

3G PD 30.810 v1.0.0 (1999-10)

**Permanent
Document**

**3rd Generation Partnership Project
3GPP work program
Project co-ordination aspects
Project Plan for Security
(3G PD 30.810 version 1.0.0)**



Reference

Work Item Location services in UMTS

Keywords

Location services (LCS),
Digital cellular telecommunications system,
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS),
UTRA, UTRAN, IMT-2000

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Foreword

[to be added by ETSI MCC]

1 Scope

This Permanent document describes the work program for the security architecture in UMTS.

TSG-S3 has prime responsibility for all security-related specification work in 3GPP, but it will rely on the co-operation of other TSG WGs to ensure that security specifications are appropriately integrated into all relevant 3GPP specifications.

2 References

References may be made to:

- a) specific versions of publications (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.), in which case, subsequent revisions to the referenced document do not apply; or
- b) all versions up to and including the identified version (identified by "up to and including" before the version identity); or
- c) all versions subsequent to and including the identified version (identified by "onwards" following the version identity); or
- d) publications without mention of a specific version, in which case the latest version applies.

A non-specific reference to an ETS shall also be taken to refer to later versions published as an EN with the same number.

3 Release 99

3.1 Work identified to fulfill the requirements for R99

3.1.1 Work to be done by TSG SA

3.1.1.1 Work to be done by WG S1

None identified

3.1.1.2 Work to be done by WG S2

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality	Stage 2 description	Probably, not all issues have yet been discovered. Current issues are : a) how to route to correct HLR. b) this is an HE feature, but what changes are mandatory in all VPLMNs	1: Feasibility study 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs

		c) time synchronisation of encrypted IMSI between VPLMN and mobile.	
Authentication and key agreement			
Access link integrity protection		Architectural impact of separate CS/PS nodes Key establishment during intersystem handover	1: Outline description
Access link confidentiality		Architectural impact of separate CS/PS nodes Key establishment during intersystem handover	1: Outline description
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption			
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.1.3 Work to be done by WG S3

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality	Specification of enhanced mechanism.		1: Description available in 33.102
Authentication and key agreement	Specification of enhanced mechanism.	An enhancement to the GSM scheme based on the use of sequence numbers has been specified in 33.102. A fall-back mechanism is also available in an annex to 33.102. This fall-back could be used if there are problems with the sequence numbers based scheme. At this stage the sequence numbers	1: Description available in 33.102 (fall-back scheme in Annex)

		based scheme should be considered to be the working assumption.	
Access link integrity protection	Specification of mechanism	Termination point at user: USIM or UE Termination point in network: RNC or MSC/SGSN	1: Description available in 33.102. 2: Decision on termination point in network 3: Decision on termination point at user
Access link confidentiality	Specification of mechanism		1: Description available in 33.102.
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation	Specification of mechanism		1: Description available in 33.102.
Network-wide encryption	Specification of mechanism		1: Description available in 33.102 2: Identification of 'hooks'
User equipment identification	Specification of mechanism		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Core network signalling security	Specification of mechanism and key management architecture.		1: Description available in 33.102.
Fraud information gathering system	Specification of mechanism		As per GSM
USIM application security	Specification of mechanism		As per GSM
Visibility and configurability	Specification of mechanism		1: Outline description
Mobile Execution Environment Security	Specification of mechanism		As per GSM
Location services	Specification of mechanism		As per GSM
Lawful interception architecture	Specification of mechanism		Reuse of existing GSM specification
IP security	Specification of mechanism		Outline specification / placeholder in release R99?

3.1.1.4 Work to be done by WG S4

None identified

3.1.1.5 Work to be done by WG S5

None identified

3.1.2 Work to be done by TSG RAN

3.1.2.1 Work to be done by WG R1

None identified

3.1.2.2 Work to be done by WG R2

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality		Handling of paging with IMSI	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Authentication and key agreement		Handling of cipher/integrity key changes due to authentication during RRC connection.	1: Outline description
Access link integrity protection	Specification of integrity functions in RAN (if UTRAN based).		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link confidentiality	Specification of ciphering functions in RAN MAC and RLC.		1: Outline description in 25.301 2: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 3: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	Specification of ciphering functions in RAN.	Must be possible to separate ciphering on user traffic and signalling information.	1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution			

Environment Security			
Location services	Integration of mechanism in RAN specifications		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.2.3 Work to be done by WG R3

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality		Handling of paging from second CN node when mobile is already in an RRC connection with the first node	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Authentication and key agreement		Handling of cipher/integrity key changes due to authentication during RRC connection. Handling of issues arising from 2 core network nodes. Hard handover between RNCs and/or BSCs. Authentication while a SRNC relocation is queued. Handover between RNC and BSC in a non-anchor MSC. Etc	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link integrity protection	Modification of RANAP messages (probably only if checking is UTRAN based): Cipher mode command Cipher mode complete Cipher mode reject	Messages could be renamed security mode. Handling of integrity key(s) at handover/relocation including: Handling of issues arising from 2 core network nodes. Hard handover between RNCs and/or BSCs. Authentication while a SRNC relocation is queued. Handover between RNC and BSC in a non-anchor MSC. Etc.	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link confidentiality	Specification of RANAP messages: Cipher mode command Cipher mode complete Cipher mode reject	Handling of cipher keys at intersystem handover, including: Handling of issues arising from 2 core network nodes. Hard handover between RNCs and/or BSCs. Starting encryption while a SRNC relocation is queued. Handover between RNC and BSC in a non-anchor MSC. Etc	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs

Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	May involve modification to following RANAP messages: Cipher mode command Cipher mode complete Cipher mode reject May require new RANAP messages.	Must be possible to separate ciphering on user traffic and signalling information.	1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.2.4 Work to be done by WG R4

None identified

3.1.3 Work to be done by TSG CN

3.1.3.1 Work to be done by WG N1

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality	Modification of GMM and MM Identity Response message to contain encrypted user identity. Modification of IMSI detach message.	Modification of all GMM and MM messages which carry IMSI?	1: First draft CR 2: CR approved by TSG 3: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 4: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Authentication and key agreement	Modification of MM and GMM messages: Authentication request Authentication response Location updating request CM service request CM re-establishment request "Paging response"	Support for intersystem operation	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs

	Similar GMM messages		
Access link integrity protection	Modification of MM and GMM messages, eg Authentication request Authentication response Location updating request CM service request CM re-establishment request IMSI detach “Paging response”	Integrity checking of the MSC’s “initial L3 messages” when in GSM coverage might require the “Message Authentication Code” to be added to Classmark 3 and the UE to support “early classmark sending”. Handling of out of sequence messages.	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R’99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link confidentiality	Changes to 09.08 needed for inter-MSC handover. Changes to 03.60 and 09.60 needed for inter-SGSN change.		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R’99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	May involve modification to following MM (and similar GMM) messages: Authentication request Authentication response Location updating request CM service request CM re-establishment request Paging response		1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R’99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification		Specification of additional MM and GMM messages for terminal authentication.	
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.3.2 Work to be done by WG N2

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
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User identity confidentiality	Modification of MAP Send Authentication Info to contain encrypted user identity.	How to route to the correct HLR (eg when an HPLMN has many HLRs)	1: Feasibility study (start and complete) 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Authentication and key agreement	Modification of MAP messages: MAP_Authenticate MAP_Send_Authentication_Info MAP_Send_Identification	Support for intersystem operation	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link integrity protection			
Access link confidentiality			
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	Specification of end-to-end signalling procedures for network-wide cipher establishment	Specification of synchronisation mechanism Note: the exact split of work between N2 and N3 is not clear.	1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification		Specification of additional MAP messages for terminal authentication.	
Core network signalling security	Integration of ciphering and integrity protection in certain MAP signalling messages. Specification of new MAP messages for key management.		
Fraud information gathering system	Specification of CAMEL procedures including those on the PS side.		Part of CAMEL phase 3
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services	Signalling to transfer privacy settings		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors

			in consolidated CRs
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.3.3 Work to be done by WG N3

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality			
Authentication and key agreement			
Access link integrity protection			
Access link confidentiality			
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	Specification of end-to-end signalling procedures for network-wide cipher establishment.	Specification of synchronisation mechanism. Note: the exact split of work between N2 and N3 is not clear.	1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.4 Work to be done by TSG T

3.1.4.1 Work to be done by WG T1

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality			
Authentication and key agreement			
Access link integrity protection			
Access link confidentiality			
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption			
User equipment identification	Specification of tests for checking the security of terminal identification and authentication information	Development of suitable test	
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.4.2 Work to be done by WG T2

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality			
Authentication and key agreement			
Access link integrity protection			
Access link			

confidentiality			
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption			
User equipment identification	Specification of capabilities for terminal authentication.		
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability	Specification of terminal capabilities		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Mobile Execution Environment Security	Specification of terminal capabilities		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Location services	MMI to influence privacy settings.		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.4.3 Work to be done by WG T3

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
User identity confidentiality	Specification of USIM interface to allow ME to request encrypted user identity	Means for the SIM to prevent transmission of the unencrypted IMSI over the radio interface.	1: First draft CR 2: CR approved by TSG 3: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 4: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Authentication and key agreement	Specification of USIM interface to allow UE to request authentication and key agreement.		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs

Access link integrity protection	Specification of USIM interface to allow UE to request generation/verification of integrity protected messages (if integrity is terminated on USIM)	Integrity termination on USIM believed to be feasible if only a few messages are protected.	1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Access link confidentiality			
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	Specification of USIM interface for network-wide encryption.		1: Outline description of hooks 2: First draft CR for hooks 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security			
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security	Specification of security message formats and security functionality required on USIM.		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Visibility and configurability	USIM control parameters		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Mobile Execution Environment Security	Specification of security functionality on USIM.		1: Outline description 2: First draft CR 3: CR approved by TSG 4: MCC provide draft R'99 spec 5: First corrections to errors in consolidated CRs
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.1.5 Work to be done by ETSI SAGE

Item	Specification required	Issues	Milestones
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User identity confidentiality			
Authentication and key agreement			
Access link integrity protection	Specification of algorithm		Delivery of algorithm
Access link confidentiality	Specification of algorithm		Delivery of algorithm
Secure UMTS-GSM interoperation			
Network-wide encryption	Specification of algorithm (if different to cipher algorithm in RAN)		1: decision on same/different algorithm
User equipment identification			
Core network signalling security	Specification of algorithms.		Candidate cipher (BEANO) is available.
Fraud information gathering system			
USIM application security			
Visibility and configurability			
Mobile Execution Environment Security			
Location services			
Lawful interception architecture			
IP security			

3.2 List of all the deliverables applicable to the subject

Status of specifications					
Del #	Title	Working Group	Editor	Completion date	Comment
TS21.133	Security threats and requirements	S3	Per Christoffersson (Telia Promotor).	Approved at SA#3.	CRs may be required at SA#6 to refine or clarify some security requirements.

TS33.102	Security architecture	S3	Bart Vinck (Siemens Atea), Stefan Pütz (T-Mobile).	Approved at SA#3. 11 CRs approved at SA#4. CRs for approval at SA#5.	More CRs expected at SA#6.
TS33.103	Integration guidelines	S3	Colin Blanchard (BT).	For approval at SA#5.	CRs may be required at SA#6 to align with architecture.
TS33.105	Cryptographic algorithm requirements	S3	Takeshi Chikazawa (Mitsubishi).	Approved at SA#4. CRs for approval at SA#5.	CRs may be required at SA#6 to align with architecture.
TS33.106	Lawful interception requirements	S3	Berthold Wilhelm (RegTP).	Approved at TSG-SA #4.	CRs expected at SA#6.
TS33.107	Lawful interception architecture and functions	S3	Berthold Wilhelm (RegTP).	Approval at SA#6 planned.	Originally planned for approval at SA#5.
TS33.120	Security principles and objectives	S3	Timothy Wright (Vodafone).	Approved at SA#3.	Stable.
TR33.900	Guide to 3G security	S3	Charles Brookson (UK DTI).	Approval at SA#6 planned.	Draft presented at S3#6.
TR33.901	Criteria for cryptographic algorithm design process	S3	Rolf Blom (Ericsson).	Approved at SA#4.	Stable.
TRxx.xxx	Formal analysis of security mechanisms	S3	Günther Horn (Siemens).	For approval at SA#5.	Additional analyses may be added.

3.3 Time plan

This time plan is a project plan, including the completion date of all the deliverables.

The plans are included in the attached Excel spreadsheet.

4 Release 00

Out of scope.

5 Change history

Change history					
SA2 No.	TDoc. No.	CR. No.	Section affected	New version	Subject/Comments

6 Annex A: Scope of the security co-ordination ad-hoc group

This ad hoc group is intended to produce, maintain and monitor the work plan for the delivery of a consistent security specifications for release 99.

[Insert scope of the ad-hoc group (copy-paste from the overall project plan)]

The work items being progressed in TSG-S3 are listed in the table below. Each work item addresses a particular security issue and is assigned a particular priority which includes whether or not the feature or mechanism should be specified in Release 99. This table is an updated version of a table presented to TSG-S#4 in Tdoc SP-99284.

Table 2 : Priorities of security work items assigned by TSG-S3

	Work item	Priority
1	User identity confidentiality	The specification of an enhanced mechanism to help guard against active attacks against user identity confidentiality on the radio interface is essential in R99. Note that only the transport mechanism needs to be specified. The exact mechanism to protect the user identity can be home operator dependant. The specification of algorithm requirements and interfaces is also essential for R99, although the algorithms themselves can be home operator dependant and do not need to be specified.
2	Authentication and key agreement	The specification of an enhanced mechanism to help guard against active attacks on the radio interface is essential for R99. Furthermore, the specification of algorithm requirements and interfaces is also essential for R99, although the algorithms themselves can be home operator dependant and do not need to be specified.
3	Access link integrity protection	This is a new security mechanism in UMTS introduced to help guard against active attacks on the radio interface. The specification of the message authentication mechanism is essential in R99.
4	Access link confidentiality	The GSM ciphering mechanism cannot be used in the new access network and the GSM algorithms are unsuitable. The specification of a new ciphering mechanism and algorithm is essential in R99.
6	Secure GSM-UMTS interoperation.	Owing to the requirements for both CS and PS 'handover' between UMTS and GSM and to the requirements to be able to perform roaming between GSM and UMTS networks, for all these items, dual mode UMTS/GSM operational aspects need to be specified in R99.
7	Network-wide encryption	Appropriate 'hooks' must be provided in the R99 specification so that network-wide encryption can be introduced in later releases. It may be possible to re-use the algorithm for ciphering in the UTRAN. If a new algorithm is required then its specification can be left to later releases providing that appropriate 'hooks' are incorporated into the R99 specification.
8	User equipment identification	TSG-SA have recommended that TSG-S3 specify a secure mechanism in R99. The mechanism will require manufacturers to secure terminal identities and associated authentication data.
9	Core network signalling security	Although this is a high priority item, it is recognised that implementable specifications might not be achievable in R99. A cipher algorithm designed by ETSI SAGE for this purpose called BEANO is already available. Off-the-shelf algorithms are likely to be suitable for the message authentication functions.
10	Fraud information	The GSM mechanism can be used. Enhancements will be considered in later

	gathering system	releases.
11	USIM application security	The GSM mechanisms can be used. Enhancements will be considered in later releases.
12	Visibility and configurability	An encryption indicator should be included in R99. Other items are of lower priority and will be considered in later releases.
13	Mobile Execution Environment Security	The GSM mechanisms will be enhanced in R99.
14	Location services	Specification of privacy mechanism is essential in R99. Can be largely based on GSM Location Services privacy mechanisms.
15	Lawful interception architecture	The specification of a lawful interception architecture is essential in R99. This architecture can be largely based on the GSM/GPRS architecture.
16	IP security	Some support for mobile IP has been added to R99 at a late stage. There will be security issues but it may be difficult to address these in any substantial way in R99 because of time constraints. An outline specification or placeholder will be included in the R99 security architecture. Detailed specification of appropriate security features will probably have to wait until R00.

7 Annex B: Contact person

Group	Contact person*	Email
S2	Chris Pudney	Chris.Pudney@vf.vodafone.co.uk
S3	Peter Howard	Peter.Howard@vf.vodafone.co.uk
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T3	Klaus Vedder* Still to nominate	Klaus.Vedder@gdm.de
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R3	Atte Länsisalmi	Atte.Lansisalmi@nokia.com
N1	Hannu Heitalahati	Hannu.Hietalahti@NOKIA.COM
N2	Ian Park	Ian.Park@vf.vodafone.co.uk
N3	Norbert Klehn	Norbert.Klehn@icn.siemens.de
N-SS	Steffen Habermann* Still to nominate	Steffen.Habermann@t-mobil.de
UMTS-GSM interoperation coordination group	Francois Courau	Francois.courau@alcatel.fr

*Where no contact person is nominated the chair man of the group is contact person

USIM application security

		1999												2000																							
		August				September				October				November				December				January				February				March				April			
		16-20	23-27	30-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-1	4-8	11-15	18-22	25-29	1-5	8-12	15-19	22-26	29-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21	24-28	31-4	7-11	14-18	21-25	28-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21
TSG SA	WG3						00xxx		xxx00				0xxx0		0xxxx			0xxx0					00xxx					0xxx0				00xxx					0xxx0
		spec in GSM 03.48								create 3GPP spec																											
TSG T	WG3		xxxx0					000xx					0xxx0					00xxx																			
								xxx00																													

Visability and configurability

		1999												2000																								
		August				September				October				November				December				January				February				March				April				
		16-20	23-27	30-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-1	4-8	11-15	18-22	25-29	1-5	8-12	15-19	22-26	29-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21	24-28	31-4	7-11	14-18	21-25	28-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21	
TSG SA	WG3						00xxx		xxx00				0xxx0		0xxxx			0xxx0					00xxx					0xxx0				00xxx					0xxx0	
		33.102								outline spec				complete spec								correct spec																
TSG T	WG1 (not concerned)							000xx										000xx																				
	WG2							xxx00								xxxxx										xxxxx												
	Terminal capabilities																																					
	WG3		xxxx0					xxx00					0xxx0					00xxx																				
		Control parameters on USIM, CR to 31.102																																				

MeXE

		1999												2000																								
		August				September				October				November				December				January				February				March				April				
		16-20	23-27	30-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-1	4-8	11-15	18-22	25-29	1-5	8-12	15-19	22-26	29-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21	24-28	31-4	7-11	14-18	21-25	28-3	6-10	13-17	20-24	27-31	3-7	10-14	17-21	
TSG SA	WG3						00xxx		xxx00				0xxx0		0xxxx			0xxx0					00xxx					0xxx0				00xxx					0xxx0	
		review 23.057								review MeXE security and send LS to MeXE																												
TSG T	WG1 (not concerned)							000xx										000xx																				
	WG2							xxx00								xxxxx										xxxxx												
	terminal capabilities																																					
	WG2 MeXE subgroup							xxx00								xxxxx										xxxxx												
	23.057																																					
	WG3		xxxx0					xxx00					0xxx0					00xxx																				
		Security functions on USIM																																				

