**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #108e *S3-221853-r2***

**e-meeting, 22 - 26 August 2022**

**Source: Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell**

**Title: KI3 EN resolution on requirements for subscribe notify**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.24**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***EN resolution on requirements for subscribe notify key issue***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TR 33.875

# 3 Rationale

*Resolution of "Editor’s Note: It is ffs whether these are the correct requirements." is proposed by clarifying the text.*

# 4 Detailed proposal

*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGE*

### 5.3.3 Potential security requirements

It shall be possible for 5G system to ensure notification service is only provided to an authorized NF routed by the URI in the subscribe request message.

It shall be possible for the 5G system to ensure that the notification service is only provided to an NF that has authorized the subscriber to subscribe on its behalf for notifications.

It shall be possible for the 5G system to prevent information disclosure to an unauthorized NF routed by the URI in the subscribe request message.

*\*\*\*\*\* NEXT CHANGE*

## 7.3 KI#3: Service access authorization in the "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios

### 7.3.1 Analysis

TBD

Editor's Note: The following points need analysis 1) Since NF\_A can also subscribe on its own behalf and forward the information, it is not clear whether the information leakage can be addressed. 2) It is not clear whether accidental mis-operation shall be prevented or intentional attacks. 3) Since the example scenarios assume compromised UDM or DCCF, which have access to large amounts of highly sensitive user and network data, it is not clear whether stricter authorization requirements on the delegated subscribe notify can prevent information disclosure in case of a compromised UDM or DCCF. Solutions to this key issue need to clearly specify which threats they mitigate and which not.

### 7.3.2 Conclusion

TBD

*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGE*