**3GPP TSG-CT WG1 Meeting #128-eC1-21xxxx**

**Electronic meeting, 25 February – 5 March 2021 rev of C1-210639**

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* | | | | | | | | |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | **24.008** | **CR** | **3254** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **17.1.0** |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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| ***Title:*** | Inclusive language review – TS 24.008 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to WG:*** | OPPO | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | C1 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | TEI17 | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2021-02-26 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | **D** |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) ... Rel-15 (Release 15) Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18)* | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Reason for change:*** | | In [SP-201143](https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/TSG_SA/TSGs_90E_Electronic/Docs/SP-201143.zip), from SA#90e, SA has suggested that all TSG WGs should align their TS to more inclusive and neutral language.  In [C1-210516](https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.3gpp.org%2Fftp%2Ftsg_ct%2FWG1_mm-cc-sm_ex-CN1%2FTSGC1_128e%2FDocs%2FC1-210516.zip&data=04%7C01%7Cchin.chenho%40OPPO.COM%7Cbdbd70f8a54249e2372f08d8cddcfe2d%7Cf1905eb1c35341c5951662b4a54b5ee6%7C0%7C0%7C637485697948643352%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=vbrJ7ACNTfcKUoFasz2QPBTYcFiLWVhlYmHy5iIZBFY%3D&reserved=0), RAN2 has indicated the inclusive language they have used and suggested that CT1 might use those same terms. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | | Exclusive language changed to inclusive language | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Non-inclusive language exist in TS 24.008 | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 4.7.7b, G.1 | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **X** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **X** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **X** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\* \* \* First Change \* \* \* \*

#### 4.7.7b Authentication and ciphering procedure used for GSM authentication challenge

The purpose of the authentication and ciphering procedure is threefold (see 3GPP TS 43.020 [13]):

- to permit the network to check whether the identity provided by the MS is acceptable or not;

- to provide parameters enabling the MS to calculate a new GPRS GSM ciphering key; and

- to let the network set the GSM ciphering mode (ciphering/no ciphering) and GSM ciphering algorithm.

The authentication and ciphering procedure can be used for either:

- authentication only;

- setting of the GSM ciphering mode and the GSM ciphering algorithm only; or

- authentication and the setting of the GSM ciphering mode and the GSM ciphering algorithm.

The cases in which the authentication and ciphering procedure shall be used are defined in 3GPP TS 42.009 [5].

In A/Gb mode, the authentication and ciphering procedure is always initiated and controlled by the network. It shall be performed in a non ciphered mode because of the following reasons:

- the network cannot decipher a ciphered AUTHENTICATION\_AND\_CIPHERING RESPONSE from an unauthorised MS and put it on the prohibited list; and

- to be able to define a specific point in time from which on a new GPRS GSM ciphering key should be used instead of the old one.

GSM authentication challenge shall be supported by a ME supporting GERAN or UTRAN.

In A/Gb mode, the network should not send any user data during the authentication and ciphering procedure.

A GSM security context is established in the MS and the network when a GSM authentication challenge is performed in A/Gb mode or in Iu mode. However, in Iu mode the MS shall not accept a GSM authentication challenge, if a USIM is inserted. After a successful GSM authentication challenge, the GPRS GSM ciphering key and the GPRS ciphering key sequence number, are stored both in the network and the MS.

\* \* \* Next Change \* \* \* \*

# G.1 Causes related to MS identification

Cause value = 2 IMSI unknown in HLR

This cause is sent to the MS if the MS is not known (registered) in the HLR, or if the MS has packet only subscription (see 3GPP TS 29.272 [150]). This cause code does not affect operation of the GPRS service, although is may be used by a GMM procedure.

Cause value = 3 Illegal MS

This cause is sent to the MS when the network refuses service to the MS either because an identity of the MS is not acceptable to the network or because the MS does not pass the authentication check, i.e. the SRES received from the MS is different from that generated by the network. When used by an MM procedure, except the authentication procedure, this cause does not affect operation of the GPRS service.

Cause value = 4 IMSI unknown in VLR

This cause is sent to the MS when the given IMSI is not known at the VLR.

Cause value = 5 IMEI not accepted

This cause is sent to the MS if the network does not accept emergency call establishment using an IMEI or not accept attach procedure for emergency services using an IMEI.

Cause value = 6 Illegal ME

This cause is sent to the MS if the ME used is not acceptable to the network, e.g. prohibit listed. When used by an MM procedure, this cause does not affect operation of the GPRS service.

\* \* \* End of Changes \* \* \* \*