Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects **TSGS#26(04)0868**

Meeting #26, Athens, Greece **revision to S3-041151**

CR-Form-v7

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **33.234** CR **020** ⌘ **rev** **5** ⌘ Current version: **6.2.1** ⌘

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

Proposed change affects: UICC apps⌘ ☐ ME [X] Radio Access Network ☐ Core Network ☐

Title:	⌘	Impact of Feasibility Study on (U)SIM Security Reuse by Peripheral Devices on Local Interfaces
Source:	⌘	MCC
Work item code:	⌘	WLAN
Date:	⌘	25/11/2004
Category:	⌘	**B**
Release:	⌘	Rel-6

Use one of the following categories:
- ***F*** *(correction)*
- ***A*** *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*
- ***B*** *(addition of feature),*
- ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)*
- ***D*** *(editorial modification)*

Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.

Use one of the following releases:

2	*(GSM Phase 2)*
R96	*(Release 1996)*
R97	*(Release 1997)*
R98	*(Release 1998)*
R99	*(Release 1999)*
Rel-4	*(Release 4)*
Rel-5	*(Release 5)*
Rel-6	*(Release 6)*

Reason for change:	⌘	TS 33.234 currently does not consider the Reuse of a Single SIM, USIM, or ISIM by peripheral devices on local interfaces to access multiple networks. This aspect has been studied in the feasibility study report (i.e. TR 33.817).
Summary of change:	⌘	Some minor changes to accommodate the additional feature.
Consequences if not approved:	⌘	New feature could not be supported.

Clauses affected:	⌘	4.1.4, 4.2.4.2, C.3.1
Other specs affected:	⌘	Y / N ☐ / N ☐ / N ☐ / N
	⌘	
Other comments:	⌘	The CR is the outcome of TR 33.817 that was supported by the following companies. Toshiba, Intel, T-Mobile, Telcordia, Thomson, Fujitsu, HP, RIM, SmartTrust, BT Group PLC, Alcatel and Gemplus. **CR020R4 has been updated by MCC (to CR020R5) because the addition to the Editors' note in 4.1.4 is no longer relevant as the first Editors note has been transformed to a normal NOTE in the TS.**

***** Start of change *****

4.1.4 Network elements

The list below describes the access control related functionality in the network elements of the 3GPP-WLAN interworking Reference Model:

- The **WLAN-UE**, equipped with a UICC (or SIM card), for accessing the WLAN interworking service):
  - May be capable of WLAN access only;
  - May be capable of both WLAN and 3GPP System access;
  - May be capable of simultaneous access to both WLAN and 3GPP systems;

Editors note: definition of simultaneous access still TBA with SA1- LS in S3 030169] Reply to SA2 in S3-030188 provides some clarification

  - May be a laptop computer or PDA with a WLAN card, UICC (or SIM card) card reader, and suitable software applications;
  - May be functionally split over several physical devices, that communicate over local interfaces e.g. Bluetooth, Infrared ~~IR~~ or serial cable interface;

Editors note: All these alternatives must be carefully studied from a security perspective.

- The **AAA proxy** represents a logical proxying functionality that may reside in any network between the WLAN and the 3GPP AAA Server. These AAA proxies are able to relay the AAA information between WLAN and the 3GPP AAA Server.
  The number of intermediate AAA proxies is not restricted by 3GPP specifications. The AAA proxy functionality can reside in a separate physical network node; it may reside in the 3GPP AAA server or any other physical network node;
- The **3GPP AAA server** is located within the 3GPP network. The 3GPP AAA server:
  - Retrieves authentication information from the HLR/HSS of the 3GPP subscriber's home 3GPP network;
  - Authenticates the 3GPP subscriber based on the authentication information retrieved from HLR/HSS. The authentication signalling may pass through AAA proxies;
  - Communicates authorisation information to the WLAN potentially via AAA proxies.
- The **Packet Data Gateway (PDGW)** enforces tunnel authorization and establishment with the information received from the 3GPP AAA via the Wm interface.

NOTE: The **WLAN Access Gateway (WAG)** responsibilities for security issues are related to tunnel establishment but this decision is pending to be taken.

***** End of change *****

***** Start of change *****

4.2.4.2 Generic s~~S~~ecurity requirements on local interface

The security functionality required on the terminal side for WLAN-3G interworking may be split over several physical devices that communicate over local interfaces. The UICC or the SIM card may reside in a 3GPP UE (acting as a (U)SIM "server") and be accessed by a WLAN-UE through Bluetooth, Infrared or a USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable or some other similar wired or wireless interconnect technology (acting as the (U)SIM "client"). This would facilitate the user to get simultaneous WLAN and 3GPP access with the same (U)SIM. If this is the case, then the following requirements shall be satisfied:

1. Any local interface shall be protected against eavesdropping, attacks on security-relevant information. This protection may be provided by physical or cryptographic means. For cryptographic means, the encryption key length shall be at least 128 bits.

2. The endpoints of a local interface should be authenticated and authorised. The authorisation may be implicit in the security set-up. Keys used for local interface transport security shall not be shared across local interface links. Each local interface shall use unique keys.

3. The involved devices shall be protected against eavesdropping, undetected modification attacks on security-relevant information. This protection may be provided by physical or cryptographic means.

4. The device without (U)SIM shall not be allowed to change the status of the device with (U)SIM, e.g. to reset it, or to switch its power on or off.

5. The (U)SIM holding device shall allow the user to shut off sharing of (U)SIM feature.

6. Whenever someone tries to remotely access a (U)SIM some sort of alert shall be sent, e.g. a message shall be displayed informing the user of the attempted access and guiding him to choose ì Allowî , or ì Disallowî . The user can then decide whether the access is authorized or not and can opt for allow or disallow the access.

7. Leakage of (U)SIM information (authentication data, session keys) to the user, or any third party over the UE Split local wireless interface (e.g. Bluetooth/WLAN) or wireline interface (USB etc) is the major security threat. This leakage of information shall be guarded against. (Integrity and privacy of signalling between the WLAN system, the 3GPP core network, and the WLAN-UE is covered under Wa, Wd and Wx interfaces).

8. The UICC holding device shall be responsible for scheduling all (possibly concurrent) accesses to the UICC by itself, and by one additional device connected via the local interface.

9. (U)SIM Security Reuse shall be consistent with current security arrangements and ensure that user security is not compromised.

10. Applications/Data information could be retrieved from (U)SIM, provided that the UICC (or SIM card) is inserted in a 3GPP ME. When the (U)SIM is re-used over local interfaces, further access control on the Applications/Data information shall be applied by the 3GPP ME holding the (U)SIM.

Editors note: It was agreed at SA3#31 that for WLAN interworking, modification of EAP parameters on the Bluetooth interface will cause EAP to fail in the network or on the USIM. It was therefore agreed to remove the "undetected modification" requirement from this TS.

***** End of change *****

***** Start of change *****

C.3.1 Attacks at the Victim's WLAN UE

Open platform terminals may be infected by viruses, Trojan horses or other malicious software. The software operates without the knowledge of the user on his terminal, and can be used for different types of attacks:

- If the user has credentials stored on a smart card connected to his terminal, a Trojan residing in the terminal can make fake requests to the smart card and send challenge-response results to another MS. For example, the owner of the latter MS could then get access with the stolen credentials.

NOTE: This attack is performed inside the terminal, and it is independent of the external link between the terminal and the smart card reader, which can be secured or assumed to be physically secure.

- Trojans may perform all the usual activities: monitor the user's keyboard or sensitive data, and forward the information to another machine.

- Malicious software can be used to perform Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. That is, several instantiations of the software (residing on different hosts) synchronise and start a DoS attack simultaneously against a target.

- Malicious software could be trying to connect to different WLANs, just to annoy the user.

Alternatively, the (U)SIM in the cellular phone can be used remotely from the WLAN client through a serial, infrared, or Bluetooth connection, ~~;~~ in order to use the phone as a smart card reader. As the terminal must access the (U)SIM in the phone, the link in between must be secure. Both cable and Infrared ~~IR~~ can be assumed physically secure, and Bluetooth will depend highly on the current Bluetooth security mechanism.

***** End of change *****