**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #107-e *draft\_S3-220968-r1***

**e-meeting, 16 - 20 May 2022**

**Source: Ericsson**

**Title: Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1 to emphasize that security parameters for PC5 Direct Communication are determined during Direct Discovery**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 4.7**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1***

# 2 References

[1] 3GPP TS 33.503 "Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) (Release 17)"

[2] 3GPP TS 23.304 “Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) (Release 17)”

# 3 Rationale

Move PC5 direct communication security for relay services to a separate paragraph as it is describing a different procedure .Correct reference 6.1 to 6.1.3.2 as 6.1 also describes open 5G Prose Discovery. Remove “negotiation” as “negotiation” is not done during restrict discovery.

# 4 Detailed Proposal

## \*\*\*\*\*\*\* START OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

## 6.2 Security for unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication

### 6.2.1 General

The unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication procedures are described in TS 23.304 [2]. Unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication is used by two UEs that directly exchange traffic for the ProSe applications running between the peer UEs.

PC5 security policy provisioning for unicast mode 5G Prose Direct Communication during the restricted 5G ProSe Discovery procedure is specified in clause 6.1.3.2.

PC5 direct communication security for relay services is specified in clause 6.3.

If the UE receives PC5 security policies from 5G DDNMF as specified in 6.1.3.2.2, the UE uses the PC5 security policies from 5G DDNMF to establish PC5 unicast communication security instead of the PC5 security policies provisioned by PCF or pre-configured in UE as defined in TS 23.304 [2].

## \*\*\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGES \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*