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33.102	CR	Current Version:	3.5.0
GSM (AA.BB) or 3G (AA.BBB) specification number ↑		↑ CR number as allocated by MCC support team	
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Proposed change affects: (U)SIM ME UTRAN / Radio Core Network
(at least one should be marked with an X)

Source: Siemens **Date:** 7 Sept. 2000

Subject: Profiles for sequence number management

Work item: Security

Category:	F Correction <input type="checkbox"/> A Corresponds to a correction in an earlier release <input type="checkbox"/> B Addition of feature <input type="checkbox"/> C Functional modification of feature <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D Editorial modification <input type="checkbox"/>	Release:	Phase 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Release 96 <input type="checkbox"/> Release 97 <input type="checkbox"/> Release 98 <input type="checkbox"/> Release 99 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Release 00 <input type="checkbox"/>
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(only one category shall be marked with an X)

Reason for change: The CR serves the purpose to cut down on the number of implementation options a vendor or an operator has to support and provide a consistent set of example values (profiles) for the specified parameters.

Clauses affected: Annex C

Other specs Affected:	Other 3G core specifications <input type="checkbox"/> Other GSM core specifications <input type="checkbox"/> MS test specifications <input type="checkbox"/> BSS test specifications <input type="checkbox"/> O&M specifications <input type="checkbox"/>	→ List of CRs: → List of CRs: → List of CRs: → List of CRs: → List of CRs:	
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Other comments: Should be included in an LS to T3.



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Annex C (informative): Management of sequence numbers

This annex is devoted to the management of sequence numbers for the authentication and key agreement protocol.

C.1 Generation of sequence numbers in the Authentication Centre

C.1.1 Sequence number generation schemes

C.1.1.1 General scheme

According to section 6.3 of this specification, authentication vectors are generated in the authentication centre (AuC) using sequence numbers. This section specifies how these sequence numbers are generated. ~~It is taken into account that authentication vectors may be generated and sent by the AuC in batches . The sequence numbers for the authentication vectors in a batch are generated one after the other according to the process described below. such that all authentication vectors in one batch are sent to the same SN/VLR.~~

- (1) In its binary representation, the sequence number consists of two concatenated parts $SQN = SEQ \parallel IND$. ~~SEQ is the batch number, and IND is an index used in the array scheme described in C1.2 and C2.2, numbering the authentication vectors within one batch.~~ SEQ in its turn consists of two concatenated parts $SEQ = SEQ1 \parallel SEQ2$. $SEQ1$ represents the most significant bits of SEQ , and $SEQ2$ represents the least significant bits of SEQ . IND represents the least significant bits of SQN . ~~If the concept of batches is not supported then IND is void and $SQN = SEQ$.~~
- (2) There is a counter ~~SEQ_{HE}~~ SEQ_{HE} in the HE. ~~$SEQ_{HE} = SEQ1_{HE} \parallel SEQ2_{HE}$~~ is stored by this counter. ~~SEQ_{HE}~~ SEQ_{HE} is an individual counter, i.e. there is one per user. ~~We have $SEQ_{HE} = SEQ_{HE} \parallel IND_{HE}$.~~
- (3) There is a global counter, e.g. a clock giving universal time. For short we call the value of this global counter at any one time GLC . If GLC is taken from a clock it is computed mod p , where $p = 2^n$ and n is the length of GLC and of $SEQ2$ in bits.
- (4) If GLC is taken from a clock then there is a number $D > 0$ such that the following holds:
 - (i) the time interval between two consecutive increases of the clock (the clock unit) shall be chosen such that, for each user, at most D batches are generated at the AuC during any D clock units;
 - (ii) the clock rate shall be significantly higher than the average rate at which batches are generated for any user;
 - (iii) $D \ll 2^n$.
- (5) When the HE needs new sequence numbers SQN to create a new batch of authentication vectors, HE retrieves the (user-specific) value of $SEQ_{HE} = SEQ1_{HE} \parallel SEQ2_{HE}$ from the database.
 - (i) If $SEQ2_{HE} < GLC < SEQ2_{HE} + p - D + 1$ then HE sets $SEQ = SEQ1_{HE} \parallel GLC$;
 - (ii) if $GLC \leq SEQ2_{HE} \leq GLC + D - 1$ or $SEQ2_{HE} + p - D + 1 \leq GLC$ then HE sets $SEQ = SEQ_{HE} + 1$;
 - (iii) if $GLC + D - 1 < SEQ2_{HE}$ then HE sets $SEQ = (SEQ1_{HE} + 1) \parallel GLC$.
 - (iv) ~~The i -th authentication vector in the batch receives the sequence number $SEQ = SEQ \parallel i$.~~
 - (v) ~~After the generation of the first authentication vector in the batch has been completed SEQ_{HE} is reset to SEQ .~~
 - (v) ~~for the handling of IND see C.1.2.~~

NOTES

1. The clock unit and the value D have to be chosen with care so that condition (4)(i) is satisfied for every user at all times. Otherwise, user identity confidentiality may be compromised. When the parameters are chosen appropriately sequence numbers for a particular user do not reveal significant information about the user's identity. ~~In particular, IND is to be sufficiently short so that no unacceptably long contiguous strings of sequence numbers are generated.~~

If authentication vectors for the CS and the PS domains are not separated by other means it is recommended to

choose $D > 1$ as requests from the two different domains may arrive completely independently.

~~2. The use of IND is only for the benefit of the USIM (see note 4 in Annex C.2). When D is chosen sufficiently large then several authentication vectors can be generated at the same time by (5)(ii) even when IND is not present. By setting the parameters in C.1 (1) to (5) in an appropriate way the general scheme specified in this subsection also includes the cases where either $SEQ2$ is void and $SEQ = SEQ1$ or else, $SEQ1$ is void and $SEQ = SEQ2$, as follows:~~

- ~~(a) If $SEQ2$ is void the generation of sequence numbers is not time-based. We then formally set $SEQ2 \equiv GLC \equiv 0$ (identical to zero) and $D = 1$. Conditions (4)(i) to (iii) do not apply as there is no clock. Then (5)(ii) always holds, and SEQ is incremented by 1 at each request. For better readability, this case is separated out in C.1.1.2.~~
- ~~(b) If $SEQ1$ is void then we set $D = 1$. Assuming a start condition $SEQ2_{HE} < GLC$ and the absence of failures in the AuC, the condition (5)(i) then always holds, and $SEQ = GLC$ for each request, i.e. the generation of sequence numbers is entirely time-based. In order to also accommodate potential failures in the AuC for entirely time-based sequence number, the variant described in the following Annex C1.1.3 may be used.~~

C.1.1.2 Generation of sequence numbers which are not time-based

~~The HE/AuC shall maintain a counter for each user, $SON_{HE} = SEQ_{HE} \parallel IND_{HE}$. To generate a fresh sequence number, SEQ_{HE} is incremented by 1, and the new counter value is used to generate the next authentication vector. For the handling of IND see C.1.2.~~

C1.1.3 Time-based sequence number generation

~~Another variant of the sequence number generation mechanism is described below.~~

~~In its binary representation, the sequence number consists of two concatenated parts $SON = SEQ \parallel IND$. The part SEQ is not divided into two parts. The global counter GLC is thus as long as SEQ . Instead of storing the individual counter SEQ_{HE} in the HE there is a value DIF stored in the HE which is individual for each user. The DIF value represents the current difference between generated SEQ values for that user and the GLC .~~

~~When the HE needs new sequence numbers SON to create a new batch of authentication vectors, HE retrieves the (user-specific) value of DIF from the data base and calculates SEQ values as $SEQ = GLC + DIF$.~~

~~The DIF value needs may have to be updated in the HE only during the re-synchronization procedure. In this case the DIF value is set as $DIF = SEQ_{MS} - GLC$ where $SON_{MS} = SEQ_{MS} \parallel IND_{MS}$ is the value sent by USIM in the re-synchronization procedure.~~

~~For the handling of IND see C.1.2.~~

C1.2 Support for the array mechanism

~~This subsection applies to all three schemes presented in subsection C.1.1.~~

~~Each time an authentication vector is generated, the AuC shall retrieve IND_{HE} from storage and allocate a new index value IND for that vector according to suitable rules and include it in the appropriate part of SON . The index value may range from 0 to $a - 1$ where a is the size of the array.~~

~~An example value for the array size a is given in Annex C.3.~~

~~The exact rules for index allocation are left unspecified. Guidelines are given in Annex C.3.4.~~

C.2 Handling of sequence numbers in the USIM

This section assumes that sequence numbers are generated according to Annex C.1. ~~If the concept of batches is not supported then batch numbers and sequence numbers coincide and the parameter IND is not used.~~

The USIM keeps track of an ~~ordered list of the b highest batch~~ array of sequence number values it has accepted. ~~In addition, for each batch number SEQ in the list, the USIM stores the highest IND value $IND(SEQ)$ it has accepted associated with that batch number.~~ Let SEQ_{Lo} denote the lowest and SEQ_{MS} denote the highest ~~sequence batch~~

number in the listarray.

C.2.1 Protection against wrap around of counter in the USIM

The USIM will not accept arbitrary jumps in batch-sequence numbers, but only increases by a value of at most Δ .

Conditions on the choice of Δ :

- (1) Δ shall be sufficiently large so that the MS will not receive any sequence batch-number SEQ -with $SEQ - SEQ_{MS} \geq \Delta$ if the HE/AuC functions correctly.
- (2) In order to prevent that SEQ_{MS} ever reaches the maximum sequence number value SEQ_{max} during the lifetime of the USIM the minimum number of steps SEQ_{max} / Δ required to reach SEQ_{max} shall be sufficiently large.

C.2.2 Verification of sequence number freshness in the USIM

The USIM shall maintain an array of a previously accepted sequence number components: $SEQ_{MS}(0), SEQ_{MS}(1), \dots, SEQ_{MS}(a-1)$. The initial sequence number value in each array element shall be zero.

To verify that the received sequence number SON is fresh, the USIM shall compare the received SON with the sequence number in the array element indexed using the index value IND contained in SON , i.e. with the array entry $SEQ_{MS}(i)$ where $i = IND$ is the index value.

- If $SEQ > SEQ_{MS}(i)$ the USIM shall consider the sequence number to be guaranteed fresh and subsequently shall set $SEQ_{MS}(i)$ to SEQ .
- If $SEQ \leq SEQ_{MS}(i)$ the USIM shall generate a synchronisation failure message using the highest previously accepted sequence number anywhere in the array, i.e. SON_{MS} .

The USIM shall also be able to put a limit L on the difference between SON_{MS} and an accepted sequence number SON . If such a limit is applied then, in addition to the above conditions, the sequence number shall only be accepted by the USIM if $SON_{MS} - SON < L$.

~~C.2.2 Acceptance rule~~

~~When a user authentication request arrives the USIM checks whether the sequence number is acceptable. The sequence number $SON = SEQ \parallel IND$ is accepted by the USIM if and only if (i) and either (ii) or (iii) hold:~~

- ~~(i) $SEQ - SEQ_{MS} < \Delta$;~~
- ~~(ii) SEQ is in the list and $IND > IND(SEQ)$;~~
- ~~(iii) SEQ is not in the list and $SEQ > SEQ_{LO}$.~~

~~The USIM shall also be able to put a limit L on the difference between SEQ_{MS} and an accepted batch number SEQ . If such a limit is applied then, in addition to the above conditions, the sequence number shall only be accepted by the USIM if $SEQ_{MS} - SEQ < L$.~~

~~C.2.3 List update~~

~~After a sequence number $SON = SEQ \parallel IND$ received in a user authentication request has been accepted by the USIM the USIM proceeds as follows:~~

- ~~(i) Case 1: the batch number SEQ is not in the list.
Then the list entry corresponding to SEQ_{LO} is deleted, SEQ is included in the list, $IND(SEQ)$ is set to IND and SEQ_{LO} and SEQ_{MS} are updated;~~
- ~~(ii) Case 2: the batch number SEQ is in the list.
Then $IND(SEQ)$ is set to IND .~~

~~If a sequence number received in a user authentication request is rejected the list remains unaltered.~~

C.2.34 Notes

1. Using the above list-array mechanism, it is not required that a previously visited VLR/SGSN SN/VLR deletes the unused authentication vectors when a user de-registers from the serving network (super-charger concept). Retaining the authentication vectors for use when the user returns later may be more efficient as regards signalling when a user abroad switches a lot between two serving networks.
2. The array list-mechanism may also be used to avoid unjustified rejection of user authentication requests when authentication vectors in two VLRs/SGSNs SN/VLRs from different mobility management domains (circuit and packet) are used in an interleaving fashion.
3. When a VLR/SGSN uses fresh authentication vectors obtained during a previous visit of the user, the USIM can reject them although they have not been used before (because the array list-size a and the age limit L are finite). Rejection of a sequence number can therefore occur in normal operation, i.e., it is not necessarily caused by (malicious) replay or a database failure.
4. The mechanism presented in this section may allows the USIM to exploit knowledge about which authentication vectors belong to the same batch, were sent to the same VLR/SGSN. It may be assumed that authentication vectors sent to the same VLR/SGSN in the same batch are always used in the correct order as they are handled by the same SN/VLR. Consequently, only one sequence number-number among those sent to the same VLR/SGSN per batch has to be stored.
5. With the exception of SEQ_{MS} - SON_{MS} , the batch numbers in the list entries of the array need not be stored in full length if a limit L (age limit) on the difference between SON_{MS} - SEQ_{MS} and an accepted sequencebatch number is applied and if those entries in the list which would cause the limit L to be exceeded are removed from the list after a new sequence number has been accepted.
6. Condition (2) on Δ means that SON_{MS} - SEQ_{MS} can reach its maximum value only after a minimum of SEQ_{max} - SON_{max} successful authentications have taken place.
7. ~~7.~~ There is a dependency of the choice of Δ and the size n of global counter GLC in Annex C.1.1.1: Δ shall be chosen larger than 2^n .

C.3 Sequence number management profiles

This section provides examples how values for the parameters defined in sections C.1 and C.2 may be chosen in a coherent way. These examples may serve as references when specifying practical sequence number management schemes. There is one example set of values for each of the three types of sequence number generation schemes:

- partly time-based corresponding to Annex C.1.1.1;
- not time-based corresponding to Annex C.1.1.2;
- entirely time-based corresponding to Annex C.1.1.3.

C.3.1 Profile 1: management of sequence numbers which are partly time-based

Generation of sequence numbers:

This follows the general scheme for the generation of sequence numbers specified in Annex C.1.1.1. The following parameter values are suggested for reference:

Time unit of the clock: 1 second

Length of IND in bits = 5.

Length of SQN2 in bits = n : 24

This means that GLC will wrap around after $p = 2^n = 2^{24}$ seconds = 194 days. This ensures that most users will have

become active at least once during this period.
This implies a length of SEQ1 in bits = 19.

Start conditions: Choose $SQN_{HE} = 0$ for all users and $GLC = 1$.

Arrival rate temporarily higher than clock rate: Choose $D = 2^{16}$.

D may be chosen quite large as long as the conditions in C.1.1.1 (4)(ii) and (iii) are satisfied. Choosing $D = 2^{16} = 65536$ means that the condition in C.1.1.1 (4)(i) is satisfied unless more than 65536 requests for batches arrive within over 18 hours which is practically impossible.

Verification of sequence numbers in the USIM:

This follows the handling of sequence numbers in the USIM specified in Annex C.2.

Length of the array: $a = 32$.

This satisfies the requirement in section 6.3.2 that the mechanism for the verification of sequence numbers shall ensure that a sequence number can still be accepted if it is among the last x sequence numbers generated.

Protection against wrap around: Choose $\Delta = 2^{28}$.

Choosing $\Delta = 2^{28}$ means that an attack to force the counter in the USIM to wrap around would require at least $SEQ_{max}/\Delta = 2^{15} > 32.000$ successful authentications (cf. note 6 of C.2.4). We have $\Delta > p$, as required in note 7 of C.2.3.

Age limit for sequence numbers:

The use of such a limit is optional. The choice of a value for the parameter L affects only the USIM. It has no impact on the choice of other parameters and it entirely up to the operator, depending on his security policy. Therefore no particular value is suggested here. To give an example: if the policy stipulates that authentication vectors older than x seconds shall be rejected then L has to be set to x as the time unit of the clock is 1 second.

User anonymity: the value of SQN does not allow to trace the user over longer periods. Therefore, there may be no need to conceal SQN by an anonymity key as specified in section 6.3.

C.3.2 Profile 2: management of sequence numbers which are not time-based

Generation of sequence numbers:

This follows the scheme for the generation of sequence numbers specified in Annex C.1.1.2. The following parameter values are suggested for reference:

Length of IND in bits = 5.

Start conditions: $SQN_{HE} = 0$ for all users.

Verification of sequence numbers in the USIM:

Length of the array: $a = 32$

Protection against wrap around: Choose $\Delta = 2^{28}$.

Choosing $\Delta = 2^{28}$ means that an attack to force the counter in the USIM to wrap around would require at least $SEQ_{max}/\Delta = 2^{15} > 32.000$ successful authentications (cf. note 6 of C.2.4). Note 7 of Annex C.2.3 does not apply.

Age limit for sequence numbers:

There is no clock here. So, the "age" limit would be interpreted as the maximum allowed difference between SQN_{MS} (see section 6.3) and the sequence number received. The use of such a limit is optional. The choice of a value for the parameter L affects only the USIM. It has no impact on the choice of other parameters and it entirely up to the operator, depending on his security policy. Therefore no particular value is suggested here.

User anonymity: the value of SQN may allow to trace the user over longer periods. If this is a concern then SQN has to be concealed by an anonymity key as specified in section 6.3.

C.3.3 Profile 3: management of sequence numbers which are entirely time-based

Generation of sequence numbers:

This follows the scheme for the generation of sequence numbers specified in Annex C.1.1.3. The following parameter values are suggested for reference:

Time unit of the clock: It has to be chosen in such a way that no two requests for a batch of authentication vectors arrive during one time unit. Value = 0.1 seconds

Length of IND in bits = 5.

Start conditions: $GLC = 1$ and, for all users, $DIF = 0$.

Verification of sequence numbers in the USIM:

This is done according to the handling of sequence numbers in the USIM specified in Annex C.2.

Length of the array: $a = 32$.

This satisfies the requirement in section 6.3.2 that the mechanism for the verification of sequence numbers shall ensure that a sequence number can still be accepted if it is among the last x sequence numbers generated.

Protection against wrap around: Choose $\Delta = 2^{28}$.

Choosing $\Delta = 2^{28}$ means that an attack to force the counter in the USIM to wrap around would require at least $SEQ_{max}/\Delta = 2^{15} > 32,000$ successful authentications (cf. note 6 of C.2.4). Note 7 of C.2.4 does not apply.

Age limit for sequence numbers:

The use of such a limit is optional. The choice of a value for the parameter L affects only the USIM. It has no impact on the choice of other parameters and it entirely up to the operator, depending on his security policy. Therefore no particular value is suggested here. To give an example: if the policy stipulates that authentication vectors older than x time units shall be rejected then L has to be set to x .

User anonymity: the value of SQN does not allow to trace the user over longer periods. Therefore, there may be no need to conceal SQN by an anonymity key as specified in section 6.3.

C.3.4 Guidelines for the allocation of the index values in the array scheme

- **General rule:** index values IND used in the array scheme, according to Annex C.1.2, shall be allocated cyclically within its range $0, \dots, a-1$. This means that the index value IND used with the previously generated authentication vector is stored in SON_{HE} , and the next authentication vector shall use index value $IND + 1 \text{ mod } a$.

It may be useful to allow exceptions to this general rule when additional information is available. This includes:

- Authentication vectors distributed within the same batch shall have the same index value.

In future releases, the Authentication Data Request MAP message may contain information about the requesting serving node and the domain (CS or PS) from which the request originates. Note that this information may also be available from other sources, depending on the implementation of the HLR and the HLR/AuC interface. If this information is available it is recommended to use it in the following way. Support for this use is, however, not required for an implementation to claim compliance to Annex C.

- Authentication vectors distributed to different service domains shall have different values (i.e. separate ranges of index values are reserved for PS and CS operation).
- If the new request comes from the same serving node as the previous request, then the index value used for the new request shall be the same as was used for the previous request;

C.4 Guidelines for interoperability in a multi-vendor environment

The specification of a sequence number management scheme affects only the USIM and the AuC which are both under the control of one operator. Therefore, the specification of such a scheme is entirely at the discretion of an operator. Nevertheless, certain operators may not want to define a scheme of their own. Instead, they may want to rely on vendors implementing one of the schemes according to the profiles in C.3 or variants thereof. If these operators have multiple vendors for USIMs and/or AuCs, and the operators wish to move subscribers from the AuC of one vendor to that supplied by another one implementing a different scheme then this will work smoothly only when the following guidelines are adhered to by all the sequence number management schemes implemented in the operator's domain.

- The array mechanism specified in C.1.2 and C.2 is used in the USIM to verify SQNs.
 - Relation to Annex F: if the AMF field is used to signal further parameters relevant to sequence number management (age limit L) then the formats of the AMF and its interpretation by the USIM must be the same for all implementations in the operator's domain.
 - Δ is larger than a specified minimum.
This is necessary to accommodate schemes as in C.3.2 according to note 7 of C.1.1.1.
We propose $\Delta \geq 2^{28}$.
 - There are no requirements on the synchronicity of clocks in different AuCs for the time-based schemes. For the entirely time-based scheme, the following is recommended when moving users from one AuC to another one: The DIF value is updated in an appropriate manner when moving subscribers from an AuC to another AuC. More specifically, assume a user is moved from AuC1 to AuC2. If AuC1 is of profile 3 and AuC2 is of any profile then AuC1 sends GLC+DIF as SEQ_HE to AuC2. In the receiving end, if AuC2 is of profile 3 while AuC1 is of any profile then AuC2 sets DIF value for this user as $DIF = SEQ_HE - GLC$.
-