3GPP TSG CN Plenary Meeting #21 **NP-030404**
17th - 19th September 2003. Frankfurt, Germany.

Source: **MCC**

Title: **All LSs sent from CN1 since TSG CN#20 meeting**

Agenda item: **6.1.1**

Document for: **INFORMATION**

Introduction:

This document contains **11 agreed** LSs sent from **TSG CN WG1#31**, and are forwarded to TSG CN Plenary meeting #21 for information only.

Status	TDoc #	Tdoc Title	Source	WI	Type	Comments
AGREED	N1-031196	Response LS on Removal of RPLMNAcT for GSM COMPACT	Christian/Ericsson		LS OUT	Reply to 970. To: T, T3
AGREED	N1-031199	Liason statement on Profiling of RFC3325 for IMS	Gabor/Nokia		LS OUT	Reply to 994. To: SA3, Cc: SA1, SA2.
AGREED	N1-031200	Reply LS on stage 3 level specification directions for support for subscriber certificate work item	Atle/Ericsson		LS OUT	Reply to 995. To: SA3, CN4, Cc:
AGREED	N1-031201	Reply to LS (N1-031052) on 'Effects of service 27/38 on 2G/3G Interworking and emergency call' from SA3	Robert/Siemens		LS OUT	Reply to 1052. To: SA3, T3
AGREED	N1-031220	LS on 'updated WID for emergency call enhancements for IP & PS based calls'	Atle/Ericsson		LS OUT	Reply to 963, To: SA1, SA2, T3, Revised from 1195
AGREED	N1-031286	Reply LS on IMS Session Hold and Resume stage 2 and 3 descriptions	Atle/Ericsson		LS OUT	Reply to 952. To: CN3, Cc: SA2. Revised from 1193
AGREED	N1-031287	Reply LS on alignment of maximum bit rate for HSDPA in UMTS system	Yukio/NEC		LS OUT	Reply to 959, To: RAN3, SA2, CN4, Revised from 1194.
AGREED	N1-031289	LS UE idle mode	Hannu/Nokia		LS OUT	Reply to 1260, To: RAN2, Revised from 1272
AGREED	N1-031313	Liason statement on Trace	Gabor/Nokia		LS OUT	Reply to 1008 and 1265. To: SA5, Cc: CN4
AGREED	N1-031330	Liason statement on requesting a joint CN1-SA3 meeting	Gabor/Nokia		LS OUT	To: SA3
AGREED	N1-031334	LS on P-TMSI signature validation in R99	Hannu/Nokia		LS OUT	Reply to 1188. To: SA2, Cc: CN4 Revised from 1315

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 Tdoc N1-031196
Sophia-Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: **Response LS on Removal of RPLMNAcT for GSM COMPACT**
Response to: LS T3-030462 / N1-030970
Release: R99 onwards
Work Item: TEI

Source: CN1
To: T, T3
Cc:

Contact Person:
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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks T3 for their LS in T3-030462 / N1-030970.

CN1 has studied this issue and two sets of CRs (N1-031053 - 55, N1-031004 - 5) have been agreed on the removal of RPLMNAcT. As a result of this, the references to RPLMNAcT have been removed from all CN1 TS 23.122 and TS 24.008.

2. Actions:

To T3 group.

ACTION: CN1 kindly recommends T3 to consider this information and amend their specifications on RPLMNAcT accordingly to avoid potential mismatches between the CN1 and T3 specifications.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_32	27 – 31 of October 2003,	Bangkok, Thailand
CN1_33	16th – 20th February 2004	TBD

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 ***Tdoc N1-031199***
Sophia Antipolis, France, 24-29 August

Title: Liason statement on Profiling of RFC3325 for IMS
Response to: N1-030994
Release: REL-6

Source: CN1
To: SA3
Cc: SA1, SA2

Contact Person:
Name: Gábor Bajkó
Tel. Number: tel:+36 20 9849259
E-mail Address: Gabor.Bajko@nokia.com

Attachments: None

1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks SA3 for the liaison statement regarding the Profiling of RFC3325 for IMS requirements for Rel-6.

CN1 has briefly discussed the LS and other related CN1 CRs relating to IMS openness and the trust domain concept, and the following conclusions were made:

Currently there are no requirements in 3GPP that the home IMS network must have the knowledge whether the destination network is IMS network (and therefore trusted) or not.
CN1 has procedures to determine whether the next hop SIP Proxy is part of the same domain or another domain. The discussion about the removal of the P-Asserted-Identity header (if privacy id was requested by the user) was postponed until 3GPP can reach a conclusion on the requirements relating to the knowledge of the trustworthiness of the destination network. If a solution is developed for this information to be available in the home network, the P-Asserted-Identity header field will not need to be removed by the home network, rather by the destination network (if privacy id was requested). If a solution is not found to the problem above, the P-Asserted-Identity header will need to be removed in the home network.
CN1 can confirm that from RFC3325 only the privacy none and privacy id options were included into Rel5, the other privacy options were left for Rel6 because they require additional procedures for the CSCFs. CN1 believes that from security architecture point of view there is no difference between the handling of the different user privacy options, they all require some information removal from SIP headers.

CN1 has agreed to a CR listing procedures for the I-CSCF regarding SIP messages received from non-trusted domains. The procedures require the I-CSCF to know whether the message has been received from a trusted domain or not. This probably narrows down the possibilities listed in bullet 4 of Spec(T), but CN1 has no strong preference on which solution to be adopted. It should be mentioned that for Rel6 IMS, CN1 does not plan to have different CSCFs for access to/from Internet and/or other non-trusted domains.

CN1 does not understand the problem statement in bullet 5 and 8 of Spec(T). CN1 has already got procedures for handling id privacy in IMS.
At the edge of IMS the P-CSCF inserts a P-Asserted-Identity header into the requests/responses, and that identity will be trusted by all entities within the trust domain, including applications servers hosting different services like Presence, Conferencing, etc.

CN1 has always assumed that Rel-5 IMS network is a closed network, i.e. messages will not be sent outside IMS and will not be received from outside IMS. Therefore, Rel-5 24.229 does not have any procedures describing what actions the CSCFs shall perform when such scenarios are faced. Such procedures are planned to be defined for the Rel-6 version of 24.229.

CN1 would like to draw the attention of SA3 that anonymity is only a subset of privacy, referring in most cases to media anonymity i.e hiding the IP address of the party which requested it. In order to provide this, a middlebox (anonymiser) is required in the architecture. Such middlebox currently does not exist in the

architecture; therefore IP address hiding is currently not supported. S3-030377 uses the terms ‘anonymity’ and ‘privacy’ interchangeably, which may lead to confusions.

2. Actions:

To SA3 group.

ACTION: SA3 is asked to take into consideration the analysis made above.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_27	27st – 31st November 2003	Bangkok, Thailand

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 ***Tdoc N1-031200***
Sophia Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title:	Reply LS on stage 3 level specification directions for support for subscriber certificate work item
Response to:	LS N1-030995 (S3-030469)
Release:	Rel-6
Work Item:	Support for subscriber certificates (SEC1-SC)
Source:	CN1
To:	SA3, CN4
Cc:	

Contact Person:

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Attachments: -

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks SA3 for the liaison. CN1 has discussed the topic, and has the following comments.

- CN1 sees benefits in clearly separating stage 2 and stage 3. In this case a new TS would be appropriate for stage 3 instead of merging it to one or more existing TSs.
- CN1 agrees that protocol A would be very logical addition to the current CN1 responsibilities.
- Regarding protocol B, CN1 cannot make a recommendation on whether SA3 or CN1 should create and maintain the stage 3. CN1 would like to come back to this when SA3 have made their decision on the specification issue above (standalone vs. merged) and more stage 2 material is available.

2. Actions:

To SA3 group.

ACTION: CN1 hopes this can assist SA3 in their further work on subscriber certificates.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1#32	27 – 31 of October 2003,	Bangkok, Thailand
CN1#33	16 – 20 of February 2004,	???, ???

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 Tdoc N1-031201
Sophia-Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: Reply to LS (N1-031052) on 'Effects of service 27/38 on 2G/3G Interworking and emergency call' from SA3

Source: CN1

To: SA3, T3

Cc: --

Contact Person:
Name: Robert Zaus
Tel. Number: +49 89 636 75206
E-mail Address: robert.zaus@siemens.com

Attachments: --

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 would like to thank SA3 for their liaison statement on the 'Effects of service 27/38 on 2G/3G Interworking and emergency call'.

CN1 think that TS 24.008 is in line with the CR approved by SA3, since TS 24.008 does not contain any requirement for the ME to derive the GSM cipher key from the UMTS cipher key and the UMTS integrity key (or to derive the GPRS GSM cipher key from the GPRS UMTS cipher key and the GPRS UMTS integrity key, respectively).

Actually, e.g. in TS 24.008, subclause 4.3.2.7, it is stated that at intersystem change from UMTS to GSM "an ME shall apply the GSM cipher key derived **by the SIM** from the UMTS cipher key and the UMTS integrity key."

With regard to the scenarios described by SA3 in S3-030402, CN1 considers these to be correct. Besides, when these scenarios are documented in a 3GPP specification, it may be worth while to add also the following variation of scenario SCN-2:

> SCN-2a First a PS connection is setup via UMTS access, and a PDP context is activated. Thereafter the mobile performs a cell re-selection to GSM. When the mobile tries to perform a routing area update, the request will be **rejected** if GPRS GSM access ciphering is subsequently **activated** by the serving network, because the USIM did not generate the GPRS GSM cipher key. The activated PDP context cannot be used by the mobile, or modified or deleted via DTAP signalling, until the mobile performs another cell re-selection to UMTS.

2. Actions:

To T3 and SA3 group.

ACTION: To add the scenario SCN-2a, when the scenarios described by SA3 are documented in a 3GPP specification.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_32	27th – 31st October 2003	TBD (Japanese friends of 3GPP plus Ericsson/China)
CN1_33	16th – 20th February 2004	TBD (TBD)

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 ***Tdoc N1-031220***
Sophia Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: LS on 'updated WID for emergency call enhancements for IP & PS based calls'
Response to: LS T3-030392 / N1-030963
Release: Rel-6
Work Item: EMC1

Source: CN1
To: SA1, SA2, T3
Cc:

Contact Person:
Name: **Atle Monrad**
Tel. Number: +47 372 93 665
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Attachments: N1-030963 (T3-030392)

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks T3 for the reply on ISIM for emergency calls, but has some further questions regarding aspects on the topic where SA1 and SA2 opinions are needed. The LS from T3 to CN1 (N1-030963) is attached for SA1s and SA2s convenience.

CN1 welcomes T3s reply and offers the following questions and comments:

1. CN1 sees emergency calls as one service, thus find it appropriate to have the possibility to use the EF_{ECC} both for emergency calls over CS and PS dependant on which type of access that is selected and not which number that is dialled.
2. IETF may define emergency SIP-URIs, it is not clear whether this will be one or more, or if they will be network or operator specific.
   Due to this, in addition to the EF_{ECC}, CN1 can see a justification to create an additional file on the ISIM describing emergency SIP-URIs, and that standardised SIP-URIs would be beneficial. However, this is up to SA1 and T3 to decide. CN1 would also remind that in UICC-less cases or lack of storage of emergency SIP-URIs in the ISIM, emergency SIP-URIs may also need to be stored in the ME.
3. 24.008 offers a possibility to download emergency numbers from the MSC and the SGSN. Is it intended that download of emergency SIP-URIs also shall be possible?

As CN1 does not find itself in the position of deciding on this, it seeks guidance from stage 1 and stage 2.

CN1 monitors the ongoing work on emergency calls and will take the proper actions for stage 3 as soon as stage 2 is completed.

2. Actions:

To SA1, and SA2 groups.

ACTION: CN1 would like to ask SA1 and SA2 to study the issues raised above and inform CN1 about the outcome of the discussion for each of the numbered items.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1#32	27 – 31 of October 2003,	Bangkok, Thailand

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 **Tdoc N1-031286**
Sophia Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title:	Reply LS on IMS Session Hold and Resume stage 2 and 3 descriptions
Response to:	LS N1-030952 (N3-030413) and N1-030978 (S2-032733)
Release:	Rel-5
Work Item:	IMS-CCR
Source:	CN1
To:	CN3
Cc:	SA2

Contact Person:

Name: **Atle Monrad**
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Attachments: -

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks CN3 for the liaison, and offers guidance in how to interpret SIP and SDP for HOLD and RESUME.

In SIP, putting a media stream on hold is indicated in an SDP offer rather than a SIP message itself. SDP offers can be carried in any appropriate SIP message, including INVITE, UPDATE, 1xx and 2xx responses.

For the SDP attributes; RFC 3264 indicates clearly in section 8.4 that putting media streams on hold is indicated by setting the media stream to **sendonly** (providing that the stream was previously set to **sendrecv**). If the media was previously set to **recvonly** mode, then it is set on hold by setting it to **inactive** mode. Note also that the port in the m-line should not be set to zero in order to prevent the PDP contexts for media from being deactivated.

To express HOLD and RESUME in interworking between IMS and CS networks, UPDATE is an appropriate message, but re-INVITE is also a valid option.

2. Actions:

To CN3 group.

ACTION: CN1 hopes this clarification helps CN3 in further work on the topic.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1#32	27 – 31 of October 2003,	Bangkok, Thailand
CN1#33	16 – 20 of February 2004,	???, ???

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 Tdoc N1-031287
Sophia-Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: Reply LS on alignment of maximum bit rate for HSDPA in UMTS system
Response to: LS (N1-030976/ S2-032720, N1-030959/R3-030912)
Release: Release 5 and onwards
Work Item: HSDPA

Source: CN1
To: RAN3, SA2, CN4
Cc:

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Attachments: N1-031227, N1-031228, four N4-031XXX against 29.002 and 29.060,

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks RAN3 and SA2 for the LSs received regarding the alignment of the maximum bit rate for HSDPA in the UMTS system. CN1 would like to inform RAN3, SA2 and CN4 that CN1 has agreed the attached CRs to TS 24.008 which update the maximum bit rate for downlink and guaranteed bit rate for downlink to 16000 kbit/s in order to support HSDPA. The CRs will be submitted for approval to TSG-CN #21 in September 2003.

During the discussion, CN1 recognised that the change of coding of the QoS IE in TS 24.008 affects also TS 29.002 and TS 29.060.

2. Actions

To RAN WG3, SA WG2

No actions.

To CN WG4

CN1 kindly asks CN4 to review the attached CRs against 29.002 and 29.060 for both Rel 5 and Rel 6 and agree these CRs, or revision of them, if possible, before the next CN#21 plenary so that the CRs from CN1 and CN4 can be submitted for approval to the plenary as one package.

3. Date of Next CN WG1 Meetings:

CN WG1 Meeting #32	27th – 31st October 2003	Bangkok, Thailand
CN WG1 Meeting #33	16th – 20th February 2004	TBD, xxx

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 Tdoc N1-031289
Sophia-Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: **LS UE idle mode**

Response to: LS (N1-031260 / R2-031924) on Reply LS on RAN WG2 terminology and impacts on CN WG1 specifications (PLMN selection) from RAN 2

Release: R99

Work Item:

Source: CN1

To: RAN2

Cc:

Contact Person:

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Attachments:

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks RAN2 for their LS and co-operation in solving the UE idle mode issue in R99.

CN1 also agrees with RAN2 that adding the AN related requirements in CN specifications, and vice versa, should be avoided.

One cause of confusion has been the 23.122 definition of idle mode which is based on radio resource procedures. No CR could be provided yet in this meeting, but CN1 intends to adapt this definition to cover the UTRAN case better by defining that the mobile station can be in idle mode even if the RRC is in connected mode but with no dedicated channel allocated.

The intention is to leave the RRC protocol details, such as RRC states where this can happen, up to RAN2 to define. CN1 assumes that RAN2 adds to 25.331 or some other appropriate specification a precise conditions in RRC on when the UE is considered to be in idle mode from CN procedure perspective.

There was discussion but no decision yet on whether CN1 part of this change could be considered as R99 correction or if a clarification in Rel-6 would be more appropriate.

2. Actions:

To RAN2 group.

ACTION: **none.**

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_32	27th – 31st October 2003	TBD (Japanese friends of 3GPP plus Ericsson/China)
CN1_33	16th – 20th February 2004	TBD (TBD)

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 ***Tdoc N1-031313***
Sophia Antipolis, France, 24-29 August

Title: Liason statement on Trace
Response to: N1-031008 (S5-038444)
Release: REL-6

Source: CN1
To: SA5
Cc: CN4

Contact Person:
Name: Gábor Bajkó
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E-mail Address: Gabor.Bajko@nokia.com

Attachments: None

1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks SA5 for the liaison statement regarding the trace activation for IMS requirements for Rel-6.

CN1 has briefly discussed the LS and the following conclusions were made:

The current SIP protocol specification does not have a mechanism that could be used for trace activation from the S-CSCF to the P-CSCF, but there are possibilities to make extensions to the protocol in order to support the required functionality. If extensions to SIP will be required, the process will need to involve IETF, in accordance with the procedures defined in the sipchanges Internet Draft, and CN1 is not able to estimate the completion time of this process currently.

Regarding the Subscriber identity availability for start triggering events, CN1 can confirm that both the Public user Identity and the Private user Identity of the user are available for this purpose. There was however questions arose in CN1 whether the Public user Identity is the right identity to be used for trace activation, or should the Private user Identity used for this purpose instead (IMSI is analogous to Private User Identity, whereas MSISDN is analogous to Public User Identity).

During the study of the start and stop triggering events listed in the LS, some delegates raised questions related to the granularity of the trace activation requirement. For example are there individual start triggering commands for each method? If there are individual commands for each method, then for example the SUBSCRIBE request is used in IMS for Presence related communication as well as for other activities. Is it enough to trace the SUBSCRIBE related activity of the user or should the P-CSCF/S-CSCF also look into the content of the request and be able to trace presence related SUBSCRIBE requests only, or non-presence related SUBSCRIBE requests only?

When discussing the work-split implications from the LS, questions were raised whether one CN WG (CN4) should take the primary responsibility regarding enhancement of further protocol requirements for the Trace functionality, to facilitate capturing the stage 3 requirements on the protocol(s) between EM, HSS and IMS nodes.

CN1 can confirm that the start and stop triggering events listed in the tables of the LS are the first and last messages of the SIP transaction. CN1 draws the attention of SA5 to the fact that SIP is an extendible protocol to which new methods can be added, and therefore there is the possibility in the future of methods that are unknown at either the IMS entities or within the tracing entities.

CN1 did not discuss yet about the applicability of SIP methods which could be extended and used for the trace activation purposes.

2. Actions:

To SA5 group.

ACTION: SA5 is requested to provide clarifications to the questions above.

To CN4 group.

ACTION: None.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_27	27st – 31st November 2003	Bangkok, Thailand

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 ***Tdoc N1-031330***
Sophia Antipolis, France, 24-29 August

Title: Liason statement on requesting a joint CN1-SA3 meeting
Response to: N/A
Release: Rel-5, REL-6

Source: CN1
To: SA3

Contact Person:
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Attachments: None

1. Overall Description:

CN1 has discussed in their #31 meeting a number of CRs and discussion papers relating to security issues. In many cases agreements were not made. as it was not clear of the exact intention of SA3

There were also misalignments discovered between 33.203 and 24.229 TS, and within 33.203
Discussing Rel-6 issues some CN1 delegates questioned if some of the required security information are available when using NDS.

CN1 would therefore propose to have a joint meeting between the SA3 and CN1 WGs, where issues considered to be important for both groups could be discussed. For CN1 delegation, a joint meeting within the next SA3 meeting (6-10 October) would be suitable, assuming that SA3 could put this on the agenda.

An agenda proposal for the joint session could be the following:

Release 5

RES/XRES generation and usage
SA management issues
Cleanup and alignment of 33.203&24.229
Trusted domain concept

Release 6

Openness of IMS.

CN1 delegates consider that a 2 days timeframe would be suitable for the above topics to be discussed.

2. Actions:

To SA3 group.

ACTION: SA3 is asked to respond as soon as possible for the joint session request and distribute their answer to the CN1 mailing list also.

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_27 27st – 31st November 2003 Bangkok, Thailand

3GPP TSG-CN1 Meeting #31 Tdoc N1-031334
Sophia-Antipolis, France, 25 – 29 August 2003

Title: **LS on P-TMSI signature validation in R99**
Response to: LS (N1-031188 / S2-033237) on P-TMSI signature validation functionality in R99 from SA2
Release: R99
Work Item:

Source: CN1
To: SA2
Cc: CN4

Contact Person:
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Attachments:

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1. Overall Description:

CN1 thanks SA2 for their LS and help in solving the P-TMSI validation question in R99.

SA2 asked two questions from CN1 and we are able to agree the following answers:

Question 1:

Does this requirement in in TS 24.008 section 4.7.1.3 apply to both UE and Network:
Upon successful completion of the subsequent attach or routing area update procedure, the used P-TMSI signature shall be deleted. Upon completion of the detach procedure, the used P-TMSI signature shall be deleted.

CN1 confirms that this requirement applies to both UE and network.

Question 2:

Does the SGSN have to delete the P-TMSI signature after completion of the detach procedure only when the UE included it in the detach request or unconditionally.

CN1 confirms that P-TMSI signature shall be deleted by the SGSN upon detach only if it is included in the detach request by the UE.

2. Actions:

To SA2 group.

ACTION: **none.**

3. Date of Next TSG-CN1 Meetings:

CN1_32	27th – 31st October 2003	TBD (Japanese friends of 3GPP plus Ericsson/China)
CN1_33	16th – 20th February 2004	TBD (TBD)