**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #103e- Bis *S3-211595-r2***

**e-meeting, 17 - 28 May 2021** Revision of S3-2xxxxx

**Source: Intel**

**Title: Conclusion to Key issue 1,2**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.19**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***It is requested to approve the key issue for 33.873***

# 2 References

[1] LS S2-2006011: " LS on System support for Multi-USIM devices."

[2] S2-2100080: “Notes of SA2#143E\_CC#0 - pre-meeting moderated email discussion results v3”

[3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System."

[4] 3GPP TR 23.761: " Study on system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM)"

# 3 Rationale

Solution 1 relies on already defined mechanisms in TS 33.501[1] to send ciphered and integrity protected BUSY indication and fulfills security requirements of Key issue 1. This solution is recommended to be reused to support sending busy indication.

For Key Issue 2, as discussed during the last meeting, SA2 has postponed this feature from Rel-17 so no security solution will be pursued.

# 4 Detailed proposal

**\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Start Of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\***

# 7 Conclusions

Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.

## 7.1 Key issue #1: Security Aspects of Busy Indication

Solution 1 is recommended for normative work to support encryption and integrity protection of Reject paging indication (Busy Indication) via NAS signaling. Solution 1 relies on already defined mechanisms in TS 33.501[1] to send ciphered, and integrity protected Reject paging indication (busy indication) and fulfills security requirements of Key issue 1. For Rel-17, no normative work will be pursued.

**\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End Of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\***