

# 3GPP Terminal Identity Security

## IMEI Security

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*Wael Adi*

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
# 1. Protected IMEI without provability (current GSM status GSM 02.09 V 4.4.0)

## Requirements:

*(1) It shall not be possible to change the IMEI after the ME's final production process. It shall resist tampering by any means (e.g. physical, electrical or software)*

*(2) The security policy for the Software Version Number (SVN) is such that it cannot be readily changed by the user, but can be updated with changes to the software.*

*The security of the SVN shall be separate from that of the IMEI.*



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## Security weaknesses

- IMEI is sent in clear (open identity)
- No proof of origin or type approval is possible
- Cloning is basically possible
- IMEI function in GSM failed till now
- IMEI security depends on software security

**As a result, requirement No. 2 appears to be contradictory !!**

Basic security rule is violated:

**”un-identified entity is a part of the system”**

## **Usage/relevant service:**

- Deter using stolen terminals
- Blacklisting type non-approved terminals
- Identify emergency call terminal
- reliable SIM lock ...
- *All these applications are unreliable/failed in GSM !*

## **Impact on security architecture:**

No impact. Methodology is up to the manufacturer

## **Advantages:**

- .Relatively simple to realize
- .No standardization is necessary

## 2. Protected and provable IMEI (proposal basics)

### Requirements (source BOSCH):

- An open **IMEI** and a corresponding secret part **SIMEI** is to be stored in a non-volatile memory in a tamperproof physical entity which is hard to remove, replace, read...
- A **common proof algorithm** is to be defined (for global identification)
- IMEI should not be easy to modify. If modified, then it should always be detected
- The manufacturer should electronically sign IMEI
- A third party should be able to verify the manufacturer's signature
- The terminal should include 64 such independent identities with 128 bits/each for separate use by owners, operator, user, authority etc.
- It should be possible to modify Identity if the secret part is presented.

# Protected and provable IMEI

## Security level

IMEI is cryptographically signed ( proof of signature)

- Proof of origin or type approval is possible
- Cloning is not possible.
- Terminal securely identified either if the software is not secure
- Network can identify terminals without destroying other services

## Protected and provable IMEI

### Usage/relevant service:

- Deter using stolen terminals
- Blacklisting type non-approved terminals
- Identify emergency call terminal
- Restricting service to some class of terminals with special quality
- Effective implementation of the MExE and Mobile IP security
- Secured SIM lock ... others

### Impact on security architecture:

Standardised architectures are necessary



## Impact on security architecture

1. A tamperproof **write-only** secret nonvolatile identity

**SMI (1..64) / 128 Bits each** (whatever *tamperproof* is)

**MI (1..64) /64 bits each** similarly stored (but readable)

2. Define a **commonly known** Signature Function **SF**.


**Either** **(SF1)**: a one way function ( say f8 or f9 )

**SIG = SF1 ( /SMI1,SMI2../ , /CH1, CH2.../)**


**Or** **(SF2)**: some public-key one way function (say Rabin-Lock)

**SIG = SF2 (/SMI1, SMI2..../, /CH1, CH2 .../)**


- No (trap door) to read any SMI. SMI is physically tied to some core function.




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**Verifier** : verify that the signature SIG is authentic





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## Advantages of the proposed architecture:

- Relatively simple to realize (probably without data base)!
- Cloning and theft could be prohibited
- Secured proof of origin and terminal capability are supported  
*(service restriction to certain class of terminal is possible)*
- Identification security does not depend on software security
- Identification functions do not disturb other system functions  
*(secured identification could be kept optional)*
- New application horizons in 3GPP ... !