**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #100e *S3-201838-r1***

**e-meeting, 17 -24 August 2020**

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| *CR-Form-v12.0* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.536** | **CR** | **0014** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **16.0.0** |  |
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| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **X** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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| ***Title:***  | Clarification on the UP security configuration checking |
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| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei, Hisilicon |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
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| ***Work item code:*** | eV2XARC |  | ***Date:*** | 21/07/2020 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **F** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-16 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)Rel-12 (Release 12)**Rel-13 (Release 13)Rel-14 (Release 14)Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | Currently, the configuration of UP confidentiality and integrity protection is negotiated using the PC5-S, i.e. the receiving UE may accept the Direct Communication Request and the response message shall include the configuration of user plane confidentiality protection based on the agreed user plane security policy. And the UE shall pass the security configuration to its AS layer. Therefore, there is no need to ensure the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection in the PC5-RRC message matches the agreed UP security policies for traffic traffic that will be sent on the bearer, when establishing or re-configuring the user plane bearer. The above operation in the initiating UE side can be removed. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Remove the UP security configuration checking in the initiating UE side, when establishing or re-configuring the user plane bearer. |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Redundent checking is not needed. |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | 5.3.3.1.4.5 |
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|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **x** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **x** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **x** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
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| ***Other comments:*** |  |
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| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Start of the change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

5.3.3.1.4.5 Security establishment for user plane bearers

The UEs handle the user plane security policies as described in clauses 5.3.3.1.4.2.3.

The UE initiating the establishment of a user plane bearer shall select an LCID whose associated value of Bearer for input to the security algorithms (see clauses 5.3.3.1.5.2 and 5.3.3.1.5.3) has not been used with the current keys, NRPEK and NRPIK. If this is not possible the UE shall initiate a re-keying (see clause 5.3.3.1.4.4) before establishing the user plane bearer.

When establishing or re-configuring the user plane bearers, the UEs shall activate the user plane security for the bearers according to the configuration of confidentiality and integrity protection received from its V2X layer. The confidentiality and/or integrity protection algorithms are same as those selected for protecting the signalling bearers if confidentiality and/or integrity protection are required for both signalling and user plane.

Both UEs shall ensure that the user plane for each V2X service is only sent or received (e.g. dropped if received on a bearer with incorrect security) on user plane bearers with the necessary security if security protection of this link is activated.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*End of the change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*