3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-86 - 2017-02-06 to 2017-02-10, Sophia Antipolis
meeting id: S3-86 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑170000 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170001 | Report from SA3#85 | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170002 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170003 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170004 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170005 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170006 | LS OUT on NFV-based solutions for next generation mobile networks | ETSI ISG NFV | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170007 | LS on Legacy Security Issues | C1-164579 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170008 | Response LS on Legacy Security Issues | R6-160125 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170009 | Reply LS on MCData prioritization and questions | C1-165427 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170010 | LS First set of Architecture Principles from the NGMN P1 E2E Architecture Framework project. | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170011 | LS to RIFS and SA3 on Diameter Security | GSMA PACKET | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170012 | LS reply to 3GPP – Completion LI study on S8HR | GSMA PSMC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170013 | LS on mobility enhancements for NB-IoT | R2-169115 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170014 | LS on LTE call redirection to GERAN | R2-169124 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170015 | LS on RAN2 decisions for eLWA mobility | R2-169139 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170016 | LS on potential security issues for access to restricted local operator services by unauthenticated Ues | S1-163436 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170017 | LS on 5G work alignment | S1-163453 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170018 | Reply LS on Cooperation on NGS FMC | S2-167247 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170019 | LS reply on NFV-based solutions for next generation mobile networks from ETSI NFV | S2-167249 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170020 | Reply LS to LS on state of SA3 discussions on NG security architecture | S2-167250 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170021 | Reply LS on external interface for TV services | S4h160679 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170022 | Reply LS to ETSI ISG NFV on NFV-based solutions for next generation mobile networks | S5-166464 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170023 | MCData prioritisation responses | S6-161612 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170024 | LS Reply on Terminology used by SA6 for Mission Critical Services | S6-161621 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170025 | TCG progress report | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170026 | CR to TS 33.863 to correct the contents table | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170027 | pCR to TR33.899 - removal of editors notes in the Authentication Security area following conf call#11 | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170028 | pCR to TR 33.899 - resolution to some of the editors notes in the Authentication Security area that were postponed in conf call11 | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170029 | Draft TS 55.242 - Specification of the GIA4 integrity algorithm for GPRS - Implementers test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170030 | Section 5.6.4.2.2 - Resolution of Editor’s Notes. | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170031 | Section 5.6.4.3.2 - Resolution of Editor’s Notes | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170032 | Credentials storage requirements | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170033 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170034 | Answers to questions from CT1 joint session on Release 14 MCPTT | S6a170172 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170035 | LS on Response to MCData questions in S6a170113 | S6a170186 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170036 | Reply LS on UE-to-NW relaying | S2 170398 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170037 | LS to SA WG3 on privacy of registration and slice selection information | S2 170687 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170038 | LS on standardization of Northbound SCEF API | S2 170647 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170039 | Section 5.6.3.3.1 - Key Issue Details | INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170040 | MASA solution Goals and Evaluation | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170041 | A clarification for 4G USIM term | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170042 | Network lying about its public key; Is it a security issue? | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170043 | Removing EN on Sending UE SEC Capabilities to Home Network | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170044 | Removing EN on Allowing SEAF to negotiate AS Security Capabilities with NG-UE | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170045 | Removing EN on Allowing SEAF to negotiate AS Security Capabilities with NG-UE | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170046 | Removing EN on More sophisticated replay protection | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170047 | Cross Referencing MASA solution to Privacy Security Area | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170048 | MASA Solution Addresses LI Requirements | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170049 | Removing EN on HS deployment supporting solution 2.12 functionality | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170050 | Update MASA Solution Terminology inline with SA3 agreed ones | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170051 | Open Questions Related to Key Issues 1.6 and 1.7 | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170052 | Reply to LS on State of SA3 discussions on NG security architecture | R2-1700652 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170053 | LS on Security considerations for NR | R2-1700655 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170054 | LS to SA3 on Small Data Transmission | R2-1700656 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170055 | Adding more details for SPCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170056 | Proposal to prioritize key issue#2.9 in phase 1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170057 | Updates to Solution #8.9 Security mechanism differentiation for network slices | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170058 | Call flow for slice-specific NAS key derivation and distribution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170059 | Removal of ENs for KI 8 2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170060 | Removal of ENs in Security Area #8 (subclause 5.8.2) | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170061 | Slice-specific NAS keys | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170062 | Use of legacy USIM and NextGen ME in solution #7.12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170063 | Update of 5.2.3.1.3: Resolving the Editor’s Note for Alternative Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170064 | Update of Solution #2.14: Resolving the Editor’s Note | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170065 | Update of Solution #2.14 with EAP-PSK Authentication Method | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170066 | LS on xMB Interface for TV Services | C3A170068 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170067 | pCR to TR 33.899: Resolving editor’s notes on solution 7.8 | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170068 | Removal of ENs for Solution #7.11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170069 | Remove EN for Interface of AUSF and ARPF in Clause 5.2.1.2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170070 | Update to 5.2.3.1.3 to remove EN for Alternative Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170071 | Solution for Key Issue 5.1 | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170072 | Interim agreement on key issue 5.1 | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170073 | Modification of solution 8.5 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170074 | Hiding keys of 5G-CN with UE assistance | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170075 | Discussion on security method of UE transmit data in RRC_INACTIVE state | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170076 | pCR to TR 33.899 – evaluations and conclusions in subscription Privacy Key Area | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170077 | Discussion on security method of mobility enhancement for NBIoT CP solution | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170078 | pCR to TR 33.899 - updating key issue 2.2 | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170079 | Security method of mobility enhancement for NBIoT CP solution | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170080 | Updating solution #7.3 | Vodafone, Telecom Italia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170081 | Adding requirement within 3GPP TS 33.250 on unpredictable TEID generated by the PGW | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170082 | Adding test case for the requirement on unpredictable TEID generated by the PGW | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170083 | Completion of Mission Critical WIs for Rel-14 | C1-165319 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170084 | LS on security of information provided via ANQP or DNS | C1-170512 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170085 | LS on applicability of WLAN emergency numbers on 3GPP access | C1-170513 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170086 | LS on security solution for MCdata SDS communications | C1-170481 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170087 | LS on unauthenticated emergency session over Trusted WLAN | C1-170384 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170088 | TR 33.899: Solution for Key Issue 1.15: User plane security termination point | KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Juniper Networks, BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170089 | TR 33.899: Questions and Interim Agreements on Key Issue 1.15: User plane security termination point | KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Juniper Networks, BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170090 | TR 33.899: Discussion on KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170091 | TR 33.899: Removal of EN in KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170092 | TR 33.899: Adding Questions related to KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170093 | TR 33.899: Adding Interim agreements related to KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170094 | TR 33.899: Adding question and removing Editor's Note from 5.2.3.1.3, KI 2.1 Authentication framework | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170095 | TR 33.899: Proposal for interim agreement for KI 2.1 Authentication framework | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170096 | CR 33.179 EN in clause 5.4. | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170097 | CR 33.179 EN in clause 5.5.1. | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170098 | 33.179 Integrity protection and client_id | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170099 | pCR 33.180 EN in clause 5.4 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170100 | pCR 33.180 Integrity protection and client_id | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170101 | pCR 33.880 MCData SDS XMPP security solution | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170102 | MCData SDS security presentation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170103 | R-14 eMCPTT security presentation | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170104 | Handling of SI requests from unauthenticated UEs in NR | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170105 | pCR 33.880 First to Answer Key Mgmt | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170106 | Handling token and key derivation for data transmitting in RRC_INACTIVE | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170107 | eLWA: Discussion on LS R2-169139 | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170108 | draft_Reply LS to RAN2 on eLWA R2-169139 | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170109 | LWA Correction on 3GPP vendor id | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170110 | NBIoT:DoNAS threat analysis | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170111 | NBIoT: DoNAS security solution for large file download | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170112 | Correct the Ref to NAS Spec (map CR) | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170113 | Discussion LS R2-1700656 | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170114 | Security Procedure for Network Slicing | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170115 | Evaluation for Network Slicing Security Solution | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170116 | Privacy Protection for EAP-AKA | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170117 | Privacy Protection for EAP-AKA | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170118 | Adding eNB Annex to TR 33.926 | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170119 | Modify KI1.11 to add service based architecture related requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170120 | Update Solution 3.8 and resolve ENs | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170121 | Automatic certificate enrolment for the gNB | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170122 | Security threats of key issue #3.3 “Principles of security negotiation” | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170123 | A solution for equipment identifier authentication using EAP | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170124 | Protection of downlink NAS signallings before security activation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170125 | A solution for KDF negotiation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170126 | Clarification for flexible security policies negotiation in control plane | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170127 | Network slice life-cycle | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170128 | Declaring the public/private key pairs (e.g in EAP-TLS) should be stored in AUSF instead of ARPF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170129 | New SID on security aspect of architecture enhancements to ProSe UE-to-Network Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170130 | Definition of network slice isolation | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170131 | Modification of key issue network slice isolation | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170132 | Addressing ENs in Slicing solution 8.6 | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170133 | Consolidate untrusted n3gpp access solutions | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170134 | Comparison of 5G untrusted n3gpp access solutions | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170135 | RAN Security: comparison of SIB protection solutions | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170136 | Update the threat description of Key issue 5.3.5.1 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170137 | Analysis on the use of IPSec transport for control and user plane of non 3GPP access | BROADCOM CORPORATION | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170138 | On the use of IPSec with LWIP | BROADCOM CORPORATION | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170139 | Adding the security requirements of mutual access prevention | Huawei; Hisilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170140 | Adding the security requirements of IP address reallocation interval | Huawei; Hisilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170141 | Adding eNB Annex to TR 33.926 | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170142 | Adding PGW Annex to TR 33.926 | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170143 | Adding the threats about the IP address reallocation continuously in the PGW Annex of TR33.926 | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170144 | Adding the threats about the UE-mutual access Annex Y of TR33.926 | Huawei; Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170145 | pCR_Threats related to control plane and user plane | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170146 | pCR _Threats related to security algorithm selection during handover | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170147 | pCR_Threats related to security mode command procedure | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170148 | pCR to TS 33.216_ Control plane data confidentiality protection | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170149 | pCR to TS 33.216_ Control plane data integrity protection | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170150 | pCR to TS 33.216_ User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170151 | pCR to TS 33.216_ User plane data integrity protection | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170152 | pCR to TS 33.216_ Initial AS ciphering algorithm selection and use | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170153 | pCR to TS 33.216_ Initial AS integrity algorithm selection and use | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170154 | pCR to TS 33.216_ AS security algorithm selection during UTRAN to E-UTRAN handover | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170155 | pCR to TS 33.216_ AS security Algorithm selection during intra-eNB handover | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170156 | pCR to TR 33.899: Fake gNB Detection using Identity Based Signature | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170157 | pCR to TR 33.899_Update solution #1.8 key hierarchy | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170158 | pCR to TR 33.899: Authentication and Key Agreement for untrusted non-3GPP access | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170159 | pCR to TR 33.899_Registration procedure for NextGen networks | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170160 | pCR to TR 33.899_Security procedure for NextGen networks | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170161 | pCR to TR 33.899_Security procedure for NextGen networks (with NAS_SM security procedure) | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170162 | Security of RRC Connection re-establishment of NB-IOT for CP Solution | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170163 | pCR to TR 33.899_Consolidated Key Hierarchy for NextGen Network | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170164 | TR 33.899 v0.6.0 clause 5.2.3.3 Editors note -Word "non-3GPP" should be replaced by another word | BT Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170165 | pCR to TR 33.899_Questionnaire on Key Issue # 1.7 to Annex | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170166 | Comparison of Solution proposals for security of RRC messages for CIoT Optimization | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170167 | pCR to TR 33.899_Merger of Key Issues #4.3 and #4.8 | NEC EUROPE LTD, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170168 | pCR toTR 33.899_Removal of Editor’s Notes of Solution 8.1 | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170169 | Correction of protected IOV container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170170 | Reply LS on xMB Interface for TV Services | S4-170240 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170171 | Correction of protected IOV container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170172 | Update of progress on BEST normative work and open questions | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170173 | CR to TS 33.401 for BEST revised for modularisation | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170174 | BEST: Exposing User plane protocol information at the Key Management layer | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170175 | BEST: Handling of key synchronization issues in Solution 10 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170176 | proposed LS to CT4 on extension of the S6 interface for BEST | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170177 | EAP based secondary authentication by an external data network | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170178 | Reply LS on “Conclusion on lawful interception in split EPC architecture” | S3i170041 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170179 | Draft TS 55.243 - Specification of the GIA4 integrity algorithm for GPRS - Design conformance test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170180 | Draft TS 55.252 - Specification of the GEA5 encryption and GIA5 integrity algorithms for GPRS - Implementers test data -(Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170181 | LS on LI requirements reconfirmed, including 5G and CIoT | S3i170054 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170182 | TS 55.253 - Specification of the GEA5 encryption and GIA5 integrity algorithms for GPRS - Design conformance test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170183 | Allocation of FC values for BEST | KPN, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170184 | LS on Use of the long-term identities for Charging in the VPLMN for 5G | S3i170043 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170185 | Adding BEST Service to TS 33.401 | KPN, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170186 | pCR to 33.899 - addition of solution detailing enhanced USIM features for 5G | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170187 | Updating solution #7.14 “Privacy protection of permanent or long-term subscription identifier using ABE” | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170188 | TS structure | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170189 | Intro TS | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170190 | Requirements on control plane | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170191 | MB2 for V2X | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170192 | NDS between network elements | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170193 | V3 interface | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170194 | Solution - using pools of IMSIs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170195 | Solution - Encrypted pseudonym in RAND | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170196 | Recovery - update of solution | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170197 | Questions related to PKI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170198 | Questions related to public vs symm. crypto | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170199 | Question to concealment of identifiers | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170200 | QuestionNAS msg length and migration aspects | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170201 | Question on synchronization | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170202 | Question to concealment of temporary identifiers | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170203 | Question to full protection of permanent identifier | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170204 | Question to slice identifier protection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170205 | Update on key issues including attack details on identity probing | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170206 | Update on key issues permanent vs temp id | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170207 | Editorial corrections | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170208 | Key issue on MBMS subchannel control message protection | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170209 | Solution for MBMS control subchannel protection based on a new bearer specific key | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170210 | Solution for MBMS control subchannel protection based on MKFC | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170211 | Solution for MBMS subchannel control message protection using a new server specific key | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170212 | Key issue on exposure of group identifiers | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170213 | Solution for the concealment of group identifiers using group specific pseudonyms | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170214 | Solution for the concealment of group identifiers using session specific pseudonyms | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170215 | TR 33.899: Questions and Interim Agreements on Key Issue 1.3: User plane integrity between UE and network | BT Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170216 | Adding the examples of the security functional requirements in the section 4.2.2.1 of TS33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170217 | 3GPP security profile update – 43.318 (GAN), Variant 1 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170218 | 3GPP security profile update – 43.318 (GAN), Variant 2 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170219 | New solution - Security of Access Stratum (AS) keys on Xn handover | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170220 | New solution- UE-assisted false base station detection | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170221 | New KI - Security aspects of N2 handover | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170222 | New KI - Security aspects of sidehaul interfaces | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170223 | New KI - Flexibility to retain or to change AS security keys | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170224 | New KI - Changing AS security keys on-the-fly | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170225 | New KI - Dealing with radio jamming | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170226 | New KI - Privacy aspects of RAN level subscription identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170227 | New KI - Security aspects of Xn handover | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170228 | New KI - Security algorithm negotiation between UE and RAN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170229 | Updating KI - #4.4 Security aspects of intra-NR mobility | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170230 | New solution - Security of sidehaul interface | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170231 | New KI – Supporting integrity protection of UP in/between gNB and UE | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170232 | Adding the security requirements in the section 4.2.3, 4.3.2 and 4.4 of TS33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170233 | Comments to “Solution for User plane security termination point” | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170234 | Resolving Editor’s Notes in Key issue #4.2: Security requirements on gNB | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170235 | Update of Key issue #5.1: Requirements on credentials storage | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170236 | Agreement on credentials storage: decide in normative phase | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170237 | Authorisation of network access for credentials provisioning | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170238 | Parameter transport for unauthenticated emergency calls over trusted WLAN, using vendor-specific EAP-method | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170239 | List of 3GPP vendor-specific EAP methods | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170240 | Comments to “Questions and Interim Agreements on Key Issue #1.15: User plane security termination point, clause 5.1.3.15” | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170241 | Overview of Key Issues and Solutions | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170242 | Building block work item: Security Enhancements of NB-IoT | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170243 | Clarifying the solutions in the section 5.2.4.17 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170244 | Clarifying the solutions in the section 5.2.4.18 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170245 | pCR on solution for key issue 1.9 (AN-CN Control Plane) | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170246 | pCR on solution for key issue 1.10 (AN-CN User Plane) | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170247 | Key Derivation Mechanism in RRC inactive connected state to RRC connected state transition | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170248 | pCR on question for key issue 1.9 ‘Security features for AN-CN Control Plane’ | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170249 | Avoiding the linkability attack on the AKA protocol | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170250 | Remove the editor’s note in solution #7.10 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170251 | Update the solution #7.10 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170252 | pCR on question for key issue 1.10 ‘Security features for AN-CN User Plane’ | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170253 | pCR to key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework - key issue details | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170254 | A solution for RLF in CP NB-IoT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170255 | pCR to key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework - requirements | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170256 | RRC re-establishment for CP NB-IoT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170257 | Resolving second EN in clause 5.2.3.3.1 | Nokia, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170258 | pCR on question 1 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170259 | pCR on question 2 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170260 | BEST: CR to fix an error in Figure 6.10.2.3 of Solution #10 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170261 | pCR on question 3 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170262 | AKA: 256-bit input key K | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170263 | FS_NSA Relation to other WGs | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170264 | Remote credential provisioning | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170265 | Discussion on the termination point for user plane security | Ericsson LM, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170266 | pCR on question 4 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170267 | FS_NSA: slice isolation | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170268 | pCR on question 5 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170269 | pCR on terminating user plane security in the AN | Ericsson LM, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170270 | pCR on evaluation of EPS AKA* | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170271 | Draft reply LS on the termination point for user plane security | Ericsson LM, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170272 | pCR on need for standardized interface AUSF - ARPF | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170273 | Discussion on the security anchor function | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170274 | Security context management during AMF change | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170275 | WID for 5G System Security Architecture – Phase 1 | Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170276 | pCR on evaluation of solution 2.6 ‘Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys’ | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170277 | Solution for the security anchor function based on a primary AMF | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170278 | pCR on evaluation of solution 2.12 (MASA) | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170279 | EAP based secondary authentication for PDU session establishment authorization | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170280 | Update to key issue #2.1: Adding architectural considerations related to 3GPP and untrusted non-3GPP accesses | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170281 | Resolution of the editor’s notes in solution #6.4 | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170282 | New Potential Security Requirements for Key Issue #8.6 | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170283 | pCR on untrusted access to the 5G core | Nokia, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170284 | Update to solution #2.9: adding evaluation, and resolving ENs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170285 | Update to key issue #2.3, and a new solution on identifiers demonstrating the proposed terms | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170286 | Editorial updates of TR 33.899 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170287 | Some proposed conclusions for V2X TR | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170288 | Proposed text for V2X TS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170289 | Proposals for supported features in Phase 1 of 5G security | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170290 | A solution for securing the initial NAS messages | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170291 | Adding a question to authentication conclusions clause related to the editor’s note about SEAF in home network | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170292 | Adding a questions relating to a security anchor and key issue #1.2 to the TR | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170293 | pCR to update solution #7.4: Privacy enhanced Mobile Subscriber Identifier (PMSI) | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170294 | PMSI usage in EAP-AKA’ | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170295 | pCR to provide an evaluation on the solutions for identity privacy | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170296 | Protocol stack options for the user-plane security terminating at a user-plane function | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170297 | pCR to update solution #1.6 to include the untrusted non-3GPP access for the roaming scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170298 | Secondary authentication and authorization using SM NAS signalling | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170299 | Support of Equipment Identifier Authentication in Phase 1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170300 | Option 3/3a/3x security aspects and conclusions | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170301 | Security requirements for Key Issue # 5.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170302 | Protecting the RLF procedure for NB-IoT UEs using the NAS security context | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170303 | Update to solution #2.9: New variant solution EAP-AKA* | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170304 | E2E protection of SDS over signalling plane | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170305 | Clarification on the UTC-Based Time Counter | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170306 | Overhead Reduction using the other SI | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170307 | Updates to HTTP User Session testcase to decrease maintenance and increase assurance | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170308 | RAN security area introduction | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170309 | Updates to Solution#12.4 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170310 | Discussion on a way forward for the privacy issue | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170311 | Updates to Solution#12.4 to support eUICC-ID privacy | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170312 | Support for Provisioning Profile for credential provisioning | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170313 | [MCSEC] Simplifying signalling and floor control in Rel-14 | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170314 | [MCSEC] Key Issue on use of MBMS within the MC Domain | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170315 | [MCSEC] Solution for simplifying signalling key distribution | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170316 | [MCSEC] Temporary group call security solution – add group call user | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170317 | [MCSEC] Temporary group call security solution – limited users | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170318 | [MCSEC] First-to-answer security solution | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170319 | [MCSEC] Rewrite of key management procedures | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170320 | [MCPTT] Correction to clause reference in TS 33.179 | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170321 | FS_NSA: virtualization security requirements | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170322 | V2X discussion for way forward | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170323 | Conclusion of Vehicle UE privacy | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170324 | Conclusion on V2X UE Authorization | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170325 | Conclusion for V2X Entities Secure Environment | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170326 | Clarification of key issue #8.1 Network slice isolation | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170327 | Update of key issues of security area #11 Security visibility and configurability | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170328 | Update of solution #11.2 Security visibility solution | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170329 | Update of solution #11.3 Security configurability solution | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170330 | Conclusion of V3 Interface Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170331 | PC5 Interface Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170332 | DoNAS security solution | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170333 | Update on key issues including attack details on identity probing | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170334 | V2X TS Skeleton | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170335 | V2X TS Reference | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170336 | V2X TS Scope | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170337 | TR 33.899: Questions and Interim Agreements on Key Issue 1.15: User plane security termination point | KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Juniper Networks, BT, NTT DoCoMo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170338 | Questions on Key Issue #1.8: UEs with asymmetric keys | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170339 | TR 33.899: Solution for Key Issue 1.15: User plane security termination point | KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Juniper Networks, BT, NTT DoCoMo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170340 | Questions on Key Issue #1.8: UEs with asymmetric keys | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170341 | The evaluation of a new version of a 3GPP network product | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170342 | Adding requirement within 3GPP TS 33.250 on unpredictable TEID generated by the PGW. | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170343 | Updating solution #7.14 “Privacy protection of permanent or long-term subscription identifier using ABE” | TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A., Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170344 | Discussion of S3-170084 (CT1 LS on security of information provided via ANQP or DNS) | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170345 | [DRAFT] Response LS to S3-170084 (C1-170512) LS on security of information provided via ANQP or DNS | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170346 | Comments on S3-170166 Comparison of solutions proposals for RRC messages for CIoT Optimization | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170347 | revised pCR on evaluation of solution 2.6 ‘Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys’ | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170348 | V2X TS Skeleton | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170349 | pCR 33.880 First to Answer Key Mgmt | Motorola Solutions, Airwave | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170350 | The evaluation of a new version of a 3GPP network product | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170351 | Removal of ENs for Solution #7.11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170352 | Security of RRC Connection re-establishment of NB-IOT for CP Solution | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170353 | Analysis on LTE Call redirection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170354 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170355 | New SID on security aspect of architecture enhancements to ProSe UE-to-Network Relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170356 | Reply to: Reply LS on external interface for TV services | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170357 | Reply to: LS on standardization of Northbound SCEF API | BT Group | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170358 | Response LS to S3-170084 (C1-170512) LS on security of information provided via ANQP or DNS | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170359 | 5G Security – Package 3:Mobile Edge Computing / Low Latency / Consistent User Experience | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170360 | Work Item exception for EARP | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170361 | TR 33.899: Removal of EN in KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170362 | TR 33.899: Adding Questions related to KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170363 | TR 33.899: Adding Interim agreements related to KI 1.4, UP confidentiality between UE and Network | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170364 | Positions on UP security termination and slicing concepts | Nokia, Ericsson, Samsung, Intel,Broadcom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170365 | Reply LS on SA2 involvement for the light connection | s3i170035 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170366 | Credentials storage requirements | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT, China Mobile, AT&T, Telenor | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170367 | Solution for Key Issue 5.1 | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT, China Mobile, AT&T, Telenor | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170368 | Interim agreement on key issue 5.1 | ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT, China Mobile, AT&T, Telenor | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170369 | Draft TS 55.242 - Specification of the GIA4 integrity algorithm for GPRS - Implementers test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170370 | Draft TS 55.243 - Specification of the GIA4 integrity algorithm for GPRS - Design conformance test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170371 | Draft TS 55.252 - Specification of the GEA5 encryption and GIA5 integrity algorithms for GPRS - Implementers test data -(Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170372 | TS 55.253 - Specification of the GEA5 encryption and GIA5 integrity algorithms for GPRS - Design conformance test data - (Release 14) | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170373 | Cover Draft TS 55.242 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170374 | Cover Draft TS 55.243 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170375 | Cover Draft TS 55.252 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170376 | Cover Draft TS 55.253 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170377 | Consolidate untrusted n3gpp access solutions | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170378 | Comparison of 5G untrusted n3gpp access solutions | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170379 | pCR on untrusted access to the 5G core | Nokia, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170380 | pCR to update solution #1.6 to include the untrusted non-3GPP access for the roaming scenario | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170381 | Clarification for flexible security policies negotiation in control plane | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170382 | A solution for KDF negotiation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170383 | pCR to TR 33.899_Registration procedure for NextGen networks | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170384 | pCR to TR 33.899_Security procedure for NextGen networks | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170385 | pCR to TR 33.899_Security procedure for NextGen networks (with NAS_SM security procedure) | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170386 | pCR to TR 33.899_Consolidated Key Hierarchy for NextGen Network | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170387 | pCR to 33.899 - addition of solution detailing enhanced USIM features for 5G | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170388 | pCR on solution for key issue 1.9 (AN-CN Control Plane) | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170389 | pCR on solution for key issue 1.10 (AN-CN User Plane) | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170390 | Remote credential provisioning | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170391 | Solution for the security anchor function based on a primary AMF | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170392 | [MCSEC] Temporary group call security solution – add group call user | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170393 | A solution for securing the initial NAS messages | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170394 | Protection of downlink NAS signallings before security activation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170395 | pCR to TR 33.899_Update solution #1.8 key hierarchy | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170396 | Open Questions Related to Key Issues 1.6 and 1.7 | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170397 | pCR on question for key issue 1.9 ‘Security features for AN-CN Control Plane’ | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170398 | pCR on question for key issue 1.10 ‘Security features for AN-CN User Plane’ | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170399 | Questions on Key Issue #1.8: UEs with asymmetric keys | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170400 | Adding more details for SPCF | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170401 | pCR on need for standardized interface AUSF - ARPF | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170402 | pCR 33.880 MCData SDS XMPP security solution | Samsung, Motorola Solutions, Airwave, Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170403 | pCR to key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework - key issue details | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170404 | pCR to key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework - requirements | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170405 | EAP based secondary authentication by an external data network | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170406 | Update to key issue #2.1: Adding architectural considerations related to 3GPP and untrusted non-3GPP accesses | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170407 | pCR on evaluation of solution 2.6 ‘Binding a serving network public key into the derivation of the radio interface session keys’ | Vodafone,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170408 | Reply to: Reply to LS on State of SA3 discussions on NG security architecture | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170409 | Reply to: LS on potential security issues for access to restricted local operator services by unauthenticated Ues | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170410 | Update to solution #2.9: adding evaluation, and resolving ENs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170411 | Reply to: Reply LS on MCData prioritization and questions | Motorola Solutions | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170412 | Update of Solution #2.14: Resolving the Editor’s Note | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170413 | pCR 33.180 Integrity protection and client_id | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170414 | TR 33.180 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170415 | Key issue on exposure of group identifiers | Ericsson LM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170416 | LS to SA6 on "temporary group call-user regroup" security | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170417 | TR 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170418 | 33.179 Integrity protection and client_id | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170419 | Conclusion of V3 Interface Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170420 | Some proposed conclusions for V2X TR | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170421 | Conclusion on V2X UE Authorization | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170422 | PC5 Interface Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170423 | TR 33.885 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170424 | TS 33.185 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170425 | Proposed text for V2X TS | Qualcomm Incorporated,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170426 | Security Procedure for Network Slicing | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170427 | Avoiding the linkability attack on the AKA protocol | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170428 | TR 33.899: Questions and Interim Agreements on Key Issue 1.15: User plane security termination point | KPN, Deutsche Telekom, Juniper Networks, BT, NTT DoCoMo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170429 | A clarification for 4G USIM term | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170430 | Removing EN on Allowing SEAF to negotiate AS Security Capabilities with NG-UE | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170431 | Removing EN on More sophisticated replay protection | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170432 | MASA Solution Addresses LI Requirements | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170433 | pCR on evaluation of solution 2.12 (MASA) | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170434 | Remove EN related to ERP information in the HSS | ORANGE,Broadcom,Ericsson,Motorola Mobility,Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170435 | MASA solution Goals and Evaluation | Huawei & Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170436 | Update of Solution #2.14 with EAP-PSK Authentication Method | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170437 | pCR to TR 33.899 – evaluations and conclusions in subscription Privacy Key Area | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170438 | Clarifying the solutions in the section 5.2.4.17 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170439 | Clarifying the solutions in the section 5.2.4.18 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170440 | pCR on evaluation of EPS AKA* | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170441 | pCR on question 1 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170442 | pCR on question 2 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170443 | Adding a question to authentication conclusions clause related to the editor’s note about SEAF in home network | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170444 | Security requirements for Key Issue # 5.1 | Qualcomm Incorporated, ORANGE, Deutsche Telekom AG, KPN, Vodafone, Telecom Italia, TeliaSonera, BT, China Mobile, AT&T, Telenor, Ericsson, Intel, Gemalto, Oberthur Technologies, G&D,Morpho | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170445 | pCR to TR 33.899_Merger of Key Issues #4.3 and #4.8 | NEC EUROPE LTD, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170446 | RAN security area introduction | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170447 | New KI - Flexibility to retain or to change AS security keys | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170448 | New KI - Changing AS security keys on-the-fly | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170449 | New KI - Dealing with radio jamming | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170450 | New KI - Privacy aspects of RAN level subscription identifiers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170451 | New KI - Security aspects of Xn handover | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170452 | Solution - using pools of IMSIs | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170453 | Solution - Encrypted pseudonym in RAND | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170454 | Questions related to PKI | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170455 | Question to concealment of identifiers | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170456 | Question to concealment of temporary identifiers | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170457 | Update on key issues permanent vs temp id | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170458 | Update on key issues including attack details on identity probing | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170459 | Reply to: LS on Security considerations for NR | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170460 | Reply to: LS to SA3 on Small Data Transmission | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170461 | Overhead Reduction using the other SI | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170462 | pCR to TR 33.899: Fake gNB Detection using Identity Based Signature | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170463 | New solution- UE-assisted false base station detection | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170464 | Key Derivation Mechanism in RRC inactive connected state to RRC connected state transition | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170465 | Ls on Ipsec use for non 3GPP access | Broadcom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170466 | pCR on question 4 for key issue 2.1 Authentication Framework | Nokia, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170467 | Updates to HTTP User Session testcase to decrease maintenance and increase assurance | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170468 | Adding the examples of the security functional requirements in the section 4.2.2.1 of TS33.250 | China Mobile Com. Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170469 | Draft CR Aspects to the network product class PGW | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170470 | Adding the security requirements of IP address reallocation interval | Huawei; Hisilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170471 | [MCSEC] Solution for simplifying signalling key distribution | NCSC (CESG) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170472 | Adding the security requirements of mutual access prevention | Huawei; Hisilicon; China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170473 | Draft TS 33.250 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170474 | Draft CR Aspect specific to the network product class eNB | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170475 | pCR_Threats related to control plane and user plane | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170476 | Parameter transport for unauthenticated emergency calls over trusted WLAN, using vendor-specific EAP-method | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170477 | WID for 5G System Security Architecture – Phase 1 | Ericsson, Nokia,NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170478 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170479 | pCR to TS 33.216_ Control plane data confidentiality protection | NEC EUROPE LTD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170480 | TS 33.216 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170481 | The evaluation of a new version of a 3GPP network product | China Mobile,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170482 | Reply LS to RAN2 on eLWA R2-169139 | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170483 | Reply to: LS on unauthenticated emergency session over Trusted WLAN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170484 | Removal of exceptions of security profile in 43.318 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170485 | Reply to: LS on mobility enhancements for NB-IoT | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170486 | pCR 33.180 MCData SDS security solution | Motorola Solutions | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170487 | BEST: CR to fix an error in Figure 6.10.2.3 of Solution #10 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170488 | Editorial updates of TR 33.899 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170489 | Work Item exception FS_Mc_Sec | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170490 | Work Item exception Mc_Sec | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170491 | Cover sheet TR 33.880 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170492 | Cover sheet TS 33.180 | CESG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170493 | Cover sheet TS 33.250 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170494 | Cover sheet TS 33.185 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170495 | Exception sheet V2X | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170496 | Exception sheet FS_V2XLTE | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170497 | Questions related to public vs symm. crypto | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170498 | Question on synchronization | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170499 | LS on secure storage and processing of subscription credentials within the NG UE | ORANGE, Oberture,G&D | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170500 | Modification of key issue network slice isolation | Nokia Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170501 | Call flow for slice-specific NAS key derivation and distribution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170502 | Updates to Solution #8.9 Security mechanism differentiation for network slices | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170503 | TR 33.899 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170504 | Cover sheet TR 33.899 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑170505 | Middlebox security protocol | TC CYBER | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-03-25 09:25:51