – EAP-AKA' | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181160 | Add description for authentication using a key left at the AUSF – 5G AKA | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181161 | Add description for fast re-authentication of multiple registration | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181162 | Authentication procedure is common for multiple registration in same PLMN | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181163 | Add condition for reset NAS COUNTs | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181164 | LS Reply on SBI Design and its Security Implications | C4-182244 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181165 | Resolution of Editor's Note on authentication vectors | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181166 | Resolution of Editor's note on key left at AUSF | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181167 | Deletion of Editor's Notes in clause 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 and restructuring | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181168 | Security of MAC algorithms and tags | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181169 | Assessment of the MAC tag size | NIST | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181170 | Introduction of the Subscription Concealed Identifier to EPC | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181171 | [CAPIF] 33.122 Functional Security Model | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181172 | [MCSEC] 33180 R14 EN clause 5.1.3.1 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181173 | [MCSec] 33180 R14 technical clarifications | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181174 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 Interconnection references clarification | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181175 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 media mixing note | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181176 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 migration user authentication | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181177 | [eMCSec] 33180 R15 various technical clarifications | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181178 | WID eMCSec R16 security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181179 | Generation and Rotation of 5G-GUTI | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181180 | Introduction of the Subscription Concealed Identifier to EPC | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181181 | Discussion paper on RP-180590/S3-181121 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181182 | Discussion paper on Subscription id format | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181183 | Discussion paper on C1-181791 LS on Paging with IMSI/SUPI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181184 | draft_Reply LS to RP-180590 Secure signalling AS context | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181185 | New SID on security aspects on support of PARLOS | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181186 | Editorials to 33.501 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181187 | Clarification UE responding with SUCI to identifier request | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181188 | Editorials to 33.501 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181189 | clarify UE concurrency rule | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181190 | Clarification for perceived potential AKA race condition | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181191 | Clause 5.2.5 Add a requirement for routing SUCI | CATT,China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181192 | Discussion on RRC-INACTIVE state Security | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181193 | Resolving Editor Note on One-Step SMS over NAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181194 | Introduction for Dual Connectivity | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181195 | Dual Connectivity Architecture for MR-DC with 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181196 | Reduce complex of Key Derivation Function negotiation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181197 | Correction and Clarification for EDCE5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181198 | Correction and Clarification for the handling of KASME | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181199 | skeleton of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181200 | a proposal for the scope of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181201 | a proposal for the introduction of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181202 | a proposal for the key issue of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181203 | a proposal for the key derivation without direct interface between AMF and MSC server of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181204 | a proposal for the key derivation with interface between AMF and MSC server of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181205 | Verification of claims in the token during service access request | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181206 | The granularity of NF service discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181207 | Authorization mechanism for NEF-AF interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181208 | Scope of CAPIF security | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181209 | Security requirements for service API discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181210 | Authorization mechanism for CAPIF-2e reference point | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181211 | Authorization mechanism for CAPIF-2 reference point | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181212 | Security method between API invoker and API exposing function | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181213 | Derivation of the key AEFPSK | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181214 | Security credentials for TLS before initiating TLS connection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181215 | TLS-PSK ciphersuites for security method of CAPIF-2e reference point | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181216 | SID on security of 5WWC | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181217 | NAS SMC procedure of multi NAS connection | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181218 | The initial value of NAS COUNT in multi NAS connection | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181219 | non-3GPP access when security context is available | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181220 | new KI of UP security parameters management | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181221 | solution of UP security policy management | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181222 | Update security mechanism in Xn-HO procedre | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181223 | AS SMC Handling- update | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181224 | AS SMC Handling-registration | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181225 | Draft Reply LS to RAN2 on security for inactive state. | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181226 | Clause 5.8 Remove a redundant requirement | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181227 | Clause 5.2.5 Privacy requirement clarification | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181228 | Clause 6.11.1-2 Editorial and wording errors correction | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181229 | Clause 6.12.2 Add routing assistance indicator in SUCI | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181230 | Clause 6.12.2 Wording and correction related to SUCI | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181231 | Discussion for the security assurance of 3GPP virtualized network functions | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181232 | New SID on SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network functions | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181233 | Clause 6.12.4 Remove some redundant content | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181234 | Discussion on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181235 | Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181236 | Living Document: Security of Service Based Architecture of 5G phase 1 | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181237 | Clause 6.12.5 Add SIDF decryption process description | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181238 | Clause 6.12.5 Add SIDF decryption process description | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181239 | Discussion of 5G phase-2 work | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181240 | Primary reauthentication Procedure | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181241 | Discussion on Prevention of Fraud Call | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181242 | Agenda and notes of conference call on SEPP protection mechanisms | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181243 | Agenda and notes of conference call on SEPP security policies | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181244 | N32 message anti-spoofing within the SEPP | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181245 | Impacted NextGen Areas | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181246 | LTKUP: clarifications for solution #5 | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181247 | LTKUP: conclusion | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181248 | Discussion on ID binding in Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Southern Power Grid | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181249 | ID binding in Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Southern Power Grid | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181250 | Updates to Secondary Authentication Procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181251 | Authentication and authorization for slice management interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181252 | OAuth based authorization for access to management functions | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181253 | Update to overview clause | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181254 | Security options | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181255 | New SID on security of URLLC in 5G system | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181256 | Adding further details for EPS to 5G interworking | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181257 | Modification for algorithm names | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181258 | Correct typo in SBA Authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181259 | Discussion on SA5 LS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181260 | Editorial changes over subclause B.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181261 | Fast Re-authentication Process for EAP-AKA’ | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181262 | NSST integrity protection solution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181263 | NSST confidentiality protection solution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181264 | pCR to TR 33.834 – clarifications to key issue 1 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181265 | pCR to TR 33.834 – clarifications to key issue 2 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181266 | Editorial corrections of clause 6.5 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181267 | Editorial corrections of clause 6.6 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181268 | Editorial corrections of clause 6.7 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181269 | Use type parameter for asymmetric key encryption schemes | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181270 | Use type information as a SUCI construction input paramter in Annex C | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181271 | Missing PEI requirements | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181272 | Missing PEI requirements | Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181273 | pCR to TR 33.834 – new key issue, undetected key leakage | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181274 | Discussion of potential issues in JSON parsers | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181275 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updated evaluation of solution #3 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181276 | Adding context to SBA API requirements | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181277 | pCR to TR 33.841- Clarification on two algorithms for resilience | Vodafone Group Plc, AT&T, Interdigital, NIST, MITRE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181278 | pCR to TR 33.841- Individual algorithms | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181279 | Requirements and impact of a longer MAC | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181280 | F1-C Protection | Orange Spain | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181281 | Living Document: Security of PLMN/RAT selection policies for roaming | Orange Spain | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181282 | Clarification for KN3IWF delivery in authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181283 | Requirement for AKA algorithm negotiation between UE and UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181284 | Non-random IVs in CTR mode | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181285 | Discussion on fraudulent Registration Request threats | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181286 | AUSF clarification | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181287 | AUSF requirements | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181288 | UDM requirements | Nokia, Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181289 | UDM clarification | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181290 | Clarification to home control | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181291 | Deletion of ed.note related to key left at AUSF | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181292 | Resolving ed.note in 6.1.3.1 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181293 | Clause 6.1.2 on auth method selection - clarification | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181294 | AMF requirements | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181295 | NRF and NEF requirements | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181296 | SN Id parameter length | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181297 | Prevent fraudulent Registration Request attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181298 | Editorial modification for message names in the 5G-AKA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181299 | Removal of security mechanism for MO SMS one step procedure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181300 | Clarification of NAS MAC computation for TAU protection, algorithm selection and security activation during idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181301 | Clean up of clause on idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181302 | [DRAFT] LS on security for inactive state | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181303 | RRC INACTIVE - Discussion on various security aspects | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181304 | RRC_INACTIVE - security handling at state transition | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181305 | RRC_INACTIVE – security handling at mobility | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181306 | Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181307 | NAS COUNTs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181308 | Multiple NAS connections | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181309 | UP security policy | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181310 | Clarifications for algorithm selection, counter setting and key derivation in mapped security contexts | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181311 | NAS MAC-I in IW HO from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181312 | Proposal for Dual Connectivity | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181313 | Dual Connectivity - Introduction | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181314 | Skeleton of FS_5G_UTRAN_SEC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181315 | Scope of FS_5G_UTRAN_SEC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181316 | Introduction of FS_5G_UTRAN_SEC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181317 | Key issue of IMS Emergency Session Handling | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181318 | Discussion on the format to specify the dual connectivity procedure when attached to a 5G core | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181319 | Correcting the anti-bidding down parameter in figure 6.7.2-1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181320 | Not sending SUCI in response to a hash failure | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181321 | Proposed solution for handling the NAS security when registered via 3GPP and non-3GPP in the same PLMN | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181322 | Addding the procedures for handling security context when multiply registered on one PLMN | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181323 | Discussion on resolution of the editor’s notes in EN-DC clauses of TS 33.401 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181324 | Reply LS on Security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181325 | Discussion on the freshness parameter for K_AMF derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181326 | K’AMF derivation and NASC protection at N2 based handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181327 | Discussion on the freshness parameter for KAMF derivation in EPS to 5GS mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181328 | K’AMF derivation at EPS to 5GS mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181329 | KeNB derivation in 5GS to EPS handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181330 | KgNB derivation in EPS to 5GS handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181331 | Discussion on ng-eNB related security specification | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181332 | Updates to Solution #6 in SoR Living Doc | Qualcomm Incorporated, T-Mobile US | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181333 | Limiting SUCI in Identifier Response | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181334 | Delete Editor’s Note in C.3.4.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181335 | CR for secure signalling only connections | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181336 | Delete Editor’s note in subclause 6.2.2.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181337 | Clause 6.2.3.2 EN on Kausf identification | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181338 | add definitions and abbreviations for TR33.843 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181339 | CR for Corrections in Clause 6.6 UP Security mechanisms | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181340 | CR for title change to clause 6.13 Local Authentication | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181341 | SUCI - protection schemes identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181342 | SUCI - protection schemes output sizes | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181343 | SIDF - NF discovery with SUCI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181344 | Corrections to 5G AKA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181345 | Handling of synchronization failure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181346 | Corrections to EAP-AKA’ | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181347 | Corrections on ngKSI and SUPI handling with EAP TLS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181348 | Revocation of certificates with EAP-TLS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181349 | Clarifications on unused 5G authentication vectors, and remaning authentication data | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181350 | Corrections to the lengths of input parameters in A.2 and A.4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181351 | Corrections related to authentication related services | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181352 | NONCE as input to horizontal key derivation and calculation/verification of NAS MAC-I in NASC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181353 | Corrections and clarifications on handover handling | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181354 | Generalization of key derivation in NG-RAN to cover both gNBs and ng-eNBs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181355 | Discussion on KAUSF identifier | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181356 | Identifier for Kausf | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181357 | Correction of KAUSF source for 5G AKA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181358 | CR to Clause 10.2.1 on Emergency Call redirection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181359 | CR for NAI Clarification | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181360 | CAPIF requirements | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181361 | Editorial corrections to TS 33.501 v0.1.0 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181362 | Binding of communication endpoins to the derivation of AEFpsk | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181363 | CR to Clause 7.2.1 Non-3gpp access registration EN | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181364 | Security procedure for the AEF to obtain API invoker’s authorization rights | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181365 | Security procedure for onboarding API invokers to CAPIF | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181366 | Clarification of access token generation to clause^^5.2.2.3^^Method 3 – Token Based authorization | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181367 | Error Correction in subclause 11.1.1 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181368 | CAPIF re-organizing | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181369 | API invoker obtaining authorization from CAPIF core fuction to access service API | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181370 | Authentication between API invoker and AEF upon the service invocation | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181371 | Resolving EN on sending SUCI in the Identifier Response message | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181372 | Update of information on Keys for AUSF in home network | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181373 | Removal of error in step 10 from the figure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181374 | Key handling at transitions between RRC-INACTIVE and RRC-CONNECTED | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181375 | Authentication method negotiation for 5G | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181376 | Clarifying the condition when ePDG sends its certificate in untrusted non-3GPP access | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181377 | Authentication method indication for 5G | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181378 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updated evaluation of solution #1 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181379 | TS 33.501 Resolving Editors notes 5.10.1 Security Visibility | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181380 | Resolving EN on Kausf identification | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181381 | Editor’s Note on NRF to NRF authentication when there is a non transparent proxy (SEPP) between them | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181382 | Fast re-authentication procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181383 | Security aspects of handover between 3GPP and untrusted non-3GPP accesses | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181384 | CAPIF – Topology Hiding | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181385 | Editor’s Note on per UE subscription level authorization in NRF | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181386 | UDM routing information in SUCI | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181387 | CAPIF – Key Derivation | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181388 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updated evaluation of solution #2 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181389 | CAPIF – Editor’s note resolution on authorization mechanism | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181390 | CAPIF – Update on CAPIF-2e Security procedure | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181391 | CAPIF – Update on CAPIF-2 authorization | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181392 | CAPIF – API Invoker on boarding | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181393 | SUCI - readiness to protection schemes update in future | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181394 | SBA: Example for SEPP Protection Policies | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181395 | Application layer solution for N32: rewriting of HTTP message into JSON objects | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181396 | Rel-15 fallback solution for Interconnect (N32) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181397 | To-Do-list for application layer solution | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181398 | Need for certificate-based N3IWF authentication in non-3GPP access | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181399 | Use of certificates for IKEv2 in non-3GPP access | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181400 | Use of fields in CMPv2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181401 | TLS 1.3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181402 | pCR: Local configuration of message protection policy in SEPP | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181403 | Remote provisioning of message protection policies in partner SEPPs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181404 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updates to solution #4 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181405 | SBA Authentication issues | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181406 | Intra PLMN NF to NF authentication | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181407 | SBA: Inter-PLMN routing and TLS issues | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181408 | SBA: Token Based Authorization for the inter-PLMN case | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181409 | Inter PLMN routing and TLS: Solution Options | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181410 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updates to solution #5 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181411 | Reference corrections in clause 5 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181412 | Reference corrections in clause 6 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181413 | Reference corrections in clause 8 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181414 | Collection of editorial corrections | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181415 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updates to solution #6 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181416 | pCR to 33.843 - collection of editorial fixes | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181417 | pcr TO 33.834 - Addition of Conclusion | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181418 | Authorization across N32 - pCR to Living Document: Security of Service Based Architecture of 5G phase 1 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181419 | [eMCSEC] Removal of Editor’s note in Clause I.3.4 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181420 | [eMCSEC] Resolution of editor’s notes within Clause 10 on logging, audit and discreet monitoring. | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181421 | [MCSEC] Addition of test vector for MIKEY-SAKKE UID | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181422 | [eMCSEC] Addition of test vector for MIKEY-SAKKE UID | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181423 | [MCSEC] Removal of Editor’s note in Clause 5.1.3.1. | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181424 | [eMCSEC] Removal of Editor’s note in Clause 5.1.3.1. | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181425 | SBA: Commenting contribution on S3-181408 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181426 | Updates to Solution #6 in SoR Living Doc | Qualcomm Incorporated, T-Mobile US, DT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181427 | SBA: A framework for application layer protection scheme in SEPP | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181428 | LS on SoR mechanism | S3i180141 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181429 | LTE and the upcoming 5G standard | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181430 | LS on paging with IMSI/SUCI in 5GS | C1-181791 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181431 | Discussion on ID binding in Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Southern Power Grid,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181432 | ID binding in Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon, China Southern Power Grid | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181433 | Security options | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181434 | Corrections on key hierarchy,key derivation, and distribution scheme | NEC Europe Ltd, ZTE Corporation, Ericsson,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181435 | Way forward for Interconnect (N32) security | Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181436 | Changes to definition clause for drafting rule conformity | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181437 | Editorial changes to clause 10 and 12 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181438 | Editorial changes to clause 9 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181439 | Editorials to 33.501 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181440 | F1-C Protection | Orange Spain,Deutsche Telekom,KPN,Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181441 | New SID on security aspects on support of PARLOS | SPRINT Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181442 | SID on security of 5WWC | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181443 | Reply to: LTE and the upcoming 5G standard | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181444 | Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181445 | Missing PEI requirements | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181446 | Reply to: LS on one step MO SMS procedure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181447 | Reply to: UE capability related to integrity protection of DRBs | Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181448 | Reply to: LS on Security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181449 | Use type information as a SUCI construction input paramter in Annex C | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181450 | Reply to: LS on security for inactive state | Huawei, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181451 | Reply to: LS on secured Signalling-only connection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181452 | Reply to: LS on paging with IMSI/SUCI in 5GS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181453 | Clarifications to: Authentication procedures | Ericsson, KPN N.V., Nokia, ZTE Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon, NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181454 | Clarifications to: Key derivation functions | Nokia,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181455 | Clarifications to: Security contexts | KPN,Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181456 | Clarifications to: Security handling in state transitions | Nokia,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181457 | Corrections to: Security procedures for non-service based interfaces | Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181458 | Corrections related to authentication related services | Ericsson,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181459 | Non-random IVs in CTR mode | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181460 | Clarifications to: Authentication framework | Ericsson, KPN N.V., Nokia, NTT Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181461 | Deletion of Editor's Notes in clause 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 and restructuring | KPN N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181462 | Clarifications to: Requirements | Nokia, Gemalto, CATT, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Ericsson, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181463 | Clarifications to: Linking increased home control to subsequent procedures | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181464 | Identifier for Kausf | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181465 | Clarifications to: Initiation of authentication and selection of authentication method | Nokia,ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181466 | Editorial modification on authentication method selection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181467 | UDM requirements | Nokia, Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181468 | LS on avoiding race conditions in 5G AKA | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181469 | SN Id parameter length | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181470 | Clarifications to:^^^^Using additional EAP methods for primary authentication | Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, HiSilicon, NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181471 | Revocation of certificates with EAP-TLS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181472 | Add Realm part in NAI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181473 | Reply to: LS Reply on SBI Design and its Security Implications | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181474 | Living Document: Security of Service Based Architecture of 5G phase 1 | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181475 | Clarifications to definitions and abbreviations | Nokia,KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181476 | Resolving EN on sending SUCI in the Identifier Response message | NEC Europe Ltd,Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181477 | Reply LS on SoR mechanism | C1-182490 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181478 | Working procedure and table of clause-CRs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181479 | Authorization across N32 - pCR to Living Document: Security of Service Based Architecture of 5G phase 1 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181480 | N32 message anti-spoofing within the SEPP | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181481 | Prevent fraudulent Registration Request attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181482 | pCR: Local configuration of message protection policy in SEPP | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181483 | Remote provisioning of message protection policies in partner SEPPs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181484 | Correct typo in SBA Authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181485 | SBA Authentication issues | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181486 | Intra PLMN NF to NF authentication | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181487 | The granularity of NF service discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181488 | [eMCSEC] Removal of Editor’s note in Clause I.3.4 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181489 | [eMCSEC] Resolution of editor’s notes within Clause 10 on logging, audit and discreet monitoring. | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181490 | Inter PLMN routing and TLS: Solution Options | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181491 | LS on security aspects of supporting LTE connected to 5GC | C1-182485 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181492 | NRF and NEF requirements | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181493 | LS on UE capability related to integrity protection of DRBs | C1-182603 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181494 | LS on AUSF/UDM instance Selection and SUCI parameters | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181495 | Clarifications to: Protection schemes for SUCI | NTT-Docomo,Ericsson,Huawei,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181496 | Clarifications to: Subscription identifier privacy | Ericsson, CATT, NEC, Docomo, Nokia, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181497 | SUCI - protection schemes identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181498 | Clause 6.12.2 Wording and correction related to SUCI | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181499 | Limiting SUCI in Identifier Response | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181500 | Missing PEI requirements | Motorola Mobility, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181501 | Reply to: Reply LS on SoR mechanism | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181502 | Updates to Solution #6 in SoR Living Doc | Qualcomm Incorporated, T-Mobile US, DT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181503 | Living Document: Security of PLMN/RAT selection policies for roaming | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181504 | WID eMCSec R16 security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181505 | Correction and Clarification for the handling of KASME | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181506 | Clarifying the condition when ePDG sends its certificate in untrusted non-3GPP access | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181507 | Clarification of access token generation to clause^^5.2.2.3^^Method 3 – Token Based authorization | NEC Corporation,Samsung, Motorola Solutions, Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181508 | SBA evening session report | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181509 | Way forward for Interconnect (N32) security | Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181510 | K’AMF derivation and NASC protection at N2 based handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181511 | Clarifications to: Security handling in mobility | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181512 | Add condition for reset NAS COUNTs | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181513 | Remove of K_AMF_CI | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181514 | CAPIF – API Invoker on boarding | Samsung,NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181515 | CAPIF – Key Derivation | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181516 | CAPIF – Editor’s note resolution on authorization mechanism | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181517 | Security procedures for dual connectivity | Huawei,Ericsson, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181518 | Clarifications to: Security algorithm selection, key establishment and security mode command procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon, LG Electronics, ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181519 | LS on SA3 status on security-related API requirements | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181520 | Clarifications to: UP security mechanisms | Huawei, Hisilicon, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181521 | Clarifications to: RRC security mechanisms | LG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181522 | Editorial corrections of clause 6.6 | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181523 | pCR to 33.843 - collection of editorial fixes | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181524 | Draft TR 33.834 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181525 | Solution #6 Editor’s Note resolution | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181526 | LTKUP: clarifications for solution #5 | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181527 | pCR to TR 33.834 – clarifications to key issue 1 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181528 | pCR to TR 33.834 – clarifications to key issue 2 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181529 | CAPIF re-organizing | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181530 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updated evaluation of solution #3 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181531 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updated evaluation of solution #2 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181532 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updates to solution #4 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181533 | Conclusion of solution #5 | Gemalto | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181534 | pCR to TR 33.834 – updates to solution #6 | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181535 | pcr to 33.834 - Addition of Conclusion (comment to S3-181247) | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181536 | Cover sheet 33.834 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181537 | Draft TS 33.122 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181538 | CAPIF – Topology Hiding | Samsung, MSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181539 | TLS-PSK ciphersuites for security method of CAPIF-2e reference point | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181540 | CAPIF re-organizing | NEC Corporation,Huawei,Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181541 | Clarification of access token generation to clause^^5.2.2.3^^Method 3 – Token Based authorization | NEC Corporation,Samsung, Motorola Solutions, Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181542 | Security method between API invoker and API exposing function | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181543 | add definitions and abbreviations for TR33.843 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181544 | Remove EN for initial NAS message protection | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181545 | LS on not sending the SUCI in response to a hash failure | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181546 | Modification on NAS SMC procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181547 | Multiple NAS connections | Ericsson, ZTE Corporation, Huawei, Hisilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181548 | Discussion on authentication and NAS SMC handling with race condition | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181549 | Rules on concurrent running of authentication and NAS SMC procedure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181550 | Reply LS to SA3 on encryption of broadcast positioning information | R2-1806308 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181551 | skeleton of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181552 | a proposal for the scope of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181553 | a proposal for the introduction of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181554 | Response to LS on encrypting broadcasted positioning data and LS on provisioning of positioning assistance data via LPPa for broadcast | R2-1806307 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181555 | Update security mechanism in Xn-HO procedre | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181556 | Authentication and authorization for slice management interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181557 | Draft TR 33.811 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181558 | Impacted NextGen Areas | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181559 | Draft TR 33.841 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181560 | Section 8, Size of the integrity protection tag MAC-I | Vodafone, AT&T, MITRE, NIST, InterDigital, TCG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181561 | Co-existence of different size keys and MAC-I tags | AT&T, Vodafone, NIST, MITRE, InterDigital, TCG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181562 | Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT | China Mobile Group Device Co. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181563 | Reduce complex of Key Derivation Function negotiation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181564 | pCR to TR 33.841- Individual algorithms | Vodafone Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181565 | TS 33.501 Resolving Editors notes 5.10.1 Security Visibility | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181566 | clarify UE concurrency rule | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181567 | Clarification on SMS over NAS | ZTE Corporation, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181568 | CR to Clause 10.2.1 on Emergency Call redirection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181569 | Updates to Secondary Authentication Procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon, Interdigital, CATT, NEC, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181570 | Clarifications to the handover from EPS to 5Gs over N26 | Qualcomm Incorporated,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181571 | Clarifications for mapping of security contexts | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181572 | Clarification of NAS MAC computation for TAU protection, algorithm selection and security activation during idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181573 | non-3GPP access when security context is available | Huawei; HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181574 | Clarifications on clause 7.2 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181575 | Clarification for KN3IWF delivery in authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181576 | Editorials to 33.501 | NTT DOCOMO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181577 | Reference corrections in clause 5 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181578 | Reference corrections in clause 6 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181579 | Reference corrections in clause 8 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181580 | Collection of editorial corrections | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181581 | Modification on UE’s subscribe privacy requirement | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181582 | Editorial changes to clause 10 and 12 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181583 | Draft TR 33.856 | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181584 | a proposal for the key issue of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181585 | a proposal for the key derivation without direct interface between AMF and MSC server of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181586 | a proposal for the key derivation with interface between AMF and MSC server of TR33.856 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181587 | Key issue of IMS Emergency Session Handling | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑181588 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-09-26 11:02:35