3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#20   **S3-010412**

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Sydney, Australia

3GPP TSG CN WG4 Meeting #09   **Tdoc N4-010969**
Dresden, GERMANY, 9th - 13th July 2001

Source:	**TSG CN WG4**
Title:	**LS to SA3 on Signalling for user authentication**
To:	**S3**
CC:	**S2, N1**

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This LS contains the response from CN4 to the following LSs received from SA3 in CN4#9 (9th-13th July, 2001):

- S3-010382 (N4-010942)

  The current working assumption that the S-CSCF is unique for a certain user is shared by CN4. Should that circumstance change, we kindly ask SA2 for prompt notification.

  CN4 does not foresee any problem, from the protocol point of view, to download more than one authentication vector if that is required. Such requirement should be indicated at stage-2 so that it could be reflected at protocol level.

- S3-010387 (N4-010943)

  CN4 thanks SA3 for the clarifications about the possibilities for optimisation of the flows on the Cx interface. CN4 is aware of the necessity of making the signalling flows as efficient as possible and will try to do so during the development of the protocol.

  Concerns have been raised at CN4 about the statement in which SA3 says that it sees no need for Authentication Failure Reporting or Positive Authentication Reporting back to the HSS after the authentication has taken place. On the other hand, when describing the handling of mobile terminated calls in course of registration, it is stated that a flag is stored in the HSS during the authentication phase to indicate that registration is in progress. When would that flag be cleared if no information is given to the HSS about the success or failure of the authentication process? From an optimisation point of view another procedure not requiring the clearing of such flag seems to be more reasonable.

- S3-010402 (N4-010945)

  CN4 kindly asks to be informed about the decision regarding the use of the different user identities.

  Although CN4 doesn't see any problem in downloading all the identities available in the HSS as required by the first approach for the validation of public identities proposed by SA3 in its LS, concerns have been raised about its inefficiency in signalling. CN4 kindly requests a clarification from SA3 about this. The second approach seems a much simpler one, from the point of view of CN4.