**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #105-e *S3-214071-r1***

e-meeting, 8 - 19 November 2021

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.116** | **CR** | **0002** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **14.1.0** |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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| ***Title:***  | Clarification on the emergency test |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei, HiSilicon |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | SCAS |  | ***Date:*** | 2021-10-21 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **F** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-14 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | The execution step of the emergency bearers can not tested, sine there is no existing mechanisms which can be used to initiate the authentication by the MME after receiving the security protected request for the EPS emergacy bearer. Hence, it is suggested to revise to steps to align with the purpose that only emergency bearers can be used without successful authentication. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Execution steps and expected results are changed to align the original purpose. |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Test cannot be performed. |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | 4.2.2.6.1 |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **x** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **x** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **x** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

\* \* \* First Change \* \* \* \*

##### 4.2.2.6.1 Authentication failure for emergency bearers

NOTE: The use of NULL integrity is addressed in clause D.3.2.3.3.

*Requirement Name*: Emergency bearer establishment when authentication fails

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.401[5], clause 15.1.

*Requirement Description*: "The MME or UE shall always release any established non-emergency bearers, when the authentication fails in the UE or in the MME." as specified in TS 33.401, clause 15.1.

*Threat References*: TBA

*Security Objective References*: TBA

*Test Case*:

**Purpose:**

Ensure that the MME enforces that only emergency bearers can be used without successful authentication.

**Pre-Conditions:**

Test environment with MME and UE. UE may be simulated. The serving network policy allows unauthenticated IMS Emergency Sessions.

**Execution Steps**

The UE sends the initial attach request for EPS emergency bearer services, then the MME initiates an authentication, which fails. The UE attached for EPS emergency bearer services sends the PDN Connectivity request for EPS non-emergency bearer services.

**Expected Results:**

The MME allows to continue the set up of the emergency bearer, and will reject the PDN Connectivity request for EPS non-emergency bearer services.

\* \* \* End of Changes \* \* \* \*