Tdoc List

2024-05-28 15:30

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑241700 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241703 Process for SA3#116 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241704 Detail agenda planning for SA3#116 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242365  
    S3‑242365 Detail agenda planning for SA3#116 SA WG3 Chair other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241704
2 Meeting Reports S3‑241701 Report from SA3#115AdHoc-e MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241702 Report from SA3#115 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241706 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑241724 LS on identifiers of 5G ProSe end UEs for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay discovery C1-241787 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241727 LS on differentiating security materials used for PC5 direct discovery for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay C1-242665 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241726 Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks C1-241848 LS in   Yes
YesHuawei: Vivo's proposal for the LS out on user's experience is not relevant. Qualcomm supported Nokia and Apple's proposal.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241885 Reply LS to S3-241726 on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242367  
    S3‑242367 Reply LS to S3-241726 on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks Apple LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241885
    S3‑241923 LS on Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242367  
    S3‑242079 Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242367  
    S3‑241728 LS on ECS Configuration Information C1-242674 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242173 Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242620  
    S3‑242620 Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242173
    S3‑242284 [draft] Reply LS on ECS Configuration Information Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242620  
    S3‑242283 Clarification on the authentication method(s) between EEC and ECS Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242621  
    S3‑242621 Clarification on the authentication method(s) between EEC and ECS Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242283
    S3‑241729 LS on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE C1-242936 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241814 LS reply on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242369  
    S3‑241900 Discussion on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE ZTE Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241901 LS reply on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242369  
    S3‑242369 LS reply on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241901
    S3‑241902 Clarification on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242368  
    S3‑242368 Clarification on the condition for provisioning of the ePDG identity to the UE ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241902
    S3‑241733 LS on Resource content filters C4-241339 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242185 Reply LS on on Resource content filters Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei: changing tokens without stage 2 requirements is very strange.
 		merged No S3‑242370  
    S3‑242285 Discussion on CT4 LS on Resource Content Filters Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242286 [draft] Reply LS on Resource content filters Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242370  
    S3‑242302 Reply-LS on LS on Resource content filters Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242370  
    S3‑242370 Reply-LS on Resource content filters Nokia LS out - Yes
YesHuawei: we looked at the CVD and decided there was nothing to do and now CT groups are changing security mechanisms without any requirements. Huawei proposed to add that there was no agreement in SA3 on what was being done in stage 3 was needed.
 		noted No   S3‑242302
    S3‑241736 LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication C4-235577 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑241812 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242371  
    S3‑241895 draft Reply LS on home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242371  
    S3‑241896 CR on the failure cases in home network triggered re-authentication ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242372  
    S3‑242123 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242371  
    S3‑242294 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242371  
    S3‑242371 Reply LS on clarification on home network triggered re-authentication Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242294
    S3‑242295 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242372  
    S3‑242372 Clarifications for HONTRA procedure with respect to failure cases Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑242295
    S3‑241737 LS on support of SSIM on eUICC Trusted Connectivity Alliance LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242191 LS reply on LS on support of SSIM on eUICC Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242373  
    S3‑242373 LS reply on LS on support of SSIM on eUICC Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei noted that the LS was directed to several 3GPP WGs so a SA-coordinated LS reply should be done in this case.They were fine with Nokia's proposal. Thales wanted to remove a paragraph but ORANGE replied that removing the first paragraph would not reply the LS.
 		approved No   S3‑242191
    S3‑241741 LS on clarifications on consent management GSMA LS in   Yes
YesLS will be answered in SA plenary.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241968 Reply-LS on clarifications on consent management Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242374  
    S3‑242374 Reply-LS on clarifications on consent management Nokia LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241968
    S3‑241746 LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context S2-2405459 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242048 draft_Reply LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context Intel LS out   Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: this should go for Rel-19. CableLabs: SA2 is challenging the mandatory use of TLS. Ericsson, Nokia: we don’t want to remove it from the protocol stack. Apple: SA2 should wait for IETF.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242052 Discussion paper on TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context Intel discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241988 Reply LS for the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241748 LS on limited MSISDN exposure S2-2405824 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242315 Reply LS on limited MSISDN exposure Xiaomi Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242375  
    S3‑242375 Reply LS on limited MSISDN exposure Xiaomi Communications LS out Approval Yes
YesApple: the SA2 CR is an addition of a feature, it should not be a correction.
 		approved No   S3‑242315
    S3‑242204 Reply LS on limited MSISDN exposure Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242375  
    S3‑241844 Reply LS on MSISDN exposure AT&T Services, Inc. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242375  
    S3‑241750 Clarification related to reliable location S2-2309698 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241813 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242379  
    S3‑242258 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242379  
    S3‑242379 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242258
    S3‑242181 LS on SMC based solution for an NB-IoT UE in NTN to report its location to the network Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t understand the concern here. Qualcomm: we don’t need this LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241751 LI considerations for TR 33.757 (""Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN"") s3i240294 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241899 [Draft]Reply LS on Issues related to LI considerations for TR 33.757 ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242376  
    S3‑242192 LS reply to LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 Nokia. Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242376  
    S3‑242254 Reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 China Mobile Group Device Co. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242376  
    S3‑242376 Reply LS on LI considerations for TR 33.757 China Mobile Group Device Co. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242254
    S3‑241778 draft Reply LS on LI considerations for Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN Johns Hopkins University APL LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242376  
    S3‑241756 Reply LS on service authorization for/to partner MC system S6-240404 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241757 Reply LS on evaluating security aspects for MC services over MC gateway UE S6-241369 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241761 LS on removing Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure to Client UE through 5GC SP-240497 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241763 Quantum Safe Cryptographic Protocol Inventory ETSI TC CYBER LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242221 LS on Quantum Safe Cryptographic Protocol Inventory Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242377  
    S3‑242377 LS on Quantum Safe Cryptographic Protocol Inventory Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242221
    S3‑241946 LS reply to ETSI on PQC Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242377  
    S3‑241765 LS regarding the publication of the Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases document in Feb 24 GSMA LS in   Yes
YesThe Chair commented that SA3 needed a plan for PQC taking into account that NIST had standardised some and that would go to IETF in the form of RFCs. There was some progress in IETF already. There should be some conference calls before the next SA3 meeting to tackle this issue. The Chair commented that this would not be possible for Rel-19. Huawei clarified the scope in 3GPP, 3GPP would only adopt these algorithms. Cable Labs: avoid discussion of symmetric keys. ORANGE: do we need to take care of TLS in 3GPP? Where TLS will be used?
 		noted No    
    S3‑242064 Discussion on publication of the Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases document Intel discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241766 LS on 3GPP studies for PQC Migration GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242222 LS on 3GPP studies for PQC Migration Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242378  
    S3‑241945 LS reply to GSMA on PQC Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242378  
    S3‑242378 LS reply to GSMA on PQC Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241945
    S3‑241773 LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases R2-2404037 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑241897 Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases ZTE Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241898 Draft reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242044 draft-Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Intel LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242080 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242100 Discussion on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242101 draft reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242105 LS Reply on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesNTT_Docomo: reply with something simple such as we will study this properly, we need more time to discuss all the options. Intel agreed.
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242136 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑241886 LTM-reply LS to RAN2 on LTM Apple LS out   Yes
YesSamsung: agreed SID, not approved. ZTE: inform RAN2 about the WID or SID, we should also let them know that there are security issues with the solutions with an analysis.
 		revised No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242400 LTM-reply LS to RAN2 on LTM Apple LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241886
    S3‑242306 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases LG Electronics LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242400  
    S3‑242055 Discussion Paper on Security Key Handling for Inter-CU LTM Intel discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241801 LS on vulnerability due to null ciphering request by network Google Inc., Deutsche Telekom LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE: we are asking other groups to work on security solutions.In which Release should this be fixed? Google: we target Rel-17. We prefer to involve CT1 first and confirm that this is a security issue for later work in SA3. Huawei: if it’s a security issue it needs to be discussed here.Qualcomm and Ericsson supported this. Apple: it seems that we agree that there is a security issue, we can agree on a security requirement then. ORANGE: let's not define requirements in LS. Ericsson: shouldn't we study whether the user or the operator will act in this case?
 		revised No S3‑242512  
    S3‑242512 LS on vulnerability due to null ciphering request by network Google Inc., Deutsche Telekom LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241801
    S3‑241884 LS to CT on IANA reservation on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple LS out   Yes
YesEricsson and Nokia didn’t agree with this. Cable Labs: the new number is not needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241758 LS on the proposal for a new work item: Security considerations for interconnection of computing power centers^^^^ ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241759 LS/r on the proposal for new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond (reply to 3GPP TSG SA3 S3-235006) ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241767 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Belgium. LLC other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241725 Reply LS on lack of GPRS IOV randomisation C1-241807 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241739 ETSI ISG MEC publication of report on MEC security^^^^ ETSI MEC LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241742 Reply LS on user consent for trace reporting R3-241115 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241743 Reply-LS on Prohibition of GEA1 & GEA2 Support in all releases R5-240020 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241744 Reply LS to GSMA on Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic S2-2403027 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241745 LS Reply on Clarification related to the information exposed by the 5GC to NSCE server. S2-2403703 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241730 Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumer for data collection via DCCF C4-240623 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241731 Reply LS on PRINS security profiles C4-240796 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241732 Reply LS on in-path and in-query parameters C4-240910 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241740 LS on GSMA OPG PRDs publication GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241760 Reply to LS on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA5 and ETSI TC SAI SP-240485 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241762 LS on the Modified PRINS solution SP-240503 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241738 ETSI ISG MEC publication of MEC Phase 3 deliverables ETSI MEC LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241734 Reply LS on nested JSON structures C4-241343 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241735 Reply LS on the Modified PRINS solution C4-241522 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241752 LI considerations for UE-Satellite-UE communications s3i240295 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241753 LS on LI considerations for Store and Forward NT operation s3i240296 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241747 Reply LS on data plane control by roaming hubs S2-2405815 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241754 LS Reply to SA4 on 3GPP work on energy efficiency S5-241924 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241755 Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting S5-242221 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241875 LS to CT on IANA reservation on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple LS out   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242336 LS replay on ProSe_diffSecParam_U2N Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242360 draft reply LS on limited MSISDN exposure NTT DOCOMO INC. LS out Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242363 Recent attack on polynomial based MACs with short tag ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242364 Response to S3-240886 LS on the introduction of the domain "ipxnetwork.org" GSMA LS in Discussion Yes
YesBSI wanted to have a conference call on this LS, where a draft response would be discussed. Nokia suggested an email approval for the reply since GSMA was meeting shortly after SA3. Huawei preferred to postpone the LS. They added that it should be work to be done properly with a work item, not a LS response. The Chair suggested to forward it to SA plenary to ask for guidance. NTT-Docomo proposed a call before SA plenary to discuss this. Not a LS reply coming out of this but maybe a company contribution to the GSMA meeting.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑242626 MPQUIC TLS Annex Intel draftCR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑241793 Add the N1 interface to the scope of fuzz testing for the AMF BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson asked for some rephrasing. NTT-Docomo found it corrext but confusing as it was written. Keysight agreed with Docomo and Ericsson: NAS protocol should be tested as well.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241794 Add an OAuth2.0 test case to check for the absence of an access token BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is not a corrrection but a new test case for Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241795 Remove unnecessary complexity from UDM test case TC_AUTH_STATUS_STORE_UDM BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241796 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241970 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: it would be good to add these terms in previous releases as well. Huawei: Network function sgould be Network Function (NF).
 		revised No S3‑242442  
    S3‑242442 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241970
    S3‑242043 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242443  
    S3‑242443 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242043
    S3‑242045 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242444  
    S3‑242444 Correction to terms Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242045
    S3‑242024 Corrections and additions for the N3IWF network product class Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC didn’t agree with renumbering the clause.
 		revised No S3‑242395  
    S3‑242395 Corrections and additions for the N3IWF network product class Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242024
    S3‑242039 Corrections to the N3IWF annex (mirror) Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242396  
    S3‑242396 Corrections to the N3IWF annex (mirror) Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC: change Release on the cover page.
 		agreed No   S3‑242039
    S3‑242040 Corrections to the N3IWF scas Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242397  
    S3‑242397 Corrections to the N3IWF scas Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Unicom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242040
    S3‑242063 Correction to abbreviations Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: let's correct only Rel-18. Huawei commented that for these type of corrections, e.g. terminology, we should stick to Rel-18 and not go back to earlier Releases. MCC: CR number shall have 4 digits. Ericsson: changes for test cases is OK for Rel-18 only, but we don’t agree with skipping earlier releases for these changes. Huawei: we added lots of new terminology in Rel-18, no need to go back. NTT-Docomo: I agree to keep it in Rel-18 only. It was commented that if the abbreviation was used it should be included in clause 3.3, hence we should go back all the way to the earliest Release where the abbreviation was used. On the other hand it wasn;t a FASMO issue, so it was something that needed to be checked offline.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242069 Correction to abbreviations Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC: CR number shall have 4 digits.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242073 Correction to abbreviations Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC: CR number shall have 4 digits.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242076 Correction to test names Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242077 Correction to test names Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242078 Correction to test names Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242089 Editorial correction of TEST CASE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn't agree with correcting this in Rel-16.There are many editorials in our specifications. If we agree with these it will never end.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242090 Editorial correction of TEST CASE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242091 Editorial correction of TEST CASE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242098 Correction to headings Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: changing clause numbering is not allowed. We don’t see a problem here, clauses can have the same title.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242099 Correction to headings Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242189 Revision on the TS 33.526 according to the scope Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242398 Revision on the TS 33.527 according to the scope Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑241841 Correcting CR implementation S3-240895 Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242452  
    S3‑241842 Clarifications on NRF and NFp checks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242461 S3‑240648
    S3‑242461 Clarifications on NRF and NFp checks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241842
    S3‑241843 Clarification needed on NF type handling in alignment with stage 3 Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242462  
    S3‑242462 Clarification needed on NF type handling in alignment with stage 3 Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241843
    S3‑241860 Split between authentication and authorization Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242630  
    S3‑242630 Split between authentication and authorization Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241860
    S3‑241868 Reference on requirements for multiple NRFs Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242224 Consistency Between NF Profile and Certificate Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242461  
    S3‑242225 Clarification of input parameter verification for token-based authorization Erricsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242461  
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑241995 Alignment with CT1 and editorial changes to U2U discovery Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242403  
    S3‑241996 Reply LS on identifications of 5G ProSe End UEs for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay discovery Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242404  
    S3‑242404 Reply LS on identifications of 5G ProSe End UEs for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay discovery Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241996
    S3‑242104 CR to TS33.503 Update U2U Relay Discovery procedures for aligning with CT1 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242403  
    S3‑242403 CR to TS33.503 Update U2U Relay Discovery procedures for aligning with CT1 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242104
    S3‑242002 Reply LS on differentiating security materials used for PC5 direct discovery for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242366  
    S3‑242124 Reply LS on differentiating security materials used for PC5 direct discovery for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242366  
    S3‑242351 LS replay on ProSe_diffSecParam_U2N Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242366  
    S3‑242366 LS replay on ProSe_diffSecParam_U2N Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242351
    S3‑242003 Excluding scrambling protection of HPLMN ID and clarifications in discovery message – R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242405 Excluding scrambling protection of HPLMN ID and clarifications in discovery message – R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242337 Excluding scrambling protection of HPLMN ID and clarifications in discovery message – R18 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242406 Excluding scrambling protection of HPLMN ID and clarifications in discovery message – R18 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242125 Correction on the protection mechanism for U2N relay discovery (R17) Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242405  
    S3‑242126 Correction on the protection mechanism for U2N relay discovery (R18) Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242406  
    S3‑242147 Rel17 ProSe – Update on U2N relay discovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242405  
    S3‑242148 Rel18 ProSe – Update on U2N relay discovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242406  
    S3‑242348 Discussion on HPLMN ID in the PC5 U2N relay discovery messages Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242349 Support cleartext HPLMN ID in PC5 U2N relay discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242405  
    S3‑242350 Support cleartext HPLMN ID in PC5 U2N relay discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242406  
    S3‑241997 Add the usage of the PLMN IDs from Remote UE – R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242407 Add the usage of the PLMN IDs from Remote UE – R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241998 Adding the usage of the PLMN IDs from Remote UE – R18 mirror Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242408 Adding the usage of the PLMN IDs from Remote UE – R18 mirror Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242060 Clarification of direct discovery in r18 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242062 Clarification of direct discovery in r17(mirror) China Telecom Corporation Ltd. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242067 Clarification related to U2U discovery model B China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242409  
    S3‑242409 Clarification related to U2U discovery model B China Telecom Corporation Ltd., Xiaomi CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242067
    S3‑242247 Security of 5G ProSe PC5 communication without network assistance - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242616  
    S3‑242616 Security of 5G ProSe PC5 communication without network assistance - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242247
    S3‑242345 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: the problem is that we didn’t define a message header. They proposed a rewording that was accepted.
 		revised No S3‑242410  
    S3‑242410 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242345
    S3‑242354 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242411  
    S3‑242411 Add clarification on encryption operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242354
    S3‑242127 Correction on the scrambing mechanism for U2U relay discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242412  
    S3‑242412 Correction on the scrambing mechanism for U2U relay discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242127
    S3‑242244 Direct Discovery Set scrambling protection - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242412  
    S3‑242352 Fix issue of scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242353 Fix issue of scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242246 Clause 6.3.6 in TS 33.503 - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242641  
    S3‑242641 Clause 6.3.6 in TS 33.503 - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242246
    S3‑242004 Excluding scrambling protection of HPLMN ID and clarifications in discovery message – R18 mirror Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242245 A.7 in TS 33.503 - correction Philips International B.V. CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242333 Discussion on HPLMN ID in the PC5 U2N relay discovery messages Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242334 support cleartext HPLMN ID in PC5 U2N relay discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242335 support cleartext HPLMN ID in PC5 U2N relay discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242341 Fix issue of scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242342 Fix issue of scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242343 Add clarification on scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242344 Add clarification on scrambling operation for PC5 ProSe discovery Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑241824 AF disabling the encryption when roaming Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242656  
    S3‑242656 AF disabling the encryption when roaming Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241824
    S3‑241903 CR on editorial clear up ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241904 CR to update AKMA related UDM services ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241905 CR to update the AKMA service disabling procedure ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we never specified the AF state. Not needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241906 CR to update the procedure for AAnF requesting UE roaming status reports ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: last change has an impact on the UE.They didn’t agree with the CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241971 update to AKMA service disabling Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson asked for more time and postpone to the next meeting. China Mobile supported the CR and Nokia supported its concept.
 		not pursued No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN S3‑242216 Corrections to NSWO with CH AAA Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242455  
    S3‑242455 Corrections to NSWO with CH AAA Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242216
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC S3‑241832 Retrieval of the EASDF security information from EASDF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242433  
    S3‑242433 Retrieval of the EASDF security information from EASDF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241832
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems S3‑241958 Discussions on DoS attacks to UAVs Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241959 CR to address DoS attacks to UAV Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑242149 Update on UE role authorization during discovery Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242465  
    S3‑242465 Update on UE role authorization during discovery Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242149
    S3‑241941 Implementing CR to TS 33.533 agreed in SA plenary in SP-240498 Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242097 Update procedure of UE privacy verification for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through PC5 link OPPO CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242466  
    S3‑242128 Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242466  
    S3‑242466 Completing the Privacy Check of n UEs for Service Exposure to Client UE Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑242128
    S3‑242129 Update to UE Privacy Verification for UE-only Operation Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242467  
    S3‑242467 Update to UE Privacy Verification for UE-only Operation Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242129
    S3‑242248 Update of local privacy check in clause 6.3.7 for server UE request Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242130 PC5-U integrity protection policy for Ranging/SL positioning service Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242657  
    S3‑242657 PC5-U integrity protection policy for Ranging/SL positioning service Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242130
    S3‑242131 Updating RSPP broadcast/groupcast to SLPP broadcast/groupcast Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242468  
    S3‑242468 Updating RSPP broadcast/groupcast to SLPP broadcast/groupcast Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242131
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA. S3‑241979 Correct procedure for Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242456  
    S3‑242456 Correct procedure for Authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241979
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑241861 Reference for IPX provider Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242457  
    S3‑242170 Discussion on unifying the name of IPX, roaming intermediary, Roaming Hub, etc. Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242172 Modification on the name of IPX, roaming intermediary, Roaming Hub, etc. Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242457  
    S3‑242457 Modification on the name of IPX, roaming intermediary, Roaming Hub, etc. Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242172
    S3‑241862 Modified PRINS alignment with 29.573 on security profile Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242458  
    S3‑242458 Modified PRINS alignment with 29.573 on security profile Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241862
    S3‑242174 Removing the requirement of Roaming Hub to support session termination Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242186 Clarification on the usage of N32-f message ID Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242459  
    S3‑242459 Clarification on the usage of N32-f message ID Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑242186
    S3‑242214 Resolving EN on roaming and interconnect Nokia draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242460  
    S3‑242460 Resolving EN on roaming and interconnect Nokia draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242214
    S3‑242666 Resolving EN on roaming and interconnect Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑241822 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241723 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242380  
    S3‑241823 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242380  
    S3‑242380 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑241823
    S3‑241815 ePDG procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242368  
    S3‑241816 Clarification in TNGF and N3IWF procedures Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242381  
    S3‑242381 Clarification in TNGF and N3IWF procedures Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241816
    S3‑241817 Clarification in TNGF and N3IWF procedures Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242382  
    S3‑242382 Clarification in TNGF and N3IWF procedures Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241817
    S3‑241818 TWIF procedure correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241819 TWIF procedure correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241820 UDR control flag for NSWO Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
YesCable Labs, AT&T and Huawei had issues and it was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242628  
    S3‑242628 UDR control flag for NSWO Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241820
    S3‑241821 UDR control flag for NSWO Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242629  
    S3‑242629 UDR control flag for NSWO Nokia, Verizon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241821
    S3‑242229 Correcting incorrect reference in Section 33.501 Annex S.3.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242230 Correcting incorrect reference in Section 33.501 Annex S.3.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241825 Updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we concluded that there is no need in the TR, we need to check carefully. Huawei also commented that this qualified as Rel-19 as it was considered as a new feature. MCC pointed out some issues on the cover page and the use of smart quotes instead of straight quotes in the text.
 		revised No S3‑242383 S3‑240580
    S3‑242383 Updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241825
    S3‑241826 Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we agreed that this was optional and now you are making it a requirement.
 		revised No S3‑242384 S3‑240993
    S3‑242384 Correction to validation of usage of X.509 certificate procedure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Johns Hopkins University APL, Cisco CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241826
    S3‑241858 Resource owner function Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241859 Addressing EN on claim versus scope Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242385  
    S3‑241965 Corrections and removing token claim related EN Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242385  
    S3‑242385 Corrections and removing token claim related EN Huawei, HiSilicon,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241965
    S3‑242206 Alignment on resource definition Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesVivo: not needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241999 Editorial and clarificaiton of SCPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242386  
    S3‑242386 Editorial and clarificaiton of SCPAC Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241999
    S3‑242026 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC clarified that the references should be voided instead or being replaced.This applies to the next three documents.
 		revised No S3‑242387  
    S3‑242387 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242026
    S3‑242028 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242388  
    S3‑242388 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242028
    S3‑242227 Updates of obsoleted RFCs Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242228 Updates of obsoleted RFCs Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242081 Correction on unauthenticated IMS emergency sessions vivo, China Telecom CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we don’t use EIA0 in 5G. Ericsson: we havent received an LS to deal with this.Besides we are not sure that the changes are correct.
 		revised No S3‑242617  
    S3‑242617 Correction on unauthenticated IMS emergency sessions vivo, China Telecom CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242081
    S3‑242618 Correction on unauthenticated IMS emergency sessions vivo, China Telecom CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242207 Terminology alignment for 5GMSG China Mobile Group Device Co. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242389  
    S3‑242389 Terminology alignment for 5GMSG China Mobile Group Device Co. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242207
    S3‑242141 Correcting the selections rules for "aes-gcm-us" Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: first change is not needed. CableLabs wanted to add more changes.
 		revised No S3‑242390  
    S3‑242390 Correcting the selections rules for "aes-gcm-us" Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242141
    S3‑242226 Correcting typo in algorithm names Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242259 Correction on negotiation of security algorithms for EN-DC (R17) CMCC CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242289 Correction on negotiation of security algorithms for EN-DC (R18) CMCC CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑242180 Discussion on SMC based solution for an NB-IoT UE in NTN to report its location to the network Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242187 Clarification on PLMN ID verification(R17) Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: it should be conditional shall and behaviour up to implementation is not really clear because we don’t know the options. Nokia: we need some offline discussions for this. Ericsson: don’t use the conditional shall. MCC: wrong CR number on the cover (it should be 2011).
 		revised No S3‑242391  
    S3‑242391 Clarification on PLMN ID verification(R17) Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242187
    S3‑242190 Serving Network Name check at AUSF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesMCC: WID code should be TEI17. Ericsson: please use the same title for mirrors.
 		revised No S3‑242392  
    S3‑242392 Serving Network Name check at AUSF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242190
    S3‑242355 Correcting incorrect statements about TLS profile Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: shouldn't we correct this in earlier Releases?
 		not pursued No    
4.2 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR). S3‑241783 Add specific UDR SCAS test cases for TS 33.530 BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241784 Addition of UDR security requirements BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm commented that it was better to work on a draft CR instead of bringing Rel-19 CRs this early.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242662 Addition of UDR security requirements BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei commented that CRs to 33.501 were not in the objectives of the WID. It was agreed to bring a revised WID to include CRs for TS 33.501.
 		approved No    
    S3‑241785 Eliminate the possibility of implementing unverified security protocols for the UDR-UDM interface. BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesNokia had a problem with this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241786 Add an appendix of threats to the UDR BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesHiawei: this should go to a draft CR. Ericsson needed some more time to consider this one.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242663 Drraft CR Add an appendix of threats to the UDR BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.3 WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions. S3‑241777 Added threat in testcase Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
YesRelated to maintenance, not this agenda item. Overlapping with 2397.
 		merged No S3‑242397  
    S3‑241788 Added threat in testcase Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242103 Fuzz TLS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.4 WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF). S3‑242307 Discussion on SGd interface at SMSF to define Diameter filtering requirements for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay discussion Discussion Yes
YesNTT-docomo: requirements are not in 3GPP specifications, but in GSMA. I'm not against the content, but we need to have a clear process. Ericsson agreed on this issue. MCC queried whether these requirements were publicly available and it was confirmed that they were, but it needed to be seen if the referral was still OK.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242323 Add a clause in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: all the CRs that are introducing content to a new Annex should be added to a draft CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242324 Diameter Session security requirements on SGd interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242631  
    S3‑242631 Diameter Session security requirements on SGd interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242324
    S3‑242338 New clause on SGd interface filtering in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242339 Filtering requirements on Diameter interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242632  
    S3‑242632 Filtering requirements on Diameter interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242339
    S3‑242362 Disabling Peer Discovery on Diameter interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242633  
    S3‑242633 Disabling Peer Discovery on Diameter interface for Security Assurance Specifications for SMSF IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242362
    S3‑242402 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats specific to SMSF IIT Bombay draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242670 Living document on SCAS for SMS IIT Bombay other Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.5 WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19                      
4.7 WID on Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm                      
4.8 WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols S3‑241768 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242664  
    S3‑242664 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.210, Updates to cryprographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑241768
    S3‑241769 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242665  
    S3‑242665 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.501, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑241769
    S3‑241770 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.310, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241782 Updates to TLS profiles on TS33210 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
YesEricsson: RFC 9325
 		revised No S3‑242413  
    S3‑242413 Updates to TLS profiles on TS33210 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241782
    S3‑242231 Remove insecure usage of “aes-gcm” and “aes-gmac” and introduce HMAC-SHA-256 Ericsson draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242414  
    S3‑242414 Remove insecure usage of “aes-gcm” and “aes-gmac” and introduce HMAC-SHA-256 Ericsson draftCR Agreement Yes
YesRemoving introduction of the new authentication algorithm as requested by Huawei.
 		noted No   S3‑242231
    S3‑241772 Modernization of the Integrity Algorithms between UE and P-CSCF Deutsche Telekom AG CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242415 Modernization of the Integrity Algorithms between UE and P-CSCF Deutsche Telekom AG draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242025 Reversal of changes related to deprecated HTTP RFCs for 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242416  
    S3‑242416 Reversal of changes related to deprecated HTTP RFCs for 33.501 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242025
    S3‑242027 Reversal of changes related to deprecated HTTP RFCs for 33.210 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242417  
    S3‑242417 Reversal of changes related to deprecated HTTP RFCs for 33.210 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242027
    S3‑242029 Clarifications of the proposals for reversal of changes related to deprecated RFCs Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241780 Updates to ESP-TTLS type Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241781 Editorial Updates on TS 33.501 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242634  
    S3‑242634 Editorial Updates on TS 33.501 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241781
    S3‑241707 Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC Deutsche Telekom AG CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242531 Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
4.9 WID on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3 S3‑241908 Update the role of UE in 5GMSG ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242389  
    S3‑241909 Update Transport security protection between the two MSGin5G Servers ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242463  
    S3‑242463 Update Transport security protection between the two MSGin5G Servers ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241909
    S3‑241910 Non MSGin5G UE Authentication and Authorization in bulk registration scenarios ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242464 Living document of security aspects of MSGin5G service Ph3 China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑242393 Add an OAuth2.0 test case to check for the absence of an access token BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242394 Remove unnecessary complexity from UDM test case TC_AUTH_STATUS_STORE_UDM BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242018 Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242019 Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242020 Local certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242021 Add threat to local certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242022 Expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242023 Add threat to expired certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242208 Test Case for Intra-VNF Communication Interface Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: not in scope.Please bring a draft CR next time.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242325 Add threat to local certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242326 Expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: not precise enough.Huawei replied that this was at draft CR stage so an editor's note could be added to precise more later.
 		revised No S3‑242623  
    S3‑242623 Expired certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this. China Telecom supported this. Huawei didn’t find a technical reason to keep postponing. Ericsson: this should be handled in TS 33.117. The Chair warned the delegates that blocking without technical reasons didn’t help progress; technical reasons should be provided each time. It was suggested to add an editor's note, but Ericsson also rejected it. NTT-Docomo proposed to bring clear proposals directed to a working agreement in the next meeting, given that there was only one company objecting. Huawei proposed to have a conference call on the subject and decide in the next meeting for a possible working agreement.
 		noted No   S3‑242326
    S3‑242327 Add threat to expired certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242328 Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242624  
    S3‑242624 Peer certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242328
    S3‑242329 Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242330 Local certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242625  
    S3‑242625 Local certificate checking at gNB to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242330
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑241870 PRINS version 2 CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we have PRINS already and this is a whole new thing that needs to be studied.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241907 Update registration procedure for handover from EPS to 5GS over N26 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair commented that this wasn't urgent and this agenda item served for those topics that were agreed beforehand. Huawei:correction should go somewhere else. This is maintenance and it can be discussed now.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242188 Clarification on token verification by NFp Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242223 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242292 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security S3‑241713 Resolve EN in Use case 1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242418  
    S3‑242418 Resolve EN in Use case 1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241713
    S3‑242034 Updates to evaluation on malformed messages use case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242418  
    S3‑241714 Resolve EN in Use case 2 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242420  
    S3‑242035 Updates to evaluation on massive number of calls use case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242420  
    S3‑242420 Updates to evaluation on massive number of calls use case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242035
    S3‑241867 Addressing ENs in Use Case 5 US National Security Agency, MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: too generic.They had questions on the whole procedure.This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242421  
    S3‑242421 Addressing ENs in Use Case 5 US National Security Agency, MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241867
    S3‑241792 New use case for security evaluation and monitoring: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) attacks ISSDU, NYCU, III pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with the document.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241851 New use case for security evaluation and monitoring: API security risks MITRE Corporation, Dell Technologies, Defense Information Systems Agency EM, US National Security Agency, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson:not clear to us what's new here. Huawei: clarify the link between relevant data and these attacks.
 		revised No S3‑242422  
    S3‑242422 New use case for security evaluation and monitoring: API security risks MITRE Corporation, Dell Technologies, Defense Information Systems Agency EM, US National Security Agency, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Johns Hopkins University APL, AT&T pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241851
    S3‑241717 Update to KI#2 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242423  
    S3‑241852 Updates to eZTS Key Issue 2 MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, US National Security Agency, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242423  
    S3‑242423 Updates to eZTS Key Issue 2 MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, US National Security Agency, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,Lenovo, Motorola Mobility,Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241852
    S3‑242296 Adding requirements to KI#2 "Security mechanisms for policy enforcement at the 5G SBA" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242423  
    S3‑241929 New Key Issue on data exposure relevant for network level attacks Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we don’t agree with exposing the information to the SBA layer.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241715 Solution to KI#1 Network assisted data collection Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: Exposing data in a way that it may be flowing in different interfaces. Huawei: we have issues with this approach. It's not a good security design and if this goes into the TR we will ask for some editor's notes.
 		revised No S3‑242424  
    S3‑242424 Solution to KI#1 Network assisted data collection Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241715
    S3‑241716 Solution to KI#1_Direct data collection Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: add something on the additional load on the network function. Huawei had some concerns and this was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242425  
    S3‑242425 Solution to KI#1_Direct data collection Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241716
    S3‑241850 New solution for KI#1: New Data Collection NFs MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: ask NF to collect data, but it is not up to the NF to give this permission.
 		revised No S3‑242426  
    S3‑242426 New solution for KI#1: New Data Collection NFs MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, OTD_US, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241850
    S3‑241930 New Solution for Key Issue 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: it looks like different solutions in one. Huawei also had some issues with this.
 		revised No S3‑242427  
    S3‑242427 New Solution for Key Issue 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241930
    S3‑242297 Adding solution to KI#1 "Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242428  
    S3‑242428 Adding solution to KI#1 "Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242297
    S3‑241718 Initial Conclusion to KI#1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is too early.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241853 New solution for KI#2: Security Policy Enforcement via NRF and SCP/NF MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: it's a bit complex. Huawei: it becomes an authorization mechanism on top of the authentication mechanism that we already have.
 		revised No S3‑242429  
    S3‑242429 New solution for KI#2: Security Policy Enforcement via NRF and SCP/NF MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241853
    S3‑241924 pCR on Solution for NRF reporting Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we havent discussed the key issue yet.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242357 TR 33.794 Cleanup Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242430  
    S3‑242430 TR 33.794 Cleanup Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242357
    S3‑241869 Discussion on ZTS Assumptions Johns Hopkins University APL, MITRE Corporation, National Security Agency discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242419 Draft TR 33.794 Lenovo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑242298 Resolve EN in Solution #2: Security of 3rd party specific identities Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242164 A new solution on third-party specific user identities Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242432  
    S3‑242432 A new solution on third-party specific user identities Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242164
    S3‑242163 A new solution on authorizing the usage of base Avatar model Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242434  
    S3‑242434 A new solution on authorizing the usage of base Avatar model Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242163
    S3‑242282 New solution on secure IMS based avatar communication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242435  
    S3‑242435 New solution on secure IMS based avatar communication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242282
    S3‑242299 New solution for IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242438  
    S3‑242438 New solution for IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242299
    S3‑242346 new sol for KI#2 Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242436  
    S3‑242436 new sol for KI#2 Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242346
    S3‑242347 new sol for KI#X IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: revise to remove user content. Huawei: this solution should be aligned with SA2.
 		revised No S3‑242437  
    S3‑242437 new sol for KI#X IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242347
    S3‑242331 new sol for KI#2 Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242332 new sol for KI#X IMS DC capability exposure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242431 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑242195 Update of KI’s based on comments provided by SA3-LI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242469  
    S3‑242469 Update of KI’s based on comments provided by SA3-LI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242195
    S3‑242194 Resolution to EN concerning DoS attack Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242470  
    S3‑242220 Solve EN for Key issue#1&2 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242470  
    S3‑242470 Solve EN for Key issue#1&2 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242220
    S3‑242217 Evaluation for solution #1 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242471  
    S3‑242471 Evaluation for solution #1 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242217
    S3‑241966 Update and evaluation to solution#2 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242472  
    S3‑242472 Update and evaluation to solution#2 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241966
    S3‑242167 Removing ENs in Sol#3 of TS 33.757 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242168 Addressing the EN on the impacts due to HNSPP Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242473  
    S3‑242473 Addressing the EN on the impacts due to HNSPP Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242168
    S3‑242169 Addressing the EN on the difference btw. HNSPP and SEG Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242474  
    S3‑242474 Addressing the EN on the difference btw. HNSPP and SEG Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242169
    S3‑242178 Removing EN in Sol#4 of TR 33.757 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242179 Add evaluation to Sol#4 of TR 33.757 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242475  
    S3‑242475 Add evaluation to Sol#4 of TR 33.757 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242179
    S3‑242218 Evaluation for solution #5 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242476  
    S3‑242476 Evaluation for solution #5 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242218
    S3‑242242 Solve EN for solution #5 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241967 Update and evaluation to solution#6 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242477  
    S3‑242477 Update and evaluation to solution#6 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241967
    S3‑241969 Update and evaluation to solution#7 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242478  
    S3‑242478 Update and evaluation to solution#7 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241969
    S3‑241990 Evaluation for KI#2 on SBA security for solution 7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242479  
    S3‑242479 Evaluation for KI#2 on SBA security for solution 7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241990
    S3‑242320 Add evaluation for solution #8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242480  
    S3‑242480 Add evaluation for solution #8 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242320
    S3‑241994 Evaluation for KI#2 on SBA security for solution 8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242481  
    S3‑242481 Evaluation for KI#2 on SBA security for solution 8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241994
    S3‑242261 Update to solution#9 on DNS Security in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242482  
    S3‑242482 Update to solution#9 on DNS Security in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242261
    S3‑242321 Add evaluation for solution #10 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242483  
    S3‑242483 Add evaluation for solution #10 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242321
    S3‑241720 Updates to Solution 11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242635  
    S3‑242635 Updates to Solution 11 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241720
    S3‑241911 Add an EN to Solution#11 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242219 Evaluation for solution #12 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242484  
    S3‑242484 Evaluation for solution #12 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242219
    S3‑242196 Solution to KI1 - Reuse SEG to protect N4 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242554  
    S3‑242554 Solution to KI1 - Reuse SEG to protect N4 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242196
    S3‑242197 Solution to KI2 – Extension of SCP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242555  
    S3‑242555 Solution to KI2 – Extension of SCP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242197
    S3‑242260 Solution on NF Authorization in PLMN hosting NPN Scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: focus on why this technology used, we need a discussion paper on the argument against certificates. Huawei supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242262 Solution for remote attestation of dedicated NFs Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesObjected by Huawei.
 		revised No S3‑242640  
    S3‑242640 Solution for remote attestation of dedicated NFs Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242262
    S3‑241912 New solution for SUPI privacy issue based on AMF register with UDM ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: there shouldn’t be UE impact. ZTE replied that there was no impact at all. Apple proposed to add an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑242556  
    S3‑242556 New solution for SUPI privacy issue based on AMF register with UDM ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241912
    S3‑241913 New solution for SUPI privacy issue ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242557  
    S3‑242557 New solution for SUPI privacy issue ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241913
    S3‑242263 Solution for SUPI privacy protection in PLMN hosted NPN scenario Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242264 New solution for SUPI privacy protection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesChina Telecom didn’t support this.ZTE and China Mobile didn’t support it either. Huawei objected due to impact on key hierarchy. An editor's note was added for this.
 		revised No S3‑242667  
    S3‑242667 New solution for SUPI privacy protection Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242264
    S3‑242175 Modification on the definition of PNI-NPN Operational domain Huawei, HiSilicon, CMCC pCR Approval Yes
YesChina Telecom proposed to enhance the definition. Ericsson: just copy the definition from TS 23.501. Huawei: the term in that TS is too short.Ericsson answered that in that case the definition should be referenced.
 		revised No S3‑242558  
    S3‑242558 Modification on the definition of PNI-NPN Operational domain Huawei, HiSilicon, CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242175
    S3‑242051 Mapping solutions to key issues China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242046 Conclusion to KI#1 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242047 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242049 Conclusion to KI#3 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241719 Threat scenarios to be addressed for KI#3 Lenovo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242265 Discussion paper to Revise the SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
YesApple didn’t agree with this.There may be other solutions without UE impact. Huawei, ZTE, didn’t agree either.Having "don’t know" as an impact was also rejected.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241712 Prevent acquiring the list of SUPI stored in the database of 5GC UDM ISSDU, III, NYCU discussion Endorsement Yes
YesZTE didn’t agree and proposed to note it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242510 Draft TR 33.757 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA S3‑241951 updates to security assumption Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242322 Proposed solution for Certificate enrolment, Challenge validation and Certificate renewal Google Inc., John Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: most of the topics have been addressed already in other key issues and solutions in the RFC. Nokia agreed with this.
 		revised No S3‑242514  
    S3‑242514 Proposed solution for Certificate enrolment, Challenge validation and Certificate renewal Google Inc., John Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242322
    S3‑241953 solution for NFs sharing a ACME client Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241985 Reuse solution about policy based certificate renewal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesCisco, Nokia: just refer to the text instead of copying.
 		revised No S3‑242439  
    S3‑242439 Reuse solution about policy based certificate renewal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241985
    S3‑241986 Reuse solution for certificate revocation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241799 Solution on certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242441  
    S3‑242441 Solution on certificate revocation Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241799
    S3‑241950 updates to Sol#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241952 addressing EN in Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242445  
    S3‑242445 addressing EN in Sol#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241952
    S3‑241779 Pseudo-CR on TR 33.776 Solution #2 to remove Editor's Notes Cisco Systems, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: this is good as it is. This over complicates the solution.
 		revised No S3‑242446  
    S3‑242446 Pseudo-CR on TR 33.776 Solution #2 to remove Editor's Notes Cisco Systems, US National Security Agency pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241779
    S3‑242440 Draft TR 33.776 Cisco Systems draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits S3‑242308 Update assumption for 256-bit algorithm indication Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: move these changes to an Annex.They didn’t agree with the second change.
 		revised No S3‑242447  
    S3‑242447 Update assumption for 256-bit algorithm indication Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242308
    S3‑241873 new kew issue on backward compatibility CableLabs, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
YesThe Chair commented that there was no backward compatibility issue here. This statement should go somewhere like in an Annex. Nokia proposed to close the SID and do a draft CR instead. They objected to have something like backwards compatibilty in an Annex as they considered as something of poor quality. Huawei: close the SID for more efficiency. The Chair replied that it needed to be closed properly capturing at least the assumptions. Huawei: if the TR is empty it should be withdrawn.
 		merged No S3‑242449  
    S3‑242202 Analysis of backwards compatibility Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242449  
    S3‑242449 Analysis of backwards compatibility Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242202
    S3‑241893 CAT256-New KI for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   Yes
YesHuawei: there is no security concern here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241894 CAT256-New solution for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242036 Proposal for a way forward Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241789 Conclusion for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: not true. There are key issues available. The Chair commented that a minimal framework should be agreed. Huawei: not fair for the authors all the time we spent discussing the key issues. Just withdraw the TR. The Chair didn’t see the need to withdraw the TR as it was still useful to show that there was no agreement and there were other cases in the past like this. Assumptions and way forward could be captured.
 		revised No S3‑242450  
    S3‑242450 Conclusion for TR 33.700-41 KDDI Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241789
    S3‑241914 Conclusion proposal ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242450  
    S3‑242203 Conclusion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242450  
    S3‑241876 CAT256 - New KI for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241877 CAT256 - New solution for CAT_256 on correctly indication Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241878 CAT256 - New KI for CAT_256 on Flexibility to adjust the preference on security algorithms Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241879 CAT256 - New solution for CAT_256 on Flexibility to adjust the preference on security algorithms Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242448 Draft TR 33.700-41 KDDI draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks S3‑242266 [TR 33.701] Update to security requirement of KI#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241708 Solution to prevent bidding down to GERAN/UTRAN by restricting inter RAT handover Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242485  
    S3‑242485 Solution to prevent bidding down to GERAN/UTRAN by restricting inter RAT handover Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241708
    S3‑241837 Key Issue #1: new solution THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242486  
    S3‑242486 Key Issue #1: new solution THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241837
    S3‑241709 Solution to prevent bidding down by restricting UE access to GERAN/UTRAN in its location Ericsson pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242487  
    S3‑242487 Solution to prevent bidding down by restricting UE access to GERAN/UTRAN in its location Ericsson pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241709
    S3‑242033 New approach for increasing user awareness Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242636  
    S3‑242636 New approach for increasing user awareness Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242033
    S3‑241830 Proposal to update a solution in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242488  
    S3‑242488 Proposal to update a solution in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241830
    S3‑241922 EN removal for Solution#3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242489  
    S3‑242489 EN removal for Solution#3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241922
    S3‑241829 Proposal to remove Editor’s Note and update solution in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242489  
    S3‑242490 Proposal to remove Editor’s Note and update solution in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241892 MiBiDA- Evaluation for solution#5 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242491  
    S3‑242491 MiBiDA- Evaluation for solution#5 Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241892
    S3‑241917 Update to Solution#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242492  
    S3‑242492 Update to Solution#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241917
    S3‑242007 Addressing the editor's note in solution 7 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242006 Addressing the editor's note in solution 8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241831 Propose to update a new solution text in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242513  
    S3‑242513 Propose to update a new solution text in TR 33.701 Google Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241831
    S3‑242005 Addressing the editor's note in solution 10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242082 Conclusion for key issue#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242313 conclusion for KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242267 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.701 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241787 Conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.701 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: we are discussing conclusions for solutions that are not acceptable at all.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241838 Key Issue #1: conclusion THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242032 Conclusion proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241891 MiBiDA- Conclusions Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241915 Conclusion proposal ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242083 LS on Providing RAT information to UE of MiBiDA vivo LS out Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: we don’t need to send an LS, the questions are not needed now.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242314 evaluation for solutions related to KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242493  
    S3‑241916 Evaluation proposal on summarizing impact of solutions ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242493  
    S3‑242031 Evaluation proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242493  
    S3‑242493 Evaluation proposal Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242031
    S3‑242030 Editorial corrections Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242038 Coversheet for TR 33.701 Huawei, HiSilicon TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242494  
    S3‑242494 Coversheet for TR 33.701 Huawei, HiSilicon TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242038
    S3‑242037 Agenda and minutes from conf call Huawei, HiSilicon other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241880 MiBiDA - New solution for mitigating bidding down attack Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242511 Draft TR 33.701 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 S3‑241711 Architecture and security assumptions of TR 33.700-29 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242542  
    S3‑242542 Architecture and security assumptions of TR 33.700-29 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241711
    S3‑241863 RAN2 assumptions for 5GSAT_SEC study InterDigital Belgium. LLC, Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
YesThe Chair commented that this format wasn't appropriate to incorporate it.It could just be endorsed. Thales didn’t want to incorporate it into the TR. Huawei commented that thiis was OK for information, no need to endorse or incorporate into a TR.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241972 Addressing the editor's note on the security assumption Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, CATT, Xiaomi, China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo: security of 3GPP Systems onboard is very ambiguous. ORANGE: operators don’t implement the security systems.
 		revised No S3‑242637  
    S3‑242637 Addressing the editor's note on the security assumption Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, CATT, Xiaomi, China Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241972
    S3‑242182 Update to the Store and forward KI: Selective forwarding scenario Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: so we don’t trust the software that runs in a satellte. Any node can have malicious software. If we assume the existence of malitious software in any core network node it can do much worse attacks.They didn’t agree with the threat. Samsung didn’t agree with the threat. Xiaomi didn’t either. Nokia: this leads to complex solutions.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242137 pCR to TR33.700-29 New solution dynamically generate UE subscription data for S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: how is the provisioning done?
 		noted No    
    S3‑241864 Solution for unauthenticated DOS protection InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
YesPhilips: we like it but it introduces more latency. Interdigital: the satellite hasn’t got enough resources to protect against the DOS attacks.
 		revised No S3‑242638  
    S3‑242638 Solution for unauthenticated DOS protection InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241864
    S3‑241927 New solution for AS security context establishment in satellite access with store-and-forward operations Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242639  
    S3‑242639 New solution for AS security context establishment in satellite access with store-and-forward operations Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241927
    S3‑241989 New solution for mitigating UE privacy risks using temporary UE ID Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242543  
    S3‑242543 New solution for mitigating UE privacy risks using temporary UE ID Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241989
    S3‑242042 New solution on secuirty protection in store and forward Satellite Operation with RAN on board Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242642  
    S3‑242642 New solution on secuirty protection in store and forward Satellite Operation with RAN on board Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242042
    S3‑242084 New solution on mitigation of privacy issues of interim GUTI vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: GUTI is a temporary ID
 		revised No S3‑242619  
    S3‑242619 New solution on mitigation of privacy issues of interim GUTI vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242084
    S3‑242269 New Solution on Expedited Authentication in 5G S&F Mode Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242643  
    S3‑242643 New Solution on Expedited Authentication in 5G S&F Mode Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242269
    S3‑242272 New solution on preventing DoS attack before security context is established Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242644  
    S3‑242644 New solution on preventing DoS attack before security context is established Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242272
    S3‑242275 New solution on Protecting registration or attach procedure Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242645  
    S3‑242645 New solution on Protecting registration or attach procedure Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242275
    S3‑242300 Solution on UE-satellite-UE communication security Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242303 Key Issue #1: new solution THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241834 Solution #1: resolution of ENs in evaluation part THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242627  
    S3‑242627 Solution #1: resolution of ENs in evaluation part THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241834
    S3‑241925 Solution 6 EN removal Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241973 Addressing the editor's note and adding evaluation in solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242545  
    S3‑242545 Addressing the editor's note and adding evaluation in solution 18 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241973
    S3‑242116 Remove the Editor’s note in solution 16 of TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242546  
    S3‑242546 Remove the Editor’s note in solution 16 of TR 33.700-29 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242116
    S3‑242161 Solution #1: resolution of EN in procedure THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242177 Removing ENs in Sol#14 of TR 33.700-29 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242547  
    S3‑242547 Removing ENs in Sol#14 of TR 33.700-29 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242177
    S3‑242270 Resolving EN in Sol#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussed with tdoc 2183.
 		revised No S3‑242548  
    S3‑242548 Resolving EN in Sol#8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242270
    S3‑242115 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update Solution#11 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242114 pCR to TR33.700-29 Update Solution#10 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241918 Update to the Solution#13 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241939 Updates to Solution #12 OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242646  
    S3‑242646 Updates to Solution #12 OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241939
    S3‑242059 Updates to Secure Initial Registration for S&F Satellite Operation Intel pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242549  
    S3‑242549 Updates to Secure Initial Registration for S&F Satellite Operation Intel pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242059
    S3‑242146 Proposed update to solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242256 Add onboard capabilitu to solution mappling OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesCATT didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242268 Update to Sol#4 on store and forward Satellite Operation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242550  
    S3‑242550 Update to Sol#4 on store and forward Satellite Operation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242268
    S3‑242273 [TR 33.700-29] Update to solution#7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242293 Update to Solution#4 on store and forward Satellite Operation Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242550  
    S3‑242183 Update to solution on preventing DoS attacks in S&F operation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242548  
    S3‑241926 Solution 6 Evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242551  
    S3‑242551 Solution 6 Evaluation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241926
    S3‑241835 Solution #5: evaluation THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242552  
    S3‑242552 Solution #5: evaluation THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241835
    S3‑241836 Solution #13: evaluation THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242553  
    S3‑242553 Solution #13: evaluation THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241836
    S3‑241940 Add evaluation to Solution #12 OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: not clear what happens in roaming. OPPO: we address it in tdoc 939.
 		revised No S3‑242647  
    S3‑242647 Add evaluation to Solution #12 OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241940
    S3‑242271 Evaluation on Solution #8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242648  
    S3‑242648 Evaluation on Solution #8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242271
    S3‑242274 Evaluation to solution#7 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241749 Reply LS on security of IP transport over satellite transport links (S3-240950 / S2-240390) S2-2405836 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242291 Evaluation of Solution#4 on store and forward Satellite Operation Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241974 Withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242544 Draft TR 33.700-29 CATT draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication S3‑241840 UE IPSec connection optimization while connecting to a new WLAN AP through the same TNGF Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241721 Updates to Solution #10 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242598  
    S3‑242598 Updates to Solution #10 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241721
    S3‑242278 Evaluation on Sol#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242599  
    S3‑242599 Evaluation on Sol#9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242278
    S3‑242304 New solution for KI#3 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242559  
    S3‑242559 New solution for KI#3 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242304
    S3‑241806 solution 8 correction Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242281 New solution on KI#3 without AMF impact Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241803 conclusion for KI1 and KI3 with only Fast BSS Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242560  
    S3‑242560 conclusion for KI1 and KI3 with only Fast BSS Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241803
    S3‑242144 Proposed conclusion for key issue #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242560  
    S3‑242143 Proposed conclusion for key issue #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242560  
    S3‑241802 generic conclusion for KI1 and KI3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242560  
    S3‑242016 propose conclusion to KI#1 and KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242560  
    S3‑242065 solution for AUN3 device Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242600  
    S3‑242600 solution for AUN3 device Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242065
    S3‑242279 Evaluation on Sol#12 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242561  
    S3‑242561 Evaluation on Sol#12 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242279
    S3‑242305 New solution for KI#2 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242562  
    S3‑242562 New solution for KI#2 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242305
    S3‑242280 New solution on KI#2 without AMF impact Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242601  
    S3‑242601 New solution on KI#2 without AMF impact Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242280
    S3‑242015 propose new solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242563  
    S3‑242563 propose new solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242015
    S3‑241805 conclusion for KI2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242564 conclusion for KI2 Nokia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241839 Solution for KI#4 UE authentication while connecting to a new WLAN AP through the same NSWOF Charter Communications, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241653
    S3‑242145 Proposed conclusion for key issue #4 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242565  
    S3‑242142 Proposing some evaluation for solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242566 Proposing some evaluation for solution #15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242017 propose conclusion to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242565  
    S3‑242565 propose conclusion to KI#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242017
    S3‑241807 Editorial cleanup of the TR Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241804 solution for AUN3 device Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242602 Draft TR 33.702 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑242603 LS on clarification on non 3GPP access mobility Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: whatever they respond it serves nothing for us.
 		noted No    
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑242243 discussion on UICC support for AIoT Service OPPO discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: observations here don’t apply to everything that is using an UICC in the market. Not sure that we need to send an LS. Device makers can find the solutions themselves. Thales agreed and they commented that we couldn’t rely on the proposal for the voltage here. China Mobile: we have a requirement that the UE needs to have the UICC in TS 33.501. If AIOTs have other means to connect to the network we won't have these limitations. MITRE: I thought that the eSIM was already considered here. Interdigital: power requirements? ORANGE answered that these was an issue between providers and device makers. OPPO: there is no business case if we don’t follow the power consumption defined by RAN. Ericsson: security requirements also have a say with regards to power consumption.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242253 LS on UICC in AIoT service OPPO LS out   Yes
YesThales, ORANGE among others objected to sending the LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241888 AIoT-LS to RAN2 on AIoT assumptions Apple LS out   Yes
YesORANGE: remove the UICC part. Docomo: let's not ignore roaming in the beginning as it would have impact on the agreed solutions. At least the key hierarchy should support roaming.
 		revised No S3‑242533  
    S3‑242533 AIoT-LS to RAN2 on AIoT assumptions Apple LS out - Yes
YesThales, NTT-Docomo, ORANGE didn’t agree with the LS. KPN found it necessary in order to make progress, anything that helps could be fine. OPPO supported this. GSMA didn’t care much about this LS but warned about defining a security atchitecture that didn't meet the deployment cases. OPPO: we can progress without this LS. Interdigital: no harm in sending this LS. ORANGE: no concrete questions in this LS. The Chair commented that even if SA3 had a disagreement SA3 needed to communicate it, otherwise other groups could accuse SA3 of not doing their job. Huawei: the problem is that the questions are not clear to us. China Mobile: in favour of sending the LS but questions need to be modified. Huawei: the Chair can send the message in his report to SA that progress in other groups delay the work in SA3. Apple (Mona): SA1 missed looking at some aspects, but stage 1 is now frozen. Maybe sending an LS to SA1 to clairfy the issue would work. KPN: please suggest concrete questions if not agreable. ORANGE: we didn’t propose this LS. Most of questions are related to lack of info from SA1 or progress in SA2, so we would agree with including this in the LS.
 		noted No   S3‑241888
    S3‑242107 LS on Ambient IoT Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE: SA1 specs say that it applies to 5G systems. Qualcomm: what is meant by 3GPP system then? What happens in 6G then? Nokia: we don’t see the need to send this LS. NTT-Docomo proposed to use the term 5G system so as not to use different terminology in future contributions and reopen this discussion. Qualcomm didn’t agree with using the term 5G systems.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242241 General Authentication Requirement OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: what are we authenticating and why? Use the SA1 requirements. Ericsson: general authentication requirements should be tied to the key issues.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241865 RAN2 assumptions for AIOT study InterDigital Belgium. LLC discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE: refer to the TR and not the meeting report. There was no agreement to endorse this document. OPPO: better send an LS to RAN2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241887 AIoT-Security assumption for Ambient IoT Apple pCR   Yes
YesORANGE: first bullet is not a security assumption. Nokia: fine with this. Refer to device type 1 and 2. Ericsson didn’t agree with this contribution. Thales didn’t see the need for this contribution either. Qualcomm agreed on the first bullet.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242119 Security assumption of 5G Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm, Apple,OPPO, Interdigital supported this contribution. ORANGE, Thales didn’t support this. Ericsson didn’t support the second bullet.
 		revised No S3‑242649  
    S3‑242649 Security assumption of 5G Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242119
    S3‑242138 pCR to TR 33.713 Clause 4 Security Architecture and Assumptions CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesCATT asked about the second bulllet (not included in the merge). ORANGE: the key issue is not clear.
 		merged No S3‑242649  
    S3‑242200 AIoT security assumption of device constrains OPPO, ZTE, Apple pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this needs to be introduced with a key issue, otherwise I don’t accept the requirement. Ericsson didn’t agree with this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242361 Security levels vs device capabilities of Ambient IoT devices KPN N.V. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242112 Regulations with digital elements in EU CRA and security requirements in NIST ZTA Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesApple: every study should include regulation into consideration. Qualcomm, OPPO didn’t agree with this. OPPO: then we need to include all countries regulations here. China Mobile didn’t agree with this either. KPN wanted this to be noted as well.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242106 AIoT: Security assumptions for existing services in the 5G system Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: how to fulfill this requirement? ORANGE: there is an existing SA1 requirement related to this one.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242111 AIoT: Security assumptions for Ambient IoT services in 5G system Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm,KPN and Nokia didn’t support this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242056 Architecture and Security Assumptions in TR 33.713 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242649  
    S3‑241977 Assumption on security aspects of network exposure Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE didn’t understand this contribution. Ericsson didn’t support it either.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242120 Update KI#1 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: SA2 hasn’t concluded on the architecture, we need to wait for them. Qualcomm supported this. Interdigital: refer to SA2's decision. It was decided to reword the editor's note instead of removing it.
 		revised No S3‑242534  
    S3‑242534 Update KI#1 in TR 33.713 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242120
    S3‑241849 Update Key issue #3 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: valid threat but this is not about privacy. It's about confidentiality.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241889 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on Authentication Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241848 New key issue for AIoT device authentication and authorization vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: first discuss the use cases and then we come back to the requirements. Interdigital supported this. The general view was to note this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242157 pCR to TR33.713 New key issue on authentication of AIoT Devices CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242193 KI Authentication and identity of type 1 and 2 devices Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdiigital: I'd like to keep the first requirement. Ericsson: to whom shall be authenticated?
 		noted No    
    S3‑241890 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on communication security Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242535  
    S3‑241975 key issue on protection of information transfer for AIoT services Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242535  
    S3‑242158 pCR to TR33.713 New key issue on communication security of AIoT system CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242535  
    S3‑242150 New Key Issue on the protection of information during AIoT service communication Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242535  
    S3‑242535 New Key Issue on the protection of information during AIoT service communication Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO commented that SA3 couldn’t progress if everything was left to wait for SA2's decisions. Only requirements left.
 		approved No   S3‑242150
    S3‑242108 AIoT: New key issue for integrity protection of communication messages sent between AIoT device and 5G network Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242535  
    S3‑242109 AIoT: New key issue for encryption of communication messages sent between AIoT device and 5G network Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242535  
    S3‑241976 solution on protection for disabling device operation Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: password sent in plane text. Steps 9 and 10 the device is permantnently disabled, so how does it reply? Lenovo: do you assume that all AIOT devices have a subscription? Huawei replied that they had one. Interdigital: this requires maintaining a state machine, so we consider the device powerful enough to have sich state machine.Provisioning is in scope or out of scope? ORANGE: remove evaluation. This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242537  
    S3‑242537 solution on protection for disabling device operation Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom, CAICT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241976
    S3‑242121 New solution on disabling operation procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: device disabled in step 6, so step 7 cannot be executed.
 		revised No S3‑242538  
    S3‑242538 New solution on disabling operation procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑242121
    S3‑242251 New solution - Ambient IoT device disabling mechanism Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242539  
    S3‑242539 New solution - Ambient IoT device disabling mechanism Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242251
    S3‑241845 KI#2, New Sol: Authorization of intermediate UE interacting with AIoT device vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241846 New Sol: AIoT device authentication and authorization vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241920 New solution for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: this doesn’t cover any requirements. Ericsson: align with SA2. Interdigital: last sentence should be an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑242540  
    S3‑242540 New solution for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241920
    S3‑241938 Solution on authorization of Intermediate UE for AIoT services OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm, Ericsson: editor's note to align with SA2.
 		revised No S3‑242541  
    S3‑242541 Solution on authorization of Intermediate UE for AIoT services OPPO Beijing pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241938
    S3‑242110 Solution_Authorization of AIoT capable UE in topology 2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei wanted to have more time to study this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242122 New solution on authorization of intermediate node for Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this contribution. Qualcomm found too many issues and proposed to note it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242199 Solution on AIoT capable UE Authorization OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t find this agreable.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242290 Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT AS Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242340 Solution for Authentication, Authorization of AIoT devices with USIM on AIoT Layer Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241847 KI#3, New Sol: Privacy protection on number of AIoT devices vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241866 Solution for Lightweight AIoT ID privacy InterDigital Belgium. LLC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241931 New solution on KI3 Privacy by protecting AIoT device identifiers CALTTA pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242139 Sol on AIoT device ID protection during the AIoT device initial registration OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242151 A new solution for privacy protection of AIoT device identifier Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242159 Sol on temporary ID based AIoT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242250 New solution - Ambient IoT ID privacy Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241978 solution on protection of information transfer for AIoT services Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑242152 A new solution for end-to-end security protection of command Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241919 Clean up for TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑241881 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on Authentication Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241882 AIoT - New KI for Ambient IoT on communication security Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241883 AIoT - Security assumption for Ambient IoT Apple pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242536 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.10 SID on security aspects of Usage of User Identities S3‑241722 User authentication and authorization of human user Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242495  
    S3‑242495 User authentication and authorization of human user Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241722
    S3‑241810 User authentication Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242496  
    S3‑242496 User authentication Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241810
    S3‑241854 New Solution for User Authentication and Authorization via AMF InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242497  
    S3‑242497 New Solution for User Authentication and Authorization via AMF InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241854
    S3‑241855 New Solution for User Authentication and Authorization via SMF InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242498  
    S3‑242498 New Solution for User Authentication and Authorization via SMF InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241855
    S3‑241921 Solution to KI#1 and KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242499  
    S3‑242499 Solution to KI#1 and KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241921
    S3‑241960 new solution for User A&A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242500  
    S3‑242500 new solution for User A&A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241960
    S3‑242010 New soluiton to address KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242501  
    S3‑242501 New soluiton to address KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242010
    S3‑242074 New Solution for KI #1 of TR 33.700-32 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242502  
    S3‑242502 New Solution for KI #1 of TR 33.700-32 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242074
    S3‑242134 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Preconfigured Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242503  
    S3‑242503 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Preconfigured Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242134
    S3‑242135 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Derived Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242668  
    S3‑242668 33.700-32: New Solution on User Authentication with Derived Credential Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242135
    S3‑242232 A user plane based solution for key issue #1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242504  
    S3‑242504 A user plane based solution for key issue #1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242232
    S3‑242249 New solution - Human User ID authentication and authorization Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242505  
    S3‑242505 New solution - Human User ID authentication and authorization Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242249
    S3‑242277 New solution to handle Security Requirements of KI #1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242506  
    S3‑242506 New solution to handle Security Requirements of KI #1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242277
    S3‑241808 user profile exposure privacy issue Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242507  
    S3‑242507 user profile exposure privacy issue Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241808
    S3‑241809 User privacy during the connection with 5GC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242508  
    S3‑242508 User privacy during the connection with 5GC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241809
    S3‑241961 new solution for User privacy protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242509  
    S3‑242509 new solution for User privacy protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241961
    S3‑242011 New KI on privacy to non-3GPP device case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: remove evaluation. Nokia: add editor's note on mobility scenario.
 		revised No S3‑242610  
    S3‑242610 New KI on privacy to non-3GPP device case Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242011
    S3‑242233 New solution for key issue #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: remove evaluation and add editor's note on mobility scenario.Huawei suggested another editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑242611  
    S3‑242611 New solution for key issue #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242233
    S3‑241874 Solution for authentication and authorization of non-3GPP devices behind 5G-RG CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242612  
    S3‑242612 Solution for authentication and authorization of non-3GPP devices behind 5G-RG CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241874
    S3‑241962 new solution for non-3gpp device A&A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242613  
    S3‑242613 new solution for non-3gpp device A&A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241962
    S3‑242075 New Solution for KI #3 of TR 33.700-32 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242614  
    S3‑242614 New Solution for KI #3 of TR 33.700-32 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242075
    S3‑242356 New solution for key issue #3 Ericsson India Private Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242359 Authentication and authorization of non-3GPP devices Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: not clear whether this is needed.
 		revised No S3‑242615  
    S3‑242615 Authentication and authorization of non-3GPP devices Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242359
    S3‑242012 New soluiton to address KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242133 33.700-32: Update to Key Issue #3 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesCableLabs: some of this is not concluded in SA2 yet. Xiaomi: these are assumptions, no need to conclude on them. Ericsson didn’t agree with this contribution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242132 33.700-32: Update to Assumption Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with the first definition. Interdigital didn’t support it either.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242234 New solution for key issue #3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242515 Draft TR 33.700-32 Interdigital draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.11 R19 SID on UAS security enhancement S3‑241856 New solution UAV Authentication and Authorization for Multiple USS InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: align the editor's note with SA2. Ericsson proposed anothereditor's note.
 		revised No S3‑242516  
    S3‑242516 New solution UAV Authentication and Authorization for Multiple USS InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241856
    S3‑241955 UUAA supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242518  
    S3‑242518 UUAA supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesAdding editor's notes proposed by Ericsson and Interdigital.
 		approved No   S3‑241955
    S3‑241956 Authorization supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: take out the "must". Qualcomm: align with SA2 with an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑242519  
    S3‑242519 Authorization supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241956
    S3‑241957 Revocation supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242520  
    S3‑242520 Revocation supporting multiple USS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241957
    S3‑241954 new key issue for no transmit zones (NTZ) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm and Interdigital were not convinced about what this key issue was trying to address. This was taken offline.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242517 Draft TR 33.759 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑242072 Update the clause 4 of TR 33.743 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241857 New Solution for Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcommm wasn’t sure why this was needed. Ericsson had also some comments and this was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242650  
    S3‑242650 New Solution for Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay InterDigital France R&D, SAS pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241857
    S3‑241942 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242651  
    S3‑242651 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model A Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241942
    S3‑241943 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242652  
    S3‑242652 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay discovery Model B Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241943
    S3‑241944 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242522  
    S3‑242522 New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241944
    S3‑242000 New Solution for Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay security establishment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: remove the evaluation. Qualcomm: add editor's note on user plane solution.
 		revised No S3‑242523  
    S3‑242523 New Solution for Multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay security establishment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242000
    S3‑242070 New Solution on Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay Communication China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242524  
    S3‑242524 New Solution on Security for multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay Communication China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242070
    S3‑242117 New solution on multi-hop U2N relay discovery security procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242525  
    S3‑242525 New solution on multi-hop U2N relay discovery security procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242117
    S3‑242118 New solution on multi-hop U2N relay security establishment procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242526  
    S3‑242526 New solution on multi-hop U2N relay security establishment procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242118
    S3‑242153 A new solution for multihop U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242527  
    S3‑242527 A new solution for multihop U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242153
    S3‑242154 A new solution for multi-hop U2N relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: step 2 is not clear.Qualcomm had also comments that had to be taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑242653  
    S3‑242653 A new solution for multi-hop U2N relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242154
    S3‑242001 New Solution for Multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: alignment with SA2 is needed.
 		revised No S3‑242528  
    S3‑242528 New Solution for Multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242001
    S3‑242071  New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay Communication China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: remove the third bullet in the solution details.
 		revised No S3‑242529  
    S3‑242529  New Solution on Security of multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay Communication China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242071
    S3‑242068 New solution for multi-hop U2U discovery China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242530  
    S3‑242530 New solution for multi-hop U2U discovery China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242068
    S3‑242155 A new solution for multihop U2U relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242532  
    S3‑242532 A new solution for multihop U2U relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242155
    S3‑242156 A new solution for multihop U2U relay communication security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242521 Draft TR 33.743 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.13 SID on security aspects of AIML enhancements S3‑242085 Address topology EN in Key Issue#2 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242584  
    S3‑242584 Address topology EN in Key Issue#2 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242085
    S3‑242209 New KI on protection of network topology information in VFL China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242210 Topology information exposure EN resolving of KI #2 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242584  
    S3‑242086 New key issue on Security of communication data used in VFL training process vivo, InterDigital, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242585  
    S3‑242585 New key issue on Security of communication data used in VFL training process vivo, InterDigital, China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242086
    S3‑242162 KI on protection of training data exchange in VFL OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242585  
    S3‑242093 Add KI on Privacy of processing VFL intermediate data Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242585  
    S3‑242094 Discussion paper on processing VFL training data using privacy computation Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241811 Solutionf for VLF member authorization Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242586  
    S3‑242586 Solutionf for VLF member authorization Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241811
    S3‑242087 New solution on KI2 Authorization of VFL member selection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242587  
    S3‑242587 New solution on KI2 Authorization of VFL member selection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242087
    S3‑242160 New Solution to KI#2: Authorization of VFL participant involving NWDAF and AF Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242588  
    S3‑242588 New Solution to KI#2: Authorization of VFL participant involving NWDAF and AF Ericsson,Huawei pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242160
    S3‑242184 Authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242589  
    S3‑242589 Authorization mechanism through NRF and NEF for AF outside the PLMN Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242184
    S3‑242309 New sol for KI#2_Authorization for selection of participant NWDAF instances for the 3rd party AF-initiated federated Learning Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242590  
    S3‑242590 New sol for KI#2_Authorization for selection of participant NWDAF instances for the 3rd party AF-initiated federated Learning Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242309
    S3‑242311 New sol for KI#2_Authorization for selection of participant AF for the NWDAF-initiated federated Learning Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242591  
    S3‑242591 New sol for KI#2_Authorization for selection of participant AF for the NWDAF-initiated federated Learning Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242311
    S3‑241800 A new solution for AIML Data Privacy Protection InterDigital Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241980 New solution on KI#3 Privacy of VFL between VFL members Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242592  
    S3‑242592 New solution on KI#3 Privacy of VFL between VFL members Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241980
    S3‑242088 New solution to KI3 privacy of data and sample alignment vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242593  
    S3‑242593 New solution to KI3 privacy of data and sample alignment vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242088
    S3‑242140 New Solution to KI#3: Privacy of VFL between VFL members Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242594  
    S3‑242594 New Solution to KI#3: Privacy of VFL between VFL members Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242140
    S3‑242171 VFL sample alignment initialled by NWDAF OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242595  
    S3‑242595 VFL sample alignment initialled by NWDAF OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242171
    S3‑242312 New solution for KI#3 Privacy protect mechanism for sample alignment Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242669  
    S3‑242669 New solution for KI#3 Privacy protect mechanism for sample alignment Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242312
    S3‑241981 New solution on KI#1 Security aspects on enhancements to LCS to support AIML Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242596  
    S3‑242596 New solution on KI#1 Security aspects on enhancements to LCS to support AIML Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241981
    S3‑242113 Solution to KI#1 Reusing existing security mechanism for LCS China Unicom, ZTE pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242597  
    S3‑242310 New solution for KI#1 LMF authorization mechanism in the AIML model retrieving scenarios Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242597  
    S3‑242597 New solution for KI#1 LMF authorization mechanism in the AIML model retrieving scenarios Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242310
    S3‑241774 New Solution to KI#2 Authorization of VFL participant involving NWDAF and AF Ericsson GmbH, Eurolab pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242102 Solution to KI#1 Reusing existing security mechanism for LCS China Unicom pCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242609 Draft TR 33.784 China /Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.14 SID_EdgeComputing S3‑241827 Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in EDGE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241828 Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in the EDGE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242567  
    S3‑242567 Secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in the EDGE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241828
    S3‑242041 Solution for EEC provided IP address verification Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242661  
    S3‑242661 Solution for EEC provided IP address verification Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242041
    S3‑242165 EEC provided information verification Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson, Samsung, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242567  
    S3‑242166 New KI on authorization of AF outside the operator domain Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242567  
    S3‑242205 New key issue on EEC provided IP address verification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242567  
    S3‑242604 Draft TR 33.749 China Unicom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.15 SID on security aspects for Multi-Access S3‑242050 Add Abbreviations Intel pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242013 update key issue #1 on privacy aspect Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242568  
    S3‑242014 Address EN of key issue #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242569  
    S3‑242568 update key issue #1 on privacy aspect Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242013
    S3‑242569 Address EN of key issue #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242014
    S3‑241984 New key issue about UPF exposing new IP communication endpoint Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242622  
    S3‑242622 New key issue about UPF exposing new IP communication endpoint Huawei, HiSilicon,Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑241984
    S3‑241987 New solution about doing access control for UPF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241983 Using 3GPP security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for NIN3A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242570  
    S3‑242570 Using 3GPP security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for NIN3A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241983
    S3‑242317 New sol for KI#1_AUSF based authenticatation mechanism for UE and UPF Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242571  
    S3‑242571 New sol for KI#1_AUSF based authenticatation mechanism for UE and UPF Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242317
    S3‑241833 Solution for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity protection of UE in ATSSS while selecting MPQUIC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242572  
    S3‑242572 Solution for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity protection of UE in ATSSS while selecting MPQUIC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241833
    S3‑242058 Secure Authentication and Connectivity for UE in ATSSS over NIN3A Intel pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242573  
    S3‑242573 Secure Authentication and Connectivity for UE in ATSSS over NIN3A Intel pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242058
    S3‑242092 Solution for KI#1 & #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242574  
    S3‑242574 Solution for KI#1 & #2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242092
    S3‑242301 Solution on omitting IPsec for QUIC traffic over non-3GPP access Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242654  
    S3‑242654 Solution on omitting IPsec for QUIC traffic over non-3GPP access Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242301
    S3‑241982 IPsec solution between UE and UPF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242575  
    S3‑242575 IPsec solution between UE and UPF Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241982
    S3‑242319 New sol for KI#2_User plane data protection mechanism between UE and UPF Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242655  
    S3‑242655 New sol for KI#2_User plane data protection mechanism between UE and UPF Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242319
    S3‑242252 Update to new SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) Philips International B.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241872 Revised SID on security aspects for Multi-Access (DualSteer + ATSSS Ph-4) CableLabs SID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241871 Reply LS on the use of TLS with QUIC in ATSSS context CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242318 New sol for KI#1_A random number based authenticatation mechanism for UE and UPF Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242605 Draft TR 33.754 Intel draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.16 SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving S3‑241936 Addition of security threat to KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242576  
    S3‑242576 Addition of security threat to KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241936
    S3‑242176 Update KI#2 on Authorization for exposing Energy related information Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242577  
    S3‑242577 Update KI#2 on Authorization for exposing Energy related information Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242176
    S3‑241937 Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy-related information collection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242578  
    S3‑242578 Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy-related information collection Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241937
    S3‑241992 Solution on mutual authentication and NEF-AF interface protection for exposing energy related information Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242579  
    S3‑242579 Solution on mutual authentication and NEF-AF interface protection for exposing energy related information Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241992
    S3‑242316 New solution for KI#2 protection for network energy related information exposure Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242579  
    S3‑241775 Addition of security threat to KI#1 L.M. Ericsson Limited pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑241776 Solution reusing existing interfaces and security mechanisms for energy-related information L.M. Ericsson Limited pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242606 Draft TR 33.766 Nokia draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.17 SID on security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑241933 Update to security architecture and assumptions ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242211 Add terms to TR 33.745 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242009 Update Key issue #5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242053 New KI on direct link between 5G NR Femtos China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242054 New KI on 5G NR Femto management system accessible on the public internet China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑242276 Key issue on broadcasting manipulated CAG IDs by the malicious Femto devices Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241934 Solution to KI#1 Ownership Security ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241710 Solution to authenticate and secure backhaul of 5G NR Femto Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242580  
    S3‑242580 Solution to authenticate and secure backhaul of 5G NR Femto Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241710
    S3‑242057 Solution to KI#2 in TR33.745 China Telecomunication Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑241928 New Solution for UE access control using CAG verification Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242581  
    S3‑242581 New Solution for UE access control using CAG verification Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241928
    S3‑241935 Editorial update to gap analysis table ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242582  
    S3‑242008 Update to Annex A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242582  
    S3‑242582 Update to Annex A Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑242008
    S3‑242255 Partially fill the gap analysis table of TR 33.745 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242582  
    S3‑242212 Evaluation for solution#1 of TR 33.757 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242213 Evaluation for solution#5 of TR 33.757 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242215 Evaluation for solution#12 of TR 33.757 China Mobile Group Device Co. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑242607 Draft TR 33.745 ZTE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.18 SID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑241932 New solution for UE authorization China Unicom, ZTE pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242583  
    S3‑242583 New solution for UE authorization China Unicom, ZTE pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241932
    S3‑242095 New sol for KI 2 about using homomorphic technology processing user sensitive data Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242096 New key issue on security aspect of digital asset container in 5GC Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242608 Draft TR 33.721 Samsung draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work item proposals S3‑241771 New SID on Security Aspects of Roaming Traffic Offload via Home-Session Breakout OTD_US SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: some work tasks already covered in existing specifications. Huawei didn’t agree with some of the issues covered.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241993 Discussion paper on security aspects of NEF Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241991 SID on security aspects of NEF Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT SID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t find this SID necessary. Samsung: it can be addressed with a TEI19 CR.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242066 Discussion of enhancements for SNPN cellular hotspots Cisco, Intel discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242061 Study on Security Aspects of Interconnect of SNPN Cisco, Intel SID new   Yes
YesEricsson didn’t find it clear the need to have this study in Rel-19. ORANGE: come back with a discussion paper so we know in which direction we are going. Intel: we already brought a discussion paper about this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242257 New SID on security management service China Mobile, ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CATT, CableLabs, China Telecom SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we need to study the operators' use cases like we do in Zero Trust. Interdigital: objectives too open-ended. No interfaces to protect here. Huawei: hard to see what needs to be done in SA3. NTT-Docomo liked the idea but preferred to see it as an extension of the Zero Trust study.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242287 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 Samsung SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei wanted to add some work tasks. Nokia: focus on something that everybody agrees now and start asap as SA6 is progressing quickly. Huawei added that this new WT was inline with SA6. The Chair asked to focus on the most critical tasks coming from SA6.
 		revised No S3‑242660  
    S3‑242660 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 Samsung SID new Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo asked to be minuted: SA3 agrees to work on the stable solutions of SA6's work.
 		agreed No   S3‑242287
    S3‑242288 New SID on security aspects NR mobility enhancement Samsung, OPPO SID new Approval Yes
YesNTT_Docomo: RAN2 has zero input of in which direction SA3 is thinking. Ericsson: we need to tell RAN2 something. Huawei: we shouldn’t choose an option but point out those options that we agree that are bad.
 		revised No S3‑242401  
    S3‑242401 New WID on security aspects NR mobility enhancement Samsung, OPPO WID new Approval Yes
YesApple asked to minute that any progress in the WID will be communicated to RAN2in due time.
 		agreed No   S3‑242288
    S3‑242358 PLMN hosting a NPN SID Update Lenovo SID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑241791 New WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Nokia WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242659  
    S3‑242659 New WID on Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Nokia WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241791
    S3‑241963 Home control for Network Slice Admission Control procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241964 Dummy WID for home control for NSAC procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: this is the 4th time we see it and we are not convinced yet. Maybe it could be done as part of the Zero Trust study. Huawei: can we go for a working agreement? The Chair replied that it was hard to decide what the working assumption would be based on. He suggested taking it to Plenary as a company CR.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242198 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the WID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑242201 New WID on specification of new f5 function Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair asked if it had an impact on existing specifications, if there was a need to have it in Rel-19. Ericssson thought that indeed it was necessary. NTT-Docomo:organize conference calls before the meeting, we also see this far from implementation at this moment. The Chair suggested to have a conference call to decide the way to proceed so as not to take meeting time.
 		noted No    
    S3‑241790 Discussion paper on AEAD KDDI Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242399 Summary on the contributions submitted for security handling of inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Samsung discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑242658 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung other Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
7 CVD and research S3‑241764 CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑242240 LS on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242453  
    S3‑241947 LS reply on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 5G Core Network Attacks Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242453  
    S3‑242453 LS reply on GSMA CVD-2023-0069 5G Core Network Attacks Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑241947
    S3‑241948 Clarification on SBI token Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson asked to minute the following agreement: SA3 will discuss the inclusion of ID token plane as a Rel-19 CR.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑241949 Clarification on NFDiscovery Authorization Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242451  
    S3‑242451 Clarification on NFDiscovery Authorization Huawei, HiSilicon,Nokia,Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑241949
    S3‑242235 Validation of the allowed slices in the access token request at NRF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242236 Validation of the requested slices at NF service producer Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242237 Support iat claim in the access token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this includes enhancements that are out of scope and should be discussed in a separate contribution. Nokia: this is not solving the CVD issue, I object.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑241798 Clarification of security requirement on NF Discovery response BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242451  
    S3‑242238 Clarification of security requirement on NF Discovery response Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑242451  
    S3‑242239 Correcting wrong implementation of agreed CR Erricsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑242452  
    S3‑242452 Correcting wrong implementation of agreed CR Erricsson,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑242239
    S3‑241797 Add parameters to NRF discovery authorization BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesRelated to 2238 from Ericsson. It was pointed out that this should be treated in the CVD agenda. Huawei preferred to have it as a draft CR in Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑242454 Living document Add parameters to NRF discovery authorization BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
8 Any Other Business S3‑241705 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other Agreement Yes
YesOnly Nokia and Google supported having one or two online meetings. NTT-Docomo: impossible to know one year in advance whether we can switch to online meetings. Huawei agreed with this. ORANGE, Thales: online meetings are not efficient. We don’t support having them. Interdigital supported having f2f meetings only.
 		noted No