

**3GPP TSG SA WG3 & WG4 joint meeting**

**S3S4J040018**

**23-24 August 2004**

**Sophia Antipolis, France**

**Source: Chairman of 3GPP TSG-SA WG3**

**Title: Draft agenda for joint SA3-SA4 meeting on MBMS security**

**Document for: Approval**

**1 Opening of the meeting (Monday, 23 August, 14:00)**

**2 Agreement of the agenda**

The agenda was agreed.

It was agreed that the main meeting objective was for both groups to gain a better understanding of the work in each group. This would help identify gaps and overlaps in the two specifications and this information could then be used to complete the work in each group with the resulting specifications fitting together well. It was also hoped to draft some text for the SA4 specification, particularly the security section.

**2.1 3GPP IPR Declaration**

**3 Assignment of input documents**

**4 Status of relevant specifications**

**4.1 SA3 specifications on MBMS**

**Tdoc 12** (MBMS security rapporteur) provides an overview of the work in the MBMS TS.

If there are two distinct RTP flows (either on one MBMS bearer with two ports or on two MBMS bearers), are there issues to using one MTK or two for this situation. What other effects are there on the keying procedures. The more complicated scenarios that are allowed, the more complicated it will be come to know when a MTK can be thrown away. It was commented that the SA3 specification did not currently contain a method of throwing away old MTKs.

The issue of updating MTK was raised. It was commented that for streaming MTKs could be updated by interleaving MIKEY messages in the RTP stream carrying the data. The error resilience of this was questioned. It was noted that the MTK messages could be repeated. It was observed that there is nothing about this possible repetition in the SA3 TS 33.246. It was also noted that the TS does not mention the port numbers used for using MIKEY over UDP. It was asked if it had been considered to have a separate point-to-multipoint channel for the delivery of MTKs. This had not been considered by SA3 but is possible, although it would bring its own complexities, e.g. the need for the UE to open the ptm bearer to listen for MTK updates. Before this could be accepted, it was felt that the trade-offs between the two solutions would need to be studied in detail.

The relationship between MTK and MKI (the Master Key Identifier field in SRTP) was raised. It was noted that it would be compulsory to include the MKI field in all STRP packets for MBMS. More study is needed to look if the MKI field (9 bytes currently) can be omitted in parts of the RTP trailer.

It was asked how does the BM-SC know which UEs to send the new MSKs to? This would be done by some registering of interest in the service by the UE, which from SA3 perspective relates to application layer joining. SA4 delegates indicated that there was no SA4 requirement for UE to contact BM-SC to receive MBMS services.

**Tdoc 13** (SA3) is the latest version of the SA3 MBMS specification, TS 33.246.

It was noted that there needs to be a Unique Key Group ID across multiple BM-SCs. SA3's specification needs to be adapted for this.

It was asked how the BM-SC could contact the UE to send an MSK update if the UE is in idle mode. In that case the user has no active PDP context (no IP address exists). It was asked whether a Gmb procedure existed for this. SA3 action to think about and contact the relevant group (CN3) ?

Similarly how does a UE know how to contact the BM-SC. This information could be contained in the User Service Description.

It was felt that some text showing how put an MBMS service together would be useful. This could be contained in the SA4 TS or TR. There was some concern about not having it in the TS, as it would not seem part of the technical specifications.

It was noted that SA3 solution is actually bearer agnostic such that the data can be transported in multicast mode as well as in broadcast mode. This was recognized as a possible reason for the application layer joining procedure.

## **4.2 SA4 specifications on MBMS**

**Tdoc 14** and **t doc 15** (SA4) are the latest versions of TS 26.346 and TR 26.946.

Download section is quite mature while the Streaming section is less mature. Other sections still need more work.

The RTCP (in downlink) is automatically integrity protected by SRTP (called SRTCP).

There was a request from SA4 for input to clause 9 of the specifications.

There were doubts if the User Service Description needs to be integrity protected.

**Tdoc 11** (Siemens) reviews the SA4 contribution S4-040527.

It was noted that document 527 has not been agreed by SA4-plenary. Still the joint meeting felt it useful to discuss this early draft of reference architecture in order to get a mutual understanding of the allocation of security functions within it.

- Why Gmb proxy? The Gmb proxy is optional. The SA2 specification allows a split of Gmb functionality into the user authorisation and the Session Start like functionality that indicates data is about to be sent. The Gmb proxy is under discussion and if it part of the BM-SC it will require no standardisation and only be part of the Gmb interface.
- In clause 4.4, it was noted that some functions are not allocated to blocks in the architecture.
- The joint meeting agreed that it was important to add security functions in additions to the procedures given S4-040527. It was felt that the best way to achieve this was via company contributions directly to SA4.
- SA4 use the term User Service Initiation, whereas SA3 use the term application layer joining. SA3 should align with the SA4 terminology where appropriate. It was noted that it is currently not clear if the application layer joining would be a subprocedure of this User Service initiation or a separate procedure. The final specification of these procedures will need to be aligned between SA3, SA4 and CN1.
- There were other editorial changes discussed. An update of the document including the agreed changes was made in **tdoc 16** and can be used by SA4 for reaching agreement on appropriate text in their next meeting.

## **5 Questions from SA3 to SA4**

### **5.1 Questions presented in the LS S3-040675**

#### **5.2 What is the SA4 status on MBMS application layer joining/leaving procedures?**

#### **5.3 What are the SA4 plans on post delivery procedures (e.g. point to point repair service)?**

#### **5.4 What is the status of HTTP usage for MBMS?**

#### **5.5 Other questions**

## **6 Questions from SA4 to SA3**

## **7 Further discussion on technical issues**

### **7.1 Protection of streaming data**

**Tdoc 17** (LS from SA3 to SA4) was opened for discussion. SA3 asked for some further clarification on the use of SRTP. The SA4 delegates clarified that SRTP is used for the integrity protection of PSS and is optional to implement at the UE. The reason for this choice was driven by the requirements of OMA DRM. SA3 also asked about the other methods that were hinted at by SA4 in their response. It was verbally reported that the RTP wrapper payload for OMA DRM was a possible solution, but no technical proposal was received at this joint meeting. The SA4 delegates in the meeting stated that SA4 are happy with SRTP as a technical solution. The joint meeting agreed that the Editor's note on SRTP in the SA3 specification could be deleted before the specification was presented to the September SA plenary for approval, subject to e-mail approval on the SA3 list.

**Tdoc 2** (Ericsson) describes the overlap between the SA3 and SA4 work on MBMS security and in particular how the combination of MIKEY and SRTP could be used. Much of the document had been covered by earlier discussions (see **tdocs 12, 13, 14, 15** and **17**). The document emphasized that DRM and MBMS security provided different use cases. The document highlighted four areas of overlap: PTP repair service, streaming protection, download protection and application level joining (if defined by

SA4). It was commented that the protection of the PTP repair should really be more general and cover all post delivery functions. It also seems to be the case that there will need to be some application level procedure to initiate the key management and the open questions is how/where to specify this.

There exact combination of integrity and confidentiality protection was discussed. It is noted in clause 5.3 of TS 33.246 that protection is either confidentiality or confidentiality and integrity protection. This seems to be out of line with the requirements and also the desire to have no protection. It was agreed that the clause should be reviewed by SA3.

**Tdoc 6** (Samsung) notes that the definition of MKI in clause 6.6.2.1 is incorrect and should also include Network ID and Key Group ID. The meeting agreed that the change was technically correct and should be made to the specification before the presentation to the SA plenary, subject to no objections on the SA3 list. It was also felt that it may be possible to reduce the length of the MKI by knowing some of the parameters implicitly. These ways will be explored for the next two SA3 meetings.

**Tdoc 10** (Siemens) proposes a specific order for the protection of streaming data and the application of FEC to the data. It proposes that FEC can and should be applied to the data before it is encrypted i.e. to use default order that is proposed by the RFC3711 (SRTP). There were concerns raised that any architecture should not tie different media types together, i.e. it should be possible to apply different coding overheads to different media streams. It was noted that FEC-encrypt order for streaming might be different to the ordering for download. It was discussed whether the security was weakened by applying FEC first before of encryption, as there would be linear relation in the encrypted data. Ericsson noted that due to the use of salting keys within SRTP encryption they did see no security risk.

The meeting had no problems with the proposed ordering of FEC and encryption for streaming, i.e. apply FEC before encryption. The meeting felt that the SA4 specification was the correct place to capture this ordering. If companies have any security concerns with this decision, they are invited to raise them by bringing in a contribution at the October SA3 meeting so the concerns can be forwarded to SA4.

## **7.2 Protection of download data**

**Tdoc 8** (Nokia) proposes the use of OMA Downloadv1 for use in downloading files in MBMS. The process involves pre-processing, e.g. to ensure sufficient resources are available and post-processing, e.g. download complete notification. It is proposed at a minimum that this should at not least be excluded for MBMS. The proposal was considered not mature at this stage for SA3 delegates to comment upon. It was left to SA4 to discuss the acceptance of the proposal in their meetings.

**Tdoc 7** (Nokia) proposes to re-use the Discrete Content Format from OMA DRMv2, as the method of confidentiality protecting MBMS downloads. Integrity protection could be added on top of this by using XML signatures. There is some work to be done on how to specify the data is protected by MBMS methods as opposed by DRM techniques. It was questioned whether this proposal would need to be discussed in OMA, as there was concern that it might require changes to OMA specification. The support of a DRM Agent would be optional, as it would only be necessary to support the DCF content format for MBMS. With the DCF format it is possible to include more than one piece of protected content.

**Tdoc 3** (Ericsson) proposes the use of XML encryption and XML signatures for the protection of download data in MBMS. The use of S/MIME was ruled out, as there is no standardised way to use shared keys for integrity protection. It was commented that perhaps S/MIME with a MAC might be easier to support, but no conclusion was reached.

**Tdocs 7 and 3** were noted, as this decision needs to be taken in SA3. It was felt that a comparison between the two methods would be useful to help SA3 make a decision.

**Tdoc 4** (Ericsson) discusses the issue of protection of ptp repair service. It proposes that protection of the repair service can be achieved by using HTTP Digest for authentication and the protection that is already applied to the file i.e. the integrity and confidentiality protection that is already applied to the retrieved file repair blocks. It was noted that HTTP Digest could be used for mutual authentication between the UE and the file repair server.

There was some discussion on whether the MIKEY packet carrying MTK could be downloaded using the repair service or included as part of the actual downloaded file. This would overcome the cases when the MIKEY packet was lost or corrupted. An alternative method would be for the UE to directly request the MTK.

### **7.3 Key management issues**

### **7.3 Other issues**

**Tdoc 9** (Siemens) concludes that the delivery confirmation procedure as it is currently described by the SA4 specification is **not** sufficient for reliable charging. Information that is essential to consuming the data should be included (i.e. The MTK). There was general agreement that it is up to SA4 to agree on the appropriate text for inclusion into the SA4 TS which could be based on the proposal of Tdoc 9.

**Tdoc 5** (Bamboo) also discusses weaknesses in using delivery confirmation for charging. It proposes the possibility of using a request for a key, as a way of knowing the download was complete. There was some concern about keeping a clear definition of what is wanted in a delivery confirmation. It is up to SA4 to clarify the goal of each of the post-delivery functions clearly (e.g. delivery notification, key delivery, file repair functions). Combined execution of post-delivery functions within one http session should be investigated.

## **8 Any other business**

## **9 Close of the Meeting (Tuesday, 24 August, 16:00)**

## **10 List of Participants**

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