

## CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **33.203** CR ⌘ rev **-** ⌘ Current version: **6.2.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps  ME  Radio Access Network  Core Network

<b>Title:</b>	⌘ Correction on IMS confidentiality protection		
<b>Source:</b>	⌘ Siemens		
<b>Work item code:</b>	⌘ IMS-ASEC	<b>Date:</b>	⌘ 10/05/2004
<b>Category:</b>	⌘ <b>F</b>	<b>Release:</b>	⌘ Rel-6
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: <b>F</b> (correction) <b>A</b> (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) <b>B</b> (addition of feature), <b>C</b> (functional modification of feature) <b>D</b> (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP <a href="#">TR 21.900</a> .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: 2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) Rel-4 (Release 4) Rel-5 (Release 5) Rel-6 (Release 6)

<b>Reason for change:</b>	⌘ Release 6 allows optional confidentiality protection, in contrast to Release 5. The necessary changes from Rel5 to Rel 6 have not been consistently carried out in all places of the specification.
<b>Summary of change:</b>	⌘ Correct the incorrect statements. In particular: 1) Section 6.2 contains an obsolete editor's note, the open issue mentioned there is now resolved in Annex I . 2) Section 7.1 currently says incorrectly that the security mode setup is NOT used for negotiating confidentiality: But Section 5.1.3 requires the possibility for confidentiality protection (and hence for the negotiation with the security mode setup procedure) as was introduced by CR-046 to TS 33.203. 3) Annex H does not take into account that, in Release 6, confidentiality protection is possible. It does not take into account either, the addition of AES-CBC as an encryption algorithm.
<b>Consequences if not approved:</b>	⌘ It will remain unclear how confidentiality protection shall be supported within Rel-6

<b>Clauses affected:</b>	⌘ 6.2, 7.1, 7.3, Annex H										
<b>Other specs affected:</b>	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">Y</td> <td style="width: 20px; text-align: center;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">⌘</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">⌘</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">⌘</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> </tr> </table> Other core specifications ⌘ Test specifications ⌘ O&M Specifications ⌘	Y	N	⌘	X	⌘	X	⌘	X		
Y	N										
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<b>Other comments:</b>	⌘ -										

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## 6.2 Confidentiality mechanisms

If the local policy in P-CSCF requires the use of IMS specific confidentiality protection mechanism between UE and P-CSCF, IPsec ESP as specified in RFC 2406 [13] shall provide confidentiality protection of SIP signalling between the UE and the P-CSCF, protecting all SIP signalling messages at the IP level. IPsec ESP general concepts on Security Policy management, Security Associations and IP traffic processing as described in reference RFC 2401 [14] shall also be considered. ESP confidentiality shall be applied in transport mode between UE and P-CSCF.

The method to set up ESP security associations (SAs) during the SIP registration procedure is specified in clause 7. As a result of an authenticated registration procedure, two pairs of unidirectional SAs between the UE and the P-CSCF all shared by TCP and UDP, shall be established in the P-CSCF and later in the UE. One SA pair is for traffic between a client port at the UE and a server port at the P-CSCF and the other SA is for traffic between a client port at the P-CSCF and a server port at the UE. For a detailed description of the establishment of these security associations see clause 7.

The encryption key  $CK_{ESP}$  is the same for the two pairs of simultaneously established SAs. The encryption key  $CK_{ESP}$  is obtained from the key  $CK_{IM}$  established as a result of the AKA procedure, specified in clause 6.1, using a suitable key expansion function.

~~[Editors Note: This key expansion function depends on the ESP encryption algorithm and should be specified in Annex I but is FFS.]~~

The encryption key expansion on the user side is done in the UE. The encryption key expansion on the network side is done in the P-CSCF.

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## 7.1 Security association parameters

For protecting IMS signaling between the UE and the P-CSCF it is necessary to agree on shared keys that are provided by IMS AKA, and a set of parameters specific to a protection method. The security mode setup (cf. clause 7.2) is used to negotiate the SA parameters required for IPsec ESP with authentication and (optional for use), ~~but without~~ confidentiality.

The SA parameters that shall be negotiated between UE and P-CSCF in the security mode set-up procedure are:

- **Encryption algorithm**

The encryption algorithm is either DES-EDE3-CBC as specified in RFC 2451 [20] or AES-CBC as specified in RFC 3602 [22] with 128 bit key.

Both encryption algorithms shall be supported by both, the UE and the P-CSCF. Both encryption algorithms shall be supported by both, the UE and the P-CSCF.

- **Integrity algorithm**

NOTE: What is called "authentication algorithm" in RFC 2406 [13] is called "integrity algorithm" in this specification in order to be in line with the terminology used in other 3GPP specifications and, in particular, to avoid confusion with the authentication algorithms used in the AKA protocol.

The integrity algorithm is either HMAC-MD5-96 [15] or HMAC-SHA-1-96 [16].

Both integrity algorithms shall be supported by both, the UE and the P-CSCF as mandated by RFC 2406 [13]. In the unlikely event that one of the integrity algorithms is compromised during the lifetime of this specification, this algorithm shall no longer be supported.

NOTE: If only one of the two integrity algorithms is compromised then it suffices for the IMS to remain secure that the algorithm is no longer supported by any P-CSCF. The security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2) will then ensure that the other integrity algorithm is selected.

- **SPI (Security Parameter Index)**

The SPI is allocated locally for inbound SAs. The triple (SPI, destination IP address, security protocol) uniquely identifies an SA at the IP layer. The UE shall select the SPIs uniquely, and different from any SPIs that might be used in any existing SAs (i.e. inbound and outbound SAs). The SPIs selected by the P-CSCF shall be different than the SPIs sent by the UE, cf. clause 7.2. In an authenticated registration, the UE and the P-CSCF each select two SPIs, not yet associated with existing inbound SAs, for the new inbound security associations at the UE and the P-CSCF respectively.

NOTE: This allocation of SPIs ensures that protected messages in the uplink always differ from protected messages in the downlink in, at least, the SPI field. This thwarts reflection attacks. When several applications use IPsec on the same physical interface the SIP application should be allocated a separate range of SPIs.

**The following SA parameters are not negotiated:**

- Life type: the life type is always seconds;
- SA duration: the SA duration has a fixed length of  $2^{32}-1$ ;

NOTE: The SA duration is a network layer concept. From a practical point of view, the value chosen for "SA duration" does not impose any limit on the lifetime of an SA at the network layer. The SA lifetime is controlled by the SIP application as specified in clause 7.4.

- Mode: transport mode;
- Key length: the length of the integrity key  $IK_{ESP}$  depends on the integrity algorithm. It is 128 bits for HMAC-MD5-96 and 160 bits for HMAC-SHA-1-96.
- Key length: the length of the encryption key depends on the encryption algorithm. The entropy of the key shall at least be 128 bits.

**Selectors:**

The security associations (SA) have to be bound to specific parameters (selectors) of the SIP flows between UE and P-CSCF, i.e. source and destination IP addresses, transport protocols that share the SA, and source and destination ports.

- IP addresses are bound to two pairs of SAs, as in clause 6.3, as follows:
  - inbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
The source and destination IP addresses associated with the SA are identical to those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.
  - outbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
the source IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the destination IP address bound to the inbound SA;  
the destination IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the source IP address bound to the inbound SA.

NOTE: This implies that the source and destination IP addresses in the header of the IP packet in which the protected SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF need to be the same as those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.

- The transport protocol selector shall allow UDP and TCP.
- Ports:
  1. The P-CSCF associates two ports, called *port\_ps* and *port\_pc*, with each pair of security associations established in an authenticated registration. The ports *port\_ps* and *port\_pc* are different from the standard SIP ports 5060 and 5061. No unprotected messages shall be sent from or received on the ports *port\_ps* and *port\_pc*. From a security point of view, unprotected messages may be received on any port which is different from the ports *port\_ps* and *port\_pc*. The number of the ports *port\_ps* and *port\_pc* are communicated to the

UE during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. These ports are used with both, UDP and TCP. The use of these ports may differ for TCP and UDP, as follows:

**UDP case:** the P-CSCF receives requests and responses protected with ESP from any UE on the port *port\_ps* (the "protected server port"). The P-CSCF sends requests and responses protected with ESP to a UE on the port *port\_pc* (the "protected client port").

**TCP case:** the P-CSCF, if it does not have a TCP connection towards the UE yet, shall set up a TCP connection from its *port\_pc* to the port *port\_us* of the UE before sending a request to it..

NOTE: Both the UE and the P-CSCF may set up a TCP connection from their client port to the other end's server port on demand. An already existing TCP connection may be reused by both the P-CSCF or the UE; but it is not mandatory.

NOTE: The protected server port *port\_ps* stays fixed for a UE until all IMPUs from this UE are de-registered. It may be fixed for a particular P-CSCF over all UEs, but there is no need to fix the same protected server port for different P-CSCFs.

NOTE: The distinction between the UDP and the TCP case reflects the different behaviour of SIP over UDP and TCP, as specified in section 18 of RFC 3261 [6].

- The UE associates two ports, called *port\_us* and *port\_uc*, with each pair of security associations established in an authenticated registration. The ports *port\_us* and *port\_uc* are different from the standard SIP ports 5060 and 5061. No unprotected messages shall be sent from or received on the ports *port\_us* and *port\_uc*. From a security point of view, unprotected messages may be received on any port which is different from the ports *port\_us* and *port\_uc*. The number of the ports *port\_us* and *port\_uc* are communicated to the P-CSCF during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. These ports are used with both, UDP and TCP. The use of these ports may differ for TCP and UDP, as follows:

**UDP case:** the UE receives requests and responses protected with ESP on the port *port\_us* (the "protected server port"). The UE sends requests and responses protected with ESP on the port *port\_uc* (the "protected client port").

**TCP case:** the UE, if it does not have a TCP connection towards the P-CSCF yet, shall set up a TCP connection to the port *port\_ps* of the P-CSCF before sending a request to it.

NOTE: Both the UE and the P-CSCF may set up a TCP connection from their client port to the other end's server port on demand. An already existing TCP connection may be reused by both the P-CSCF or the UE, but it is not mandatory.

NOTE: The protected server port *port\_us* stays fixed for a UE until all IMPUs from this UE are de-registered.

NOTE: The distinction between the UDP and the TCP case reflects the different behaviour of SIP over UDP and TCP, as specified in section 18 of RFC 3261 [6].

- The P-CSCF is allowed to receive only REGISTER messages and error messages on unprotected ports. All other messages not arriving on a protected port shall be either discarded or rejected by the P-CSCF.
- The UE is allowed to receive only the following messages on an unprotected port:
  - responses to unprotected REGISTER messages;
  - error messages.

All other messages not arriving on a protected port shall be rejected or silently discarded by the UE.

The following rules apply:

- For each unidirectional SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the P-CSCF stores at least the following data: (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port, SPI, IMPI, IMPU1, ... , IMPUn, lifetime) in an "SA\_table". The pair (UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port) equals either (*port\_uc*, *port\_ps*) or (*port\_us*, *port\_pc*).

NOTE: The SPI is only required when initiating and deleting SAs in the P-CSCF. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

- 2. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of a protected REGISTER message that the source IP address in the packet headers coincide with the UE's IP address inserted in the Via header of the protected REGISTER message. If the Via header does not explicitly contain the UE's PI address, but rather a symbolic name then the P-CSCF shall first resolve the symbolic name by suitable means to obtain an IP address.
- 3. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of an initial REGISTER message that the pair (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_client\_port), where the UE\_IP\_address is the source IP address in the packet header and the protected client port is sent as part of the security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2), has not yet been associated with entries in the "SA\_table". Furthermore, the P-CSCF shall check that, for any one IMPI, no more than six SAs per direction are stored at any one time. If these checks are unsuccessful the registration is aborted and a suitable error message is sent to the UE.

NOTE: According to clause 7.4 on SA handling, at most six SAs per direction may exist at a P-CSCF for one user at any one time.

- 4. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the P-CSCF shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by the triple (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port) in the "SA\_table". The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall further check that the IMPU associated with the SA in the "SA\_table" and the IMPU in the received SIP message coincide. If this is not the case the message shall be discarded.
- 5. For each unidirectional SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the UE stores at least the following data: (UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port, SPI, lifetime) in an "SA\_table". The pair (UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port) equals either (port\_uc, port\_ps) or (port\_us, port\_pc).

NOTE: The SPI is only required to initiate and delete SAs in the UE. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

- 6. When establishing a new pair of SAs (cf. clause 6.3) the SIP application at the UE shall ensure that the selected numbers for the protected ports do not correspond to an entry in the "SA\_table".

NOTE: Regarding the selection of the number of the protected port at the UE it is generally recommended that the UE randomly selects the number of the protected port from a sufficiently large set of numbers not yet allocated at the UE. This is to thwart a limited form of a Denial of Service attack. UMTS PS access link security also helps to thwart this attack.

- 7. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the UE shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by the pair (UE\_protected\_port, P-CSCF\_protected\_port) in the "SA table".

NOTE: If the integrity check of a received packet fails then IPsec will automatically discard the packet.

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### 7.3.2.3 Failed consistency check of Security-Set-up lines at the P-CSCF

The P-CSCF shall check whether authentication [and encryption](#) algorithms list received in SM7 is identical with the authentication [and encryption](#) algorithms list sent in SM6. If this is not the case the registration procedure is aborted. (Cf. clause 7.2).

\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGE\*\*\*\*\*

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## Annex H (normative): The use of "Security Mechanism Agreement for SIP Sessions" [21] for security mode set-up

The BNF syntax of RFC 3329 [21] is defined for negotiating security associations for semi-manually keyed IPsec in the following way:

```

security-client      = "Security-Client" HCOLON sec-mechanism *(COMMA sec-mechanism)
security-server     = "Security-Server" HCOLON sec-mechanism *(COMMA sec-mechanism)
security-verify     = "Security-Verify" HCOLON sec-mechanism *(COMMA sec-mechanism)
sec-mechanism       = mechanism-name *(SEMI mech-parameters)
mechanism-name      = "ipsec- 3gpp"
mech-parameters    = ( preference / algorithm / protocol / mode / encrypt-algorithm / spi-c / spi-s / port-c /
port-s )
preference          = "q" EQUAL qvalue
qvalue              = ( "0" [ "." 0*3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." 0*3("0") ] )
algorithm           = "alg" EQUAL ( "hmac-md5-96" / "hmac-sha-1-96" )
protocol            = "prot" EQUAL ( "ah" / "esp" )
mode                = "mod" EQUAL ( "trans" / "tun" )
encrypt-algorithm   = "ealg" EQUAL ( "des-ede3-cbc" / "aes-cbc" / "null" )
spi-c               = "spi-c" EQUAL spivalue
spi-s               = "spi-s" EQUAL spivalue
spivalue            = 10DIGIT; 0 to 4294967295
port-c              = "port-c" EQUAL port
port-s              = "port-s" EQUAL port
port                = 1*DIGIT

```

The parameters described by the BNF above have the following semantics:

**Mechanism-name:** For manually keyed IPsec, this field includes the value "ipsec- 3gpp". "ipsec- 3gpp" mechanism extends the general negotiation procedure of RFC 3329 [21] in the following way:

- 1 The server shall store the Security-Client header received in the request before sending the response with the Security-Server header.
- 2 The client shall include the Security-Client header in the first protected request. In other words, the first protected request shall include both Security-Verify and Security-Client header fields.
- 3 The server shall check that the content of Security-Client headers received in previous steps (1 and 2) are the same.

**Preference:** As defined in RFC 3329 [21].

Algorithm: Defines the authentication algorithm. May have a value "hmac-md5-96" for algorithm defined in RFC 2403 [15], or "hmac-sha-1-96" for algorithm defined in RFC 2404 [16]. The algorithm parameter is mandatory.

Protocol: Defines the IPsec protocol. May have a value "ah" for RFC 2402 [19] and "esp" for RFC 2406 [13]. If no Protocol parameter is present, the value will be "esp".

NOTE: According to clause 6 only "esp" is allowed for use in IMS.

Mode: Defines the mode in which the IPsec protocol is used. May have a value "trans" for transport mode, and value "tun" for tunneling mode. If no Mode parameter is present, the value will be "trans".

NOTE: According to clause 6.3 ESP integrity shall be applied in transport mode i.e. only "trans" is allowed for use in IMS.

Encrypt-algorithm: If present, defines the encryption algorithm. May have a value "des-ede3-cbc" for algorithm defined in RFC 2451 [20] or ["aes-cbc" for the algorithm defined in IETF RFC 3602 \[22\]](#) or "null" if encryption is not used. If no Encrypt-algorithm parameter is present, the algorithm will be "null".

~~NOTE: According to clause 6.2 no encryption is provided in IMS.~~

Spi-c: Defines the SPI number of the inbound SA at the protected client port.

Spi-s: Defines the SPI number of the inbound SA at the protected server port.

Port-c: Defines the protected client port.

Port-s: Defines the protected server port.

It is assumed that the underlying IPsec implementation supports selectors that allow all transport protocols supported by SIP to be protected with a single SA.

\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGE\*\*\*\*\*