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3GPP requirements on SIP

Status of this Memo

1. Abstract

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has selected SIP [3] as the session establishment protocol for the 3GPP IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IM CN Subsystem).

Although SIP is a protocol that fulfills most of the requirements to establish a session in an IP network, the SIP protocol suite has

never been evaluated against the specific 3GPP requirements for operation in a cellular network.

In this document we express the requirements identified by 3GPP to support SIP for IM CN Subsystem in cellular networks.

2. Conventions used in this document

This document does not specify any protocol of any kind. Therefore, the use of te key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document, as described in RFC-2119 [2], does not apply.

3. Table of Contents

4. Introduction

3GPP has selected SIP [3] as the protocol to establish and tear down multimedia sessions in the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IM CN Subsystem). A description of the IM CN Subsystem can be found in [4]. A comprehensive set of session flows can be found in [5].

This document is an effort to define the requirements applicable to the usage of the SIP protocol suite in cellular networks, and particularly in the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem.

The rest of this document is structured as follows:

Section 5 offers an overview of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem. Readers who are not familiar with it should carefully read this section.

Section 6 contains the 3GPP requirements to SIP. Requirements are grouped by categories. Some requirements include a statement on possible solutions that would be able to fulfill the requirement. Note also that, as a particular requirement might be fulfilled by different solutions, not all the solutions might have an impact on SIP.

5. Overview of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem

This section gives the reader an overview of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem. It is not intended to be comprehensive. But it provides enough information to understand the basis of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem. Readers are encouraged to find a more detailed description in [4], [5] and [6].

For a particular cellular device, the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem network is further decomposed in a home network and a visited network.

An IM CN Subsystem subscriber belongs to his or her home network. Services are triggered and may be executed in the home network. One or more SIP servers are deployed in the SIP home network to support the IP Multimedia Subsystem. Among those SIP servers, there is a SIP serving proxy, which is also acting as a SIP registrar. Authentication/Authorization servers may be part of the home network as well. Users are authenticated in the home network.

The visited network contains a SIP outbound proxy to support the UA. The SIP outbound proxy in the visited network may translate locally dialed digits into international format, detect emergency sessions, maintain security associations between itself and the terminals, and interwork with the resource management in the packet network.

The SIP outbound proxy is assigned after the mobile has connected to the access network. Once this proxy is assigned, it does not change while the mobile remains connected to the access network. Thus the mobile can move freely within the access network without SIP outbound proxy reassignment.

The home network may support also a SIP entry proxy. This node may act as the first entry point for SIP signaling to the home network and may decide (with the help of location servers) which SIP registrar server to assign to a particular user. Typically the address of the home network SIP entry proxy is configured in DNS in the form of a DNS SRV record for SIP.

Additionally, home and visited networks may deploy, if required, a SIP hiding proxy. The main purpose of the SIP hiding proxy is to hide the network configuration.

The 3GPP IM CN Subsystem is designed to be access independent. Access is granted from 3GPP cellular terminals or from other terminals that use other accesses out of the scope of 3GPP.

3GPP cellular IP Multimedia terminals use the existing General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) [6] as a transport network for IP datagrams. The terminals first connect to the GPRS network to get an IPv6 address. In order to do this, the terminals must perform a (GPRS) Attach procedure followed by a (GPRS) PDP Context Activation procedure. These GPRS procedures are required to be completed before any IP Multimedia session can be established.

As a result of the above-mentioned GPRS procedures, the terminal has got an IPv6 address. In the case of non-roaming terminals, the IPv6 address belongs to the home network address space. In the case of a roaming terminal, the IPv6 address belongs to the visited network address space. The address does not change as the mobile terminal moves while still attached to the same network address space.

If the terminal moves from a GPRS access to another GPRS access, the above-mentioned GPRS procedures needs to start from the beginning to allocate an IPv6 address to the terminal.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the 3GPP architecture for IM CN Subsystem.



Figure 1: Overview of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem architecture

Another possible configuration is depicted in Figure 2. In that case, a general-purpose computer (e.g., a laptop computer) is connected to a GPRS terminal. The computer hosts the Multimedia application (comprising SIP, SDP, RTP, etc.). The GPRS terminal handles the radio access and the GPRS connectivity. Note that, for the sake of clarity, the home network has not been depicted in the figure.



Figure 2: A computer connected to a GPRS terminal

Services are typically executed in an application server. The interface between the SIP server and the application server is based on SIP. However, certain operators may want to reuse the existing technology, and therefore, they may need to interoperate SIP with protocols like CAMEL/Intelligent-Network or Open services Architecture (OSA).

6. 3GPP Requirements on SIP

6.1 General requirements

This section does not specify any particular requirement to SIP. However, it includes a list of general requirements that must be considered when developing solutions to particular requirements.

6.1.1 Efficient use of the radio interface

The radio interface is a scarce resource. As such, the exchange of signaling messages between the UA and the network should be minimized. All the mechanisms developed should make an efficient use of the radio interface.
See also the related requirements in section 6.5.

6.1.2 Minimum session setup time

All the procedures and mechanisms should have a minimum impact on the session setup time as perceived by the user. When there is a choice between performing tasks at session establishment and in transactions prior to session establishment, then the tasks should be performed prior to session establishment.
See also the related requirements in section 6.5.

6.1.3 Minimum support required in the terminal

As terminals could be rather small devices, memory requirements, power consumption, processing power, etc. should be kept to a minimum. Mandating support for additional protocols in the terminal must meet this requirement.

6.1.4 Roaming and non roaming

The developed solutions should work efficiently in roaming and non-roaming scenarios.

6.1.5 Mobility management

As mobility management is managed by the access network, there is no need to support mobility management in SIP.

6.1.6 IP version 6

The IP CN Subsystem is solely designed to use IP version 6 addresses.

6.2 SIP outbound proxy in the visited network

6.2.1 SIP outbound proxy in the visited network

A SIP outbound proxy, typically in the visited network, must be supported in both roaming and non-roaming case, even when the SIP serving proxy in the home network is located in the same network as the SIP outbound proxy.

6.2.2 Discovery of the SIP outbound proxy

There must be a general mechanism to configure the UA with the address of the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network.

The Internet Draft "DHCP option for SIP servers" [7] may be a good starting point to meet this requirement. However, there is no support for IPv6 in this Internet Draft.

3GPP has another mechanism provided by the GPRS access network that meets this requirement, in addition to the above one.

6.2.3 Removal of headers

The SIP outbound proxy must be able to remove the network generated contents of the Via and Record-Route headers of the SIP requests to be sent to the UA. These contents are reinserted in the appropriate headers of the responses, as if they would have been included by the UA. This increases security and reduces SIP message sizes and thus transmission delay and peak bandwidth requirements over the radio interface.

6.3 Registration

6.3.1 Registration required

A user must register to the IMS before he/she can initiate or terminate any session. The rationale behind this is that:
1. The user must be reachable for terminating sessions and services;
2. The user is authenticated and possibly billed for the resources that he/she is authorized to use.

The procedure should not have a penalty on the session setup time (see also requirement 6.1.2).

6.3.2 Location of the SIP Registrar

The SIP registrar is located in the home network. The SIP registrar authenticates and registers the user.
Once the terminal is switched on, the UA reads its configuration data. This data may be stored in a SIM card or any other memory device. The configuration data contains an identification of the home network. The device finds the SIP registrar address from the home network domain name. The terminal sends the registration through the SIP outbound proxy.
In order to support the search of the registrar, the home network contains one or more SIP servers that are configured in DNS with the SRV record of SIP. These are the home network entry proxies. Their mission is to serve as a first point of contact in the home network, and decide (with the help of location servers) which SIP registrar server to assign to a particular user.

The procedures specified in SIP [3], section 1.4.2, applied to a REGISTER message seems to be sufficient to meet this requirement.

6.3.3 Efficient registration

Due to the scarce radio interface resource, a single registration must be used to register both with the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network and the registrar in the home network.

A single REGISTER message, addressed to the registrar, may traverse the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network. This can install, if needed, soft registration states in the SIP outbound proxy.

6.3.4 Registration for roaming and non roaming cases

In order to facilitate roaming between different networks, the UA must use the same registration procedure(s) within its home and visited networks.

6.3.5 Visited domain name

The home network must be able to validate that there is a roaming agreement between the home and the visited network. The home network needs to validate that the user is allowed to roam to such a visited network. Therefore, there must be a mechanism so that the visited network identity is known at registration time in the home network. As such, the visited network identity must be transported from the SIP outbound proxy to the home network.

It is acceptable to represent the visited network identity as a visited network domain name.

6.4 De-registration

6.4.1 De-registration of users

There must be a procedure for a user to de-register from the network. This procedure may be used, e.g., when the user deactivates the terminal.

We believe that a REGISTER with an expiration timer of 0 will meet the requirement.

6.4.2 Types of network initiated de-registrations

Two types of network initiated de-registrations must be provided:

- To deal with registration expirations.
- To allow the network to force de-registrations following any possible causes for this to occur.

6.4.3 Network initiated de-registration, network maintenance

The IM CN Subsystem may initiate the network initiated de-registration procedure due to forced re-registrations from subscribers, e.g. in case of data inconsistency at node failure, in case of SIM lost, etc. Canceling the current contexts of the user spread among the network nodes at registration, and imposing a new SIP registration solves this condition.

6.4.4 Network initiated de-registration, network/traffic determined

The system must support a mechanism to avoid inconsistent information storage and remove any redundant registration information. This case will occur when a subscriber roams to a different network. This case occurs in normal mobility procedures when the user roams from one access network to another one, or when imposing new service conditions to roamers.

6.4.5 Network initiated de-registration, application layer determined

The service capability offered by the system to the application layers may have parameters specifying whether all SIP registrations are to be removed, or only those from one or a group of terminals from the user, etc.

6.4.6 Network initiated de-registration, administrative

For different reasons (e.g., subscription termination, lost terminal, etc.) a home network administrative function may determine a need to clear a user’s SIP registration. This function initiates the de-registration procedure and may reside in various elements depending on the exact reason for initiating the de-registration.

There must be a procedure for an entity in the network to de-register users. The de-registration information must be available at all the proxies that keep registration state and the UA.

We believe that a procedure based on SIP events [15] and a registration package will meet the requirement.

6.5 Compression of SIP signaling

As the radio interface is a scarce resource, the transport of SIP messages over the radio interface must be done efficiently.

Therefore, there must be a mechanism to efficiently transport SIP signaling packets over the radio interface, by compressing the SIP signaling messages between the UA and the SIP outbound proxy, and by compressing the IP and transport layer protocol headers that carry these SIP messages.

6.5.1 Extensibility of the SIP compression

The chosen solution(s) must be extensible to facilitate the incorporation of new and improved compression algorithms in a backward compatible way, as they become available.

6.5.2 SIP compression and roaming

The chosen solution(s) for SIP compression must work in roaming scenarios.

6.5.3 Minimal impact of SIP compression on the network

Application specific compression shall minimize impacts on existing 3GPP network, e.g. the compression must be defined between the UA at the SIP terminal and the outbound SIP Proxy in the visited network.

6.5.4 Optionality of SIP compression

It must be possible to leave the usage of compression for SIP signaling optional. To facilitate mobile terminal roaming between networks which are using compression, the mobile terminal should always support ability to compress SIP signaling. If compression is not supported, communication may continue without compression, depending on the local policy of the visited network.

6.5.5 Default algorithm for SIP compression

If SIP signaling compression is used, a default algorithm must be supported by the UA and the network elements involved for compression.

6.5.6 Compression Negotiation

There must be a mechanism to negotiate between the UA and the first SIP outbound proxy the compression algorithm to be used. The type of negotiation mechanism that should be implemented is that the UAC includes a list of compression algorithms and the first SIP outbound proxy responds with the selected one. Subsequent SIP messages are compressed based on the agreed algorithm.

Note: 3GPP is investigating if the compression of SIP signaling is negotiated on a per call basis, on a per registration basis or something completely different. More information will be provided in future versions of this document.

6.6 QoS requirements related to SIP

6.6.1 Independence between QoS signaling and SIP

The selection of QoS signaling and resource allocation schemes must be independent of the selected session control protocols. This allows for independent evolution of QoS control and SIP.

6.6.2 Coordination between SIP and QoS/Resource allocation

6.6.2.1 Allocation before alerting

In establishing a SIP session, it must be possible for an application to request that the resources needed for bearer establishment are successfully allocated before the destination user is alerted. Note, however, that it must be also possible for an SIP application in a terminal to alert the user before the radio resources are established (e.g. if the user wants to participate in the media negotiation).

We believe this requirement is met by [8] and [21].

6.6.2.2 Destination user participates in the bearer negotiation

In establishing a SIP session, it must be possible for a terminating application to allow the destination user to participate in determining which bearers shall be established.

We believe this requirement is met by the standard SDP negotiation described in [3] and the extensions described in [8] and [21].

6.6.2.3 Successful bearer establishment

Successful bearer establishment must include the completion of any required end-to-end QoS signaling, negotiation and resource allocation.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [8] and [21].

6.7 Prevention of theft of service

The possibility for theft of service in the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem shall be no higher than that for the corresponding GPRS and circuit switched services.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [9].

6.8 Radio resource authorization

As radio resources are very valuable the network must be able to manage these in a controlled manner. The network must be able to identify who is using these resources and be able to authorize their usage.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [9].

6.9 Prevention of denial of service

The system unavailability due to denial of service attacks in the IM CN subsystem shall be no greater than that for the corresponding GPRS and circuit switched services.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [9].

6.10 Identification of users

6.10.1 Private user identity

To use the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem, a subscriber must have a private user identity. The private identity is assigned by the home network operator, and used, for example, for registration, authorization, administration, and possibly accounting purposes. This identity shall take the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI) as defined in RFC 2486 [10].

The private user identity is not used for routing of SIP messages.

The private user identity is a unique global identity defined by the Home Network Operator, which may be used within the home network to uniquely identify the user from a network perspective.

The private user identity is not accessible by the user. Typically this identity is stored in a SIM card.

The private user identity shall be permanently allocated to a user (it is not a dynamic identity), and is valid for the duration of the user’s subscription with the home network.

6.10.1.1 Private user ID in registrations

The UA must deliver the private user identity to the SIP outbound proxy and the registrar at registration time.
The private user identity is used as the basis for authentication during registration of the subscriber. The term authentication is used in this document with the same meaning as it is defined in [39].

The current working assumption is that this requirement is met by populating the From: header value of the REGISTER message with the private user ID.

6.10.2 Public user identities

To use the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem, a subscriber must have one or more public user identities. The public user identity/identities are used by any user for requesting communications to other users. For example, this might be included on a business card.

Different public user identities may be grouped into a user profile. A user may have different profiles, each one containing different public user identities. A public user identity can be part of a single user profile.

The current working assumption in 3GPP is that this requirement is met by populating the To: header value of a REGISTER message with the public user ID. In an outbound call, the From: and/or the Remote-Party-ID header values are populated with any of the public user identities.

6.10.2.1 Format of the public user identities

The public user identity/identities must take the form of a SIP URL (as defined in SIP [3] and RFC2396 [11]) or the form of a E.164 number [12].

We believe this requirement is met by using SIP URLs and telephone numbers represented in SIP URLs as described in SIP [3]. In addition, tel: URLs as specified in [13] can be used to fulfil the requirement.

6.10.2.2 Registration of public user IDs

It must be possible to register globally (i.e. through one single UA request) a subscriber that has more than one public identity that belongs to the same user profile, via a mechanism within the IM CN Subsystem. In this case, the user will be registered with all the public identities associated to a user profile. This must not preclude the user from registering individually some of his/her public identities if needed.

6.10.2.3 Authentication of the public user ID

Public user identities are not authenticated by the network. However the network authorizes that the public user identity is associated to the registered private user identity..

6.11 Identifiers used for routing

Routing of SIP signaling within the IM CN Subsystem must use SIP URLs as defined in [3]. E.164 [12] format public user identities must not be used for routing within the IM CN Subsystem, and session requests based upon E.164 format public user identities will require conversion into SIP URL format for internal IM CN Subsystem usage.

We believe that this requirement is achieved by translating E.164 numbers into SIP URLs. A database, such as ENUM [14] might do the job.

6.12 Hiding requirements

We believe that the requirements in this section are met by the current SIP protocol [3].

6.12.1 Hiding of the network structure

A network operator need not be required to reveal the internal network structure to another network (in Via, Route, or other headers) that may contain indication of the number of SIP proxies, name of the SIP proxies, capabilities of the SIP proxies or capacity of the network. Association of the node names of the same type of entity and their capabilities and the number of nodes will be kept within an operator’s network. However disclosure of the internal architecture must not be prevented on a per agreement basis.

6.12.2 Hiding of IP addresses

A network need not be required to expose the explicit IP addresses of the nodes within the network (excluding firewalls and border gateways).

6.12.3 SIP hiding proxy

In order to support the hiding requirements, a SIP hiding proxy may be included in the SIP signaling path. Such additional proxy may be used to shield the internal structure of a network from other networks.

6.13 Cell-ID

The identity of the cell through which the 3GPP UA is accessing the IM CN Subsystem (Cell-ID) may be used by either the visited or the home network to provide localized services or information on the location of the terminal during an emergency call (see also requirement 6.16.3).

6.13.1 Cell-ID in signaling from the UA to the visited and home networks

Assuming that the cell-ID is obtained by the UA by other mechanisms outside the scope or beyond SIP, the cell-ID must be transported at least in the following procedures:

- Registration
- Session Establishment (Mobile Originated)
- Session Establishment (Mobile Terminated)
- Session Release

6.13.2 Format of the cell-ID

The cell-ID must be sent in the format of a Cell Global ID, as described in [22].

6.14 Release of sessions

In addition to the normal mechanisms to release a SIP session (e.g. BYE), two cases are considered in this section. The ungraceful release of the session (e.g., the terminal moves to an out of coverage zone) and the graceful session release ordered by the network (e.g., pre-paid caller runs out of credit).

6.14.1 Ungraceful session release

If an ungraceful session termination occurs (e.g. flat battery or mobile leaves coverage), when a call stateful SIP proxy server (such as the SIP serving proxy at home) is involved in a session, memory leaks and eventually server failure can occur due to hanging state machines. To ensure stable proxy operation and carrier grade service, a mechanism to handle the ungraceful session termination issue must be provided. This mechanism should be at the SIP protocol level in order to guarantee access independence for the system.

6.14.2 Graceful session release

There must be a mechanism so that an entity in the network may order the release of resources to other entities. This may be used, e.g., in pre-paid calls when the user runs out of credit.

This release must not involve any request to the UA to send out a release request (BYE), as the UA might not follow this request. The receiving entity needs the guarantee that resources are released when requested by the ordering entity.

6.15 Routing of SIP messages

In order to clarify the terminology, we introduce the term vector to refer to the set of proxies that the INVITE has to traverse.

6.15.1 SIP outbound proxy in the visited network

As the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network is supporting the UA in terms of limited dialed digits translation (i.e., local to international), emergency calls, all sessions initiated in the mobile terminal when using IM CN Subsystem, must first route the SIP signaling to the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network, independently of the destination of the session.

6.15.2 SIP serving proxy in the home network

As services are triggered in the home network, all sessions initiated in the mobile terminal (except emergency calls) must route the SIP signaling to the SIP serving proxy in the home network allocated at registration time, independently of the destination of the session.

6.15.3 INVITE might follow a different path than REGISTER

The path taken by the INVITE need not be restricted to the specific path taken by the REGISTER. However, the path taken by the INVITE may follow the same path taken by the REGISTER (e.g., the INVITE may traverse just the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network and the SIP serving proxy in the home network, without passing through any other proxies).

6.15.4 Information of the vector

There must be some means of dynamically informing the node which adds the vector (e.g., the SIP outbound proxy) of what that vector should be, in the specific case where the vector is used to find a SIP serving proxy in the home network.

Similarly, there must be some means of dynamically informing the node which adds the vector (e.g., the SIP serving proxy) of what that vector should be, in the specific case where the vector is used to find a SIP inbound proxy in the visited network.

The hiding requirements expressed in section 6.12 also apply to the vector.

6.15.5 SIP inbound proxy in the visited network

The visited network may apply certain local policies to incoming sessions. Therefore, there is a need to have an SIP inbound proxy in

the visited network for terminating sessions. In general, the SIP inbound proxy and the SIP outbound proxy are the same entity in the visited network.

6.16 Emergency sessions

It must be possible to place an emergency session using the IM CN Subsystem. Emergency calls will be routed to the emergency services in accordance with national regulations for where the subscriber is located.

6.16.1 Registration is not required

It must be possible to place an emergency session using SIP, independently on whether the user is registered to the IM CN Subsystem or not. Note, however, that in certain countries, it might be possible to reject an emergency call when the user is no registered to the IM CN Subsystem.

6.16.2 SIP outbound proxy support

Emergency sessions must be handled by the SIP outbound proxy in the visited network.

6.16.3 Cell Global ID in emergency sessions

It is required that location information including Cell Global ID (see also requirement6.13) be made available in the initial INVITE and the BYE message for the purpose of locating the user and routing to the appropriate Emergency Call Center.

6.16.4 Types of emergency calls

It must be possible to initiated emergency calls to different emergency call centers, depending on the type of emergency. The following types of emergency calls are possible:

- Police
- Ambulance
- Fire brigade
- Marine guard
- Mountain rescue
- Spare, at least three different types

6.16.4 Default identifier for emergency calls

In order to support emergency calls in roaming situations, it must be allowed to establish an emergency call without the need to dial a

dedicated number or SIP URL. This allows to dial an emergency center based on a menu, "red button" or a linkage to a car air bag control.

Additionally, it is desirable that the user interface for emergency calls in 3GPP terminals is similar to the one in other SIP networks.

3GPP is currently investigating the applicability of the Universal Emergency SIP URL described in [36].

6.17 Identities on session establishment

6.17.1 Remote Party Identification presentation

It must be possible to present to the caller the identity of the party to which he/she may dial back to return a call.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [16].

6.17.2 Remote Party Identification privacy

In addition to the previous requirement, the called party must be able to request that his/her identity not be revealed to the caller.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [16].

6.17.3 Remote Party Identification blocking

Regulatory agencies, as well as subscribers, may require the ability of a caller to block the display of their caller identification. This function may be performed by the destination subscriber’s SIP serving proxy. In this way, the destination subscriber is still able to do a session-return, session-trace, transfer, or any other supplementary service.

Therefore, it must be possible that the caller requests to block the display of his/her identity at the callee's display.

We believe this requirement is met by the procedures described in [16].

6.17.4 Anonymity

Procedures are required for an anonymous session establishment. However, sessions are not intended to be anonymous to the originating or terminating network operators.

Note: 3GPP is still discussing whether the requirement is needed or not.

6.17.4.1 Anonymous session establishment

If the caller requests the session to be anonymous, the UAC must not reveal any identity information to the UAS.

If the caller requests the session to be anonymous, the terminating network must not reveal any identity or signaling routing information to the destination endpoint. The terminating network should distinguish at least two cases, first if the caller intended the session to be anonymous, and second if the caller's identity was deleted by a transit network.

6.18 Charging

It must be possible to apply charging, in a flexible manner based on any number of different charging models. Specific charging models and requirements for charging are under study.

6.19 IPv6

As the 3GPP architecture is solely based on IP version 6, all protocols must support IPv6 addresses.

We believe SIP [3] and SDP [17] meet this requirement. However, the "DHCP option for SIP servers" [7] does not support IPv6.

6.19.1 Interworking IPv6 with IPv4

3GPP IM CN subsystem is based on IPv6. As external networks may be based on IPv4 addresses, there is a need to interwork with such a external networks. Therefore, interworking between IPv6 and IPv4 at the SIP and SDP level (UAs and proxies) must be guaranteed.

6.20 General support of additional capabilities

3GPP is interested on applying and using additional services, like those described in [19], [37] and [38]. Although 3GPP is not going to standardize additional services, 3GPP may make sure that the capabilities that enable those services are granted in the network.

As such we believe that the REFER method [18] and the Replaces header [20] constitute the enablers in order to meet the above requirement.

6.21 Three-way handshake in the session description negotiation

Typically a session description protocol like SDP is used in SIP to describe the media streams and codecs needed to establish the session. SIP uses an offer/answer model of the session description where one of the parties offers his session description and the other answers to that offer.

In 3GPP IM CN Subsystem, the terminals might have restrictions with the memory, DSP capacity, etc. As such, it is required that the Session Description negotiation concludes with one out of many single codecs per media stream. Both UAC and UAS must know, prior to any media is sent or received, which codec is used for each media stream.

In 3GPP IM CN Subsystem, an efficient use of the network and radio resources is an important requirement. As such, the network must know in advance which codec is used for a particular media stream. The network may use this information to apply the most appropriate error correction mechanism depending on the selected codec. The network access control may use this information as well.

Additionally, it is required that the party who pays for the resource utilization has the opportunity to decide the codec to use, once both end parties are aware of the capabilities supported at the remote UA.

Therefore, it is required a three-way handshake model in the session description negotiation within SIP. This follows the model of offer/counter-offer/answer of the session description.

6.22 Security Model

Sections 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 have been based on the 3GPP documents [23], [4], and [24], and the work done by Dirk Kroeselberg in the Internet-Draft [31] (now expired).

The scope for security of the 3GPP IM CN Subsystem is securing the SIP signaling between the various SIP entities. Protecting the end-to-end media streams may be a future extension but is not considered in the first version of the IM CN Subsystem.

It is expected that security for the underlying GPRS network and the IM CN Subsystem will be provided independent of each other. Therefore, SIP signaling security must be provided independently of underlying access network security mechanisms. In particular, it must be possible to access the IM CN Subsystem services securely from other accesses than GPRS.

Each operator providing IM CN Subsystem services acts as its own domain of trust, and shares a long-term security association with its subscribers. Operators may enter into roaming agreements with other operators, in which case a certain level of trust exists between their respective domains.

SIP user agents must authenticate to their home network before the use of IM CN Subsystem resources is authorized. The current working assumption in the 3GPP is to perform authentication during registration and re-registrations.

A hop-by-hop model must be used to protect actual SIP signaling. Looking at Figure 1 in Chapter 5, we can distinguish two main areas where security is needed:

- Access Domain: Between the SIP user device and the visited network.
- Network Domain: Between the visited and the home networks, or inside the home network.

Characteristics needed in the Access Domain are quite different from those of the Network Domain because the terminal's requirements on mobility, computation restriction, battery limit, bandwidth conservation and radio interface. SIP entities in the access domain should be able to maintain security contexts with a large group of users in parallel. Furthermore, Access Domain provides user specific security associations while Network Domain provides security associations between network nodes. Therefore the weight of protocols and algorithms and the compliance of them with compression mechanisms are very important to Access Domain Security. It is therefore required that the security solutions must allow different mechanisms in these two domains.

Note that authentication, as used in this context, means entity authentication that enables two entities to verify the identity of the respective peer. This is different from message origin authentication, which allows a receiver to verify the origin of a single message and is provided by the same means as integrity protection.

6.23 Access Domain Security

6.23.1 Authentication

Strong, mutual authentication method must be used.

It must be possible to support different authentication methods. Therefore authentication using an extensible authentication framework must be provided.

Authentication methods must support the secure storage of long-term authentication keys and the secure execution of authentication algorithms.

The SIP client's credentials must not be transferred as plain text.

HTTP Basic Authentication sends the passwords as plain text, also, it is neither strong nor does it offer mutual authentication. HTTP Digest has an option for mutual authentication. It uses

cryptographic means for authentication, but does not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks where attackers modify the request while preserving the authentication headers. Lower layer mechanisms allow strong and mutual authentication (but do not fulfill other requirements). 3GPP intends to reuse UMTS AKA [24], but would prefer to a generic authentication framework at SIP level that supports UMTS AKA as well as other authentication mechanisms. UMTS AKA applies a symmetric cryptographic scheme, provides mutual authentication, and is typically implemented on a so-called SIM card that provides secure storage on the user's side.

Additional requirements related to delegation that apply to the authentication method are given in section 6.23.2.3.

6.23.2 Scalability and Efficiency

3GPP IM CN Subsystems will be characterized by a large subscriber base of up to a billion users, all of which must be treated in a secure manner.

The security solutions must allow global roaming among a large number of administrative domains.

6.23.2.1 Bandwidth and Roundtrips

The wireless interface in 3GPP terminals is an expensive resource both in terms of power consumption and maximum utilization of scarce spectrum. Furthermore, cellular networks have typically long round-trip time delays, which must be taken in account in the design of the security solutions.

Any security mechanism that involves 3GPP terminals should not unnecessarily increase the bandwidth needs.

All security mechanisms that involve 3GPP terminals should minimize the number of necessary extra roundtrips. In particular, during normal call signaling there should not be any additional security related messages.

The roundtrip requirements are particularly hard to satisfy. It seems that IKE [32] adds a number of roundtrips, particularly if run together with legacy authentication extensions developed in the IPSRA WG. TLS [25] uses less roundtrips, but on the other hand doesn't support UDP.

6.23.2.2 Computation

It must be possible for IM CN Subsystem terminals to provide security without requiring public key cryptography and/or certificates. There may, however, be optional security schemes that employ these techniques.

Current HTTP authentication methods use only symmetric cryptography as required here (but do not meet other requirements). Lower-layer security mechanisms all require the use of public key cryptography, or at least Diffie-Hellman as a mandatory part in their operation. HTTP EAP [27] is one candidate method to allow both symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography based authentication within SIP, though there are probably other candidates as well, such as GSS_API [28]. However, definition of UMTS AKA under EAP is already in progress [29].

6.23.2.3 Delegation of Security Tasks

Performing authentication on all SIP signaling messages would likely create bottlenecks in the authentication infrastructure. Therefore, a distributed implementation of security functions responsible for authentication is required.

It must be possible to perform an initial authentication based on long-term authentication credentials, followed by subsequent protected signaling that uses short-term authentication credentials, such as session keys created during initial registration. The used authentication mechanisms must be able to provide such session keys.

Initial authentication is performed between the SIP UA and the authenticating SIP serving proxy in the home network. However, the authentication mechanism must not require access to the long-term authentication credentials in these nodes. In the home network, the authenticating SIP serving proxy must support interaction with a dedicated authentication server in order to accomplish the authentication task. At the client side a secured (tamper-proof) device storing the long-term credentials of the user must perform the authentication.

Additionally, the SIP serving proxy that performed the initial authentication must be able to securely delegate subsequent SIP signaling protection (e.g. session keys for integrity or encryption) to an authorized SIP proxy further downstream. The tamper-proof device at the client side must be able to securely delegate the session keys to the SIP user agent.

Initial authentication can be performed with existing mechanisms such as HTTP Digest [3], but there exists no method to allow subsequent protection of the SIP signaling messages. There are also no proposals to allow secure delegation of signaling protection task. Currently the use of SIP together with an authentication server is not possible, though several proposals are under way to extend this [33, 34, 35]. However, the purpose of this document is not to discuss AAA requirements. They are discussed somewhere else.

6.23.3 Negotiation of mechanisms

A method for secure negotiation of security must be provided, to negotiate the security services to be used in the access domain.

This method must at least support the negotiation of different security services providing integrity protection and encryption, algorithms used within these services and additional parameters they require to be exchanged.

The negotiation mechanism must protect against attackers who do not have access to authentication credentials. In particular, it must not be possible for man-in-the-middle attackers to influence the negotiation result such that services with lower or no security are negotiated.

A negotiation mechanism is generally required in all secure protocols to decide which security services to use and when they should be started. This security mechanism serves algorithm and protocol development as well as interoperability. Often, the negotiation is handled within a security service. For example, the HTTP authentication scheme includes a selection mechanism for choosing among appropriate authentication methods and algorithms. Note that with the negotiation we mean just the negotiation, not all functions in protocols like IKE. For instance, we expect the session key generation is to be a part of the initial authentication.

SIP entities may use the same security mode parameters to protect several SIP sessions without re-negotiation. For example, security mode parameters may be assumed to be valid within the lifetime of one registration.

Existing lower-layer security mechanisms provide the above functionality as a part of them. We do not currently know of any mechanism that would allow this also at the SIP layer, [30] might perhaps be extended to perform secure negotiation. Note that such a mechanism is required not only for negotiation of security mechanisms, but for other services as well, e.g. for compression (see section 6.5.6). Although negotiation of security mechanisms is different due to the need for secure negotiation, all negotiation mechanisms could operate in a similar fashion.

6.23.4 Message protection

SIP entities (typically a SIP client and a SIP proxy) must be able to communicate using integrity and replay protection. By integrity, we mean the ability for receiver of a message to verify that the message has not been modified in transit. SIP entities should be able to communicate confidentially. These protection modes must be based on initial authentication. Integrity protection and confidentiality must be possible using symmetric cryptographic keys.

It must be possible to handle also error conditions in a satisfactory manner as to allow recovery (see also 6.4.3 and 6.14).

It must be possible to provide this protection between two adjacent SIP entities. In future network scenarios it may also be necessary to provide this protection through proxies, though at the moment 3GPP does not require this. .

The security mechanism should not incur external limitations to any transport bearers carrying SIP message.

All the lower layer security mechanisms offer these services for the hop-by-hop case, but currently we do not know of any mechanism that would allow also end-to-end operation.

The security mechanism must be able to protect a complete SIP message.

If header compression/removal or SIP compression is applied to SIP messages, it must be compatible with message protection.

6.24 Network Domain Security

Authentication, key agreement, integrity and replay protection, and confidentiality must be provided for communications between SIP network entities such as proxies and servers.

Network domain security mechanisms must be scalable up to a large number of network elements.

The 3GPP intends to make it mandatory to have protection discussed above at least between two operators, and optional within an operator’s own network. Security gateways exist between operator’s networks.

We believe the above requirements to be fulfilled by applying security mechanisms as specified in the current IP Security standards [26].

7. Security considerations

This document does not define a protocol, but still presents some security requirements to protocols. The main security requirements are in sections 6.22 "Security Model", 6.23 "Access Domain Security" and 6.24 "Network Domain Security". Additional security-related issues are discussed under 6.7 "Prevention of theft of service", 6.8 "Radio resource authorization", 6.9 "Prevention of denial of service", 6.12 "Hiding requirements" and 6.10 "Identification of users".

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