

aSIP-Access Security for IP-Based Services

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Current timeplan for WI aSIP agreed in Phoenix SA3#18:

S3#20	October 15-20, 2001	Integration of security architecture
S3#21	November 27-30, 2001	Concept presented to CN, RAN, T and GERAN
SA#14	December 17-20, 2001	Stage 2 presented for information
SA#15	March, 2002	Stage 2 presented for approval. The TS shall at this stage be stable in order to freeze Stage 3 specifications in June
SA#16	June, 2002	IMS stage 3 specifications for approval

Updates in TS33.203v050:

- **SA3#19 in Newbury**
 - **The working assumption is that authentication shall take place at (Re-) Registrations**
 - **Network topology hiding included**
 - **The concept of the ISIM included**
 - **Error messages shall not be integrity protected. It is too complicated to require full proof DoS attack resistance**
 - **Working assumption for security mode set-up defined**
 - **Signalling flows updated**

Updates in TS33.203v060:

- **SA3#19bis in Sophia Antipolis**
 - **Both SIP-level integrity protection and IPSec shall be worked on in parallel**
 - **New annexes have been created for the parallel work which is taking place in SA3 and in IETF**
 - **An open issues table tailored to CN1 defined in Annex E**
 - **Generic security association procedures included in section 7**

SA#13 (SP-010579)

At the SA#13 meeting in Beijing China the following tasks were identified as being essential tasks to accomplish within the Release 5 framework:

- SIP extensions for integrity protection
- IMS impact on UICC
- ISC (IM Service Control) interface
- User authentication
- Network Domain Security

SA#13 (SP-010579)

At the SA#13 meeting in Beijing China the following tasks were identified as being **not essential** tasks to accomplish within the Release 5 framework:

- UE functional split (what is needed?)
- Lawful interception
- IMS local services
- Support of VHE/OSA by the IMS
- Support of Camel by the IMS
- IMS emergency sessions
- Sh-interface between the HSS and the AS
- IMS security i.e. confidentiality protection

TR22.941 Stage 0 Release 5

“IP Based Multimedia Services Framework”

- **Several Security issues can be identified e.g.**
 - (Section 8.1.10) The network should support the option to encrypt the voice component and signalling of a basic voice call.
 - (Section 8.14.5) It is required that a single authentication and authorisation enables access to the full capabilities of the corporate environment.
 - (Section 8.14.6) It shall be possible to adopt the security of the access to the security of the customer’s corporate environment
 - etc
- **Concluded at SA3#20 in Sydney that this TR is for Release 6 and has no impact on the work currently taking place in WI aSIP**

Open issues (**Contributions requested**):

- Include material into TS33.203 Annex C on SIP extensions for integrity protection (Essential)
- Resolve the issue on the number of SAs between the UE and the P-CSCF
- Shall it be possible to negotiate different authentication algorithms in order to support the access independence requirement?
- Hiding. Inputs needed. Is this essential for Release 5?
- Configurability and visibility
- Define a list of parameters that are tailored to the ISIM. This shall be put into the TS33.203.
- UE functional split

Open issues (**Contributions requested**):

- Handling of authorising IMPUs (S-CSCF or HSS)
- Reducing the number of editors notes in TS33.203
- Reducing the number of FFS in TS33.203
- SA3 shall define solutions to the Multiple S-CSCF architecture as required by SA2
- Make the flows more informational as requested by CN1
- Whenever possible each contributor is encouraged to write 'CR-like' contributions like Siemens initiated in Sophia Antipolis

Open issues (**Contributions requested**):

- Security mechanisms for the ISC interface between the AS and the S-CSCF
- IP-address anonymity
- Mechanisms for network forced re-registrations (defined by CN1)

IETF-activities (Status reports required for this and future SA3 meetings):

- **Extending EAP with IMS AKA**
- **Extending HTTP (and SIP) with EAP**
- **Solutions required in IETF for Security Mode Setup**
- **Requirements draft to IETF**
- **Progress on SIP level integrity protection**