3GPP TSG SA WG 3 Meeting SA3#103e TDoc draft\_S3-211523-r4

Electronic meeting, Online, 17 - 28 May 2021

**Title: Reply LS to LS on broadcasting from other PLMN in case of Disaster Condition**

**Response to: LS C1-211189 on LS on broadcasting from other PLMN in case of Disaster Condition from CT1**

**Release: Rel-17**

**Work Item: FS\_MINT-CT**

**Source:** **SA3**

**To: CT1**

**Cc: RAN2**

**Contact person: Dongjoo Kim**

 **dongjoo7.kim@lge.com**

**Send any reply LS to: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator,** **mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org**

**Attachments:** **None**

# 1 Overall description

SA3 thanks CT1 for the LS (C1-211189/ S3-211372) on FS\_MINT-CT being studied in TR 24.811.

For the two questions in this LS:

Q1: Whether receiving and utilizing broadcast information as being studied in TR 24.811 from PLMNs other than the PLMN with Disaster Condition, which can be the home PLMN or a visited PLMN, pose any security risks; and

A1: Yes, there are security risks as the broadcast information is not protected. For example, a false base station may impersonate PLMN with disaster condition after the genuine serving PLMN with disaster condition broken down.

Q2: If the answer to Q1 is yes, then what would be SA3's recommendations from security perspective?

A2: The impact of these security risk(s) is no worse than denial of service to the UE (e.g., MINT service not available) with the assumption that the UE performs primary authentication and non-null integrity algorithms are activated by the other PLMN. If the DoS threat is acceptable for CT1, then no security enhancement is needed.

# 2 Actions

**To CT1**

**ACTION:** SA3 kindly asks CT1 to take the above reply into consideration for their subsequent works.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings

SA3#103bis-e 5 - 9 July 2021 Electronic meeting

SA3#104e 16 - 27 August 2021 Electronic meeting