Tdoc List
2019-03-08 16:03
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Opening of the meeting |   | ||||||||||
2 | Approval of Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑190600 | Agenda | WG Vice Chair | agenda | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
3 | IPR and Anti-Trust Law Reminder |   | ||||||||||
4 | Work Areas |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | Security Assurance Specification for 5G (SCAS_5G) (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
4.1.1 | NR Node B (gNB) (TS 33.511) |   | ||||||||||
4.1.2 | Access and Mobility Management Function (TS 33.512) | S3‑190740 | SCAS: AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
4.1.3 | User Plane Function (UPF) (TS 33.513) | S3‑190741 | Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case for UPF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
4.1.4 | Unified Data Management (UDM) (TS 33.514) |   | ||||||||||
4.1.5 | Session Management Function (SMF) (TS 33.515) | S3‑190743 | Security Assurance Requirement and test cases for SMF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
4.1.6 | Authentication Server Function (AUSF) (TS 33.516) |   | ||||||||||
4.1.7 | Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517) | S3‑190637 | New Test Case: Error handling of malformed N32 signalling message sent between peer SEPPs | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190728 | Test Case: Connection-specific scope of IPX-provider cryptographic material | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190780 | SCAS SEPP: Serving PLMN ID Mismatch | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
4.1.8 | Network Resource Function (NRF) (TS 33.518) | S3‑190742 | Security Assurance Requirement and Test for NRF | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190805 | SCAS NRF: Scope Representation for Nnrf_AccessToken Service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
4.1.9 | Network Exposure Function (NEF) (TS 33.519) | S3‑190618 | SCAS NEF Add test steps for authorization on northbound APIs | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
4.1.10 | Other issues | S3‑190638 | New Test Case: Error handling of malformed JSON object between two network products | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190672 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190749 | The purpose and scope of SCAS | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190775 | SCAS 5G: mutual authentication between NFs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190777 | SCAS 5G: update to Access Token Verification Failure in non-roaming case | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190778 | SCAS 5G: update to Access Token Verification Failure in roaming case | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190779 | SCAS 5G: Search Result Handling for NF Discovery | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5 | Studies |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16) | S3‑190744 | New Key Issue: Support of a UP gateway function on the N9 interface | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190737 | New KI: flexible protection of data exchange on N9 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190876 | Protection of N9 interface in Inter-PLMN scenario | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190869 | Security aspects of Service Communication Proxy (SCP) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190726 | Key Issue: Protection of SCP interfaces | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190727 | Key Issue: Secure message transport via the SCP | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190871 | NF to NF authenticaton and authorization in Indirect communication mode | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190872 | Authorization of NF service access in SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190874 | Service access authorization within a NF Set or NF Service Set | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190873 | Indirect communication between NFs in roaming scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190724 | Draft LS on SCP security requirements | Deutsche Telekom AG | LS out | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190725 | Key Issue: Handling of invalid IPX patches | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190879 | TLMSP, A Proxy Transport Layer Secure Protocol | NCSC | other | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.2 | Study on Long Term Key Update Procedures (FS_LTKUP) (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
5.3 | Study on Supporting 256-bit Algorithms for 5G (FS_256-Algorithms) (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
5.4 | Security aspects of single radio voice continuity from 5G to UTRAN (FS_5G_UTRAN_SEC) (Rel-16) |   | ||||||||||
5.5 | Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) (Rel-16) | S3‑190750 | New KI: Interworking between AKMA and GBA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190640 | Discussion on use of established keys for AKMA root key | NEC Europe Ltd | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190646 | New KI on Synchronization of Keys when using established keys | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190702 | Key issue on Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190824 | Updates to KI #14 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190613 | New Solution: Battery efficient AKMA | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190632 | Solution to KI#9 Key separation for AKMA AFs | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190801 | pCR: Reusing KAUSF for AKMA | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190385 | |||
S3‑190639 | Solution for Established Key Synchronization | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190642 | Resolving Editor’s Notes in Solution #16 | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190641 | Discussion on using KSEAF and/or KAUSF for AKMA in view of regulatory compliance | NEC Europe Ltd | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190644 | Updating solution #16 to include home network option | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190645 | Creating a combined solution for usage of KSEAF and KAUSF | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190643 | Solution for Roaming Architecture | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190688 | improvement for AKMA architecture | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190703 | Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190767 | AKMA Architecture and procedures with the anchor function as NEF | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190774 | Resolving Editor's notes in solution 6 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190807 | Protocol details for solution 3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190821 | Updates to Solution #14 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190823 | New Solution Key Lifetime | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190836 | Modification of user identity in solution 2 and solution 3 | ZTE Corporation, Nubia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190842 | Solution 15 editorials | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190843 | Solution 15 comment on the application keys | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190701 | Evaluation of solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190806 | Evaluation of solution 2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190808 | Evaluation of solution 3 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190822 | Conclusion to Solution #14 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190844 | Solution 15 evaluation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.6 | Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16) | S3‑190611 | Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices | S1-190501 | LS in | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
S3‑190784 | Acknowledging the multiple possible mobility solutions for CP small data | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190815 | Evaluation to Solution #3 ‘Security solution for MO SMS at AMF re-allocation’ | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190816 | Evaluation to Solution #4 ‘Security solution for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT)’ | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190817 | Evaluation to Solution #5 ‘Security solution for small data included in initial NAS signalling at mobility’ | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190614 | Update of Solution #6 – Use of UE Configuration Update | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190661 | Deleting EN on the usage of per-gNB and per-UE counters for solution #7 “protecting gNB from RRC DoS attack” | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190662 | Delete the EN related to the “AttackInformationNotification” message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190792 | Security protection of small data at idle mode mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190800 | Adding an evaluation to solution #9 in TR 33.861 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190785 | Resolving the editor’s note in solution #10 in TR 33.861 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190786 | Adding an evaluation to solution #10 in TR 33.861 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190717 | Update to solution#12"DDoS attack mitigation in CIoT" | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190603 | Solution proposal for FS_CIoT_sec_5G key issue #1 and #2 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190704 | Solution to identify misbehaving UEs | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190705 | Solution to Migitate DDoS Attack based on RAN | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190706 | Conclusion for KDF negotiation for 5G System Security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑190723 | |||
5.7 | Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) (Rel-16) | S3‑190745 | New KI: N3GPP Key Hierarchy | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190746 | New Solution: New access type distinguisher for N3GPP | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190747 | New Solution: Key separation for untrusted and trusted access | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190748 | New Solution: SUCI deconcealment for the FN-RG | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190877 | Mobility between TNAPs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190878 | Mobility between TNGFs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN) | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190710 | Add content to Introduction clause | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190709 | Add content to section 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190713 | Delete EN for solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190714 | Add evaluation to solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190715 | Delete EN for solution 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190716 | Add evaluation to soluiton 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190712 | Conclusion on KI#1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190875 | Removal of Editor’s Note in Solution#6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190711 | Add content to section 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
No
| reserved | No | ||||
5.8 | Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16) | S3‑190615 | False base station key issue for RLOS P-CR | SPRINT Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190616 | Reduced confidentiality protection key issue for RLOS P-CR | SPRINT Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190617 | Fraud controls bypassed key issue for RLOS P-CR | SPRINT Corporation | pCR | Agreement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190781 | Proposed evaluation for Solution #1 AS and NAS security for RLOS services | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190782 | Proposed evaluation for Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190783 | Proposed update for Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190868 | Solution Evaluations and Conclusion on KI#1 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.9 | Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16) | S3‑190669 | New security requirement against tampering of RRCResumeRequest message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190667 | Protection of RRSResumeCause | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190670 | New security requirement against replay of RRCResumeRequest message | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190668 | RRCResume replay protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190829 | KI#1 in TR 33.809 - new solution with netwrok controlled RRC Reject message | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190834 | Adding evaluation for Solution #1 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190831 | KI#2 in TR 33.809 – updated details (cleanup) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190798 | Changing the security requirement for KI #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190676 | Cell Authenticated Access for fake base station detection | Intel Mobile Communications | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190832 | KI#2 in TR 33.809 – new solution for tamper resistant SI messages | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190835 | Adding evaluation for Solution #2 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190865 | Evaluation of Solution #2 | Samsung | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190630 | 5GFBS-solution Using symmetric algorithm with assistance of USIM and home network | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190155 | |||
S3‑190776 | Certificate based solution against false base station | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190833 | ID based solution against false base station | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190866 | Solution for AS security during RRC Idle mode | Samsung | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190635 | Updating Key issue #3 for Network detection of nearby false base station | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190825 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 - updates to updates to details and threats | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190826 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 - updates to requirements | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190828 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 - conclusion on second requirement (reactive action) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190654 | Notifying cell information to the network after authentication procedure failure | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190674 | Notifying cell information to the network when the UE determines that the network fails the authentication procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190660 | Network detection of false base station from UE measurement reports | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190665 | Avoiding UE connecting to fake base station during HO | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190666 | Measurement report requirement for the case when the UE in RRC-IDLE & RRC-INACTIVE | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190671 | Measurement Report Requirement When UE in RRC-CONNECTED | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190827 | KI#3 in TR 33.809 - new solution for enriched measurement reports | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190733 | New requirment for Authentication relay attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190837 | Improvement to key issue #5 | ZTE Corporation, Nubia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190655 | Protection of UE configuration against false base station | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190673 | Handling of UE configuration update by a fake base station | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190734 | New solution for Authentication relay attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190838 | Detection of false relay base station by UE | ZTE Corporation, Nubia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190870 | Solution on Authentication Relay Attack | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190663 | Propose a new KI and security requirement for spoofing paging messages | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190664 | Protection for Incoming Paging Message Based on Stored Security Context | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190675 | Key Issue for Fake Base Station | Intel Mobile Communications | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190793 | Protection against Man-in-the-Middle false base station attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190381 | |||
S3‑190830 | New annex in TR 33.809 - summary of PWS security study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190636 | Solution for preventing UE camping on false base station during Idle mode | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
5.10 | Study of KDF negotiation for 5G System Security (FS_5GS_KDF) (Rel-16) | S3‑190723 | Conclusion for KDF negotiation for 5G System Security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190706 | |
5.11 | Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16) | S3‑190609 | Solution for Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization with multiple registrations in the same PLMN | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190697 | Amendment to solution #2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190692 | Discussions on solutions to AMF key separation | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190693 | AMF key separation solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190694 | AMF key separation solution 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190695 | AMF key separation solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190799 | KAMF separation using a standalone SEAF | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190814 | Solution for key separation based on slice authentication keys | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190696 | Discussion on provisioning security features for a network slice | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190698 | Amendment to solution #3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190867 | Privacy for Slice Authentication | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190738 | Remove EN in 6.6.3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190739 | Solution for slice specific authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190656 | NSSAI protection during the RRC connection establishment procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190657 | NSSAI protection during the RRC connection establishment procedure | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190791 | Proposed solution for protecting the S-NSSAI for transmission at the AS layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190699 | Amendment to KI#6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190771 | Key issue on Granularity of isolation for slice specific security | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.12 | Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16) | S3‑190731 | pCR to TR33.814 – Text for Clause Introduction | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190732 | Text for Clause 4 Security aspects of eLCS | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190729 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for positioning data confidentiality protection | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190719 | Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of assistance data | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190720 | Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of location data | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190730 | pCR to TR33.814 - Solution for positioning data confidentiality protection | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190721 | Key Issue for privacy setting integrity between UE and homenetwork | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190772 | Key issue on UE location privacy setting | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190755 | New KI: Privacy control in LCS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190881 | Key Issue proposal on location measurement tampering for FS_eLCS_Sec | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190722 | Solution on integrity protection of privacy setting between UE and UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190756 | New solution: Effective privacy control in LCS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190751 | New solution: WLAN measurements from UEs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190752 | New solution: Bluetooth measurements from UEs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190753 | Update KI: TBS positioning | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190754 | New solution: TBS measurements from UEs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190718 | Solution for updating key to broadcast assitance data | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.13 | Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16) | S3‑190681 | overall introduction | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190619 | URLLC-KI UP security performance for low latency | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190620 | URLLC-solution Enhancement of handover with Xn forwarding tunnel | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190819 | New solution for security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity procedures | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190631 | Evaluation and text for resolving editor’s note for solution #5 in TR 33.825 | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190682 | URLLC solution5 update | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190689 | Dynamic UP security policy control solution for URLLC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190818 | Solution #Y: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190685 | solution1 and evaluation update | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190680 | deleting the EN of solution3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190820 | Correction to solution #3 ‘Security policy handling for redundant data transmission’ | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190683 | evaluation of solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190679 | solution 2 clarification | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190678 | conclusion for key issue 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190796 | Conclusion on KI #6 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190686 | conclusion for key issue 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190687 | conclusion for key issue 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190677 | conclusion for key issue 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190794 | Conclusion on KI #3 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190684 | conclusion for key issue 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190795 | Conclusion on KI #4 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190797 | Conclusion on KI #8 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.14 | Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products (FS_VNP_SECAM_SCAS) (Rel-16) | S3‑190757 | Considerations on network product class when using NFV technology | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
S3‑190758 | Considerations on SECAM of the virtualized network products | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
5.15 | Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16) | S3‑190862 | Key issue on Alignment of the terms Private network and NPN | Samsung | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
S3‑190700 | Discussion on NPN authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190787 | Proposed solution to the key hierarchy for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190788 | Proposed addition to key issue#1.1 for standalone non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190789 | Adding network binding requirement to the keys issue #1.1 on standalone public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190790 | Proposed solution to key issue #1.1 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190855 | KI on credential storage for NPN-Ues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190858 | Key issue on secure storage of SNPN access credentials | Samsung, Intel | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190859 | Solution for secure storage of SNPN access credentials | Samsung, Intel | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190860 | Key issue on CAG access control in Non-standalone NPNs | Samsung | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190861 | New solution for CAG access control in Non-standalone NPNs | Samsung | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190845 | Discussion on NPN Authentication | Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190856 | KI on authentication and authorization of NPN subscribers by a 5G external entity | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190846 | Deployment options for authentication in NPNs | Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190847 | Evaluation of EAP-TTLS for non-certificate based UE authentication in SNPNs | Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190848 | Solution on non-certificate based UE authentication in 5G NPN with AAA | Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190849 | Solution on non-certificate based UE authentication in 5G NPN without AAA | Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190850 | Discussion of security solutions for SNPN service access via PLMN and vice versa | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190851 | Solution on SNPN service access via PLMN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190852 | Solution on PLMN service access via NPN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190853 | Discussion on Authentication of UE to PLMN integrated NPN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190854 | Solution for UE authentication to PLMN integrated NPN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190857 | Rapporteur correction to TR 33819 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190882 | Issue of Alignment of the terms Private network and NPN | SAMSUNG | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.16 | Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions (FS_LTKUP_Detail) (Rel-16) | S3‑190768 | pCR to 33935 - addition section 4.1 Overview | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190773 | pCR to 33935 - addition of detailed solution 4b | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190840 | Detailed solution 5 in TR 33.935 | Gemalto N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.17 | Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16) | S3‑190605 | Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #1.3: User plane integrity between UE and network | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190647 | Editorial corrections in TR 33.853 v0.1.0 | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190648 | Discussion on the need of UP IP solution for Rel.15 UEs | NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190649 | New key issue on data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB | NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190650 | New solution for data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB | NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190651 | New solution for data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190652 | New key issue on integrity protection capability imbalance in MR-DC scenarios | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190653 | New solution for integrity protection capability imbalance in MR-DC scenarios | NEC Europe Ltd | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190707 | Support UP_IP in option 7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190708 | UP IP for Option 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190802 | pCR: New KI: Integrity Algorithm independence | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190388 | |||
S3‑190803 | pCR: New KI: Ability to prioritize certain PDCP packets on the UE uplink | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190387 | |||
S3‑190804 | pCR: New KI: Efficient handling of PDCP discardTimer expiry on the UE Uplink | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | S3‑190386 | |||
S3‑190880 | (FS_UP_IP_Sec) Integrity protection of the User Plane -New key Issue - Reporting Integrity check failures to the network | BT plc | discussion | Decision | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.18 | Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation (FS_SIV) (Rel-16) | S3‑190610 | Initialisation of Sensitive Functions in a Virtualised Environment | ETSI TC CYBER | LS in | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
5.19 | Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16) | S3‑190809 | Skeleton for TR 33.846 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190810 | Scope for TR 33.846 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190760 | Key issue to ensure the security of session anchor keys | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190690 | A key issue on the long-term key and its related anchor key leakage | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190811 | New KI: Leakage of long-term key | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190759 | Key issue regarding the minimal computational cost when generating session anchor keys | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190626 | eAUTH-Linkability KI exposure of cause value | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190735 | Key issue on linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190762 | Key issue to resist the linkability attacks | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190628 | eAUTH-Linkability KI SQN exposure | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190627 | eAUTH-Linkability KI different length of response | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190621 | eAUTH-SUCI KI Computing resource consuming | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190761 | Key issue to mitigate the DDoS attacks on the UDM | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190622 | eAUTH-SUCI KI congestion | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190623 | eAUTH-SUCI KI quantum computing | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190633 | New KI on Fast re-authentication procedure for 5GS | NEC Europe Ltd, Intel | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190813 | Update on EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190812 | New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190841 | 33.846: solution for anchor keys security | Gemalto N.V. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190658 | Discussion paper on UE initiated EAP AKA' with PFS | Nokia | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190659 | UE Initiated EAP AKA' PFS solution | Nokia | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190691 | Solution Proposal based on DH between UE and AUSF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190763 | Security enhancement for the key KSEAF based on the symmetric algorithm | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190764 | KSEAF enhancement for the EAP-AKA’ protocol | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190839 | New solution: Deriving session anchor keys with random number | ZTE Corporation, Nubia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190765 | ECIES based security enhancement for the key KSEAF | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190766 | KSEAF enhancement for 5G AKA protocol | China Mobile Com. Corporation | pCR | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
S3‑190629 | eAUTH-Linkability solution encrypted session anchor key based solution | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190736 | New solution for linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190625 | eAUTH-SUCI solution mitigation of large SUCI attack | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190624 | eAUTH-SUCI solution adding symmetric algorithm for SUPI protection scheme | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190634 | Solution to support Fast Re-authentication in 5GS | NEC Europe Ltd, Intel | pCR | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
5.20 | Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (FS_NR_IAB_Sec) | S3‑190863 | Draft TR 33.xxx - Skeleton TR on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | other | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||
S3‑190864 | Scope for the study on security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | other | Yes |
No
| available | No | |||||
5.21 | Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec) | S3‑190601 | New Key Issue for eV2X TR - privacy protection for unicast messages | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||
S3‑190602 | New Key Issue for eV2X TR - privacy protection for multicast messages | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190604 | New Key Issue for eV2X TR - security for unicast/multicast messages | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190606 | New Key Issue for eV2X TR - Security of the UE service authorization and revocation | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190607 | New Key Issue for eV2X TR - Security of the UE service provisioning | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190608 | References | InterDigital, Inc. | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190769 | Skeleton of eV2X security study | LG Electronics | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
S3‑190770 | Scope proposal for eV2X security study | LG Electronics | other | Approval | Yes |
No
| available | No | ||||
6 | Any Other Business | S3‑190612 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | WG Vice Chairs | other | Yes |
No
| available | No |