
Source: SA WG3
Title: CR to 33.203: Clean-up of clause 7.3 (Rel-5)
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 7.3.3

SA doc#	Spec	CR	R	Phase	Subject	Cat	Current Version	WI	SA WG3 doc#
SP-020352	33.203	009		Rel-5	Clean-up of clause 7.3	D	5.1.0	IMS-ASEC	S3-020319

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Victoria, Canada

CR-Form-v5
CHANGE REQUEST
⌘ 33.203 CR 009 ⌘ rev - ⌘ Current version: 5.1.0 ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

Proposed change affects: ⌘ (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ Clean-up of 7.3		
Source:	⌘ SA WG3		
Work item code:	⌘ IMS-ASEC	Date:	⌘ 17/05/2002
Category:	⌘ D	Release:	⌘ Rel-5
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories: F (correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature) D (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases: 2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) REL-4 (Release 4) REL-5 (Release 5)

Reason for change:	⌘ Current security association (SA) handling procedures are contained in an error section. Error cases on security mode set-up are brought into line with the new version of security mode set-up specification. Some error cases are dealt with in two different sections with very little difference between the sections.
Summary of change:	⌘ The SA handling procedures are also moved from a section describing error behaviour to a new section 7.4. Error cases with the security mode set-up are brought into line with the current version of security mode set-up specification. Removes some sections that re-specify error behaviour in relation to security mode set-up
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ Error cases will not be inline with the current version of security mode set-up

Clauses affected:	⌘ 6.1, 7.3, 7.4		
Other specs affected:	⌘ <input type="checkbox"/> Other core specifications <input type="checkbox"/> Test specifications <input type="checkbox"/> O&M Specifications	⌘	

Other comments: ☒

[Redacted area]

6.1 Authentication and key agreement

The scheme for authentication and key agreement in the IMS is called IMS AKA. The IMS AKA achieves mutual authentication between the ISIM and the HN, cf. Figure 1. The identity used for authenticating a subscriber is the private identity, IMPI, which has the form of a NAI, cf. [3]. The HSS and the ISIM share a long-term key associated with the IMPI.

The HN shall choose the IMS AKA scheme for authenticating an IM subscriber accessing through UMTS. The security parameters e.g. keys generated by the IMS AKA scheme are transported by SIP.

The generation of the authentication vector AV that includes RAND, XRES, CK, IK and AUTN shall be done in the same way as specified in [1]. The ISIM and the HSS keep track of counters SQN_{ISIM} and SQN_{HSS} respectively. The requirements on the handling of the counters and mechanisms for sequence number management are specified in [1]. The AMF field can be used in the same way as in [1].

Furthermore a security association is established between the UE and the P-CSCF. The subscriber may have several IMPUs associated with one IMPI. These may belong to the same or different service profiles. Only one SA shall be active between the UE and the P-CSCF. This single SA shall be updated when a new successful authentication of the subscriber has occurred, cf. section 7.4.3.3.

It is the policy of the HN that decides if an authentication shall take place for the registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles. Regarding the definition of service profiles cf. [3].

***** NEXT CHANGED SECTION *****

7.3 Error cases in the set-up of security associations

Whenever an expected message is not received after a time-out the receiving entity considers the registration to have failed.

~~[Editor's note: Clarify, how SIP registration handles the inconsistent state that is created by a lost SM12 message]~~

7.3.1 Error cases related to IMS AKA

Errors related to IMS AKA failures are specified in section 6.1. However, this section additionally describes how these shall be treated, related to security setup.

~~[Editors Note: It is FFS if this is appropriate taking DoS attacks into account.]~~

7.3.1.1 ~~Integrity check~~ User authentication failure ~~in the P-CSCF~~

In this case, SM7 ~~containing a potentially wrong RES~~ fails integrity check ~~by IPsec at the P-CSCF if the~~ (IK_{IM} derived from RAND at UE is wrong ~~as well~~). ~~The SIP application at the P-CSCF never receives SM7. It shall delete the temporarily stored SA parameters associated with this registration after a time-out.~~

~~In case IK_{IM} was derived correctly, but the response was wrong t~~The authentication of the user fails ~~in the network at the S-CSCF due to an incorrect response RES. The P-CSCF shall discard SM7 and the registration and the authentication procedures shall be aborted (see also clause 6.1.2.1). The S-CSCF will send a 4xx Auth Failure message to the UE, via the P-CSCF, which may pass through an already established SA. Afterwards, both, the UE and the P-CSCF delete the new SAs.~~

7.3.1.2 Network authentication failure

If the UE is not able to successfully authenticate the network, ~~the UE is not able to create the key IK and therefore the SA with the P-CSCF, such that it is not possible to send SM7 in a protected way. Since the P-CSCF already expects SIP messages from the UE to be protected, and is not already aware of any errors, the P-CSCF shall accept such REGISTER messages indicating network authentication failure in the clear.~~

~~So the UE shall send a new REGISTER message which may pass through an already established SA SM7, indicating a network authentication failure, to the P-CSCF, without protection. SM7 should not contain the security-setup line of the first message. The P-CSCF deletes the new SAs after receiving this message.~~

7.3.1.3 Synchronisation failure

In this situation, the UE observes that the AUTN sent by the network in SM6 contains an out-of-range sequence number. The UE shall send a ~~new~~ REGISTER message ~~SM7~~ to the P-CSCF, ~~which may pass through an already established SA in the clear~~, indicating the synchronization failure. ~~SM7 should not contain the Security-Setup line of the first message, and the P-CSCF shall keep the security-setup state created after receiving SM1 from the UE. The P-CSCF deletes the new SAs after receiving this message.~~

7.3.2 Error cases related to the Security-Set-up

7.3.2.1 ~~Unacceptable P~~proposal ~~unacceptable set~~ to P-CSCF

In this case the P-CSCF cannot accept the proposal set sent by the UE in the Security-Set-up command of SM1. SM6 shall respond to SM1 with indicating a failure, by sending a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal.

The P-CSCF therefore shall modify the message SM2 such that the S-CSCF sends a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message back to the UE in SM4 and 6 and the registration process is finished.

SM2:

REGISTER(*Security-setup = integrity mechanisms list, [confidentiality mechanisms list], integrity algorithms list, [confidentiality algorithms list], SA_ID_U, [info], Failure = NoCommonIntegrityAlgorithm, IMP1, IMPU*)

[Editors Note: It is FFS how the exact mechanism shall be for the Unacceptable proposal set case. The editor believes that the S-CSCF is the registrar and hence the P-CSCF should only be able to modify the headers and not send back responses. The failure response should be sent by the S-CSCF. This however has not been agreed.]

7.3.2.2 Proposal unacceptable to UE ~~Unacceptable algorithm choice~~

If the P-CSCF sends in the security-setup line of SM6 ~~an algorithm~~ a proposal that is not acceptable for the UE (~~i.e. has not been proposed~~), ~~the UE shall not continue to create a security association with the P-CSCF and~~ shall terminate the registration procedure.

7.3.2.3 Failed consistency check of Security-Set-up lines at the P-CSCF

The P-CSCF shall check whether authentication algorithms list received in SM7 is identical with the authentication algorithms list sent in SM6. If this is not the case the registration procedure is aborted. (Cf. section 7.2) ~~This is the case if the Security-Setup line in SM7 from the UE to the P-CSCF cannot be verified, so the Security-Setup line of the unprotected SM1 and the Security-Setup line of the protected SM7 do not match. The P-CSCF shall respond to the UE by sending a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message in SM12. The P-CSCF therefore shall modify the message SM8 such that the S-CSCF sends a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message back to the UE in SM10 and SM12 and the registration process is finished.~~

SM8:

REGISTER(*Security-setup = integrity mechanisms list, [confidentiality mechanisms list], integrity algorithms list, [confidentiality algorithms list], SA_ID_U, [info], Failure = NoCommonIntegrityAlgorithm, IMP1*)

[Editors Note: It is FFS how the exact mechanism shall be for the Unacceptable proposal set case. The editor believes that the S-CSCF is the registrar and hence the P-CSCF should only be able to modify the headers and not send back responses. The failure response should be sent by the S-CSCF. This however has not been agreed.]

7.43.3 Authenticated re-registration

If the registration is a re-registration, a pair of security associations between UE and P-CSCF is already active. The authenticated re-registration shall initially utilize the existing SA. This is the normal case. However, in the event the UE originates the (SM1) Register message using no protection, the P-CSCF shall still accept it and forward the request to the S-CSCF, indicating that the register message was not integrity protected. This shall trigger the S-CSCF to challenge the subscriber with the execution of a new IMS-AKA authentication procedure as described in clause 6.1.1.

[Editors Note: The exact mechanism for changing SAs is currently under investigation.]

Before SM7 is sent by the UE, both peers shall replace the existing SA by the new SA negotiated during these first two messages.

[Editors Note: The exact mechanism when to change SA1 to SA2 under certain error conditions is FFS.]

7.43.3.1 Handling of security associations in authenticated re-registrations (successful case)

Before re-registration begins the following SAs exist:

- SA1 from UE to P-CSCF;
- SA2 from P-CSCF to UE.

The re-registration then is as follows:

- 1) The UE sends SM1 to re-register with the IMS, using the existing SA1 to the P-CSCF. As in the case of a new registration, a list of parameters to be negotiated in a security association set-up is included.

[Editors Note: It is FFS if the SA1 shall be used for SM1 or not]

- 2) The P-CSCF waits for the response SM4 from the S-CSCF and then sends SM6 to the UE, using SA2. As in the case of a new registration, the parameters selected for the new security associations are included. The P-CSCF then creates two new security associations, in parallel to the existing ones, in its database:
 - SA11 from UE to P-CSCF;
 - SA12 from P-CSCF to UE.
- 3) If SM6 could be successfully processed by the UE, the UE also creates the new SAs SA11 and SA12 in its database. The UE then sends SM7 to the P-CSCF. As in the case of a new registration, the authentication response and the list of parameters repeated from message 1 are included. SM7 is protected with the new SA11.
- 4) The P-CSCF waits for the response SM10 from the S-CSCF and then sends SM12 to the UE, using the new SA 12.
- 5) After the reception of SM12 by the UE, the re-registration is complete.

The UE now uses the new SAs for all subsequent messages. The old (outbound) SA1 is deleted. The old (inbound) SA2 must be kept until a further SIP message protected with the new inbound SA12 is successfully received from the P-CSCF.

The P-CSCF keeps all four SAs with the UE active until a further SIP message protected with the new inbound SA11 is successfully received from the UE. In the meantime, the P-CSCF continues to use the old SA2 for outbound traffic to the UE.

7.43.3.2 Error cases related to authenticated re-registration

Whenever an expected message is not received after a time-out the receiving entity considers the registration to have failed. The receiving entity then deletes any new security associations it may have established and continues to use the old ones if they have not yet expired.

If the registration protocol goes well up to the last message SM12, and SM12 is sent by the P-CSCF, but not received by the UE, then the UE has only the old SAs available (after the time-out), but the P-CSCF cannot know this. Therefore, the P-CSCF continues to use the old SA2 for outbound traffic to the UE, but keeps both, old and new SAs. The new SAs are deleted when a message is received from the UE which is protected with the old SA, or if a REGISTER message is received on the port where the P-CSCF accepts specific unprotected messages.

~~7.3.3.3 Error cases related to IMS AKA~~

~~User authentication failure~~

~~The S-CSCF will send a 4xx Auth_Failure message SM10, which will pass through the already established SA to the UE as SM12. Afterwards, both, the UE and the P-CSCF delete the new SAs.~~

~~Network authentication failure~~

~~If the UE is not able to successfully authenticate the network, it does not establish a new SA. The UE sends a REGISTER message SM7 indicating a network authentication failure to the P-CSCF, using the already established SA. The P-CSCF deletes the new SAs after receiving this message.~~

~~Synchronisation failure~~

~~If the UE notices a synchronisation failure it does not establish a new SA. The UE sends a message SM7, indicating the synchronisation failure, to the P-CSCF, using the already established SA. The P-CSCF deletes the new SA after receiving this message.~~

~~7.3.3.4 Error cases related to the Security Setup~~

~~Unacceptable proposal set~~

~~The message SM6 shall respond to the first REGISTER message SM1 with a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal, using the already established SA. Neither side establishes a new SA.~~

The P-CSCF therefore shall modify the message SM2 such that the S-CSCF sends the 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message back to the UE in SM4 and SM6 and the registration process is finished.

~~SM2:~~

~~REGISTER(Security-setup = integrity mechanisms list, [confidentiality mechanisms list], integrity algorithms list, [confidentiality algorithms list], SA_ID_U, [info], Failure = NoCommonIntegrityAlgorithm, IMPI)~~

~~{Editors Note: It is FFS how the exact mechanism shall be for the Unacceptable proposal set case. The editor believes that the S-CSCF is the registrar and hence the P-CSCF should only be able to modify the headers and not send back responses. The failure response should be sent by the S-CSCF. This however has not been agreed.}~~

Failed consistency check of Security-Set-up lines

This is the case if the Security-Setup line in SM7 from the UE to the P-CSCF cannot be verified, so the Security-Setup line of the unprotected SM1 and the Security-Setup line of the protected SM7 do not match. In this case the P-CSCF shall respond to the UE by sending a 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message in SM12 using the already established SA. Both sides delete the new SAs.

The P-CSCF therefore shall modify the message SM8 such that the S-CSCF sends the 4xx Unacceptable_Proposal message back to the UE in SM10 and SM12 and the registration process is finished.

~~SM8:~~

~~REGISTER(Security-setup = integrity mechanisms list, [confidentiality mechanisms list], integrity algorithms list, [confidentiality algorithms list], SA_ID_U, [info], Failure = NoCommonIntegrityAlgorithm), IMPI)~~

~~{Editors Note: It is FFS how the exact mechanism shall be for the Unacceptable proposal set case. The editor believes that the S-CSCF is the registrar and hence the P-CSCF should only be able to modify the headers and not send back responses. The failure response should be sent by the S-CSCF. This however has not been agreed.}~~