3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-79 - 2015-04-20 to 2015-04-24, Nanjing
meeting id: S3-79 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
| TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| S3‑151211 | draft_CR ProSe Sec Annex F | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151212 | ProSe: pCR to add EN to Relay Solutions | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151213 | IOPS: pCR to add Key issue Authentication | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151214 | IOPS: pCR to add Key issue Inter node security | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151215 | Work Plan input from the Rapporteurs | ETSI Secretariat | - |
| S3‑151216 | LS on TLS and DTLS terminology | ITU-T SG16 | - |
| S3‑151217 | Reply LS on VoLTE Roaming Architecture | GSMA NG | - |
| S3‑151218 | LS on Enable MB2 authorization | C3-150424 | - |
| S3‑151219 | Reply LS on Security Framework for Cellular IoT | GPC150120 | - |
| S3‑151220 | Response LS on work split for Study on Cellular IoT | GPC150122 | - |
| S3‑151221 | Reply to LS related to Mobile VoIP IMS Roaming | GSMA PSMC | - |
| S3‑151222 | Liaison about the creation of ETSI ISG QSC (Quantum Safe Cryptography) | ETSI ISG QSC | - |
| S3‑151223 | Response LS on public safety discovery | R1-150948 | - |
| S3‑151224 | Reply LS on end-to-end WebRTC-IMS security | S1-150212 | - |
| S3‑151225 | LS on MCPTT core items selection | S1-150340 | - |
| S3‑151226 | LS on public safety discovery | S2-150691 | - |
| S3‑151227 | LS on I-WLAN specification maintenance | SP-150158 | - |
| S3‑151228 | Reply LS on work split for Study on Cellular IoT | SP-150170 | - |
| S3‑151229 | Reply LS on ITU-T SG17 WI on Simple Encryption for IoT | oneM2M WG4 | - |
| S3‑151230 | Proposing Draft TR skeleton for FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151231 | Defining scope for Draft TR FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151232 | Section 6.3.1.2 - Mechanism for replay protection in EPC-level discovery | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151233 | TR skeleton proposal for FS_ EASE_IoT | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151234 | Proposed introduction for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia | - |
| S3‑151235 | Proposed scope for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia | - |
| S3‑151236 | SCAS: Clarification/Improvements of packet filtering requirements | Ericsson, Telecom Italia | - |
| S3‑151237 | SCAS: Clarification/Improvements of packet filtering test cases | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151238 | SCAS: Clarification/Improvements protection management data in transit requirements | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151239 | SCAS: Basic Vulnerability Testing requirements | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151240 | Defining scope for Draft TR FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec | Vodafone, ORANGE | - |
| S3‑151241 | Security for IOPS with Local EPC and no backhaul | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151242 | Security for Proximity-based services (ProSe) Direct Discovery for Public Safety Use | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151243 | Security for one-to-one Proximity-based services (ProSe) Direct communication for Public Safety Use | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151244 | LS reply on Public Safety discovery | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151245 | Improving requirement B.4.3.2 | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151246 | Adding test cases D.4.3.2.x related to Minimised kernel network functions | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151247 | Adding 4.3.x Syn Flood Prevention requirement | Telecom Italia S.p.A. | - |
| S3‑151248 | Adding test case D.4.3.x related to Syn Flood Prevention | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151249 | Correction of the hash input parameters for proximity request | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151250 | Corretion on PTK ID handing | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151251 | Key issue of UE-to-UE relay discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151252 | Scope and references | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151253 | Key issue on security between UEs and Isolated EUTRAN without backhaul | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151254 | Key issue on security between (N)eNBs | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151255 | Discussion on authentication between UE and Isolated E-UTRAN for IOPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151256 | key issue on integrity protection for signalling | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151257 | Solution of integrity protection for signalling | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151258 | NFV Security Assurance Discussion paper | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151259 | Agenda | WG Chairman | - |
| S3‑151260 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | - |
| S3‑151261 | SA3 Meeting calendar | ETSI Secretariat | - |
| S3‑151262 | Report from last SA3 meeting | ETSI Secretariat | - |
| S3‑151263 | SA3 work plan | ETSI Secretariat | - |
| S3‑151264 | Threats T9 and T10 | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151265 | SCAS: Discussion on handling of requirements 6.7 from main body of TR and DT catalogue requirements 3.01-20 to 3.01-22 in Annex C of TR 33.806 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151266 | Threats T30, T36, and T43 | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151267 | SCAS: pCR to TR 33.806 on merging requirements on Protecting Sessions | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151268 | Threat T44 | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151269 | SCAS: pCR to TR 33.806 on merging requirements on Protecting User Sessions | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151270 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposals for maintenance of the IOPS Technical Report | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151271 | Update on Security Procedure for Data Transfer to UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151272 | draft_CR ProSe Sec 5 3 3 2 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151273 | draft_CR ProSe Sec 6 1 3 3 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151274 | draft_CR ProSe Sec 6 2 3 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151275 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposal for the Scope section (IOPS) | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151276 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposal for the Introduction section (IOPS) | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151277 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposal for the List of Assets section (IOPS) | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151278 | pCR to 33.997: Discussion of IOPS AKA and Key Issues text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151279 | pCR to TR 33.997: IOPS AKA - security threats text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151280 | pCR to TR 33.997: IOPS AKA - security requirements text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151281 | pCR to TR 33.997: IOPS AKA - solution text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151282 | pCR: UE-to-Network Relay security for ProSe using PC4a | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151283 | pCR: Expanding section 8.1.1 on UE-to-Network relay discovery | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151284 | ProSe: Discussion on using uni-directional versus bi-directional mode of communication for ProSe Bearer layer security | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151285 | ProSe: Discussion paper comparing HTTP/TLS with MIKEY/UDP for PC8 communication | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151286 | pCR: Section 6.3.4: Assessment and conclusion on candidate solutions for TURN authentication | Alcatel Lucent Huawei HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151287 | pCR: Editorial corrections and clarifications for OAuth based TURN authentication | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151288 | pCR: Clarification of TURN credential provisoin flow using eP-CSCF | Huawei, Hi-Silicon, Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151289 | CR to TS 33.203 - Solutions for TURN credential provisioning and authentication | Alcatel-Lucent, Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151290 | CR to TS 33.223: change to AUTN length | Gemalto, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151291 | Change to AUTN length | Gemalto, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151292 | Change to AUTN length | Gemalto, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151293 | Change to AUTN length | Gemalto, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151294 | Change to AUTN length | Gemalto, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151295 | Spoofed call actor definitions | Sprint | - |
| S3‑151296 | Valid and invalid (spoofed) call scenarios | Sprint | - |
| S3‑151297 | MCPTT: Key issue on denial of service | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151298 | MCPTT: Key issue on eavesdropping | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151299 | MCPTT: Key issue on impersonation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151300 | MCPTT: Key issue on manipulation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151301 | MCPTT: Key issue on traffic analysis | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151302 | MCPTT: Off network: Key issue on denial of service | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151303 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on eavesdropping | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151304 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on impersonation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151305 | MCPTT: Off network: Key issue on manipulation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151306 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on traffic analysis | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151307 | FS_ESCAPADES: Previous spoofed call detection solutions | NEC | - |
| S3‑151308 | FS_ESCAPADES: Consideration on verifier behavior against detected spoofed call | NEC | - |
| S3‑151309 | Summary of IETF STIR group active drafts on spoofed call detection | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151310 | Security credentials in IOPS network | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151311 | IOPS security requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151312 | Discussion of IMSI/IMPI exposure at the SCEF | Nokia Networks, Microsoft Corporation | - |
| S3‑151313 | Conclusion on solutions for Group Message Protection | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151314 | WebRTC e2e security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151315 | Discussion of optimized security solutions for ProSe Restricted Direct Discovery using Model B | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151316 | ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B with Match Report procedure initiated by Discoverer UE only | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151317 | ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B with local MIC Checking | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151318 | Tutorial for use of the 3G Ultimate TD allocation tools | ETSI Secretariat | - |
| S3‑151319 | Security of ProSe Restricted Discovery | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151320 | Security of ProSe Restricted Discovery (Model B) | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151321 | key issue on Restricted Discovery with application-controlled extension | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151322 | CR on PGK expiration of TS 33.303 | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151323 | Modifications for locaton management | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151324 | SCAS: Add Malware to Annex A | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151325 | SCAS: Add a threat to Annex A | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151326 | SCAS: Add security threats caused by lack of MME traffic isolation to Annex A | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151327 | SCAS: Revision of critical assets | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151328 | ProSe:delete an EN of DOS attack solution in registration procedure | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151329 | ProSe:add a definition of Remote UE | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151330 | Discussion of End-to-End WebRTC-IMS Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151331 | ProSe: Key Issue on ProSe discovery in out of coverage scenario | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151332 | Discussion on secure discovery in out of coverage scenario (Public Safety use) | Huawei, Hisilicon | - |
| S3‑151333 | [MTCe] Key derivation clarification about group authentication mechanism | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151334 | [MTCe] Syncronization analysis about group authentication mechanism | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151335 | [MTCe] revised group authentication mechanism | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151336 | MCPTT TR 33.879 Defintion of Ambient and Discreet Listening and Potential System Security Requirements | BT Group | - |
| S3‑151337 | Basic UNIX/Linux hardening | TeliaSonera | - |
| S3‑151338 | pCR to TR 33.806 on Security Functional Requirements deriving from 3GPP specifications | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151339 | Proposed handling of privacy-related requirements in SCAS (TR 33.806) | Nokia Networks, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151340 | Scope of TR 33.849 | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151341 | pCR to TR 33.806 on merging requirements on HTTPS | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151342 | Condensed threats | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151343 | pCR to TR 33.806 on test case for requirements on HTTPS | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151344 | Mitigation technology for privacy consideration | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151345 | pCR to TR 33.806 on UNIX-related requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151346 | Privacy identification process | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151347 | pCR to TR 33.806 on test case for requirements on Unique UID | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151348 | Guidance for privacy considerations | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151349 | pCR to TR 33.806 on GTP-C filtering requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151350 | New study item proposal: Study on Security Aspects of RAN Sharing Enhancements | China Unicom, CATR, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151351 | Update of WID on Security Assurance Specification | Nokia Networks, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151352 | Skeleton for TS 33.116 on Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP network product classes | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151353 | Skeleton for TS 33.sas on Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151354 | Proposed key issue on entity authentication and key agreement for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151355 | Proposed key issue on eavesdropping for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151356 | Proposed key issue on unauthorized modification of data for EASE_IoT | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151357 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Key Stream Reuse | CESG | - |
| S3‑151358 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Configuration & Service Access | CESG | - |
| S3‑151359 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Group Key Management | CESG | - |
| S3‑151360 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Late Entry to Group Communications | CESG | - |
| S3‑151361 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Private Call Confidentiality | CESG | - |
| S3‑151362 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Data Communication Security | CESG | - |
| S3‑151363 | Proposed baseline architecture for EASE_IoT | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151364 | pCR FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec: NEW Key Issue: AKA procedures impact in very low throughput condition and on battery efficient batteries | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151365 | pCR to FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec: Adding Background Information | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151366 | pCR to FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec: Proposing new requirement on AKA procedure efficiency | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151367 | pCR to FS_BEST_MTC_Sec: Adding UE to GGSN security solutions | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151368 | Proposed solution for EASE_IoT | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151369 | UE obtaining the current time UTC from the BSF | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151370 | Clarification to solution 8.3.2: Security for restricted discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151371 | Updates on the solution for ProSe one-to-one security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151372 | Updates on the solution for ProSe UE-to-network relay security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151373 | Clarification on PC3ch (charging interface) security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151374 | Correction to Solution 8.3.3 ProSe Restricted Discovery in Model B | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151375 | Correction of standalone BSF term | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151376 | Threats on PC2 interface in Restricted Discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151377 | TR 33.895: Proposed conclusions | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151378 | DRAFT LS to GERAN2 to confirm security data transmission targets for CIoT devices | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151379 | TR 33.895: Resolving editor's notes on local user authentication | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151380 | Security solution for PC2 interface in Restricted Discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151381 | TR 33.895: Clean-up of TR | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151382 | AESE: Clarification of authorization mechanism in SCEF | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151383 | Solution for protecting the confidentiality of ProSe Codes in Restricted Discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151384 | Proposed EASE_CIoT Key Issue 'Unauthorized modification of signalling data' | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151385 | Clarifying MIC Calculation is based on parameters, not the discovery message itself | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151386 | Need for Match Report for ProSe Query Codes | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151387 | Enhancement to the Restricted Discovery solution 8.3.2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151388 | Key Issue for structured Restricted Discovery ProSe Codes | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151389 | TCG progress report for TMS WG | Interdigital | - |
| S3‑151390 | Solution for structured Restricted Discovery ProSe Codes | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151391 | Obtaining the security parameters to perform restricted discovery | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151392 | Update of the key issue for group member discovery (public safety) | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151393 | Group member discovery based on commercial discovery solutions | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151394 | Generic framework for the establishment of security between two ProSe UEs | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151395 | Solution for UE-network relay based on a shared key | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151396 | One-to-one communications using the group key | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151397 | Security mechanism for IMS based Architecture for MCPTT Applications | Samsung | - |
| S3‑151398 | Solution for key establishment between the Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay | Samsung | - |
| S3‑151399 | Authentication Mechanism for IOPS No Backhaul Case | Samsung | - |
| S3‑151400 | CR_ProSe NAF Key Indication | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151401 | CR_ProSe Clause 6 1 3 3 VPLMN clarification | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151402 | Adding Conclusion clause Title to FS_BEST_MTC_Sec draft Skeleton | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151403 | Fixing normative shalls and musts in 33.916 | NTT DOCOMO | - |
| S3‑151404 | Comments on S3-151377, TR 33.895: Proposed conclusions | Interdigital | - |
| S3‑151405 | Comments on S3-151313:Conclusion on solutions for Group Message Protection | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151406 | Telecom Italia comments toTD S3-151349 (pCR to TR 33.806 on GTP-C filtering requirements) | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151407 | Web Server Hardening Requirements | Deutsche Telekom AG | - |
| S3‑151408 | Comments toTD S3-151349 (pCR to TR 33.806 on GTP-C filtering requirements) | Telecom Italia S.p.A, Telia Sonera | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑151409 | Comments toTD S3-151349 (pCR to TR 33.806 on GTP-C filtering requirements) | Telecom Italia S.p.A, Telia Sonera | - |
| S3‑151410 | [MCPTT] Comment on S3-151336: Key Issue for Ambient Listening | CESG | - |
| S3‑151411 | Comments to TD S3-151388 (Key issue for structured Restricted Discovery ProSe Codes) | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151412 | MCPTT: Registration and User Authentication Flow | Motorola Solutions | - |
| S3‑151413 | Correction of clause title and text referring to wrong subject | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151414 | Discussion of way forward for SCAS - update | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151415 | List of open SCAS requirements in TR 33.806, Annex B | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151416 | LS on MCPTT security aspects | S6-150284 | - |
| S3‑151417 | Email discussion on VoLTE roaming architecture | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
| S3‑151418 | LS to GERAN2 to confirm security data transmission targets for CIoT devices | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151419 | MCPTT: Registration and User Authentication Flow | Motorola Solutions | - |
| S3‑151420 | SCAS: Revision of critical assets | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151421 | Threats T30, T36, and T43 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Telia Sonera | - |
| S3‑151422 | SCAS: Add security threats caused by lack of MME traffic isolation to Annex A | China Mobile,Huawei,HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151423 | SCAS: Add Malware to Annex A | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151424 | SCAS: pCR to TR 33.806 on merging requirements on Protecting Sessions | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151425 | SCAS: pCR to TR 33.806 on merging requirements on Protecting User Sessions | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151426 | pCR to TR 33.806 on GTP-C filtering requirements | Nokia Networks,Telecom Italia, Telia Sonera | - |
| S3‑151427 | SCAS: Clarification/Improvements of packet filtering requirements | Ericsson, Telecom Italia | - |
| S3‑151428 | SCAS: Clarification/Improvements of packet filtering test cases | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151429 | SCAS: Basic Vulnerability Testing requirements | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151430 | Basic UNIX/Linux hardening | TeliaSonera | - |
| S3‑151431 | Note for UNIX | Telia Sonera | - |
| S3‑151432 | Improving requirement B.4.3.2 | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151433 | Adding test cases D.4.3.2.x related to Minimised kernel network functions | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151434 | Adding 4.3.x Syn Flood Prevention requirement | Telecom Italia S.p.A. | - |
| S3‑151435 | Adding test case D.4.3.x related to Syn Flood Prevention | Telecom Italia S.p.A | - |
| S3‑151436 | Web Server Hardening Requirements | Deutsche Telekom AG | - |
| S3‑151437 | draft TR 33.806 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151438 | draft TR 33.916 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151439 | Update of WID on Security Assurance Specification | Nokia Networks, Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151440 | Skeleton for TS 33.116 on Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP network product classes | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151441 | Skeleton for TS 33.sas on Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151442 | Response to Reply LS on Security Framework for Cellular IoT | S2-151382 | - |
| S3‑151443 | LS on support of public safety services over an IOPS network | S2-151424 | - |
| S3‑151444 | Reply to: LS on MCPTT security aspects | CESG | - |
| S3‑151445 | Response to Reply LS on Security Framework for Cellular IoT | S1-151528 | - |
| S3‑151446 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Group Key Management | CESG | - |
| S3‑151447 | MCPTT: Key issue on denial of service | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151448 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Data Communication Security | CESG | - |
| S3‑151449 | MCPTT: Key issue on impersonation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151450 | MCPTT: Key issue on manipulation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151451 | MCPTT: Key issue on traffic analysis | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151452 | Clarification of the MCPTT scope | CESG | - |
| S3‑151453 | MCPTT: Key issue on eavesdropping | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151454 | [MCPTT] Key issue: Private Call Confidentiality | CESG | - |
| S3‑151455 | MCPTT: Off network: Key issue on denial of service | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151456 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on eavesdropping | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151457 | MCPTT: Off network: Key issue on manipulation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151458 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on impersonation | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151459 | MCPTT: Off-network: Key issue on traffic analysis | Motorola Solutions, Sepura, Airbus, Thales, UK Home Office | - |
| S3‑151460 | Security mechanism for IMS based Architecture for MCPTT Applications | Samsung | - |
| S3‑151461 | draft TR 33.879 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151462 | pCR: Section 6.3.4: Assessment and conclusion on candidate solutions for TURN authentication | Alcatel Lucent Huawei HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151463 | WebRTC e2e security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151464 | draft TR 33.872 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151465 | Exception sheet iWebRTC | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151466 | Presentation sheet TR 33.872 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151467 | Solution for EASE_IoT | Huawei, HiSilicon,Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151468 | CR_ProSe NAF Key Indication | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151469 | Annex F correction to show ProSe Key Management Function KMS and PC8 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151470 | Correction of the hash input parameters for proximity request | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151471 | CR on PGK expiration of TS 33.303 | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151472 | CR_ProSe Clause 6 1 3 3 VPLMN clarification | Alcatel-Lucent,Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151473 | List of SCAS requirements vs test cases in TR 33.806 | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151474 | key issue on Restricted Discovery with application-controlled extension | ZTE Corporation, China Unicom | - |
| S3‑151475 | SCAS: Add a threat to Annex A | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151476 | Discussion of IMSI/IMPI exposure at the SCEF | Nokia Networks, Microsoft Corporation | - |
| S3‑151477 | LS on risk of IMSI exposure to an SCEF | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151478 | AESE: Clarification of authorization mechanism in SCEF | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151479 | New study item proposal: Study on Security Aspects of RAN Sharing Enhancements | China Unicom, CATR, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151480 | Reply to: LS on Enable MB2 authorization | Ericsson,Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151481 | Conclusion on solutions for Group Message Protection | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151482 | Correction of clause title and text referring to wrong subject | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151483 | TR 33.895: Proposed conclusions | Ericsson,Interdigital | - |
| S3‑151484 | Solution for structured Restricted Discovery ProSe Codes | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151485 | Threats on PC2 interface in Restricted Discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151486 | Security solution for PC2 interface in Restricted Discovery | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151487 | Key issue of UE-to-UE relay discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151488 | Update of the key issue for group member discovery (public safety) | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151489 | Security for Proximity-based services (ProSe) Direct Discovery for Public Safety Use | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151490 | Generic framework for the establishment of security between two ProSe UEs | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151491 | One-to-one communications using the group key | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151492 | ProSe:add a definition of Remote UE | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151493 | ProSe:delete an EN of DOS attack solution in registration procedure | China Mobile | - |
| S3‑151494 | Scope and references | Huawei, HiSilicon,General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151495 | pCR: UE-to-Network Relay security for ProSe using PC4a | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151496 | Solution for key establishment between the Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay | Samsung | - |
| S3‑151497 | Solution for UE-network relay based on a shared key | Qualcomm Incorporated | - |
| S3‑151498 | pCR: Expanding section 8.1.1 on UE-to-Network relay discovery | Alcatel Lucent | - |
| S3‑151499 | Reply to: Reply LS on end-to-end WebRTC-IMS security | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151500 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposal for the Introduction section (IOPS) | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151501 | pCR to TR 33.997: Text proposal for the List of Assets section (IOPS) | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151502 | Security for one-to-one Proximity-based services (ProSe) Direct communication for Public Safety Use | Intel corporation | - |
| S3‑151503 | Proposed key issue on entity authentication and key agreement for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151504 | Proposed key issue on eavesdropping for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151505 | Proposed EASE_CIoT Key Issue 'Unauthorized modification of signalling data' | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151506 | Security credentials in IOPS network | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151507 | IOPS security requirements | Nokia Networks | - |
| S3‑151508 | IOPS: pCR to add Key issue Authentication | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151509 | pCR to 33.997: Discussion of IOPS AKA and Key Issues text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151510 | pCR to TR 33.997: IOPS AKA - security requirements text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151511 | pCR to TR 33.997: IOPS AKA - solution text proposal | General Dynamics UK Ltd. | - |
| S3‑151512 | IOPS: pCR to add Key issue Inter node security | Alcatel-Lucent | - |
| S3‑151513 | Draft TR 33.997 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151514 | Proposed introduction for EASE_IoT | Ericsson, Nokia | - |
| S3‑151515 | Proposed baseline architecture for EASE_IoT | Ericsson | - |
| S3‑151516 | Proposing Draft TR skeleton for FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151517 | Defining scope for Draft TR FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec | Vodafone, ORANGE | - |
| S3‑151518 | pCR to FS_ BEST_MTC_Sec: Adding Background Information | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151519 | TR 33.889 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151520 | TR 33.860 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151521 | TR battery efficiency | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151522 | Corretion on PTK ID handing | Huawei, HiSilicon | - |
| S3‑151523 | Presentation sheet TR 33.916 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151524 | LS reply on Public Safety discovery | Intel corporation,Qualcomm | - |
| S3‑151525 | Presentation sheet TR 33.895 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151526 | draft TR 33.895 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151527 | revised WID SSO | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151528 | Scope of TR 33.849 | China Unicom, ZTE Corporation | - |
| S3‑151529 | new draft TR 33.849 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151530 | draft TR 33.833 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151531 | pCR to FS_BEST_MTC_Sec: Adding UE to GGSN security solutions | Vodafone | - |
| S3‑151532 | Update of WID on Security Assurance Specification | Nokia Networks, Ericsson,NTT-Docomo | - |
| S3‑151533 | FS_ESCAPADES: Consideration on verifier behavior against detected spoofed call | NEC | - |
| S3‑151534 | TR 33.832 | Rapporteur | - |
| S3‑151535 | Work Plan input from the Rapporteurs | ETSI Secretariat | - |
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